While newly crafted monographs based on the latest research are a welcome sight when it comes to the Second World War, and more specifically the Eastern Front, what Stephen Fritz has compiled here is a dated analysis that wholly lacks any kind of up-to-date look at the war on the Eastern Front. Unfortunately, with this title, while the German point of view is up-to-date to some extent, although largely unoriginal, the Soviet point of view is pretty much thrown back to Cold War era stereotypes. The reader is regularly bombarded by the huge numbers the Red Army was able to utilize against the Wehrmacht, with ten and fifteen to one ratios being thrown around and Red Army success being almost wholly attributed to numbers of tanks and men with those numerous 'waves' of frontal assaults. To keep up those pretenses the author regularly emphasizes the 'combat' or 'front' strength of German forces. Left out are all the other forces within German Army Groups (rear area personnel, etc.), but when listing Red Army strength all are included thus invaliding any type of ratios one could conclude from the information presented. I would expect a synthesis to at least offer some new or original take on the topic being covered, but aside from rehashing readily available information, there is little of anything else evident here.
This book's strengths are the intertwining of Hitler's ideology and the complex process(es) that led to the Holocaust by the latter period of the war, but both of these issues have been readily addressed in multiple works by Christopher Browning, when it comes to the 'Final Solution', and a host of publications on the Wehrmacht and its role in the genocide on the Eastern Front (Omer Bartov, Geoffrey P. Megargee, etc.). The biggest weakness is the analysis of the actual military campaigns. For instance, even though Frtiz cites Glantz he does not recount the fact that offensive unleashed by Operation Blau did not feature a Red Army that regularly retreated but, on the contrary, one that consistently launched its own offensives all the way to Stalingrad. He labels the 13th Guards Rifle Division an 'elite' formation, while Glantz has shown that in fact the division was recently reconstituted with raw recruits and returned soldiers from hospitals, hardly 'elite'. Additionally, the author seems to think that whenever the Red Army is able to amass forces at a breakthrough point they are 'emulating the Germans'. No, they are emulating well known military doctrine that has nothing to do with the Germans. Another 'elite' unit is found when dealing with the Battle of Kursk, the 5th Guards Tank Army. Again, no, this was a unit that recently came together with a staff that never truly worked together before the eve of the battle. In general, the author's analysis of the Battle of Kursk is horribly dated and too often one has to read about 'fanatical Russians' who are 'inspired...by liberal doses of vodka'. Soviet success is attributed to the 'condition of German forces' rather than any skill Red Army soldiers or commanders exhibited. Oddly enough, Fritz characterizes Red Army attacks against the 'boundaries' of German units as 'unimaginative Soviet tactic[s]' when in fact the Germans regularly utilized such tactics themselves, and in many cases they proved quite successful as 'boundaries' between units were regularly viewed as weak spots. Finally, in one of the tables in the appendix there is a list of deaths for the Germans and Soviets for the duration of the war. This would be fine if not for the obviously skewed 'ratios' that are presented right after. While Fritz regularly discusses the amount of allied support the Germans enjoyed throughout their campaign in the Soviet Union, the figures for their casualties are wholly missing thus greatly skewing the ratios in favor of the Germans as Soviet deaths are certainly not all attributable to just German action(s) on the Eastern Front and the Red Army certainly inflicted hundreds of thousands of casualties on Italian, Finnish, Romanian, and Hungarian forces (just to name a few).
In many respects this title proves what historian David Stahel has recently written in his first book on Operation Barbarossa. When it comes to the Wehrmacht the average academic is too entwined with its role in the Holocaust with the end result that military and operational history takes a back seat and suffers or it simply becomes a rehashing of what has already been said, usually ignorant of the other side and lacking real in-depth analysis. Unfortunately whatever 'good' this book contains is marred by the numerous Cold War stereotypes and inadequate analysis that is offered. Those unfamiliar with the Eastern Front will find plenty of interesting information here but they would need a heavy dose of supplemental reading(s) to assure that a more objective understanding is reached.
