WWII and other Book Reviews

Why Stalin's Soldiers Fought: The Red Army's Military Effectiveness in World War II by Roger R. Reese

2012-01-13T11:24:00.000-08:00

In his latest monograph, Roger Reese offers an analysis of “Why Stalin’s Soldiers fought.” In attempting to locate an answer, he engages in dialogue with historians from both the Cold War and post-Soviet eras. At the center of Reese’s analysis are the Winter War and the year 1941. While some might question on what grounds the greater comparison of the Great Patriotic War to the Winter War can be made, Reese provides enough evidence and context to show that the performance of Red Army soldiers were very much interconnected between the two. The focus on 1941 stems from the millions of prisoners of war the Germans captured, which stands in stark contrast to the few prisoners taken during the Winter War.

After a brief discussion of what constitutes military effectiveness, Reese begins his analysis with the Winter War. Here the reader is presented with an initial failure on the part of Red Army effectiveness in battle. Yet the losses sustained by Soviet units, which by the end of the war numbered 131,000 combat dead and permanently missing in action, as well as 264,908 wounded, included a meager 5,486 captured (p. 32). Reese showcases that while there were numerous Red Army retreats, soldiers’ morale remained stoic in the face of Finnish tactical and operational victories, including negligible Soviet progress that often cost many lives for insignificant gains. Even though some soldiers exhibited opposition to the war, and went against the party endorsed line for why the Soviet Union declared war on Finland, the numbers who sought asylum or deserted were minute. As for what kept Red Army soldiers fighting, Reese does acknowledge the creation of blocking detachments and penal battalions, both implemented during the Winter War, but insists that they were just as important as Soviet appeals to patriotism and duty, based on the idea that the war being waged was just and necessary (p. 52).

The most innovative and original research can be found in the third chapter, where Reese posits a new perspective on the encirclements of 1941. Here he engages the historical debate over whether the millions of prisoners captured by the Germans during the opening phases of Operation Barbarossa were due to German military prowess or whether “anti-Stalinist political motivations” were behind mass surrenders, leading to the question of whether it was Soviet military inefficiency or ineffectiveness that was to blame (p. 57). In addressing the question of why so many surrendered, Reese aligns himself against those that have set up a binary between the Soviet state and its citizens. He argues that if soldiers surrendered, it was not solely or even mainly because they did not agree or were against the government. But simultaneously we cannot claim that soldiers who continued to fight were doing so because they were supporters of the regime they found themselves fighting for.

The reasons Reese offers for mass surrenders of Red Army soldiers continually vary on the situation they found themselves in, and they include “antiregime sentiment, German tactical doctrine and its skillful implementation, flawed soviet doctrine, poor Soviet military leadership, civilian political interference, and chaotic battlefield conditions that often left soldiers leaderless, disorganized, and inadequately armed” (p. 58). In analyzing the encirclement battles of 1941, Reese reaches the conclusion that Soviet military doctrine and command failures were at fault. The Red Army was never trained to fight in encirclements, and when troops found themselves threatened with encirclement they were forbidden by STAVKA from maneuvering to avoid such a fate and almost always attempted to escape after being surrounded.

In making a parallel with the Winter War, Reese shows that when small units were surrounded they were allowed to take up an all-around defense and, while often annihilated, few if any surrendered. While when facing the Wehrmacht, more often than not due to the circumstances they found themselves in, including constant communication problems, units were disorganized and their escape attempts were uncoordinated. Furthermore, a contrast with the encirclements of the war against Finland was that tens of thousands of soldiers caught in the encirclements of 1941 were rear area troops, while those caught in Finnish encirclements were frontline soldiers (p. 97-98).

Thus, the outcome was predictable: massive air, artillery and mortar strikes against any known troop concentrations, giving more reason for soldiers to try their luck in smaller groups. Additionally, many troops in the Red Army in 1941 were raw conscripts recently called up for service. The end result was an army that was more prone to heavy losses, defeat, and capture when confronted by a force that had yet to meet defeat on the field of battle. The only success Red Army soldiers enjoyed was when they were led by a determined commander who kept up unit cohesion and discipline, or in small groups that drew little attention from German soldiers who were busy hauling in tens of thousands of prisoners or attempting to catch up to their tank troops who were busy creating the next encirclement. Additionally, Reese highlights that there is no evidence for large Red Army units surrendering en masse. On the contrary, the majority of evidence points to soldiers “captured in small batches in a multitude of separate instances across a vast landscape as combat ebbed and flowed” (p. 90).

Although some might baulk at Reese’s analysis of the Winter War and the events of 1941, he is aware of the inherent problems of this comparison. But, as he explains, the real question has to do with an analysis of “the behavior of Soviet soldiers faced with the prospect of capture in encirclements” (p. 58). In this case, both wars feature parallels that are ripe for evaluation. Consequently, it is evident that even while Red Army troops were consistently outfought in the initial period of the Winter War, those caught in encirclements never surrendered to the degree that those fighting in 1941 did.

Mobilization of Soviet society, motivation, morale, and the role of female soldiers make up the rest of the monograph. The reasons Soviet soldiers fought varied throughout the war. According to Reese, as much as the state tried to generate patriotism within its citizens, the government was only able to take “advantage of inherent or latent patriotic feelings” (p. 307). Thus, many did join for patriotic reasons but that patriotism was most evident in Russians, and at times wholly absent from non-Russian nationalities. Others strove for vengeance against an invading force bent on genocide as hatred kindled a fire only the baptism of war could extinguish. The latter was evident in the motivations of women as well as men. More important to note is that at all levels of Soviet society men and women expected some kind of change when the war was over; Peasants hoped for an end to collectivization, workers relied on an end to strict discipline, while intellectuals hoped for more freedom, and lower level state functionaries were eager for “greater latitude in decision making” (p. 307). Those who joined the Red Army in the war against Nazi Germany did so in part hoping for a better tomorrow, showcasing their understanding that the Soviet Union at its present state was not yet the answer they were promised.

Learning from Foreign Wars: Russian Miltiary Thinking 1859-1873 by Gudrun Persson

2011-12-20T22:21:00.001-08:00

Too often the Russian state and, inherently, the Russian army are presented as "backward" or "exceptional". Up to and through the First World War the deficiencies of the Russian state and military are regularly highlighted to explain the battlefield defeats and failures Russia suffered as well as the eventual dissolution of the Russian Empire with the 1917 Revolution(s). Gudrun Persson, however, has authored an original look at the "thinkers" of the Russian military and how the highest echelons of Russia's armed forces viewed the wars taking place in Europe and abroad, and the lessons they took away from them. The reality, as usual, is a complex amalgamation of traditionalist thought on the part of conservatives within the military and a minute group of reformers looking at the present and toward the future, including all that needed to be created and prepared to catch up with Russia's European competitors.

The contentious discussions and debates the author focuses on revolve around mass conscription; the move away from an officer corps made up of mainly the nobility - dictated by birth and blood - toward officers who achieve their rank and office through talent, merit, and education; technological developments, including railways and weapon advancements; and mobilization plans that included ideas about offensive and defensive preparations (including fortifications). There are a few chapters/sections that seem somewhat removed from the main emphasis the author concentrates on, but seen in the greater context of the book, much of what is presented not only adds to already established debates and discussions on the Russian military in this period, but also goes against established understandings and offers new venues and areas for research. Fascinating, for instance, is the chapter on military attachés throughout various European states and their role in keeping military officials, including the Tsar, up to date on the latest developments in European armies. But how or if they were influential in crafting Russian policy and reforms within the armed services or the state as a whole is not conclusively shown. The overarching movement that an attaché fit into was the move by the military toward educating their officers. Those in attaché work had to have a working knowledge of several foreign languages and needed to regularly read foreign manuals and texts on the latest ideas related to strategy, tactics, industry, technology, etc.

This goes to the heart of one of the more interesting aspects of not only Russia's military but that of Europe in general that Persson devotes some discussion to (but not enough in my opinion). Specifically, a few influential Russian reformers within the army were aware of the changes armed forces throughout Europe were undergoing. The move was away from professional armies that were commanded by nobles and adhered to strict guidelines when taking the field of battle. Now, the officer corps was composed of educated men from all sectors of society who achieved status and rank through merit and ability rather than blood or birth. As a result, the tactics of the battlefield began to change with the introduction of new technology, which a more educated officer corps was needed to understand and utilize (the paper pushers of the army), and at the same time those officers leading in the field were expected to retain a degree of autonomy in fulfilling orders as linear tactics of the past were replaced by ever-changing developments on the field of battle that could be reported on in speeds thought impossible previously.

Thus, Russian reformers found themselves in a consistently changing military environment and having to advocate for changes that traditionalists and conservatives could not always or fully support or endorse. Persson's main point here is that it is less important to note that by the eve of the First World War Russia's military seemed oblivious of the changes that took place four decades previously, but that with the help of reformers like D. A. Miliutin, Russia was making similar updates and changes to her military as were the French, Germans, and Austro-Hungarians. Her railroads developed and grew, rifles were consistently updated and upgraded, and military institutions began to educate the officer corps in record numbers. What happened between 1873 and 1914 is not offered up for analysis in this text, but the information presented undoubtedly offers food for thought. Undoubtedly the period leading up to the war, featuring Tsar Alexander III and his counter-reform movement, impacted previous progress. But more important to note here is that a system previously thought too conservative and 'backward' to consistently accept needed changes was, on the contrary, willing to make amendments to its institutions on a regular basis and looked toward Western Europe for ideas and advances to implement, albeit usually with alterations made for the fact that it was being done in Russia.

Cataclysm: The War on the Eastern Front 1941-45 by Keith Cumins

2011-11-28T19:11:00.000-08:00

In “Cataclysm: The War on the Eastern Front, 1941-1945” Keith Cumins assembles an operational history of the Eastern Front from the perspective of both the Soviet Union and Germany, which he rightfully points out is rare to find. Cumins acknowledges that this study is further concentrating solely on the military operations on the ground, forsaking the seas and air, to say nothing of the political, economic, social, and cultural nature of the war. Although the book is only 300 pages, these are very dense pages, to say the least. The enormity of the Eastern Front defies explanation, and in reading this book the reader will discover, or rediscover, how insignificant our knowledge of the clash between the Red Army and Wehrmacht is to this day.

Setting out to write an operational history means that much of what the author presents lacks context. For those familiar with the Eastern Front, that might not be much of a hindrance, but for those new to the topic, they might want to immerse themselves in general histories before they pick up this tome. While the operational history presented by Cumins is very much all-encompassing, he regularly focuses on battles/engagements that most histories of the Second World War omit, they are not contextualized well enough to give the reader a better understanding of their significance. “Cataclysm” can be compared to works by David Glantz, Chris Bellamy, and Evan Mawdsley; all are experts in their relative fields (be it history in general or military history more specifically), but it is true that their narratives are skewed toward the Soviet side. Thus, the advantage of this work is that the author draws the reader’s attention to the German side and incorporates some of the newest secondary literature available.

Reading “Cataclysm” reinforces the fact that our knowledge of the Eastern Front, the Red Army, and even the Wehrmacht in the latter period of the war, continues to be in need of further study and analysis. There remain too many unanswered questions and operations/battles that do not carry the significance of Kursk, Stalingrad, or Bagration are too often left out of the narrative even though casualties suffered ran into the hundreds of thousands. These battles are evident as early as the first weeks of the war, where the Red Army continually offered resistance and launched counteroffensives that slowed or bloodied German forces but could never achieve any type of initiative or take it away from the Wehrmacht. If Cumins showcases anything, it is that an operational history can only tell us so much about the Eastern Front; there remains a need for further research, contextualization, and analysis, even today, over half a century after the conflict has ended.

When taking on a topic such as the Eastern Front, the author will have to contend with decades old myths/errors. Cumins contextualizes some well enough, but others are reiterated, unfortunately. For instance, the author continually references Far Eastern divisions during his discussion of 1941 and the Moscow counter-offensive, but fails to point out that divisions from all over the Soviet Union were called up and that Far Eastern divisions were activated as early as June/July 1941 with orders to move to the west. Cumins also has an outdated view of Operation Mars when compared to Geoffrey Jukes’s latest book, which offers an original and compelling view of what happened around Rzhev during the Stalingrad offensive (Operation Uranus). Finally, the author is mistaken when he claims that the commander of the 1st Polish Army launched a crossing into Warsaw in 1944 during the uprising without Front or STAVKA authorization and was later removed as a result. Recently published document collections prove that it was in fact an order from the Front that allowed Berling to launch a crossing into Warsaw by the 1st Polish Army; Berling’s statements to the contrary after the war are disingenuous at best, although unfortunately reaffirmed here.

The publisher has included over 30 maps, with references next to various paragraphs that refer to specific maps for the reader to consult. Very helpful, but considering this is a book on the entirety of the Eastern Front, even 30+ maps are not enough! There is also a photograph section; although Hoth and Bock are mislabeled (Hoth’s photo is listed as Bock and Bock’s as Hoth). Overall, the book is well written even if at times there are thick descriptions of units/locations. Additionally, there are rare instances of grammatical errors/mistakes, but they hardly take much away from the reading experience. My bigger complaint is the fact that there are no footnotes/endnotes and the bibliography seems wholly inadequate when compared to the amount of information the author has accumulated. To be of use to academics – granted it is a rare thing to find an academic immerse him/herself in operational histories – there needs to be a line to original source material(s)! For instance, the author claims that the Red Army’s battlefield performance in 1941 was inhibited by strict obedience to orders, which allowed the Germans to anticipate and counter their actions (79); unfortunately, no examples are offered and no source is listed. Thus, for those interested in an in-depth operational history of the Eastern Front from the perspectives of both the Soviet Union and Germany, this is definitely recommended, although keep the above caveats in mind as you immerse yourself in this twentieth century ‘slaughterhouse.’

Secrets of Warfare: Exposing the Myths and Hidden History of Weapons and Battles by William Weir

2011-09-28T16:40:00.000-07:00

This book is truly the definition of 'popular history'. It is a quick read, with limited source material, and attempts to tackle a multitude of events, personalities, and time periods without giving adequate time to explaining the context of the topics the author attempts to dissect and 'expose'. Yes, there are quite a few myths that have developed around military history and continue to this day. Some date from histories dealing with ancient and medieval times, others from the nineteenth century. The author should be commended that he took the time out to explore some of these 'myths' and present them in a more interesting and less biased light. But his efforts are just scratching the surface. Additionally, a growing number of studies have already done what the author is now just uncovering.

For instance, the author discusses how German tanks during the initial period of the Second World War were perceived as invincible when put in context with the successful 'Blitzkrieg' campaigns the Germans had waged against Poland and France. What he omits is the fact that recent scholars have begun to question whether either of those campaigns were in fact 'Blitzkrieg', a 'myth' much more interesting, in my opinion, than whether or not Germany had 100 ton tanks running around France. Additionally, the author discusses whether or not Hitler was correct in not listening to his generals. True enough, many of the generals that survived the war blamed Germany's defeat on Hitler, but at the same time it is a fact that Hitler was not comparable to leading German commanders in regards to talent and ability. Just because he might have been right in advocating for Manstein's plan during the invasion of France, that doesn't mean he came up with that plan. Backing a great idea and coming up with one are two wholly separate things.

Additionally, the author's analysis in throughout his chapter on Hitler jumps from campaigns, to personalities, and really has no cohesive narrative holding those ideas together. There is no doubt that the author is recounting some interesting events and attempting to put them in a more nuanced light, but for those familiar with military history in general, many of these 'myths' will be a rehashing of banal information. Recommended for those seeking a starting point in studying interesting events that deal with military history, but not so much for those already immersed in the field.