Friday, March 30, 2012
Friday, March 23, 2012
Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative by Valeriy Zamulin
Valeriy Zamulin’s ”Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative” is the quintessential representation of what Eastern Front literature is all too often lacking. Today’s Russian historians and scholars are putting out a plethora of monographs and studies of the Great Patriotic War and Zamulin is one of the best examples of the type of objective analysis they are capable of producing (it should be noted that this study of Prokhorovka was Zamulin’s first, he has since then put out at least three other monographs covering various aspects of the Kursk battle and the ensuing operations unleashed to liberate Belgorod and Orel). While there have been quite a few titles recently released on the Battle of Kursk none of them will have the level of detail and analysis that Zamulin’s study exhibits. This is not because they are of a lower caliber of scholarship, but simply because they lack his experience with and access to Soviet era archives. This is a book that in the grand scheme of things covers and offers much more than an analysis of the encounter at Prokhorovka between forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and the II SS Panzer Corps. Through Zamulin’s ‘operational narrative’ the reader is exposed to the inner workings of the Red Army and a multidimensional look at the weaknesses and failures of Red Army leadership on the ground that led to the losses experienced by Soviet forces when they attacked the Germans head-on July 12, 1943. Finally, there are many images we can conjure up when thinking of the ‘myth(s)’ associated with the battle at Prokhorovka. Many readers will find that aside from the usual questions about how many tanks took part in the engagement and their losses, Zamulin also questions many myths that can only be found in Soviet era accounts of the battle – from individual soldier and officer accounts, to greater narratives of the war that have perpetuated various myths and legends, which have become engrained in even today’s histories of the Battle of Kursk.
The majority of this book is dedicated to German and Soviet actions around Prokhorovka. There is a good amount of text devoted to analyzing how Vatutin’s Voronezh front faired before the onslaught of the II SS Panzer Corps, the XXXVIII Panzer Corps, and Army Detachment Kempf, followed by the makeup of the 5th Guards Tank Army (including small biographies of the leadership). The post-July 12 actions are only analyzed through July 16 on a limited front as ensuing German operations were reduced in scale. Thus, this is a study that revolves around Prokhorovka, the analysis of which is unrivaled in western literature.
To begin, Prokhorovka is usually viewed as a wholly separate battle from the rest of the encounters that German forces had with Vatutin’s Voronezh front. Desperate and costly battles were ongoing since the start of operations, July 5, up to July 12 and days later when German troops abandoned their original plans to breakthrough to Kursk and settled instead on a more limited objective, the encirclement of the 48th Guards Rifle Corps. The situation that developed on the southern face of the Kursk battle in the first days forced Vatutin to include all of his reserves, thus leading to the eventual need for the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank armies from the Steppe Front under the command of Konev. One should keep in mind that the Central Front under Rokossovsky had an easier time holding back Model’s forces and switching over to the counteroffensive without the amount of help Vatutin was requesting, but they also faced a more limited German force when compared to what Manstein was able to put in the field.
The initial plans of the Voronezh front for Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Army were beyond his capabilities. His tank corps were not only supposed to check the German advance, but in cooperation with Vatutin’s forces switch over to the offensive and advance some 15-20 kilometers against German troops to return the frontlines to their positions before the start of Operation Citadel. This was beyond the ability of Rotmistrov and beyond the capabilities of Red Army forces in general at this point in time. Additional problems arose from the fact that the 5th Tank Army included forces that recently joined it, and some of their commanding officers were also fresh additions, thus this was not a cohesive force accustomed to planning and fighting together. In many ways Vatutin and his staff share a large portion of the blame for what came about as the plan for the 5th Tank Army, but the pressure he was under makes it clear that something had to be done and the limited Soviet intelligence of German positions and abilities only added to the strain and problems Soviet forces now had to contend with.
The actual forces that took part in operations on July 12 featured two Soviet Tank Corps, with some 350 tanks, taking on one SS Panzer Division with support from two others, all part of the II SS Panzer Corps, fielding around 120-150 tanks (exact numbers are simply impossible to come by for either side) for a total of some 500 tanks. German troops did not engage in a ‘meeting engagement’ with their Soviet opponents, on the contrary, German forces were entrenched in recently taken positions and put up a bloody defense against both Soviet tank corps. Additionally, the fact that Soviet tank and mechanized corps lacked in their anti-tank and artillery assets when compared to German panzer and panzer grenadier divisions only complicated the situation that much further as German forces were able to readily engage Red Army forces from ambush and defensive positions with all types of weapons. Meanwhile Soviet reconnaissance failed to adequately predict the territory and numbers of enemy troops the 5th Guards Tank Army would be facing and artillery and aviation failed to adequately support their tank counterparts on the ground and in the air. Shell shortages were soon apparent as well when logistical capabilities broke down for various reasons. One of the ‘myths’ that exists about the battle is that German forces were caught unawares of the attack by forces of the 5th Guards Army. This is readily disproven as the Germans had excellent intelligence about the movement and location of Soviet forces and also guessed correctly their future intentions, thus allowing for a formidable defense in the face of the ensuing Red Army attack.
An additional battle on July 12 took place further from Prokhorovka and featured a few hundred more tanks, combined from both sides, but it was on a more limited scale and suffered from the same deficiencies that the two Soviet tank corps experienced. Soviet losses overall were heavy, as were those they inflicted on the Germans. The numbers are contested and depend on which forces are taken into account as it is impossible to ascertain exactly which formations took part in the fighting. Zamulin presents numerous tables showing loss figures for Soviet forces and consults various German publications to come up with numbers for the II SS Panzer Corps as well as the other formations that took part in the fighting leading up to July 12 and after. But he points out that even with the casualties the Germans suffered, they were able to go on a limited offensive in the following days and almost managed to encircle the 48th Guards Rifle Corps. Unfortunately for Manstein and Hitler, the ultimate objective(s) of Operation Citadel were beyond the German grasp by the end of July 12. Thus, Zamulin views the operation as an ultimate success for the Red Army as it prevented the Germans from fulfilling their original objectives, even if the losses were skewed in the German’s favor and they went on the offensive immediately after. Depending on how one views the assignment of the Voronezh front and that of Manstein’s forces, this represents a reasonable conclusion when confronted with the amount of detail, facts, and figures Zamulin has presented.
The above is a very much simplified version of events that Zamulin goes over and the reader should be warned that this is an immensely dense and detailed study although often enough his narrative is simply riveting. The maps and pictures of the battlefield that are provided are very helpful but the numerous locations are still difficult to keep track of, especially since this is one of the few, if not only, studies that features discussion of individual Red Army regiments and even battalions. Additionally, one of the more interesting aspects of this study was a look into the ‘inner workings’ of the Red Army. For instance, the use of blocking detachments; on a few occasions, when retreating Red Army forces could not be stopped by their commanders, orders went out to form blocking detachments that were able to gather up troops and send them back in order to establish new defensive positions. This is something usually encountered with descriptions of the Battle of Stalingrad, but blocking detachments were regularly used since 1941. They were made up of dependable Red Army soldiers (or later on NKVD personnel) and contributed to limiting panic in the rear and retreat from the frontlines without authorization. Zamulin also presents numerous after action reports that are highly critical of the actions of Soviet commanders. Seeing these inadequacies shows how much rank and file Red Army soldiers had to overcome to achieve victory. Not only did Soviet forces face the professionalism of the Wehrmacht but also, at times, the gross neglect of their wellbeing by their own commanders who occasionally could not properly organize reconnaissance, establish communication with artillery and aviation for mutual support, or succeed in utilizing flanking maneuvers where head-on assaults were an obvious death sentence.
Finally, one must mention that this work is available to western readers thanks to the efforts of translators like Stuart Britton who continues to translate and make available invaluable memoirs and now operational studies from the Red Army to help contextualize the Eastern Front for a western audience. While there are minor mistakes throughout the book, and considering that this is a 630 page monograph (including 560 pages of text) some would simply be unavoidable, they will not detract from the overall reading experience that Zamulin has created. Although limited to the southern face of the Kursk operation, this is a highly recommended text for those who are interested in an in-depth and the most objective analysis to date of the German-Soviet encounter around Prokhorovka.
The majority of this book is dedicated to German and Soviet actions around Prokhorovka. There is a good amount of text devoted to analyzing how Vatutin’s Voronezh front faired before the onslaught of the II SS Panzer Corps, the XXXVIII Panzer Corps, and Army Detachment Kempf, followed by the makeup of the 5th Guards Tank Army (including small biographies of the leadership). The post-July 12 actions are only analyzed through July 16 on a limited front as ensuing German operations were reduced in scale. Thus, this is a study that revolves around Prokhorovka, the analysis of which is unrivaled in western literature.
To begin, Prokhorovka is usually viewed as a wholly separate battle from the rest of the encounters that German forces had with Vatutin’s Voronezh front. Desperate and costly battles were ongoing since the start of operations, July 5, up to July 12 and days later when German troops abandoned their original plans to breakthrough to Kursk and settled instead on a more limited objective, the encirclement of the 48th Guards Rifle Corps. The situation that developed on the southern face of the Kursk battle in the first days forced Vatutin to include all of his reserves, thus leading to the eventual need for the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank armies from the Steppe Front under the command of Konev. One should keep in mind that the Central Front under Rokossovsky had an easier time holding back Model’s forces and switching over to the counteroffensive without the amount of help Vatutin was requesting, but they also faced a more limited German force when compared to what Manstein was able to put in the field.