War of the White Death: Finland Against the Soviet Union 1939-40 by Bair Irincheev

2011-09-15T12:47:00.000-07:00

The author, Bair Irincheev, is readily forthcoming in what this book encompasses and leaves out. Unfortunately for those hoping for a single volume history of the Winter War, they will be disappointed. There is a lack of any political/diplomatic history, little to no mention of the campaigns in the air or on the high seas, and little to no discussion is offered of either nation's high command and their roles in the war. But, with all those omissions, the Irincheev does a great job in offering an overview of many of the battles that took place throughout the 105 days the Winter War lasted. He regularly attempts to dispel myths and rumors that have been built up around the war, both in the lacking performance of the Red Army and the vaunted heroism of Finland's defenders, and offers evidence from both sides, including first hand accounts, to put the actions he describes in richer contextual detail. The end result is an enhanced understanding of the battles fought in the Winter War, but a simultaneously realization that there still remains so much more to be done. As Irincheev himself says, "I would be very happy if" this book "could be used as a starting point for new research on the Winter War."

While Irincheev has done a great deal of work on the subject, the final product in its present form is wholly lacking. A lot of the events discussed feel as if they are disconnected, there is no real 'thread' that is weaved between them all and a lot of context outside the actual battles being described seems to be missing. Furthermore, there are no footnotes/endnotes, so much of the information presented has no source attached to it that one can go consult themselves if the need or desire ever arose. Additionally, while there are over a dozen maps included, they are all rather small and none are specifically referenced within the text itself, so the reader is left to guess when they should consult one of the maps. This, unfortunately, brings down the value of this volume, but I would venture to say the fault there might rest with the publisher rather than the author.

Lastly, omitting all of the above for a second, there is still a good amount of value to this text. Viewing the Red Army as it existed during the Winter War is quite enlightening, especially if you can juxtapose the actions of the same troops during the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. Within this book you'll find Red Army soldiers and commanders protesting and refusing to send their men to what they expect will be outright slaughter, and their protests are actually heeded and acquiesced to. Additionally, wherever possible the author has located and offered casualty reports for various divisions/regiments/battalions/companies for both sides. These prove enlightening, especially when dispelling some of the myths that have been propagated about Red Army performance. Soviet casualties were regularly high but almost never to the degree that they've been presented in popular accounts of the war. In the end there is much to commend about the book but enough that one can consider the effort a bit of a let down and hope that something more encompassing and comprehensive comes along in the near future.

Total War: From Stalingrad to Berlin by Michael Jones

2011-08-13T09:57:00.001-07:00

It's quite rare these days that a book on the Eastern Front will surprise me once, almost never more often than that. Having read on this war for over a decade I thought I knew the majority of what went on and what one could expect to find on a book entitled 'Total War'. With this work, however, Jones has built on what he's done previously and in many ways this might be his best work to date, easily rivaling his first foray into the Eastern Front with 'Stalingrad'.

As with his previous volumes, Jones tells the story of the Eastern Front through the voices of the soldiers, commanders, and civilians who participated in it, willingly or unwillingly from both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Woven through the accounts he presents is the regular question of how Red Army soldiers and the civilian population of the Soviet Union kept up enough morale to endure the chaos and defeats of 1941, the demoralizing situation around the siege of Leningrad, and the battle for Stalingrad in 1942. Thus, 'Total War' begins with the initial situation around 1941 and moves through battles for Leningrad and Stalingrad, onto the eventual Soviet defeat of the German sixth Army and continues through their victories at Kursk, Bagration, etc., all the way to Berlin.

The question here is less about military prowess, tactical, operational, or strategic decisions (although various details of individual operations are discussed and contextualized) but revolves around what the Red Army and civilian population endured, witnessed, and remembered up until their entrance into East Prussia and Germany proper. Jones sets the stage for the infamous events of the Red Army's 'liberation' (a contested term to say the least) of Eastern Europe and Germany. The initial chapters dealing with 1941 and Stalingrad are readily covered in Jones's other books on the Eastern Front so they presented little new in the greater scheme of the Eastern Front. It is only when we get to 1944 and the German scorched earth policy as they retreated before the Red Army that events and information I had never heard of before first began to appear. As the Germans withdrew from Belorussia they ran up against large swamp areas, on these territories they began to herd the local population, encased them in barbed wire, and trucked in typhus patients. They dumped them all in one of these 'camps', let them lay on muddy ground and allowed hundreds of cases of typhus to break out so that they might be passed on to the liberating troops of the Red Army. According to the commander of the 65th Army, whose soldiers were at times unable to control themselves as they ran to liberate these locals, an entire corps had to be quarantined because typhus ran rampantly through Red Army units as they tried their best to liberate these hastily established camps. Luckily the spread of the disease was readily contained and presented limited problems for the Red Army advance.

The Red Army's crossing over into Germany proper brings much debate and controversy. What Jones attempts to do, and in truth does very well, is contextualize what Red Army soldiers perpetrated on German territory. In showcasing what Red Army soldiers witnessed on their way to Germany, the enormous amount of death and destruction they came through during the liberation of Ukraine and Belorussia, the liberation of camps like Majdanek and Auschwitz (both of which are discussed by Jones in this book), as well as the regular propaganda campaign waged by the Soviet Union in order to keep up Red Army morale and encourage them to 'kill' the occupiers of their territory and the murderers of their families and friends, there is reason to suspect that such bent up anger and hatred would have an outlet once the German border was crossed. And this is exactly what happened. But Jones also gives voice to those soldiers who attempted to curb the violence, looting, raping, and murder that was going on. He continually implies that this was a minority within the Red Army that contributed to the 'total war' mentality of the time and shows orders coming from the high command and army command that attempted to curb any type of violence and looting against the local population, changing the propaganda of the time from 'destroy the fascist beast in his lair' to a voice claiming the Red Army is an army of liberation. There are some heartwrenching stories presented of Red Army soldiers taking out their hatred on the German population, all too often women, but in each case Jones attempts to contextualize the atmosphere these events occurred in and the reaction of Red Army soldiers to these events, which after the initial euphoria of revenge passed quickly into condemnation, contempt and a questioning of their methods. Many soldiers even attempted to protect the local population, forgetting or at least putting aside the propaganda they had been exposed to for years.

A minor weakness in these chapters is the fact that Jones mentions little of the fact that the Red Army at this point was operating with allies, like two Polish armies, who at times had more reason to hate Germans than Soviet troops, who can account or separate for crimes they perpetrated? Additionally, Jones takes the time to show how the Germans themselves exaggerated Red Army atrocities on their soil. Goebbels created something called 'atrocity propaganda' that exaggerated everything 'in order to strengthen the deterrent effect and the German people's will to hold out' (224). More so, at times the Germans themselves were given orders to destroy a village or town while the population was expelled, only to then have German film crews and journalists bussed in to "survey the ruins and to record the imagined ravages of Soviet soldiers...The swans in the town park were shot, and it was then announced that the 'Asiatic hordes' had killed and eaten them' (225).

As I reached the end of the book I found myself speechless. The epilogue Jones includes is a mere five pages, and the last page simply found me questioning myself and my knowledge of the Great Patriotic War/Second World War as well as the costs that the Soviet population had to bear. I don't want to give anything away but Jones shows once more that we continue to merely scratch the surface of the Eastern Front and there is still so much left to learn and understand in this encounter between Germany and the Soviet Union.

A few minor mistakes are evident, Soviet units should be listed as 'rifle' but in various instances they are described as 'infantry brigade' or 'infantry corps' rather than rifle or if this was a naval unit it should have been 'naval infantry' rather than just 'infantry'. There is also a mention of a fortieth 'tank army', but only six existed and they were named first through sixth. Additionally, the Soviet commander Chernyakhovsky is misspelled as 'Chernyakovsky'. Lastly, I have to say that the notation system in this book leaves much to be desired. While Jones lists his sources there are no endnotes/foodnotes in the traditional sense and at times it makes for a very hard time when attempting to locate the source of a specific comment/description/event.

Putting aside these minor errors, there is no question that Jones has created a highly important addition to Eastern Front literature. He is one of the few authors who attempts to contextualize Red Army action on German territory by putting the motivation of the Soviet soldier in a context that showcases that while some might have taken vengeance to an extreme, many others managed to control themselves and at times showed their altruistic side by protecting the local population and providing them with basic necessities. Jones continually emphasizes that it was a minority of the Red army that committed crimes on enemy soil, while the majority managed to preserve their reputation and the title of 'liberators'.

Little Soldiers: How Soviet Children Went to War, 1941-1945 by Olga Kucherenko

2011-08-08T09:28:00.000-07:00

In ‘Little Soldiers’, Olga Kucherenko contextualizes the role children played in the Soviet Union’s war effort and how their appearance on the frontlines, behind the front, and on the high seas was hardly out of the ordinary in a country that was regularly bombarded by propaganda in the pre-war period predicting a future war, which all sectors of the population were expected to take part in. This is a highly researched and detailed work based on archival material, interviews, and a wide variety of secondary sources from not only the field of history, but also anthropology and psychology. Contextually, this study can be placed alongside the recently published Soviet Women in Combat by Anna Krylova and Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought by Roger R. Reese, as this is more a social than military history.

Little Children is broken into two parts. In the first part, Kucherenko focuses on the pre-war period featuring discussions of children in the Soviet Union, their education, the type of propaganda they were regularly exposed to, and the atmosphere as a whole within the Soviet Union throughout the 1930s. The second section concentrates on the war itself and the role children played in the various branches of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

Although rare, there are instances in the first section when the breadth of the territory the author is covering moves the focus away from the children themselves and various historical arguments and debates centering on the entirety of the Soviet Union take center stage. By no means does this mean that this text is solely written for those with in-depth knowledge of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the amount of ground covered in the first part of the text makes for an excellent overall introduction to not only the topic of children in the Soviet Union and the Great Patriotic War, but the subject of the Soviet Union itself. Additionally, the author regularly has to walk a fine line in analyzing her sources and interviews due to the fact that around the Great Patriotic War a cult was crafted and a government endorsed ‘master narrative’ all too often impeded a more nuanced and personalized characterization of what veterans experienced. Specifically, this means that often veterans will retain a politicized language when recalling their experiences from the war and their recollections will either mimic or regurgitate a state sponsored rhetoric. While this tells us a great deal about the society these men and women participated and lived in, it becomes a task in itself to separate their version of the Great Patriotic War from that of the state, which was regularly forced onto the Soviet population through a variety of mass media.

Estimates of how many children actually participated in the war effort range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. By no means were these youngsters instrumental in the outcome of the war as their numbers hardly made up one percent of the Soviet armed forces. Nevertheless, Kucherenko shows quite well what kind of impact these adolescents had on the frontlines in not only fighting the enemy but in boosting the morale of their fellow soldiers. For instance, when a former partisan commented on children in partisan ranks he mentioned how ‘tough’ it was for them, but seeing that they never complained about the conditions they found themselves in ‘gives us strength; a march seems less strenuous, and privations not as hard’ (226). Additionally, in many ways, child soldiers were an important future generation that was highly inculcated into the Soviet ethos on the eve of and during the war itself, serving as guardians of Stalinist ideology in the post-war period. Their actions during the war, however, were a result of more than just the indoctrination they, as well as the entirety of the Soviet population, underwent during the 1930s.

From an early age children participated in youth movements and were encouraged to join clubs that created an atmosphere where collective experiences permeated everyday life, teaching kids that ‘only through teamwork could they acquire strong socialist moral standards’ (40). Furthermore, propaganda regularly stressed hero worship (be they Civil War heroes, arctic/polar explorers, aviators, etc.) and children were encouraged to give back to the state, the collective, which provided them with the ‘best’ quality of life possible, through heroic acts. But the propaganda within which these acts were enmeshed omitted any type of suffering on the part of the hero, death itself was a topic regularly avoided, as was any ‘senseless destruction of a human life’ (144). In some respects this idealized reliance on human heroism seems to have reinforced the misleading belief that bravery would compensate for technological backwardness, as when young volunteers for the front ‘recited or paraphrased’ the ‘proverbial line: “A bullet fears the brave!”’ (149) Thus, when the Soviet Union was invaded, children were eager to participate in a romanticized version of a war they could only imagine based on their interaction with Soviet media before it was too late.

There can be no doubt the Soviet state sent mixed messages to children when it discussed war. They were encouraged to actively contribute to the war effort in the rear while at the same time seeing propaganda that lauded images of children fighting. Kucherenko, however, is adamant that the education system cannot be accused of pressuring children to take part in hostilities. On the contrary, she offers more than enough proof to show how the government did everything to prevent adolescents from such participation. The front line, however, was a separate world from occupied territory. Here everyone was encouraged to take part in the fight against the enemy, although children’s acceptance into partisan units was often left to the discretion of local commanders, something also seen in studies of women’s role in the Soviet war effort (198). But for an age group that regularly exhibits a fascination with war, even a restrained propaganda campaign proved too much for some and resulted in adolescents actively seeking a way, any way, to get to the front and contribute to the war effort. More importantly, boys were not the only ones eager to arrive at the front. In one instance, on the third day of the war, the head of the Leningrad Red Cross complained that school girls, mothers and daughters, and even an old lady, were all petitioning to go to the front (143). Yet while boys were eager to play war, it was girls who had a greater chance of being accepted into the ranks of the Red Army since they endeavored to attain certain skills to make their presence in the armed forces a necessity.

Blind reliance on propaganda affected not only children. When war finally did come to the sole socialist state in Europe, there resonated a belief that the enemy would be quickly defeated on their own soil. In effect, propaganda that highlighted the invincibility of the Red Army created an environment that saw utter shock when Soviet civilians learned of the advances made by the Wehrmacht against Soviet troops. The amount of children eager to gain admittance to the front, however, only increased as the war dragged on into 1942. Ultimately, the motivating factors in the actions of future child soldiers, according to Kucherenko, seemed ‘to be rooted in the romantic notion of one’s usefulness and a sense of moral duty, a naïve conception of war, and unshakable loyalty to the country, all of which were externalized in defiance of its enemies’ (111). Transformed into acts of bravery and heroism, reckless endangerment of their own lives was something children were prone to do when working with a flawed definition of war. When a former child partisan, who at one point was arrested and beaten while on a mission, was asked if he was afraid of being tortured or killed, he replied ‘No. But now I wouldn’t do what I did back then when I was 13’ (223).

Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II by Henrik O. Lunde

2011-08-06T17:57:00.000-07:00

Over half a century after the conclusion of the Second World War there are still areas that are simply begging for more research. Henrik Lunde has discovered one such area and has gone through great lengths to provide a highly detailed operational history of Finland's Continuation War from the point of view of the Axis powers. The initial chapter discusses the position Finland assumed after gaining her independence from Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution. The Winter War is then discussed, including Finland's stand against the Soviet Union. The eventual defeat suffered at the hands of the Red Army created an environment where Finland found itself succumbing to German pressure and needs and moving further away from her independent/democratic stance to a more reliant alliance with and on Germany.

Up to this point there is a variety of literature available, especially on the Winter War. What Lunde seems to gloss over is the Soviet aspect of the political and diplomatic maneuverings that he covers, for which there is also plenty of literature available (in English). The author could have added much more detail to his narrative if he bothered to consult a few more secondary sources that are readily available in detailing the position of the Soviet Union on the eve of both the Second World War and the invasion of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, Lunde's text is regularly marred by the lack of attention he pays to the Soviet side. Granted, this is not a book that aims to retell the story of the Continuation War from the Soviet point of view, but adding in relevant context and detail that's available in English would not have hurt the overall narrative.

This book can readily be divided into two sections after the invasion of the Soviet Union commences. The operations undertaken in 1941 and early 1942, and those undertaken in 1944. The initial operations feature the Finns taking back the territory they lost in the Winter War, with German help, and then holding back from taking additional territory (aside from a few pieces here and there to help in terms of defensive lines). What follows for the rest of the 1942 and 1943 is a stagnation of the frontlines with limited combat activity as the Germans lack the forces necessary to do anything on their own and the Finns refuse to budge and help with the taking of Leningrad or cutting off Murmansk. Lunde also goes into great detail discussing how the Finns really have no excuse in terms of their guilt in starting this 'War of Choice'. They had planned for it and they cannot simply get out the position they dug themselves into by saying that the Soviets began the war. Lunde shows quite well that German divisions were already stationed in Finland, German planes were operating out of Finnish airstrips and both the Finns and Germans participated in the mining of the Baltic. While it is true that Finnish forces did not begin combat operations until after Soviet forces began bombing Finland, according to Lunde, this was mainly done to garner public support in believing in the myth that Finland was undertaking a defensive war rather than an offensive one.