The initial plans of the Voronezh front for Rotmistrov’s 5th Guards Army were beyond his capabilities. His tank corps were not only supposed to check the German advance, but in cooperation with Vatutin’s forces switch over to the offensive and advance some 15-20 kilometers against German troops to return the frontlines to their positions before the start of Operation Citadel. This was beyond the ability of Rotmistrov and beyond the capabilities of Red Army forces in general at this point in time. Additional problems arose from the fact that the 5th Tank Army included forces that recently joined it, and some of their commanding officers were also fresh additions, thus this was not a cohesive force accustomed to planning and fighting together. In many ways Vatutin and his staff share a large portion of the blame for what came about as the plan for the 5th Tank Army, but the pressure he was under makes it clear that something had to be done and the limited Soviet intelligence of German positions and abilities only added to the strain and problems Soviet forces now had to contend with.
The actual forces that took part in operations on July 12 featured two Soviet Tank Corps, with some 350 tanks, taking on one SS Panzer Division with support from two others, all part of the II SS Panzer Corps, fielding around 120-150 tanks (exact numbers are simply impossible to come by for either side) for a total of some 500 tanks. German troops did not engage in a ‘meeting engagement’ with their Soviet opponents, on the contrary, German forces were entrenched in recently taken positions and put up a bloody defense against both Soviet tank corps. Additionally, the fact that Soviet tank and mechanized corps lacked in their anti-tank and artillery assets when compared to German panzer and panzer grenadier divisions only complicated the situation that much further as German forces were able to readily engage Red Army forces from ambush and defensive positions with all types of weapons. Meanwhile Soviet reconnaissance failed to adequately predict the territory and numbers of enemy troops the 5th Guards Tank Army would be facing and artillery and aviation failed to adequately support their tank counterparts on the ground and in the air. Shell shortages were soon apparent as well when logistical capabilities broke down for various reasons. One of the ‘myths’ that exists about the battle is that German forces were caught unawares of the attack by forces of the 5th Guards Army. This is readily disproven as the Germans had excellent intelligence about the movement and location of Soviet forces and also guessed correctly their future intentions, thus allowing for a formidable defense in the face of the ensuing Red Army attack.
An additional battle on July 12 took place further from Prokhorovka and featured a few hundred more tanks, combined from both sides, but it was on a more limited scale and suffered from the same deficiencies that the two Soviet tank corps experienced. Soviet losses overall were heavy, as were those they inflicted on the Germans. The numbers are contested and depend on which forces are taken into account as it is impossible to ascertain exactly which formations took part in the fighting. Zamulin presents numerous tables showing loss figures for Soviet forces and consults various German publications to come up with numbers for the II SS Panzer Corps as well as the other formations that took part in the fighting leading up to July 12 and after. But he points out that even with the casualties the Germans suffered, they were able to go on a limited offensive in the following days and almost managed to encircle the 48th Guards Rifle Corps. Unfortunately for Manstein and Hitler, the ultimate objective(s) of Operation Citadel were beyond the German grasp by the end of July 12. Thus, Zamulin views the operation as an ultimate success for the Red Army as it prevented the Germans from fulfilling their original objectives, even if the losses were skewed in the German’s favor and they went on the offensive immediately after. Depending on how one views the assignment of the Voronezh front and that of Manstein’s forces, this represents a reasonable conclusion when confronted with the amount of detail, facts, and figures Zamulin has presented.
The above is a very much simplified version of events that Zamulin goes over and the reader should be warned that this is an immensely dense and detailed study although often enough his narrative is simply riveting. The maps and pictures of the battlefield that are provided are very helpful but the numerous locations are still difficult to keep track of, especially since this is one of the few, if not only, studies that features discussion of individual Red Army regiments and even battalions. Additionally, one of the more interesting aspects of this study was a look into the ‘inner workings’ of the Red Army. For instance, the use of blocking detachments; on a few occasions, when retreating Red Army forces could not be stopped by their commanders, orders went out to form blocking detachments that were able to gather up troops and send them back in order to establish new defensive positions. This is something usually encountered with descriptions of the Battle of Stalingrad, but blocking detachments were regularly used since 1941. They were made up of dependable Red Army soldiers (or later on NKVD personnel) and contributed to limiting panic in the rear and retreat from the frontlines without authorization. Zamulin also presents numerous after action reports that are highly critical of the actions of Soviet commanders. Seeing these inadequacies shows how much rank and file Red Army soldiers had to overcome to achieve victory. Not only did Soviet forces face the professionalism of the Wehrmacht but also, at times, the gross neglect of their wellbeing by their own commanders who occasionally could not properly organize reconnaissance, establish communication with artillery and aviation for mutual support, or succeed in utilizing flanking maneuvers where head-on assaults were an obvious death sentence.
Finally, one must mention that this work is available to western readers thanks to the efforts of translators like Stuart Britton who continues to translate and make available invaluable memoirs and now operational studies from the Red Army to help contextualize the Eastern Front for a western audience. While there are minor mistakes throughout the book, and considering that this is a 630 page monograph (including 560 pages of text) some would simply be unavoidable, they will not detract from the overall reading experience that Zamulin has created. Although limited to the southern face of the Kursk operation, this is a highly recommended text for those who are interested in an in-depth and the most objective analysis to date of the German-Soviet encounter around Prokhorovka.
Monday, March 12, 2012
Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East by David Stahel
In “Kiev, 1941” historian David Stahel once more takes on the myths and legends that have been built up around the Wehrmacht’s Barbarossa campaign against the Soviet Union. In his previous volume Stahel did an excellent job reorienting the discourse surrounding the failure of the initial invasion by the time the Wehrmacht reached Smolensk (although mainly concentrating on the Panzer Groups of Army Group Center). This volume concentrates on Army Group South and parts of the southern wing of Army Group Center (mainly focusing on Guderian’s Panzer Group) while discussing the enormous difficulties encountered by the Germans and the position they found themselves in by the end of summer.
Although the battle of Kiev proper does not take up an enormous amount of ink, the lead up to the battle in some cases is more important than the battle itself. In some respects this lack of concentration on a battle that on paper netted over 600,000 prisoners of war has to do with the limited information available from the Soviet/Russian point of view and the mythical narrative in place that views the end result of an encirclement of so many soldiers a foregone conclusion. One hopes that will change in the near future, but since Stahel is limited to German and English sources the reader is presented with a heavily German oriented narrative. This is not to say that the author does not possess a rather large and in-depth understanding of the literature in English on the first year of the war and the Red Army in general from the Soviet side, on the contrary, his command of the literature rivals many of those who have been studying the topic from the Soviet side for years. Nonetheless, the limited concentration on Kiev itself once again reinforces the need for further studies on the Eastern Front and Operation Barbarossa.
Stahel’s main argument revolves around the idea that German generals continually fought amongst each other and with Hitler. Lower level commanders ignored orders and assumed risks that should have ended in their dismissal, yet the chaotic situation the Red Army found itself in allowed such risks to pay off in ever greater dividends with the end result a grievous catastrophe for the Red Army. According to the author, by the end of August Barbarossa was a “spent exercise, incapable of achieving its central objective of ending Soviet resistance” (1-2). The difficulties encountered by Army Group Center forced a rest period onto von Bock’s army group while Hitler vacillated about what action to undertake next. Many have argued that this period of rest cost the Germans the war, and this in effect is one argument Stahel aims to disprove. The “rest period” Army Group Center enjoyed, if one can call it that, featured numerous Soviet offensives against Bock’s forces that resulted in casualties, including destroyed and disabled equipment the Wehrmacht could hardly afford. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers lost their lives in battles few are even aware of (pointing out another aspect of the Eastern Front that needs further research).
Overall this is not a new argument, David Glantz made the same in his previous volumes on the war, but those hundreds of thousands of men could have caused tremendous damage to the Wehrmacht had Army Group Center decided to advance on Moscow (attacking entrenched German position is a wholly different story when compared to a Wehrmacht on the move), not to mention the over half a million men on the southern wing that would have had to be dealt with if Kiev was never surrounded. Considering the condition Army Group Center found itself in, according to Stahel, Hitler’s decision to turn south and deal with Kiev was the right move. Yet the drain on German forces and supplies by this point was best evidenced by the two panzer groups sent to encircle the Soviet south-western front. The panzer divisions that finally closed the trap on Soviet troops were doing so with minimal forces at their disposal because they were running out of fuel and tanks, as well as having to guard ever-expanding flanks. The initial encirclement was porous at best, reminiscent of the Smolensk encirclement that preceded it. But the trapped soldiers of the Red Army did not have as much time to escape, nor forces attempting to break into the encirclement from the outside (as occurred at Smolensk) to take the pressure off. The majority of the front found itself encircled and slowly split into smaller pockets as the Luftwaffe achieved aerial supremacy over the pocket and communications broke down between units and commanding officers. The results were predictable by the time the encirclement was tightened by additional German troops.