The second section of the book deals with 1944 and the various attempts by the Finns to get out of the war, while the Germans were attempting to keep them in and eventually had to withdraw/evacuate their units after Finland signed a treaty with the Soviets. Here the majority of combat activity belonged to the Soviets, who initiated numerous offensives and pushed back the Finns and Germans and demonstrated that combined arms operations were a possibility even in the arctic conditions found in the far north of Lapland. Lunde praises the German ability to evacuate the majority of their forces but also admits that many Soviet forces were withdrawn after their initial successful operations to other areas of the Eastern Front and so could not commence or continue operations that would have netted greater gains against the Germans.

Throughout the Continuation War the Germans assumed a very interesting position in relation to Finland. Often times they were bereft of any real choice in terms of operations against the Red Army unless the Finns acquiesced to their demands. And more often than not the Finns simply held back as they had achieved everything they wanted. Unfortunately they did not think things through well enough to understand that if the Germans were to be successful in defeating the Soviets they would be at Hitler's mercy and if the Third Reich were to fall they could hardly do anything of worth against the forces of the Red Army.

Aside from the above mentioned limited representation the Soviets get, there were a few other weaknesses. In mentioning the losses the Soviets suffered in the Winter War the author is unfortunately not aware the official numbers were published years ago in English and are readily available, he, however, quotes inflated estimates. There is mention of the Soviet occupation of the Baltics but nothing to put it into context with Soviet foreign policy and the fact that the occupation only came with the defeat of the last continental power in Europe, France. At times the author doesn't go to the trouble of quoting his sources and, lastly, by the latter part of the book, the author (or maybe editor) forgets that Soviets units were 'rifle' not 'infantry' (for instance, Lunde discusses a 'light infantry corps' when in fact it was a 'light mountain rifle corps'). This at times makes for difficult reading as German and Finnish forces are also listed as 'infantry' and it becomes difficult to separate them all when there are dozens being mentioned.

Nonetheless, overall, this is a fascinating look at the Continuation War and Finland's alliance with the Third Reich. How both attempted to use and help the other and the final results of a dictatorship allying with and at times being at the mercy of a democracy.

The Damned and the Dead: The Eastern Front Through the Eyes of Soviet and Russian Novelists by Frank Ellis

2011-07-13T13:53:00.000-07:00

I would classify this book as two steps forward in our knowledge and understanding about Soviet and post-Soviet literature on the Second World War and Great Patriotic War, but a step backward in our understanding of the war itself. In this tome, Frank Ellis discusses and analyzes the literature written in the post-WWII period of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation on the Great Patriotic War by the likes of some of the most famous and esteemed Soviet/Russian/Belorussian authors. They include Vasily Grossman, Konstantin Simonov, Vasily Bykov, Viktor Nekrasov, Vladimir Bogomolov, etc. While Ellis has some experience in discussing the likes of Grossman (readers will be able to tell as much by the length of discussion and analysis devoted to his works), some of the space devoted to other authors seems less than ideal. But, it has to be admitted that there really is no other author or text that has taken the time to devote so much time and effort to discussing authors who most of the western world has undoubtedly never heard of. So while there are some weaknesses in Ellis's descriptions of the various novels he discusses, the real weakness here is the history that the author brings to bear to either attack or dispose of in defense of subjects the authors he analyzes concentrate on. This, in effect, is why I claim this text is a step backward in our knowledge of the Great Patriotic War. For all the books listed in the bibliography and throughout the footnotes, Ellis is regularly lacking in his knowledge of the Eastern Front, especially considering the amount of information that has become available in the past two decades. It seems that while the majority of the book is relegated to discussing Soviet-era novels on the war, the author's knowledge of the war is also mired in what was available to historians, researchers, and scholars in that period - both ideas and facts. When that proves to not be the case, specifically when the author devotes an entire chapter to regurgitating a single compilation of reports written during the battle of Stalingrad, he makes claims that have no real backing.

In describing the works of the authors listed above, the major themes that seem to retain the interest of both author and the reading public are those that revolve around the subject of prisoners of war and their fate after liberation, SMERSH (death to spies), the NKVD, Vlasov and those that served in ROA (Russian Army of Liberation), penal formations, the battle of Stalingrad, the dubious nature of partisan warfare, the purges of the Red Army, collectivization, and the retreats of 1941. One interesting note that Ellis makes is that due to the fact that the Soviet Union equated POWs with traitors, there is missing from the genre of Great Patriotic War literature the subject of prisoner escapes. Whereas in the west the topic has multiple volumes about the daring and genius of prisoners and their eventual escape from the enemy, within the Soviet Union the only event that comes close what can be considered 'prisoner escapes' is a description of soldiers escaping from encirclement, where they might have tainted their honor but not to an unsalvageable degree.

One of the more glaring problems that Ellis exhibits is his interest in Viktor Suvorov's thesis on the outbreak of the Second World War. This makes for a variety of flawed analyses not only of the literary work in question, but of the Soviet war effort, the Red Army, and the Soviet Union in general. In asking what type of 'large land mass, fails to devote sufficient attention to large-scale defensive operations? (1224)' Ellis wholly ignores the fact that the defensive strategy Stalin and the Red Army relied on was one that featured an immediate offensive to spare the Soviet state any fighting on her territory. Unfortunately, the author discusses none of the historians/specialists that have written about the Soviet Union on the eve of the invasion and have disproven Suvorov's claims repeatedly. There is no doubt that the purges of the Red Army created an atmosphere that propagated a subdued attitude on the part of Red Army commanders when it came to questions of defensive operations, but an army whose doctrine is to wage defensive war with an offensive mindset is not the same thing as an army bent on a preemptive strike.

When comparing the successes of the Wehrmacht to the Red Army Ellis makes an interesting, although also flawed, point in that German success in the first two years of the Second World War was so all-encompassing that eventually their victories were seen as a given. The same could be said for Red Army defeats in 1941/1942. Thus, when the Soviets defeated the Germans at Stalingrad, Ellis argues, the defeat was exaggerated since it was against an enemy that everyone expected only success from. While there is some truth in this, the author ignores that the Germans suffered defeat outside Moscow in 1941/1942, and furthermore, that much of the success the Wehrmacht enjoyed throughout Europe was to a great degree based on propaganda, thus enhancing German hubris in their own abilities and that of what others expected from them. Additionally, the author makes quite a few assumptions, based on the above mentioned book on Stalingrad, that are little more than suppositions without adequate basis or foundation. When discussing the amount of soldiers that were detained by blocking detachments during the battle, there is no evidence to show how many were in fact guilty or innocent. The only information that's available is how many were released back to their units, how many were sent to 'special camps' or penal formations, were arrested, or executed. Most numbers show that less than 10% suffered arrest or execution. While Ellis believes that due to the chaos of the time 'large numbers of innocent soldiers were executed or otherwise punished for no reason...' (197), this is a statement, that while it might be true, is not backed up with credible evidence. Furthermore, the author is utterly incorrect when he asserts that 'certain frontline units must have had their operational efficiency, already perilously low, severely degraded, to the point that they played no useful role' (205) after pointing to the fact that the Don and Stalingrad fronts had 51,758 soldiers go through the NKVD screening process after being detained from 1 August - 15 October 1942. Considering that the majority of those men were returned to their units, this makes little sense. Additionally, this is the number of men (51,758) that were detained during a period of two and a half months from two separate fronts which contained hundreds of thousands of men each. Divided by the 75 or so days that this report is based on, the figure we come up with is 690 men per day, something that Ellis cannot prove was detrimental to the war effort. And for those interested, a total of 47,766 were either returned to their units or transit centers. There is no doubt that the grueling process of going through NKVD screening/filtration camps consumed time and manpower. But considering that the Soviet Union was fighting for its very life and there was more than enough evidence to show that Soviet citizens were working against the state, such security precautions are at the very least understandable.

These are only some of the ideas the author brought up that I take issue with. Due to the fact that any discussions of literary personalities writing on the war are inherently tied to the parallel presentation of the Great Patriotic War by Ellis, these failures of analysis take away from the conclusions the author reaches. I am not a literary critic, so the author's dissection of what Soviet authors discussed and paid attention to was quite interesting and thought provoking. But a sloppy analysis of a war that stands at the heart of this book and the men being examined makes for an unbalanced final product.

Historical ebooks: D-Day: The Battle For Normandy by Antony Beevor

2011-06-03T22:42:00.000-07:00

For those keeping track, the anniversary of D-Day is right around the corner (June 6th). Coinciding with said anniversary, Penguin is releasing an enhanced ebook of Beevor's D-Day that features:

- Rarely seen video from the NBC News Archive, including original NBC and Universal newsreels
- Original NBC Radio broadcasts announcing the D-Day invasion
- Rare color footage shot by journalist Jack Lieb, who worked for the newsreel company
- News of the Day and shot footage from D-Day to the liberation of Paris. 25 years later, he recorded this narration, giving a uniquely personal view of the war.
- All the maps included in the original book
- Unique videos of the Allied commanders, paratroopers suiting up and jumping, Allied troops landing on the Normandy beaches, firefights in the deadly bocage hedgerows and through bombed-out towns, Allied bombing runs, the liberation of Paris and much more.
- Embedded video within the text gives readers a seamless reading and viewing experience

Those interested, can find a trailer here:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahdMRRo7ing

Personally, I never gave much thought to some of the advantages ebooks have to offer over that of hardcover/softcover books I usually buy and/or review. Granted, you can get an ebook reader and stash tons of ebooks on them, as well as access search functions that can lead you to finding keywords/phrases in a fraction of the time it would take you to look up said word in the index and then rummage through all listed pages. But, in retrospect, for fans of history, historical ebooks can offer something that's been limited or wholly missing previously. In talking to authors and translators, it's become clear that publishers look to avoid publishing copious amounts of images/pictures, as it usually costs more money and at times the authors themselves have to foot the bill! But, with an ebook, it seems such problems are less of a burden for publishers. More so, they can intersperse videos, as they've done with Beevor's work, into the books as well. Not only will the reader be able to visualize what they're reading about, but also hear and see historic events unfold in between pages of text! For fans of Beevor and/or the Western Front of the Second World War, this might be a worthwhile investment (at the moment available for iphone/ipad on ibooks).

Berlin 1961 by Frederick Kempe

2011-05-25T11:41:00.000-07:00

One excerpt on the back describes this volume as 'history at its best...' While I can agree that this text is a history of sorts, I can't say that it's 'history at its best.' There are some things trained historians can do that others cannot, and this book proves it. While the author can be commended on assembling a vast array of sources to tell the story of Berlin in 1961, those sources and their stories are only a small part of a larger picture which more often than not is overlooked for various tidbits of juicy information about Kennedy, Khrushchev, Clay, Konev or any number of other, usually less important, individuals that come and go throughout the narrative. Yes, the putting up of the Wall in Berlin is/was an event that should be documented, and in and of itself this text does a good job of setting the stage and going through the motions of showing what each side was thinking (although to be fair the U.S. gets a lot more attention than the U.S.S.R.) and why they decided on the actions they did. For instance, Khrushchev needed to deal with the fact that thousands were escaping from East Berlin on a regular basis and the economy simply could not be sustained if it continued. For Kennedy, however, it was important to show West Berliners and West Germany/Western Europe in general that the U.S. would support them, even by force if the need arose (furthermore, after the disaster that was the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy needed some type of 'win' for the public at home). That by itself is highly relevant and important to understanding the setting of Berlin in 1961, however, this book, which weighs in at some 500 pages, could easily have been told in 100-150 pages less. Finding information that few others are aware of that makes for a juicy story are fine for a journalist, but not for a historian (this is why historians use footnotes/endnotes for those who have a passing interest in such details). Thus, while there are chapters that move quickly, there are also just as many that you will get bogged down in as your mind begins to wonder why the need for so much superfluous detail. Lastly, one of the ideas behind the book is to showcase how close the Cold War came to being Hot. I can't say I found the author's argument(s) convincing. Due to the wide variety of personalities he showcased and identified, it is evident that any drastic action that would lead to all out war would have had to go through a myriad of red-tape to even begin to be considered on the side of the U.S. (such information, in regards to decision making, is not readily presented in regards to the Soviets). Just because some were beginning to think of such drastic actions doesn't mean the world was close to annihilation. For those who enjoy a journalistic account, you will probably find this an interesting read on Cold-War Berlin.

The Crimean War: A History by Orlando Figes

2011-05-13T14:41:00.001-07:00

In the shadow of the Napoleonic Wars, Europe and her monarchs were attempting to do their best to keep the status quo, a balance of power, alive while aware that more often than not their own interests and citizens yearned for something more. Orlando Figes has created an enjoyable, readable, and highly valuable narrative that includes an in-depth look at European machinations on the eve of the Crimean War and showcases the importance of this often forgotten and/or overlooked encounter of east versus west. Overall, this text can be divided into three sections: the lead-up to the war, which includes a tremendous amount of detail on the role of religion in Western Europe, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire; the war itself, including grandiose battles ranging from the Balkans to the Crimea and the Caucasus; and the aftermath, which highlights the real importance of the Crimean War and its lasting effects on not only Europe, but the world.

While initially the Crimean War can be said to have begun due to religious undertones and what was happening in the Holy Land between the Muslims and their Christian (Eastern and Western) counterparts, all too soon religion was intermixing with a variety of other desires on the part of all the major players. France was looking for a new reorientation within European politics, they wanted the stigma of Napoleon’s rule to be done away with and for France to be considered a major contender in future European politics; England was eager to check Russian expansion into the Caucasus and the Balkans, as they feared for their interests in India; some within the Ottoman Empire were eager to institute reforms so as to give the Empire a fighting chance to survive in the coming years, while also looking to check Russian expansion and forcing its citizens to look the other way as Christians from the west came to help fight the Russian menace.

In numerous ways the Crimean War can be described as an event that witnessed a clash of ideas on warfare, with the Russians utilizing offensive weaponry and tactics belonging to the Napoleonic battlefield, while straddling new-age ideas in how they developed their defensive works and trench-lines. In essence, their efforts on the offensive lagged behind their eagerness to experiment with the newest ideas in defensive warfare. But such eagerness was not enough to offset the technological and industrial might that Britain and France brought with them to war. In more ways than one it would be safe to say that the reason, as many suspect, that Russia lost this war was due to her backwardness and conservative contempt for reform. Mistakes on the field of battle were made by both sides, which regularly witnessed friendly fire, delayed offensives which cost numerous casualties, lack of communication and coordination, and disorderly retreats by both sides that wound up costing more casualties than if these men stood their ground or at least retreated in order. As an example, during the battle at Alma, a bugle call to cease fire halted a British advance because ‘an unnamed officer had thought that the Russians were the French and had ordered his men to stop firing’ (213), his call was picked up by the other regiments and precious time was lost as the Russian Vladimirsky regiment gained the upper hand. Additionally, the Crimean War could be seen as a foreshadowing of the Russo-Japanese war. Both times the Russian Empire faced an enemy they regularly degraded and hardly considered a worthy challenge. And in both instances one of the main reasons for their eventual failure on the field of battle was that numerous (thousands for the Crimean War, tens of thousands for the Russo-Japanese war) soldiers were held in reserve, which would have been able to tip the balance in favor of the Russians if utilized at key points in the war by well trained commanders.