Although what resulted in the Kiev encirclement was never planned for from the beginning, in more than one instance Stahel points to Stalin being responsible for the continued postponement of the evacuation of Soviet forces behind the Dnepr - resulting in tens of thousands of more prisoners of war than the Red Army had to sacrifice - the results achieved reinforced the Hubris of both Hitler and the Wehrmacht in what they were capable of against the Red Army, momentarily forgetting their own weaknesses. That false sense of confidence would soon play itself out on the approaches to Moscow when an utterly exhausted Army Group Center would suffer a catastrophe of its own. Overall, an excellent addition to the literature on the Eastern Front.
Although the battle of Kiev proper does not take up an enormous amount of ink, the lead up to the battle in some cases is more important than the battle itself. In some respects this lack of concentration on a battle that on paper netted over 600,000 prisoners of war has to do with the limited information available from the Soviet/Russian point of view and the mythical narrative in place that views the end result of an encirclement of so many soldiers a foregone conclusion. One hopes that will change in the near future, but since Stahel is limited to German and English sources the reader is presented with a heavily German oriented narrative. This is not to say that the author does not possess a rather large and in-depth understanding of the literature in English on the first year of the war and the Red Army in general from the Soviet side, on the contrary, his command of the literature rivals many of those who have been studying the topic from the Soviet side for years. Nonetheless, the limited concentration on Kiev itself once again reinforces the need for further studies on the Eastern Front and Operation Barbarossa.
Stahel’s main argument revolves around the idea that German generals continually fought amongst each other and with Hitler. Lower level commanders ignored orders and assumed risks that should have ended in their dismissal, yet the chaotic situation the Red Army found itself in allowed such risks to pay off in ever greater dividends with the end result a grievous catastrophe for the Red Army. According to the author, by the end of August Barbarossa was a “spent exercise, incapable of achieving its central objective of ending Soviet resistance” (1-2). The difficulties encountered by Army Group Center forced a rest period onto von Bock’s army group while Hitler vacillated about what action to undertake next. Many have argued that this period of rest cost the Germans the war, and this in effect is one argument Stahel aims to disprove. The “rest period” Army Group Center enjoyed, if one can call it that, featured numerous Soviet offensives against Bock’s forces that resulted in casualties, including destroyed and disabled equipment the Wehrmacht could hardly afford. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers lost their lives in battles few are even aware of (pointing out another aspect of the Eastern Front that needs further research).
Overall this is not a new argument, David Glantz made the same in his previous volumes on the war, but those hundreds of thousands of men could have caused tremendous damage to the Wehrmacht had Army Group Center decided to advance on Moscow (attacking entrenched German position is a wholly different story when compared to a Wehrmacht on the move), not to mention the over half a million men on the southern wing that would have had to be dealt with if Kiev was never surrounded. Considering the condition Army Group Center found itself in, according to Stahel, Hitler’s decision to turn south and deal with Kiev was the right move. Yet the drain on German forces and supplies by this point was best evidenced by the two panzer groups sent to encircle the Soviet south-western front. The panzer divisions that finally closed the trap on Soviet troops were doing so with minimal forces at their disposal because they were running out of fuel and tanks, as well as having to guard ever-expanding flanks. The initial encirclement was porous at best, reminiscent of the Smolensk encirclement that preceded it. But the trapped soldiers of the Red Army did not have as much time to escape, nor forces attempting to break into the encirclement from the outside (as occurred at Smolensk) to take the pressure off. The majority of the front found itself encircled and slowly split into smaller pockets as the Luftwaffe achieved aerial supremacy over the pocket and communications broke down between units and commanding officers. The results were predictable by the time the encirclement was tightened by additional German troops.
Although what resulted in the Kiev encirclement was never planned for from the beginning, in more than one instance Stahel points to Stalin being responsible for the continued postponement of the evacuation of Soviet forces behind the Dnepr - resulting in tens of thousands of more prisoners of war than the Red Army had to sacrifice - the results achieved reinforced the Hubris of both Hitler and the Wehrmacht in what they were capable of against the Red Army, momentarily forgetting their own weaknesses. That false sense of confidence would soon play itself out on the approaches to Moscow when an utterly exhausted Army Group Center would suffer a catastrophe of its own. Overall, an excellent addition to the literature on the Eastern Front.
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