The majority, if not all, of the major actions that took place during the war involved British, French, and Russian troops. Turkish troops are at best a sideshow, a tangent, that gets mentioned every now and then. In truth, this war made little sense in the fact that British and French soldiers had more in common with their Russian enemies than their Ottoman allies. All too often Figes comments on the fact that fraternization occurred between the French/British and Russians, who exchanged alcohol, food, and trinkets in no-man's land (many Russian officers could speak French), and even visited each other's camps to talk, and more often than not complain about the Turks/Ottomans. Furthermore, British soldiers regularly treated Turkish troops in a degrading manner, assigning them do jobs fit for slaves, at best. While some Turks might have found this unbearable, their government routinely reminded them that the British and French were their allies and here to help them, so any contempt they might have felt for their Christian, European counterparts was curbed when reminded of the fact that these men were putting their lives on the line for the Ottoman Empire.

One of the more interesting aspects of the war period that Figes deals with is public opinion and newspapers and their impact on the home front. More than any other, the British were regularly aware of what harm newspaper articles could do to the war effort or, in turn, how helpful they could be in siding the public with the actions of the state. The Crimean War was the first war to be seen in pictures by the public as it was being fought, and for the British, it was the first time that a military award, the Victoria Cross, was issued to common soldiers for their courageous deeds on the field of battle (something other states were already doing).

In effect, the Crimean War holds an important place in European history as the antagonisms that resulted from the conflict led directly to the unification of Italy and Germany and most definitely to the Balkan crises that would usher in the First World War. France received its wish and a shift in the balance of power in Europe was underway soon after the end of hostilities. Austria had antagonised Russia for the last time and Russia was soon happy to see Austrian troops defeated by the French/Italians and soon after by the Prussians, leading the way to Italian and German unification. The French were happy to witness the breakup of the Holy Alliance, and after the creation of the Dual Alliance, the relationship between Prussia/Germany, Austria, and Russia would never be the same again; in the end this led to the Franco-Russian alliance that would become the Entente. Lastly, the changes made in the Balkans were never truly finalized as the needs/wants of the population in the Balkans was hardly taken into consideration. Thus, it was only a question of when rather than if a future war would break out in the powder keg of Europe. Additionally, Russia was forever changed as Alexander II took the throne in the midst of war, brought the war to an end, and freed the serfs, thereby changing the course of Russian history in the coming decades.

For all the strengths that Figes brought to this study of the Crimean War, and there were many, there were also a few weaknesses. They by no means take away from the numerous strengths, but they are worth mentioning as Figes is a historian new to military history and at times it seems he makes exaggerations and unfair criticisms without all the relevant/needed information at his disposal. Initially I was somewhat skeptical when the author claimed that the Crimean war was the “first ‘total war’” (xix). Considering the studies available on ‘total war’ I would say that’s very much stretching the definition. While both civilians and soldiers took part, and this was a war very much reliant on industry and, to an extent, the home front, claiming this to be a ‘total war’ is an exaggeration, at best. Figes also inserts a limited discussion of the Russian military, at one point concentrating on the fact that many casualties within the Russian army were a result of disease and death from wounds (due to lacking sanitary conditions). While such accusations are true, Figes makes it seem as if only the Russians suffered from such inadequacies on the field of battle. Yet, throughout the various battles that he discusses (Alma, Inkerman, Siege of Sevastopol) the French and British suffer just as much as the Russians from disease and unsanitary conditions for their wounded. Such initial descriptions of the Russian army are weak as there are no comparisons made and at best the analysis is superficial.

Dealing with the Devil: Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Cooperation During the Second World War by Donal O'Sullivan

2011-04-12T13:50:00.000-07:00

Donal O'Sullivan has crafted a detailed and interesting narrative of the Anglo-Soviet cooperation during the Second World War. While not all of the topics discussed merit the same level of interest (at least not for me), there is enough presented to showcase how much we still do not know, keeping in mind that we're talking about an event that's more than sixty years past. Initial chapter discuss the relative relationship between the British and the Soviets on the eve of the war, followed by a chapter detailing the 'main players' on both sides. Knowing the background and future of these men gives some insight into their character and actions throughout the war.

The more interesting chapters of the book deal with the 'Pickaxe' agents sent by the Soviets to England to be flown into Europe for clandestine operations. 'Operation Mamba', where the British hoped to utilize Soviet POWs - these men were captured by the Germans, then joined the Wehrmacht (for one reason or another), and were in turn captured by the allies after the invasion of Normandy - and insert them behind enemy lines for sabotage operations. Lastly, enlightening was the overall discussion of the 'Red Orchestra' and how this 'entity' was utilized by all sides for their own needs, an organization that in the end proved to have been nothing but smoke and mirrors when archival materials became available for scrutiny.

With 'Pickaxe', the author allows the reader to see in essence how desperate the situation was for the Soviets. They put their trust in the British to get their agents (none were Soviet citizens, all were foreigners - Germans, Austrians, etc.) to mainland Europe for clandestine operations. Unfortunately, the majority of these agents were just not prepared well enough, did not have the mental capacity to pursue espionage work, and at times even lacked proper documentation. German counter-intelligence operations, which utilized captured agents, were much more successful and regularly outwitted the NKVD on the Soviet side (even when warnings signals were being sent over by captured agents).

'Operation Mamba' was something new. One regularly hears about Soviets being drafted into the Wehrmacht to fulfill one role or another, but after being captured by the allies not much more is heard about them until it comes to repatriation to the Soviet Union. Here, the author offers a glimpse into British SOE planning for a few dozen Soviets, including their training, the impression they made on their British handlers, etc. Unfortunately, nothing came of these plans as the Soviets vigorously protested such actions on the part of the British.

Lastly, the 'celebrity' reputation the 'Red Orchestra' enjoys today in the history of the Second World War is based in myth and exaggeration. The majority of those assumed to have been part of the organization were in truth independent agents. Unfortunately, because many of these agents were communists with similar views living in the same country, they were aware of each other and gave each other up when caught and interrogated. The Germans first used the idea of a 'Red Orchestra' in the post-war period when offering their services to the British. They exaggerated the intelligence apparatus of the Soviets to increase their worth in the eyes of the allies. The allies, in turn, did the same to increase government funding against the 'Red Menace' and the Soviets never cared to correct them as having your new Cold War enemies view your assets in Europe as a credible threat was better than knowing the truth.

Overall, this is an excellent addition to literature on clandestine operations in the Second World War and a little known collaboration between the Soviets and British. The only flaw is the fact that not all documents and documentation on these operations have been released, especially from the Soviet side. The author is forced to rely solely on what is available, which leaves many questions as of yet unanswered. But, he can hardly be blamed for that.

EASTERN INFERNO: The Journals of a German Panzerjager on the Eastern Front, 1941-43 edited by Christine Alexander and Mason Kunze

2011-01-02T17:37:00.000-08:00

A diary from a Wehrmacht soldier participating in the invasion of the Soviet Union is an extremely rare find, especially one this forthcoming. Hans Roth's notes, commentary, descriptions, and candid portray of the fighting on the Eastern Front are a necessity for those interested in the clash between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Most importantly, as pointed out by the editors, the grandson and granddaughter of the author, this diary was written by Roth as the events he described were unfolding, not years or decades after-the-fact. Thus, what we have before us is a depiction of the author's thoughts with little if any self-censorship. The editorial notes, evident throughout the text, on the other hand, are a mixed bag. At times they are helpful but there is also evidence of the editors’ naiveté when it comes to the Eastern Front, i.e. assigning Soviet victory outside Moscow in 1941/42 to 'General Winter' and 'Siberian' divisions. Furthermore, there are quite a few editing mistakes throughout the text. Not enough to take away from the reading, but enough to be noticed on a more or less regular basis.

While what Roth sees is limited to his field of vision, there is still some validity in knowing his train of thought at any given moment. For instance, before the invasion of the Soviet Union I was surprised to read that on June 15, 1941, Roth posits that "Russian scouts were on our side of the river [Bug] last night..." (23) Having read on the Eastern Front for over a decade, I have yet to encounter any discussion of Soviet scout missions behind German lines before June 22nd, especially considering the fact that Stalin and the Soviet high command regularly had orders going out that no provocation(s) should be made against German forces. On June 17 the author writes "I now know the date of the attack" (24). This is interesting to note as it shows until what day the exact date of the invasion was, at the very least, kept from soldiers. As the date of the invasion approaches the author is excited that "The greatest battle of all times will start the day after tomorrow!" (25) It then takes three months of fighting for the author to exclaim, "When will this horrible war find its end..." (110) A statement made not in the midst of battle, but during a time of self-reflection after the Kiev encirclement is over.

Roth also exhibits evidence of the racist mentality that so many in the Wehrmacht undoubtedly entered the Soviet Union with. Trying to figure out how Soviet forces made it into Lutsk to attack his unit (after the town and its environs had been already captured by the Germans), he calls Red Army soldiers "sub-humans", "Caucasian monsters", "Asian tundra scum", and an "Asian mob" who "is sly and cunning" (31, 53, 131, 133, 161). Additionally, upon seeing some of the first casualties of the invasion, a young woman and two small children, during the first day of war, he exclaims "How wonder it is that we are able to exterminate these murderous beats. How good it is that we have pre-empted them; for in the coming weeks these bloodhounds might have been standing on German soil" (27). Here we also see the idea that the war was a pre-emptive one was very much part of the reasoning at least some soldiers used for the invasion of the Soviet Union. In general Roth displays a wide variety of attitudes toward his Red Army counterparts, many of which can be found in a variety of German memoirs (from soldiers to generals/field marshals). He discusses the precision with which Soviet soldiers are shooting at his unit, which "could have only been learned through intensive training" (67), and labels Red Army soldiers "...a dull, indifferent, soulless machine of destruction and death" who are "masters" "at digging themselves in" (51, 58).

There is also evidence that while the German invasion was a surprise, the Soviets, be they border guards or Red Army soldiers, did put up fierce resistance where they could. The entry for June 22nd also discusses how German soldiers were "...pressed hard by enemy tanks" and had to retreat with "many casualties" (27). A similar incident occurs on July 10 when an entire German infantry regiment takes "enormous...casualties" and has to retreat to its starting positions (49). (The same day a portion of the regiment is encircled by the Red Army.) On June 24, while clearing out a Soviet village, the author notes "the number of our own casualties is...high" and discusses how one house after another "must be cleansed with hand grenades" as "Fanatics fire at us until the roofs collapse over their heads and they are buried under the rubble" (28-29). Already, three days after the war begins, there is evidence of Soviet activities behind German lines as the author notes the small battles to the rear of the front and convoys being attacked by enemy forces. On June 25 Roth writes he is already "spiritually and physically totally exhausted!" (30) And as early as July 13, the author writes "We have almost reached the end of our fighting strength" (56). Interestingly, there are numerous mentions made about the Soviet air force, both bombers and fighters, harassing Roth's unit. Usually, Soviet accounts are filled with a longing for the air force to do something, simply be present. Perhaps the fact that the author is describing actions occurring in the sector of Army Group South, opposite of which were some of the larger Soviet concentrations, might explain the regular presence of the Soviet air force during the first few days of the war.

More than once the author mentions the precarious position he and his division find themselves in. It is hard to know for sure if the author's observations are accurate, but if they are then German actions need to be analyzed more thoroughly throughout the entirety of 1941. On July 9, the author claims his division has advanced so far that it will take at least an entire day for reinforcements to catch up, meanwhile the entirety of the Soviet 5th Army is standing opposite a lone German division. Roth begins to question the Soviets, "Are the Russians going to miss their big chance once again? Don't they know that their opponents are nothing more than small combat forces?" (48) The next day the author thanks the presence of heavy artillery for protecting his unit's flanks, otherwise "...the Russians would have rolled over our entire front line from the flanks" (49).

The battle sequences described are not always full of the detail that some will be looking for. That is understandable since in the midst of battle few can remember the exact details of what transpired as they are fighting for their lives. Time might either slow down during prolonged artillery exchanges, or an hour long battle might be over in the blink of an eye. Both are present in Roth's diaries; especially interesting accounts are offered in the fighting for Kiev, the immense pressure the Germans are put under by both the Soviet Air Force and continuous artillery fire. Some of the stories representative of the Red Army and partisans are hearsay while others are more believable, although some context is undoubtedly missing. For instance, the author recounts how two Red Army soldiers, the last of a 'wave' attempting to reach their target (a bridge), retreat and are mowed down by their own side. While order 227 during Stalingrad created 'blocking detachments' from NKVD troops, Red Army forces themselves were creating blocking detachments during the summer of 1941 from 'reliable' soldiers with orders that unauthorized retreats should be stopped. Keeping that in mind, this episode is quite believable.

June 26 becomes witness to the first war crime described by Roth. The initial entry of German troops into the city of Lutsk presented them with a gruesome sight, prisoners massacred by retreating NKVD troops. Roth then describes how "comrades" pulled out hiding Red Army soldiers and Jews from their hiding places and executed them (31). More interesting is the fact that Roth knew what was going on in the rear areas with Jews. During his stay in Kiev, when the executions of Babi Yar were taking place, he has an exchange with "a young SS soldiers [sic]" of the "kill commando", who tells the author of how "they 'freed' all the larger cities which were touched by our advance of the Jewish population" (111). What follows are the well known descriptions of mass executions that took place in Zhitomir. But the author admits he was "astonished" to learn about these activities taking place in the rear; he writes that "we soldiers in the first attack wave have never thought about the stuff that happens behind us in the cities we leave..."

Roth's recounting of the logistical problems his unit and the German army in general experience from the mud and cold are enlightening. Usually, it is taken as a given that the rainy weather of October held up German forces by disabling their mobility. But Roth also provides evidence that while in some areas of the front the roads became frozen by intermittent periods of frost, areas to the rear were still suffering from muddy roads. Thus, while German forces at the front might have been ready to advance, their logistical difficulties, a result of countless trucks stuck in the mud, made it impossible to advance until the winter more or less began on November 15. And on that day the author writes: "It is finally here; the ground is frozen solid. We can start" (123).

The last journal is the least detailed of the three in terms of dates (it covers June 1942-May 1943). Some of the entries are listed either under months or locations (unlike in the first two journals, where entries are listed under specific dates). There is a lot of self-reflection about the war, rear-area troops and the disdain frontline soldiers have for them, and the countless actions the author finds himself in with the enemy on a day-to-day basis. His exhaustion, and that of his comrades, is readily evident on every page, at times in every paragraph.

For those interested in aspects of combat on the Eastern Front (especially detailed scenes are depicted of the fighting for Kiev in 1941, Voronezh in 1942, and Orel in early 1943), the ‘holocaust by bullets’ that was perpetrated in the east, and the ‘daily life’ of soldiers and civilians (men and women on both counts), this is a must read.

The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin by Stephen F. Cohen

2010-12-18T12:36:00.001-08:00

Cohen's new book concentrates on a project he began decades ago when the Soviet Union was still around. In part such an undertaking was facilitated by Cohen's connections through Anna Larina, Bukharin's widow, whose biography Cohen wrote. This is a small book, less than two hundred pages of text, but I believe it should be looked at as something of an introduction to a field that has become eclipsed by other aspects of Soviet history (similar to Holocaust studies where much of the attention is focused on those who died, so studies of the Gulag often focus on those who did not survive, and if they do focus on those that survived we hear little about what happened once they were released). Cohen is limited by the circle Gulag returnees he meets in that many of them were intellectuals - writers, part of the Soviet nomenklatura/bureaucracy, sons and daughters of generals and old Bolsheviks, etc. While Cohen managed to interview dozens of these survivors, their stories are still a microcosm of what millions of others went through. Nevertheless, these men and women are still part of Soviet and today's Russian society and make up a voice that regularly breaks through the censorship that was reinstated during Brezhnev's tenure and some wish was still in place today.

While the book begins with the author recounting how he was able to stumble into this topic and how he eventually meets personalities like Roy Medvedev, Anton Antonov-Ovseyenko, among many others, soon enough we're introduced to Cohen's observations of the role these survivors played in Khrushchev's Thaw and, eventually, Gorbachev's total renunciation of Stalin's crimes. An interesting comparison comes to light in the rule of Khrushchev with that of Putin (although Cohen himself does not make such a comparison). While Khrushchev did much to help anti-Stalinist sentiment become the norm, not to mention the rehabilitation of many of Stalin's victims and their release from the Gulag, his tenure also witnessed the rejection of publications like Grossman's "Life and Fate", and the omitting of many of his own crimes. Similarly, Putin's reign has been a contradictory view of Russia's Stalinist past. While some history school books are reevaluating Stalin's rule to show how important it was for the Soviet state, Putin also made it mandatory to read Solzhenitsyn's "The Gulag Archipelago" and invited Poland's prime minister to join him in a memorial service at Katyn. As Cohen points out, "...no nation can flourish without at least a minimally consensual past to inspire it" (pg. 174). Thus, the ambiguous nature of Putin's presidency can be viewed as a microcosm of Russia attempting to deal with a past in perpetual flux, regularly debated about by those who see Stalin as in need of rehabilitation himself and those who want to place the entirety of the disasters the Soviet Union witnessed in the 1930s and 1940s squarely on his shoulders (although these are obviously representative of the extreme views, there are a wide variety of others).

One of the author's strengths is to keep an open mind about the materials he is working with and often attempt to be objective and not judge, either the victims or the perpetrators. As becomes apparent, while many of us would like to see the interrogators, prosecutors, judges, and anyone else who was implicit in the denunciation, arrest, torture, sentencing, and even death of millions of innocent Soviet citizens put on trial, few take into consideration what the families of these men and women have been through or will go through once their names are released for the judgment of the world. As a case in point, when Anna Larina meets the daughter of Bukharin's interrogator, she claims that both men were victims of the Stalinist system. Eventually, we learn that this interrogator was himself shot soon after his interrogation of Bukharin and his daughter was placed in an orphanage. It is a fact that many of the perpetrators were themselves eventual victims of a system they helped create and sustain. In the end, while this book is far from perfect, it is an interesting starting point for a discussing on policies of the Soviet Union during the Cold War as well as contemporary Russia, especially seen through the eyes of Gulag returnees.

The Soviet Union at War, 1941-1945 Edited by David Stone

2010-12-12T15:49:00.000-08:00

This edited volume by David Stone presents eight separate articles by a number of well known historians of the Soviet Union. All are academics and, as Stone explains in the introduction, they have "not focus narrowly on their own work, but instead synthesize the findings of many scholars to improve our general understanding of the Soviet Union at war." Herein lies the strength and weakness of this volume. Aside from the fact that no original research is being presented, there are also no operational histories of the war here. The topics dealt with are either investigations of the homefront or Soviet institutions. While each essay is helpful in that it traces changes and continuities from before The Great Patriotic War to after, the fact that operational analysis is omitted, in my opinion, does more harm that good. Yes, operational histories of the Eastern Front have appeared in larger numbers since the fall of the Soviet Union, but taking those histories and putting them into a greater context would have created a better foundation for analysis than omitting them. The weaknesses I have in mind go hand in hand with a lack of operational analysis as a few times well known myths and generalizations of the war are repeated. The real strength of this volume, for me, is that it can be used as a starting point for an analysis of the Soviet Union during the Second World War for those new to the topic, specifically, college students (both graduates and undergraduates). Each chapter offers a selection of titles under the heading "Recommended Reading" and the endnotes are also quite helpful in offering those interested in further research.

The topics covered by this volume begin with Mark Harrison's chapter on the "Industry and Economy" of the Soviet Union during the war. Harrison is able to contextualize the collectivization the Soviet Union underwent in the 1930s while exploring the Soviet mentality behind the program itself and the results the state reaped during its confrontation with Nazi Germany. In some ways as Hitler was trying to prevent some of the variables Germany encountered in the First World War, Stalin was trying to do the same. As Harrison explains, urban famine was avoided throughout the state (aside from Leningrad), "but supplies to the army, the defence industry, and the urban population were protected. This outcome was the opposite of the experience of the First World War - and it was the intended result of collectivization" (24). Furthermore, the fact that Soviet industry could produce tens of thousands of tanks and planes during the 1930s created conditions for mass mobilization of industry during the war, which resulted in enormous production runs of various weapons systems even while the Soviet Union was under enormous pressure from the Germans and in the midst of evacuating thousands of its factories to the east. The reasons Harrison sees as responsible for the Soviet economy not collapsing in 1941 are "...the pre-war Soviet preparations for war, Stalin's successful exploitation of national feeling and repression to hold the war effort together, and the provision of Allied assistance in large quantities and its effective utilization" (41). There isn't too much room devoted to Lend Lease and its impact on the Soviet war effort, but as stated above, this is a good starting point for further research for those interested in the topic.

Richard Bidlack's article on "Propaganda and Public Opinion" discusses how authorities attempted to shape the attitudes and behavior of the public, while public opinion discusses a populations's "core identities and loyalties" (45). In discussing the beginning period of the Second World War Bidlack generalizes and narrows down the years 1939-1941 (before the German invasion of the Soviet Union) to a paragraph with a simplified view of Soviet foreign policy encompassed in the following sentence, "Between 1939 and 1941 the USSR was a major belligerent in the war, allied with Germany" (47). Bidlack also repeats Beevor's baseless claim that 13,500 Red Army soldiers were executed during the battle of Stalingrad (62). Overall, Bidlack's article discusses how Soviet propaganda used the image of Stalin, how the press attempted to instill a selfless devotion to the state, be it on the frontline or the homefront, as well as how it called on the population to take revenge on the "German invaders" for their actions in occupied Soviet territory. In the end, Bidlack is correct in that there is no "collective 'Soviet public opinion'" (64). The majority of the Soviet state fought in the war and worked on the homefront to achieve a victory over Nazi Germany and few outright opposed the Soviet state. While there were organizations like Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army, many who joined did so as an alternative to almost certain death rather than simply a chance to take up arms against the Soviet Union. As Bidlack explains, "The large majority of Russian military personnel and civilians displayed tremendous fortitude in carrying out the orders they were given to defend their country in the most difficult circumstances, and relatively few seem to have openly objected to the use of harsh repressive measures against law-breakers" (65).

Nicholas Ganson's essay discusses "Food supply, rationing, and living standards." But it seems much of the information he offers comes from William Moskoff's "The Bread of Affliction" (27 out of 90 endnotes are from Moskoff's book). He offers a rather superficial analysis of the treatment of German POWs in Soviet captivity saying that "The Soviet treatment of German prisoners in many ways mirrored the German treatment of Soviet POWs" (79). But without adequate context of the operational history of the war, this says next to nothing about the difficulties the Germans faced on the Eastern Front (specifically, the condition of German troops when they surrendered at Stalingrad was a greater reason for so few returning after the war than their treatment by the Red Army and Soviet authorities) or the fact that the Soviet Union was hard pressed to feed its own population, less so that of an enemy bent on genocide. Furthermore, Ganson's analysis of lend lease supplies of food is deceptive as it is not broken down by year and/or delivery to the frontlines, saying "...each Soviet soldier would have received approximately 100kg of food a year through Lend-Lease" (86) is not accurate if there is no information offered as to how much food was sent each year and how much actually arrived (two rather separate and distinct numbers that need to be analyzed but are not). Ganson's article in some ways works in tandem with Harrison's as it discusses how collectivization/industrialization helped create the food supply situation the Soviet Union utilized during the war. Lastly, in discussing the hardships the Soviet population endured, Ganson says there was a "silver lining" in that the difficulties of the 1930s "...also made it easier for the people of the Soviet Union to cope with the appalling conditions during the Second World War" (89). Thus, the question comes to mind: could the Soviet Union have survived the onslaught Nazi Germany unleashed on June 22, 1941, if they had not gone through the physical and mental deprivations of the 1930s (not to mention the industrialization campaign, etc.)?

The chapter on "Women" written by Reina Pennington is an excellent synthesis of some of the newest literature on the role women played in the Soviet Union's war against Germany. Pennington analyses the "pre-war environment" and how women were able to participate on a semi-equal basis with men in civilian military training, which included sharpshooting and parachuting. With the outbreak of war scores of women volunteered for frontline service but whether they were accepted into the military, and what role they would play, often depended on the local situation they found themselves confronting. As a sidenote, Anna Krylova's recent book on Soviet women during WWII expands greatly on this aspect of the war. I would highly recommend it for those interested in how gender discourse was utilized by the Soviet Union to propagate a perceived equality of gender roles but at the same time relegate women to something still separate and distinct from Soviet notions of "masculinity." Women in the Red Army served in a variety of positions - from medics and signal troops, to snipers, airplane pilots, navigators and mechanics, as well as tank drivers and anti-aircraft gunners - and their sacrifice, while regularly lauded in propaganda reports for mass consumption, was still not enough to create an atmosphere of equality at the front and in the rear (for instance, for all the women who partook in fighting on the frontline, only 95 were ever awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union", compared to 11,500 of their male counterparts - this represents less than 1 percent, while women made up 8 percent of the military) (103). This chapter is one of the more interesting and revealing of the Soviet Union at war, and an excellent starting point for further research and analysis.

David Stone's article deals with the institution of the "Red Army", including highlighting the role of GKO and STAVKA. Stone beings with a brief description of the historiography of the Eastern Front and its dominance by German accounts and memoirs (something David Glantz has previously written on). Then Stone discusses the Winter War and the ensuring reforms the Red Army underwent (Timoshenko reforms). Unfortunately, these were too little and too late to make any kind of difference before Barbarossa began in June of 1941. Soviet doctrine continually emphasized an offensive mindset and this is best evidenced by the initial orders after the German invasion, which tasked the Red Army with unrealistic counterattacks rather than a fighting withdrawal to prepared defenses. Stone also discusses the system of Commissars, the initial creation of guards units, the reduction in the size of Red Army units in 1941 to facilitated better command and control (and to better allocate scare resources, i.e. tanks and planes), as well as the role of STAVKA representatives. One of the weaknesses in this chapter is the author's reliance on the disproven idea that the Red Army in the summer of 1942 fought a fighting retreat on the approaches to Stalingrad (137), something David Glantz has addressed in his first volume on Stalingrad (released last year). Finally, in the latter part of the war Stone discusses how Soviet production once again influenced the size of units as previous tank brigades were combined into corps and armies (the same occurred in the air force), and other units, like sapper armies, were dissolved into smaller units as defensive oriented operations once more gave way to offensive minded thinking. This is another of the better chapters this volume has to offer and provides an excellent foundation for further research into the Red Army as an institution.

The author of "Stalin's Guerrillas", Kenneth Slepyan, wrote the chapter on the partisan movement. Slepyan presents an interesting synthesis of the partisan movement (akin to what Pennington did for women). Once again, there are no new revelations to be found in these chapters, but the questions raised about the ethics and morality of those fighting on the side of the Soviet Union or independently make for interesting contemplation. The first section of the chapter deals with the Soviet historiography of the partisan movement and how the state crafted the narrative to be used when writing about partisans (Slepyan discusses how when he was doing research he discovered a list of "forbidden" subjects that historians were supposed to omit from their written work). One of the problems with working on the partisan movement is that while there is a good amount of archival work, a large amount of information will probably never be known since many partisan groups were destroyed without ever leaving any records. What we do know about partisan operations are a microcosm from which we can, to a degree, extrapolate to give a better contextual understanding of the war in the rear. Slepyan discusses the partisan movement from its rushed beginning in 1941, to its emergence in force in 1942/43 and its eventual dissolution in 1944/45, the role Red Army men (escaped from encirclements) played in its coalescence as a force to be reckoned with, to that of the party and how the Moscow center attempted to control units far on the periphery, as well as the treatment of "outsiders", that is Jews, women, the elderly, collaborators, etc. In the end, a very interesting and in-depth synthesis.

One of the less interesting chapters covered "The Soviet Countryside" and concentrated on peasants, written by Jean Levesque. Perhaps it's my own bias, but in some ways I saw this chapter being the most removed from the war that was going on. It probably did not help that a good portion of the chapter analyzes events pre- and post-WWII. The last chapter, written by Jeremy Smith, discusses the "Non-Russian Nationalities" and their role in both the war and on the homefront. From German policies toward non-Russians to collaboration with German forces, forced relocation during the war, to the role of nationalities within the Red Army. While this was an interesting chapter, I could see it carrying more weight if a greater amount of attention was paid to the actual events of the war (an in-depth operational analysis of where national units fought, their experiences, and their contributions to the war effort would have been greatly appreciated). Unfortunately, aside from a few cursory mentions of some units being praised or lauded for their actions, not much is offered. Many know well enough about Stalin's deportations of the Chechens, Crimean Tatars, etc., and it should be mentioned that Smith is quite objective in how he portrays the actions of the state in regards to these events, but the contributions of non-Russian nationalities (especially units created specifically of non-Russians) is an interesting topic that deserves more attention, research, and analysis.

That pretty much covers this edited volume. Quite a few interesting chapters (even if some were lacking here and there) and, as pointed out, a very good starting point for discussions of several controversial subjects that have recently received some attention but deserve much more. Recommended for those interested in any of the above topics, especially if new to this subject area and interested in sources for further research.

Red Sniper on the Eastern Front: The Memoirs of Joseph Pilyushin

2010-12-03T16:21:00.000-08:00

Unlike many memoirs, which feature soldiers and officers recalling their wartime experiences without much observation of the environment around them, in the case of Pilyushin, it sometimes feels as you are reading the account of a naturalist, rather than a book about war on the Eastern Front. But all too often, the realities of combat will once more intrude and thoughts of this being anything but a true narrative of war disappear. Few authors have Pilyushin's literary or artistic ability to portray the juxtaposition of man-made war and how it both clashes with and lives alongside nature on a consistent basis. In examining details that most would readily overlook, Pilyushin paints a picture that's often hard to forget and gives the reader the feeling of being right there with him, be it on the front fighting off another German attack or in the swamps/forests of northern Russia waiting for a target to present itself. It should also be mentioned that despite being first published in the Soviet Union in the late 1950s, Pilyushin’s memoir is remarkably free of propaganda and hymns to the Party. He makes it very clear that he considers the men and women of Leningrad, and the soldiers that defended the city, the real heroes.

While this is a sniper's memoir, on more than a few occasions we witness snipers fighting as part of a regular defensive line with other troops, be they riflemen or machine gunners. Furthermore, the author himself took part in fighting tanks with grenades and Molotov-cocktails when the need arose and even went out on reconnaissance missions, something that I'm beginning to see was regularly undertaken by troops with little training (but that does not mean they weren't successful). It needs to also be mentioned that Pilyushin himself is something of a rarity because he loses his right eye and has to train himself to use a sniper rifle with his left eye after recovering.

The actions described throughout 1941, when the Wehrmacht was still attempting to advance on Leningrad, allow for an examination of defensive operations where artillery, engineers and the Soviet Air Force (VVS) were regularly supporting Red Army infantrymen in their struggle with the Germans. This is interesting to note as often times recollections from 1941 note the absence of combined arms operations (granted, this is mainly in reference to offensive operations) and a lack of air support by the VVS. Furthermore, often enough when encountering accounts from 1941, there is usually the perception that the Red Army was regularly 'outclassed' by their Wehrmacht opponents on a regular basis in terms of tactics. But Pilyushin shows that Red Army officers and soldiers were consistently able to set up ambushes for the Germans to fall into as early as the summer of 1941. It might be that the densely wooded terrain of northern Russia helped as well as the fact that Army Group North was the weakest of the three German army groups operating on the Eastern Front, but such accounts are instrumental in showcasing the abilities of Soviet officers and soldiers in the early period of the war.

One of the more humorous episodes recounted, once more from 1941, included the author with a reconnaissance team taking prisoner two men at night only to find out they were Soviet cadets escaping enemy encirclement. Another episode, which speaks to the mindset of Red Army soldiers and officers, was an exchange between a battalion commander and his company commanders. With a German tank attack and an enemy infantry battalion arrayed against them, the Red Army battalion commander was contemplating their next move. One of his company commanders became convinced the best course of action was to attack the Germans, killing as many of them as possible while sacrificing his life. In response, the battalion commander had to remind him that it was not only his life he was sacrificing, but that of his men as well. Considering the doses of Soviet propaganda the citizens of the USSR were exposed to, it should come as no surprise that individual men (and perhaps even women) were ready to risk their lives and inadvertently that of their soldiers for the defense of their motherland, and perhaps even their system of government. One cannot label such men cowards, on the contrary, their ability to readily offer their lives as a sacrifice should be acknowledged and lauded, but the fact that they could not see past their own sacrifice to that of their soldiers needs to be recognized as well. In offering up the ultimate sacrifice, their lives, they inadvertently also expose the lives of their soldiers. In some ways this might explain the numerous casualties Red Army troops took throughout the war (not forgetting that there were ignorant officers and commissars who readily let others risk their lives while saving their own) and the cults that developed post-WWII of 'heroes' and their 'sacrifices' for their motherland.

Additionally, Pilyushin recalling the various conversations about retreats also gives some insight into the mentality of both Red Army men and civilians in regards to withdrawals. It seems that the mentality the majority shared when it came to retreats was that any retreat was defeatist and should be avoided. A fighting retreat, which shortens the frontline or avoids encirclement, obviously cannot be considered the same as a headlong flight for the rear by panicked troops. Yet without a Soviet propaganda apparatus to discuss and explain away such actions, many on the frontlines and in the rear, it seems, simply lamented that any retreat reinforced the idea that the Germans were winning and Red Army soldiers were not holding themselves accountable for their actions.

Aside from descriptions of battles and the day-to-day conversations of soldiers in a combat environment, Pilyushin gives ample space and time to his visits to besieged Leningrad when either attempting to visit his family or when he was wounded. At one point the author receives a three day pass to visit his family. What follows is without a doubt one of the most emotional scenes I've ever read from the war. As well, what Leningraders in general were made to go through is given a brief description. While it is mentioned more than once that Leningrad is a dozen or so kilometers behind the battles on the frontline that the majority of the memoir is focused on, the real meaning behind those words is hard to understand without an actual 'visit' to the city. Additionally, the losses Pilyushin's unit sustains throughout the war also makes for difficult reading; these men and women who readily put their lives on the line pass in and out of Pilyushin's life all too quickly with only his memory of them serving as a reminder for what the war cost the families of the Soviet Union. I'm very impressed with the quality of memoirs that have recently been translated/published dealing with the Eastern Front, and this one makes for a great addition, highly recommended!

Bloodlands by Timothy Snyder

2010-10-30T20:01:00.000-07:00

Attempting to write about the 'bloodlands', Timothy Snyder chooses a route few others have taken: a view of the dictatorships of Stalin and Hitler through their treatment of minorities - Ukrainians, Belorussians, Balts, Poles, and Jews. But in so doing, more often than not, the author misses the forest for the trees. Specifically, Snyder generalizes too much.

As with a few other recent titles, this volume is a synthesis of research done by other authors and scholars over the past two decades, and at times it is evident how much more we know about the German side of this time period than the Soviet. Snyder deals with a plethora of secondary literature on a subject that has a growing amount of coverage in extensive detail on the topics he chooses to cover. Therefore, there is little new/original information being presented, but the liberties the author takes with the information he has at hand makes me question his reasons for writing this volume.

The introduction sets the stage for the rest of the book. Snyder claims the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were "allies" in the period between 1939 and 1941, at which point the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. This is akin to claiming the Germans were allies of Poland after they signed a non-aggression pact, the Poles and Soviets were allies after they signed a non-aggression pact, and the same can be argued for the Soviet Union and Japan due to their non-aggression pact. Considering that during the invasion of Poland the Red Army regularly issued orders to curb episodes of combat/violence between Red Army forces and the Wehrmacht, and the role Germany played in supplying Finland during the Winter War, this assertion is not based on factual evidence or reality (pg. x). One could argue that the 'secret protocols' were only evident in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact thus making it a different type of 'non-aggression pact', but such a simplification of history ignores the fact that it was the Soviet Union who championed a coalition against Hitler before 1939, when the western allies let the Germans re-militarize the Rhineland, annex Austria, and dismember and then invade Czechoslovakia. Does this not make France and England allies of Germany?

Snyder claims that "...Stalin allowed Hitler to begin a war" (pg. xi). Where is the context? Stalin had no knowledge of what Hitler planned to do after the signing of the non-aggression pact, and there is little evidence that if the pact was not signed Hitler would not have gone ahead with the invasion of Poland, which was already planned for and the Wehrmacht made ready. Just because "The Wehrmacht and Red Army both attacked Poland in September 1939..." (omitted are when the respective attacks occurred) doesn't mean it was an operation the Soviets planned for when the non-aggression pact was signed.

In discussing the annexation of the Baltics, the author omits that this was a direct response to France's defeat (pg. xi). When mentioned once more on pgs. 141-142, no further details are provided aside to say that after France was defeated by the Germans, the Soviets extended their reach to the Baltics. Perhaps the minorities of the Baltics aren't as interesting for Snyder as Ukrainians, Belorussians, Poles, and Jews. Later on, Snyder also generalizes about intelligence on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union parroting the already familiar line that Stalin was told the invasion would take place and decided to ignore that information, leaving out the highly dubious and ambiguous nature of much of that intelligence and the German counter-intelligence operations taking place at the same time (pg. 165).

The author continually claims Stalin 'directed' the famine of 1932/33 (pg. xiv). More details on the famine can be found in the first chapter, unfortunately, aside from some well-known claims, the author mainly attempts to pull at heartstrings rather than investigate why the famine occurred. What happened during the famine defies words and imagination, calling it a tragedy devalues what truly went on as that kind of suffering is simply incomprehensible. But Snyder spends entirely too much time recounting events on the ground rather than analyzing what the center (in both Ukraine and the Soviet Union) was doing. Thus, saying that Stalin by November 1932 did not suspend food exports, release grain reserves (claimed as three million tons), or give peasants access to local grain storage areas, is sheer nonsense (pg. 42). R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, and S. G. Wheatcroft in their article "Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-1933" (Slavic Review (vol. 54, no. 3)) outline well enough that the grain reserves were nowhere near 3 million (on July 1 1932 there were .641 million tons in the two main stocks that were supposed to be used for emergencies, all stocks (including grain that was in transit) amounted to 1.36 million tons). More so, grain collection plans were reduced while grain was being imported from Persia and transferred to the Far East. 1933 witnessed 1.99 million tons being reluctantly given up by the Politburo, out of a total of 2.2 million tons, to areas that were previously stripped of grain. This doesn't absolve the actions of either Stalin or the Politburo, but shows the trail one must follow in order to understand what happened during the famine. There are also many more variables that come into play than Snyder does not account for - for instance, the Soviets wanted a stock of some 1 million tons solely for the armed forces as they feared Japanese aggression in the Far East, unfortunately such a stock never appeared and the Far East suffered from the famine as well - but the bottom line is that instead of doing a balanced review of the evidence thus far available, the author regurgitates the emotionally abused version of the famine we have come to know well enough since the years of the Cold War.

Snyder's knowledge of Soviet foreign policy seems close to non-existent. No mention is made of Soviet moves against Nazi aggression on the continent before the signing of the non-aggression pact and he wholly omits the fact that Stalin wanted a defensive coalition against Hitler but the allies were dragging their feet. Once again he claims on pg. 116 that "...the Soviet Union had agreed to attack Poland along with Germany" yet offers no evidence to support this assertion. Considering that the non-aggression pact, including the secret protocols, said NOTHING about any invasion and the German move against Poland on September 1 was a surprise to Stalin and the Soviets, this is a preposterous claim. Snyder also claims there was a "joint victory parade" when the invasion of Poland was over, this idea of a joint parade has been contested. The only evidence for it are a few pictures which show German forces entering a town and Soviet forces leaving (the German band, the only indication that this was a 'parade', stood at attention, not playing their instruments, when the Soviets were leaving, meaning they only played when the Germans entered). The author then horribly simplifies the clash at Khalkhin Gol between Japan and the Soviet Union claiming simply that "The Soviets (and their Mongolian allies) attacked Japanese (and their puppet Manchukuo) forces at a contested border area..." (pg. 116). At worst, the Japanese were just as guilty as the Soviets, but if you were expecting to see some detailed coverage of the situation, you'd have been mistaken. A generalized paragraph is all you'll get. It appears that Snyder's concentration on Hitler and Stalin is a weakness for "Bloodlands" as he leaves out the rest of Europe, or at best downplays their actions, while disproportionately enhancing those of Stalin and Hitler.

Similar to his knowledge of Soviet foreign policy, Snyder's knowledge of Soviet military matters is severely lacking. He readily introduces the oft-repeated idea about Siberian troops coming to the rescue in late November/early December 1941 outside Moscow. In fact, divisions from the Far East had been on the move as early as late June of 1941. By November 20th, 17 divisions were either ordered to move west or were already facing German forces, contrary to Snyder's statement that "On 24 November 1941 Stalin ordered his strategic reserves from the Soviet East into battle against Army Group Center of the Wehrmacht" (pg. 210).

When discussing the numbers of Poles (mainly Jews) who refused Soviet passports (pg. 141) and were deported to the East, Snyder forgets that this deportation most likely saved their lives. This doesn't mean what these men, women, and children went through was something to look forward to, but it does put into perspective that post-war more than a few were happy they were deported and not outright killed by the Nazis after the invasion of the Soviet Union.

Throughout this text Snyder seems bent on creating a controversy but he lacks the evidence to do it well. For instance, on pg. 175 he conflates order 270, which threatened the families of officers and political workers with arrest if they deserted or "gave themselves up to the enemy", yet Snyder insists this applied to "Soviet prisoners of war", forgetting or omitting to differentiate between officers and enlisted men. Furthermore, again and again the reader is forced to read baseless and needless comparisons between the famine of 1933 - a famine Snyder never proves was pre-planned or truly man-made, even when attempting to show the government tried to use the famine he leaves out crucial context and facts - to the well planned in advance German starvation of Soviet prisoners of war. The author takes too many liberties with his comparisons and, at best, is reaching when he makes them, adding little to our knowledge of the events in question and in fact muddying and simplifying the context of the issues at hand. For example, on pg. 181 Snyder claims "For hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war, this was the second political famine in Ukraine in the space of eight years." What purpose does such a statement serve? It is superfluous at best, and Snyder presents as evidence the recollection of ONE Ukrainian prisoner of war who recalled the hunger of 1933. Extrapolating from limited evidence to suit your needs is NOT the job of an historian.

When discussing the actions of the Red Army during the Polish Warsaw Uprising, Snyder contends that the Red Army was "halted, by unexpectedly strong German resistance, just beyond Warsaw", but makes it seem as if the Red Army simply stood by and "watching the Germans defeat the Home Army" rather than describing the many attempts by both Soviet and Polish soldiers (under Red Army command) to help the uprising or the continued fighting against the Germans that was taking place all around Warsaw by various Red Army units (pg. 305, 312). Similarly, Snyder once again takes events that are well known and simply regurgitates them with eye-witness accounts for emotional effect, but backs away from any real analysis. This is evident with his descriptions of the Red Army on German territory (mentioning nothing of Soviet orders to curb violence against Germans and the penalties for Red Army soldiers who were caught). Furthermore, while the author mentions that the Soviets took German men (and sometimes women) as to perform labor in the Soviet Union, he omits to mention that this was done as agreed at Yalta and part of Germany's reparations to the Soviet Union.

A further claim I disagree with is Snyder's idea that Russia proper "was more distant from the experience of the war" and cannot be compared to the suffering experienced by Ukraine and Belorussia (pg. 336). While it is true that in terms of occupation Ukraine and Belorussia suffered greatly and in fact were 'totally occupied' by the Germans, Snyder never even mentions the Siege of Leningrad in this 'comparison' or the Leningrad region in general, which did stay under occupation for years rather than months (this also omits Rzhev, the Stalingrad area, etc.). Furthermore, in simplifying the experience of Ukraine as belonging solely to Ukrainians, or Belorussia as belonging solely to Belorussians, Snyder muddies the issue. Instead of taking away from the Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War, he is creating a new myth by omitting various events, episodes, or details and crafting generalizations.

Whatever benefits there are to "Bloodlands" as a study, they are highly diluted by the well evident liberties taken by the author with both the subject matter and the evidence at his disposal as well as the author's/publisher's decision to put endnotes at the end of entire paragraphs, listing all sources used, and thus leaving the reader wondering which ideas are Snyder’s and which belong to the author(s) he's listing. There are some interesting incites throughout the chapter on Stalinist terror ("Class Terror") in 1937/38, the chapter on "Resistance and Incineration" is also enlightening in regards to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the role of the Home Army, as well as some discussion of why Goebbels chose to propagandize Katyn when he did, but again, it becomes impossible to tell where some of the ideas originate. This is a difficult book to recommend because it leaves out too much and insists on drawing attention to tragedies without the proper context for an in-depth analysis. If you're interested in stories from the famine, there is plenty of literature on it. If you're interested in German policies in the east, plenty on that as well, and offered with an attention to detail that's all too often missing from this text.

Stronger than Iron. The Destruction of Vilna Jewry 1941 1945: An Eyewitness Account by Mendel Balberyszski

2010-10-08T10:36:00.001-07:00

Mendel Balberyszski's "Stronger Than Iron" is an engrossing, interesting, and at the same time painful reading experience. Painful in that while much of the text will keep you wanting more, select sections will make you put it down and contemplate what you've just read, reread sentences, paragraphs, or even entire pages in an effort to understand that what you're reading is not just fiction but an historical account of a people used, abused, and all too often simply killed. When a German in the Klooga concentration camp began to beat a Jewish doctor for being Jewish, the doctor responded with "Why are you hitting me?" That, in essence, is a reflection of the majority of the Jews and their attitude toward their treatment. These were people, professionals, middle class, working class, and even those well off who expected that life meant something to the Germans, if only in the form of slave labor. Who could contemplate that unending death and destruction awaited them at every turn without a logical reason? For many, the simple question "why?" had yet to be answered.

From the creation of the two Vilna ghettos until their destruction, Balberyszski gives us an account that surpasses a single memoir or reminiscence. He relates stories that he was told, witnessed, and heard about, which creates a greater depth to our understanding of everyday life in a ghetto. More so, he was on friendly terms with many in high positions, including both the ghetto police and the Judenrat. This created opportunities for obtaining jobs and food through his connections and even places to hide during the regular German 'cleansing actions.' Another aspect to this story is the continued hoops the Germans made Jews jump through, changing the color and type of document(s) they needed to survive the next "cleansing" process created a desperate need for the Jews to bargain with whatever they had and with whomever they could for the newest document in order to save themselves and their families. But always these documents were limited, so in the end some Jews had to remain 'illegals', even among their own. Throughout the entire story, what interested me were the interactions between the author and the Germans, Lithuanians, Russians, and Ukrainians. The majority of non-Jews encountered in the text were working with the Germans in one capacity or another, but among them we can find those who wanted and did help Jews and those who abused them at every opportunity. But the same can be said for some of the Jewish police in the ghetto itself, this was a time when everyone was desperate to save themselves and their loved ones. In one instance that instinct to save forced a woman to give up the hiding place of the author and dozens of others if only for the hope that an arrested relative was released.

It becomes difficult to describe some of what you'll encounter in this text. How easily we can read over stories that detail the escape of someone from the ghetto in order to save themselves and/or their families, and a few sentences later we're told their eventual death at the hands of the Germans came anyway. This is a book that needed to be written, and I'm thankful it came out in English translation as it gives new depth and understanding to how Jews lived and survived ghetto life, something often missing from the enormous literature on the Holocaust that concentrates on concentration and death camps rather than the ghettos.

Panzer Destroyer: Memoirs of a Red Army Tank Commander by Vasiliy Krysov

2010-09-12T19:01:00.000-07:00

While there are a few Red Army memoirs that have been translated into English of Red Army tankers, there has yet to be one, to my knowledge, on self-propelled artillerymen. German SP guns became something of a backbone to infantry operations and were produced in ever-greater numbers as they were cheaper than tanks and they could be built on already existing tank chassis. The same applies to the Red Army. In this instance, after training for a year in a tank school Vasiliy Krysov served first in a KV-1S heavy tank, and then took control of a platoon, followed by a battery of SU-122 artillery guns, then served in an SU-85 and finished the war in a T-34/85.

Overall, this is a fascinating account of what self-propelled artillery gunners faced on the field of battle. From the chaos of nighttime operations to overcoming entrenched enemy positions that showcase the ingenuity of Red Army soldiers and officers, from being caught in the open with a disabled vehicle and attempting to repair it while under enemy fire to witnessing fellow gunners burn in their machines or follow as sole survivors attempt to escape the fiery inferno their guns are turned into, from exhausting day and night marches and going without adequate food or sleep for days on end to how quickly bonds of brotherhood formed between officers and their men on and off the field of battle, all of this is recounted in candid detail. Even events that the author did not want to mention, like when he was put in charge of an investigation into the rape of a twelve-year-old German girl by three Red Army sergeants, he is open about in terms of the circumstances and the consequences of what happened. Lastly, it is widely known that Red Army armored forces lacked the radio communication their German counterparts enjoyed. Krysov regularly discusses how flags were used in conjunction with radio communication to direct operations on the field of battle during the war. Additionally, to help the reader with some of the engagements the author found himself in, there are schematics drawn, which greatly help to visualize what Krysov is discussing.

Krysov was an experienced SP gun commander, which I feel lends credence to the tanks and SP guns he claims to have encountered from his battles around Stalingrad, Kursk, Kiev, Fastov, Kovel, Poland, and East Prussia. Often enough there'll be references to Tigers and Panthers (and Ferdinands during his operations during the battle of Kursk), but considering the author's regiment faced the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and the 5th SS Panzer Division Wiking on a regular basis, there is more than enough evidence to suggest at least some of the encounters did occur. Some of the recollections might sound too good to be true as there might be an element of exaggeration, as there is with many accounts from the Second World War in general, but thanks to the editor (who's worked on quite a few previous Red Army memoirs, both as translator and editor) there are a few end notes to help guide the reader in the activities undertaken by the Germans, which regularly coincide with the descriptions offered by Kyrsov. The author is also deserving of credit as he does not fail to regularly mention the losses his own unit (and units he was operating in conjunction with) regularly sustained, as well as pointing out exaggerated German losses higher ranking Red Army officers officially penned in their reports. Recommended for those interested in the Eastern Front and armored troops/operations.

The Battle That Shook Europe: Poltava and the Birth of the Russian Empire by Peter Englund

2010-08-27T21:19:00.000-07:00

Being very much interested in Russian and military history, this was a book I had been meaning to read. In the end, I'm surprised and very much glad I finally got to it. Englund is an historian but this book was not written as per the usual guidelines for a historical monograph. There is no theory or methodology laid out nor is there an argument professed beyond the title of the book (Poltava marked the birth of the Russian Empire). That being said, this book is excellent for what it is and what it sets out to do. Aside from the campaign undertaken by Sweden against Russia, this book is also an excellent introduction to the history of warfare during the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The reasons for why the Swedish go to war, including political, economic, and military. The role officers and soldiers played on the field of battle, that of infantry, cavalry, grenadiers, standard-bearers, etc. The attention remains on that of the Swedish troops and officers so don't expect much in terms of the Russian side. Finally, the overall account of the battle is well written and relies on a plethora of sources, including a multitude of eye-witness accounts, which really makes this an engrossing read.

Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads by Fraser J. Harbutt

2010-08-05T12:53:00.001-07:00

Harbutt's book was published around the same time as S.M. Plokhy's "Yalta: The Price of Peace". If you're wondering which is the more interesting read, it's this one. While Plokhy used a greater amount of Russian/Soviet sources, Harbutt's analysis is miles ahead of Plokhy.

Fraser J. Harbutt's "Yalta 1945: Europe and America at the Crossroads" presents an analysis that disassociates itself from previous studies. The author initially presents a thick description of Allied diplomacy before addressing the conference itself. For Harbutt, where Yalta was presented as an Anglo-American (Western) bloc attempting to confront its Soviet (Eastern) bloc at the negotiating table, he argues that "Yalta was, in many respects, essentially an American revolt against a European `order' agreed upon months before within the long-developing Anglo-Soviet nexus." Consequently, Harbutt aims to show how a confrontation originally between England and the Soviets turned into a Cold War between the Soviet Union and United States.

His main argument rests on the fact that American concerns before Yalta did not feature any interest in European affairs. Roosevelt more than once told Churchill and Stalin that American troops would be out of Europe within two years after Germany's defeat. The main contention for the United States was an agreement on the United Nations and Soviet entry into the War against Japan, points far removed from the debates over Europe. Essentially, while other authors view Yalta in light of the ensuing Cold War, Harbutt steps back and assesses the conference in the context of 1930s diplomacy, when the United States remained in its isolationist shell and England and the Soviet Union stood on the periphery of Europe, attempting to keep in place their spheres of interest.

Where previous histories have concentrated on the close relationship between Roosevelt and Stalin during the conference, Harbutt views the real bond to be between Churchill and Stalin, the two European leaders to be left standing after the American departure from the continent. Only by the end of the "war, when apparent British and Soviet excesses in the reordering of Europe forced President Roosevelt to engage more fully than he wished with the old continent's politics at Yalta" does the relationship "change significantly." In support of his argument, Harbutt makes a convincing case for why the relationship in need of attention is that of Churchill and Stalin. Before the Yalta Conference, neither statesman gave as much thought to the United Nations as Roosevelt. Their vision of European post-war security was not based "on the creation of a successor to the League of Nations or the vindication of the principles of the Atlantic Charter," instead it was based "on a steadily growing Anglo-Soviet understanding about future security from which, partly by its own choice, partly by Anglo-Soviet preference, the United States was excluded."

Throughout his monograph, Harbutt's focus remains fixed to the personalities of Churchill and Roosevelt. He portrays the American President as cognizant of the developed Anglo-Soviet bloc. As a result, Roosevelt's main aim at Yalta was to see a separation between Churchill and Stalin and initiate the creation of the United Nations, a goal he feared was endangered by the "now well-established Anglo-Soviet concert" and "its sudden display of vitality and activism", which he saw as "threatening in late 1944 to destroy public support in the United States for his policy of a postwar internationalism focused on a United Nations organization." In the end, Roosevelt was successful, but in achieving his goal he sealed the fate of both Europe and the United States for the rest of the twentieth century. "...the consequence of Roosevelt's Yalta success was not the tripartite tranquility or the beneficent Yalta Order he had hoped for, but the entanglement of the United States at last in the complex and constraining politics of Europe."

Soon after the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, according to Harbutt, Churchill was looking for a "showdown" with the Soviets through which he could "bring about a better postwar settlement." While this was not representative of the Cold War that soon broke out, American backing provided Churchill with the support he needed to face-off with Stalin. The Soviets, unknowingly, continued along a path of mutual understanding. Along with the United States, "they shared an interest in avoiding" any type of crisis. But it was Churchill who continued to expose "the as yet unresolved realities behind the delicate Polish situation that both Roosevelt and Stalin were trying in their different ways to put aside with their political embroidery." Finally, after multiple attempts by Churchill to provoke Roosevelt to action, the American President came out in favor of the Prime Minister and ignored the decisions agreed to at Yalta. FDR's mistake, according to Harbutt, was an exaggerated appeal to the public about "the ease with which...problems could now be resolved by the Wilsonian moral codes and Atlantic Charter precepts...now enshrined in the Yalta documents and apparently accepted by the Soviets..." As Roosevelt tried to avoid confrontation with the Soviets he was falling into a situation beyond his control. Due to his proclamations to the public exalting the ease with which disagreements were solved, domestic support was turned away from conditions abroad. This, combined with "a Churchillian campaign to press the United States ever more strongly into an Anglo-American political front in defense of what the prime minister feared would be seen, if it were not defended, as `a fraudulent prospectus'" firmly pushed Roosevelt into committing the United States to having a stake in the future of Europe. In the end, without a British dominated Western European bloc, Harbutt contends the United States was set on a course to meet the Soviets as the new leaders of a Western European bloc, now wholly dependent economically and militarily on support from across the Atlantic.

Yalta: The Price of Peace by S. M. Plokhy

2010-08-05T12:51:00.000-07:00

S. M. Plokhy's Yalta is an updated monograph on the conference created with the help of newly accessed archival sources in both Ukraine and Russia. Unlike the recently released monograph on Yalta by Fraser J. Harbutt, he does not offered a new interpretation of Yalta but an updated narrative on the negotiations, which he believes are outdated due to the lack of publications on this event since the end of the Cold War and the opening of former Soviet archives. Plokhy also presents a conclusion that attempts to dispel "myths", but the majority have already been addressed in previous publications on the conference. And although the author does offer a better contextual understanding of the Soviet delegation's position, including "the mindset of the Soviet leaders", his prose is too often marred by attacks on those same leaders.

Whereas the previously mentioned Harbutt views the real split at the beginning of Yalta to be between Churchill and Stalin, Plokhy readily sets up the Western bloc to oppose that of the Eastern in the beginning chapters of his monograph, stating "Stalin...saw both Churchill and Roosevelt as representatives of the same imperialist camp." Plokhy credits Stalin with "exploiting" both Roosevelt and Churchill, claiming "Stalin, who liked to play off his unsuspecting subordinates against one another at the Kremlin, appears to have succeeded in doing the same to the two Western leaders." But he omits the major gaps that already existed in Roosevelt's policies when compared to Churchill, even though he mentions them at various points in the text. For instance, in describing Churchill's reaction to the commitments Roosevelt made in regards to German reparations and Poland, Plokhy states: "Churchill fought to the very end...and felt more betrayed by Roosevelt than by Stalin."

For Plokhy, the Soviets were just as pleased with the outcome of Yalta as the Western Allies. Unfortunately, this satisfaction was based on their own interpretations of what occurred at the conference. "...each side misjudged the other's intentions" and "what followed was a period of mutual distrust and suspicion that helped bring about the Cold War." Thus, Plokhy considers Yalta a stepping stone to the Cold War, which can readily be overshadowed by some of the other conferences he views as being far more detrimental to the Big Three than Yalta. The Crimean conference, for Plokhy, might have left many unanswered questions and a lack of alternatives for the Big Three, "but the main decisions leading to the Cold War were made after" Yalta. Therefore, in his final analysis, Plokhy echoes previous historians in insisting that Yalta's "true significance can be appreciated only by considering it in the context of its own time and peeling off the accretion of multiple layers of Cold War myth."

Guns Against the Reich by Petr Mikhin

2010-06-08T11:10:00.000-07:00

"Guns against the Reich" is easily one of the more interesting, enlightening, forthright and revealing Red Army memoirs I've had the pleasure to read. Petr Mikhin was rushed through officer training and served in the artillery arm of the Red Army. Often we hear that artillery is the "God of War", and this memoir will show the power that artillery can exercise on the field of battle when wielded by an experienced observer, commander, and crew. Taking part in the fighting around Rzhev, Kharkov, Kursk, the Dnestr and numerous other rivers and cities throughout eastern Europe, Mikhin paints at times a rather bleak but moving portrait of the Red Army, his fellow soldiers, the war effort in general, and himself. How did Red Army officers deal with suicidal orders on the part of their commanders? How does one deal with an officer who cared more about getting drunk than directing heavy battery fire and saving the infantrymen he was responsible for? How did artillery observers execute operations they were never trained to undertake but were volunteered for by their superiors? All of these subjects are candidly discussed and Mikhin spares no words or judgments for either his own actions or those of his subordinates and superiors. At times Mikhin's reminiscences defy logic, but simultaneously exemplify that in wartime anything is possible. Some of the more revealing events in Mikhin's Red Army career were his encounter with SMERSH (death to spies) and the accusations that were leveled against him; more interesting was how he proved his innocence. The fighting around Rzhev, now made known/famous by David Glantz's "Operation Mars", is brought to life with Mikhin's reminiscences of the quagmire he and his battery operated around and the missions that he, as an artillery observer, was forced to undertake in order to find specific German artillery or mortar batteries and silence them. Along with the recently published memoirs of Boris Gorbachevsky, Mikhin brings to life the needless sacrifices asked of Soviet soldiers as they were continuously forced to an agonizing duty of attacking and counterattacking a deeply entrenched enemy with ever weaker Red Army forces.

Interestingly enough, Mikhin was ordered/forced to go on multiple scouting missions with the goal of capturing a German prisoner for interrogation. Usually this was done by trained scouts, but here we encounter multiple failed operations by scouts and a commander's decision to send out artillery observers in their place! Their eventual success is telling of Mikhin's ingenuity, as well as that of the men he operated with. An operation I have yet to encounter from the point of view of a Red Army soldier was that of Popov's Mobile Group in 1943. This was the scratch unit ordered to exploit Soviet success post-Stalingrad and eventually it set the stage for Manstein's famous 'backhand blow' outside Kharkov. Mikhin was part of that unit. For all the talk of Manstein's genius, seeing the position Popov's group was in, their difficulties and what was expected of them, it is evident that their eventual failure was sown in Red Army hubris, thinking that the Germans could not rebuke them as easily as before. Another revealing encounter with the enemy featured the author accompanying a battalion commander and his unit into an attack through dense fog. During their silent advance the entire battalion, some seventy men, were accidentally pivoted and walked parallel to the German trenches instead of toward them. The battalion commander stubbornly refused to acknowledge what happened and only with the dissipation of the fog by rain did he realize his mistake. Unfortunately, the end result was a decimation of the battalion by the Germans as they were caught in the open and subjected to deadly flanking fire. Finally, without a doubt the most interesting episode in the memoir was the author's destruction and ensuing capture of almost 1,000 Germans and Soviet Hiwis in Moldavia. A lone battery of four howitzers with 26 men was sent to cut off a German force, at least over a thousand strong, escaping the Iasi-Kishinev encirclement. The ensuing action by the author and his men cost them 24 lives and almost all of their ammunition; one by one they were wounded, again and again, and eventually killed by enemy mortar fire. Nevertheless, the Germans, without knowing the true condition of their Red Army opponents, began to surrender. As the sole unharmed Soviet soldier ran to gather up the prisoners, the author even while wounded moved from one howitzer to the next, zeroing it in on the Germans, to keep up the ruse that the battery was still operational as they waited for reinforcements. Overall, a very descriptive, sincere account of an artilleryman at war. Highly recommended for those interested in WWII, the Eastern Front, and/or the Red Army.

The Retreat: Hitler's First Defeat by Michael Jones

2010-01-01T20:08:00.001-08:00

When writing on the German advance toward Moscow, too often it appears authors/historians take it for granted that the Germans achieved as much as they did. The campaign of 1941 was far from a walk in the park, even counting all the success the Wehrmacht enjoyed. What has yet to be shown and emphasized is the state of the Wehrmacht in those critical weeks and months leading up to and through operation Typhoon. Further, the ensuing Soviet counter-offensive is known in a general sense to have been a defeat for the Wehrmacht, but the reality of what the Soviets accomplished and, more so, had the ability to accomplish, has long been omitted from the historical record. While this book does not present an operational, or strategic, picture as well as it presents the tactical view of the soldiers and lower level officers, it nonetheless serves as an exceptionally well documented narrative of the lead up to the Moscow counter-offensive and the counter-offensive itself. Reading what soldiers and civilians were thinking, seeing, and doing does much to create a rich contextual portrait, for both sides, of what these men and women were able to overcome, or at times succumbed to, in those winter months of 1941/1942.

Jones makes interesting observations as to how both German soldiers and officers began to believe in their own propaganda. Having been driven into their heads that "Blitzkrieg" was a winnable strategy, and seeing for themselves the achievements of their armed forces during the past two years, the evidence of a false sense of superiority is readily evident in the diaries and documents the author quotes from. Within a matter of months the reader can see the change in the Werhmacht's attitude. No longer are they seeing themselves in Moscow within a few days time, or picturing a Soviet defeat within a matter of weeks; now they are simply struggling to survive and continuously question the now ridiculous notion that the war is soon coming to an end, and in Germany, according to the newspapers, has already come to an end. Poignant are Jones's observations of how the Soviet and German high command viewed the situation on the ground. As Stalin gave way to his commander's and their decisions, putting Zhukov in charge of Moscow's defense, Hitler, to the contrary, roused and exhorted his commanders to push toward Moscow. While many field commanders were aware of the condition their forces were in, to those in Berlin/Moscow, unrealistic orders were regularly issued and all too often obeyed. By the end of the counter-offensive we see a switch again, with Model being given room to operate by Hitler and Stalin now exhorting his generals to continue offensive operations when Red Army troops were spent and well past their supply lines.

Thus one of the main strength's of this narrative is the ease with which the reader can track the changing mentalities on both sides. The taste of defeat on the lips of Soviet soldiers and commanders as the are forced to an agonizing duty of retreat after retreat (for all intents and purposes, if the title of this text was simply "The Retreat" it would serve the dual purpose of applying to both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht) to the dramatic shift as Soviet forces begin to make their stand on the outskirts of Moscow in November and early December, slowly grinding down the German Blitzkrieg machine. On the other side, we see the enthusiastic German soldier marching toward another assured, it seems, victory in the East. Soon this mood of triumphalism turns to depression and exhaustion as the Soviet countryside continues to swallow German units into its expanses and spit out new Red Army formations to oppose a tiring Wehrmacht. This is followed by the initial shock of a Soviet counter-offensive and surprise on side of the Soviets at their initial success. The eventual German deterioration is epitomized by General Heinrici, "Now the Grim Reaper mercilessly raises his sickle over our battle lines. Each day he cuts down more and more of our men. Soon it will all be over." (246) And, as fate would have it, on the same day Stalin gave orders to take the 1st Shock Army off the line and transferred it to the army reserve. Simultaneously, with Model being put in charge of the 9th Army, two Soviet armies found themselves encircled. While initial German achievements gave them a false sense of superiority, the Soviets were experiencing something quite similar. As they witnessed German forces retreating along the entire front, they were urged on by Stalin and their generals to an ever increasing speed, all the while forgetting to give them adequate preparation, support, and supplies. Thus a perfect storm for the Germans was avoided, instead, the Red Army began to suffer a series of defeats anew. Defeats which eventually set the stage for the catastrophe at Kharkov before German operation Blau took the Sixth Army to the gates of Stalingrad.

Understandably, there are a few weaknesses within this book. A lack of maps makes tracking unit movements very hard, unless you have an atlas handy. Jones discusses the German campaigns against France and Poland as utilizing Blitzkrieg. Personally, I am in agreement with authors like Karl-heinz Frieser, who believe that the only real Blitzkrieg used by the Wehrmacht was against the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. Quite a bit of emphasis is placed on "Siberian divisions" saving the day outside Moscow, in reality those divisions were ordered to the west in September and October, long before Moscow was in danger. Lastly, I noticed one specific editing mistake, Stepan Mikoyan is spelled as "Stephan" throughout the text. Aside from the aforementioned, this book was hard to put down, another excellent addition to Eastern Front literature by Michael Jones.

To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War by Rebecca Manley

2010-01-01T20:06:00.001-08:00

Professor Manley has created a well researched and written narrative of the evacuations which took place in the Soviet Union during 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. Building on Peter Gatrell's "A Whole Empire Walking", the author discusses the space created within the Soviet Union for evacuees/refugees with the German invasion of the USSR. Early plans for evacuation of factories, workers, party personnel, and others were discussed and debated during the 1920s and early to mid 1930s. They seem to have reached a climax in 1937, when a new draft was proposed and remained in limbo without being outright rejected or passed as guidelines by which the state would interact with future evacuees. Unfortunately, to some degree this is a reflection of the purges the Red Army underwent. Ideas about "War of Attrition" became taboo and a Blitzkrieg style form of warfare, known as "war of destruction", came to dominate strategic and operational thought. "War of destruction" influenced Soviet thinking and was reflected in the idea that any war launched against the Soviet state would be met with a quick counterattack and taken to the "enemy's soil" with little loss of Red Army blood. With such ideas, there was little need for evacuation of either factories, workers, or party personnel. Nevertheless, some discussion still existed and was renewed weeks before June 22, 1941.

While evacuations of peoples was nothing new to Russia/Soviet Union, the many complexities that came out of the events in 1941 created a new paradigm through which "evacuees" were judged; those who left too early could be accused of spreading panic, those too late, collaborators and traitors. A limited space came into existence during which evacuations were viewed as permissible by both the state and civilian population. The author has done a great deal of research and weaves personnel accounts with archival documentation to present a mosaic of what higher officials were considering and dealing with, and what evacuees went through on their journey to Tashkent. The description of the evacuation itself begins with civilians who did not want to leave and those who could not find a way of attaining the needed permission to evacuate with their families, followed by discussions of how long these refugees waited at stations for their trains, the journeys themselves, which could take up to a month, how they were received them at their destinations, how they lived and tried to survive in Tashkent, and finally, how they tried to return home. Although the narrative is limited to evacuees from major cities such as Odessa, Moscow, and Leningrad and to the destination of Tashkent, there is little reason to believe other experiences differed drastically from those presented here. My grandfather was evacuated from the city of Kherson in Ukraine to Central Asia and underwent much of the same experiences described here, including being separated from his family and eventually being united with them again.

The experiences recounted here make for depressing reading. Families separated by enemy bombardments of their stations or individual trains, thievery was a common occurrence as was lost luggage and valuables throughout the journey and even at final destinations. Arriving in Tashkent meant an immediate search for shelter, food, and work; otherwise, there was little chance of remaining in the city or surviving. Networks and connections counted for much of how people were able to get by. Through relatives, friends, and friends of friends evacuees in Tashkent were able to attain a place to live, vouchers for food, and jobs so as to remain with their loved ones and/or friends. And through all of this a war was still going on. Too often while reading this text one can easily forget the heightened threat this nation faced. Even so, authorities in Moscow and throughout Uzbekistan tried to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees from the west.

In the end, there is clearly a dearth of literature on the evacuations that took place throughout the first year(s) of war. The suffering, deprivation, and tragedy of the time can hardly be captured for a 100%, but this book is an auspicious beginning and deserving of a five star rating. I can only hope that others will take to this topic and try to present an even more encompassing narrative of the evacuation efforts the government of the Soviet Union undertook and the obstacles evacuees/refugees faced as they struggled with the idea of leaving everything they knew to head for an unknown destination in the East. There are still countless stories to be related about the obstacles these men, women, children, and the elderly faced on their journeys and their perseverance in the face of danger, both from the enemy and their own bureaucracy. An excellent addition to both Soviet and Eastern Front literature.

Zitadelle: The German Offensive Against the Kursk Salient 4-17 July 1943 by Mark Healy

2009-07-30T07:27:00.000-07:00

The Battle of Kursk has seen more than its fair share of myths but more than half a century later there is still room for a study that takes into account sources, both primary and secondary, from both sides. Sadly, this is not the case with this book. The bibliography is very limited and there are NO footnotes/endnotes. I cannot tell if this was decided on by the publisher or the author, but this is simply unacceptable and truthfully makes this book almost worthless as a source (not to mention that it takes the work done by others and omits the credit they are due). The two 'original' takes offered up in the book are not very original to begin with, both can be traced, and are, to the works by Steven Newton and Niklas Zetterling (Kursk: The German View and Kursk: A Statistical Analysis, respectively). Specifically, the author questions the Soviet interpretation of why Hoth moved his forces toward Prokhorovka rather than Oboyan and how many tanks were actually lost at Prokhorovka. The answers can be found in the aforementioned volumes (the author names and quotes Newton to give specifics for the former assertion). Also, the idea that Hoth, before the Kursk battle began, wanted to move toward Prokhorovka is also discussed in Russian literature today.

Overall the volume is interesting but lacking in numerous ways. The author's style is repetitive, as if each chapter (and there are close to 50 of them) was written on its own, thus overlapping with information from other chapters or when the author really wants to make a point. For instance, the move toward Prokhorovka rather than Oboyan is discussed in the beginning chapters and then has an entire chapter devoted to it later on in the book. I read and understood it the first time, I do not need it repeated ad nauseum. Aside from the repeating there is the ever present imagery the author is trying to draw. I do not care how the sun looked in the sky on the morning of July 5th, 6th, or 7th. I do not need to know how the clouds bunched together to produce precipitation or how rockets from both sides criss-crossed in the sky with their respective smoke trails. Get to the point.

There are countless grammatical errors throughout the book, sloppy editing to say the least. A single name is spelled two different ways within the same paragraph, we have "Rukosuyev" and then not 3 sentences later "Rokuseyev." And yes, he is talking about the same commander of the 3rd Anti-Tank Artillery brigade (p. 285). Bad spelling also rears its head when the reader is presented with an artistic rendering of a T-34 which supposedly has "Lenin" written on the side of the turret in Cyrillic. Sadly, the author of the rendering has spelled out "Lenim." A claim is made that two Red Army Mechanized Brigades were made up of 250 tanks (p. 234), that seems like overkill since some Red Army Tank/Mechanized corps in their whole (that is 3 brigades of tanks/mechanized forces) usually contained less than 250 tanks. At least one assertion I found untenable: "The surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May had resulted in greater losses than at Stalingrad" (p. 368). Yes, more POWs were captured, but this of course overlooks how many Germans, and other axis forces, died getting to Stalingrad, trying to take Stalingrad, and trying to keep it. It also makes the case that the author considers Italian soldiers on par with German troops, as the majority of those surrendering in Tunisia were Italian, not German. Not a credible statement in the least. The author is also keen on repeating Cold War era propaganda as evidenced by the following: "Punishment battalions, the use of charging infantry to 'clear' minefields, the continuing policy of identifying retreat with treason, and the coercive presence of NKVD security units stationed in the rear to 'encourage' the front line troops to fight well..."(p. 104) Aside from these statements being wholly generalized and lacking context some of them are simply wrong. Thus, in general, the Red Army is underrepresented nor are the plethora of sources that have come out from Russia in the past few years (at least 5 volumes on Kursk) analyzed. Undoubtedly the author lacks Russian which is why this entire text is simply a repeat of what has already been written on the subject for an English speaking audience.

Lastly, while the Kursk 'eipic' is told well enough, the above (and what follows) is enough to reduce the work to 3 stars, perhaps 3 and a half at best. I found it quite helpful to have, every now and then, the numbers of tanks on hand and those in need of long/short term repair. It helps to explain why at times Soviet claims are so exaggerated. While some Soviet claims are simply propaganda meant for the population, at other times it becomes understandable why Tiger tanks are constantly being encountered, along with Panthers and Ferdinands. While at times Pz. IVs and StuGs could be confused for the former (Tiger and Ferdinand respectively), the regular appearance of repaired Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands when they were knocked out just a day or two ago can easily lead to over-counting. At times there were only 3 Tigers, out of some two or so dozen, left within a unit. The next day the number would jump to 20. Sadly, no one took the time to explain this to Red Army soldiers who counted a knocked-out or disabled tank as such. Simultaneously, I found it quite annoying to be told that the Germans lost only 17 tanks at Prokhorovka but yet the Red Army, losing some 600, still retained their positions. Really? If the Germans continued with the supposed 200+ tanks at their disposal just on the Prokhorovka sector then what kept them from advancing? The problem here, it would seem, is that many of the German tank counts day in and day out are dependent on tanks coming out of long/short term repair, meaning that the real losses, be they total write offs or those lost for the moment, cannot be accurately gauged as tank stocks are regularly replenished each new day by those coming out of repair. Hence, the author asserts that on July 13, the day after the Prokhorovka battle, divisional returns totaled 251 tanks and assault guns for the SS Panzer Corps, a difference of 43 machines from the total of 294 which were available on July 12 (the numbers given for the 3 SS divisions are 70, 103, and 121 tanks and assault guns). First off, a tank out of action is one that's not going to be taking part in combat thus there is a real difference between 17 and 43. Secondly, from those 251 tanks and assault guns we are not told if any came from repair; if they did, then the number 43 would go up. Considering newly repaired tanks were regularly being delivered this is something I'd like to see taken into consideration. Somehow the Germans seem to be the only ones for whom we count 'write offs' as the only losses they endured. More so, we have the claim that Totenkopf could deploy 121 machines on July 12, but the next day the division was fielding 54 serviceable tanks and 20 or so Assault guns, what happened to 43 less tanks for all 3 SS divisions? The Liebstandarte on the next day was said to have "fallen" to a strength of "just 50 panzers and 20 Assault Guns" how can it fall to that strength if that's what it started out with on July 12?! Supposedly, it is on July 13 that Rotmistrov, commander of the remnants of 5th Tank Army, halts both the Liebstandarte and Totenkopf in their tracks with the remainder of what was his 800+ tank armada. Interesting, he couldn't do it with 850 tanks, but with some 150-200, it's not a problem. Right, thanks but no thanks. I'll be waiting for the next volume that demolishes some more 'Kursk Myths.'

500 Days: The War in Eastern Europe, 1944-1945 by Sean M. McAteer

2009-07-13T14:53:00.001-07:00

As described, this book covers the last year and a half, give or take, of the war on the Eastern Front. It is true that this period of activities is greatly lacking literary coverage when compared to the the battles throughout 1941: the Moscow Counter-Offensive, the battle for Stalingrad, 1942, and Kursk, summer of 1943. I can only commend the author for trying to put together a text that deals with 1944 and 1945, and more so, from both sides. But in the end, too many Cold War myths are propagated and his narrative, in general, is lacking. Perhaps a step in the right direction for those new to the topic and who have an interest in some of the details that the author highlights, but the reader would do well to remember that this is a dated analysis with dated commentary. While the author would probably like to think of himself as an 'objective historian,' in this case that is certainly not true.

This is not an academic work and thus the bibliography and the endnotes are not up to academic standards. This then greatly takes away from trying to figure out where certain information is coming from, aside from this, much of the information offered does not even come with endnotes. For example, the small section of Slavic and Germanic history is interesting, but contains no endnotes. The sources themselves are lacking. There is a large dearth of materials, from both English and Russian sources, that have been released in the past two decades and rely on formerly closed Soviet archival data (the battle of Berlin, for instance, has been documented in great detail by Alexei Isaev in his "Berlin 45-vo"). Many, at times too many, sources are from the cold war era and are outdated today. It seems this book was begun in the mid to late 1980s and, for the most part, stayed glued to the sources of that time period (aside from a few ventures into later publications like Glantz's recent book dealing with the failed first Red Army offensive into the Balkans and Beevor's ever-controversial book on the Battle for Berlin). There are also no maps in this text, which massively takes away from trying to keep up with the narrative.

Aside from the errors and typos the author himself has commented on (not very sporting to give yourself a five star review), the reader will find quite a few more throughout the text. For instance, on p. 121 the author writes, in regards to the 4th Ukrainian front, at the moment it opposed German forces in the Crimea, as having "11 rifle divisions and a reinforced tank corps, 328,000 men" in reality the 4th Ukrainian Front contained 18 rifle divisions on the first of April 1944. Sapun hill is called 'Samun hill' (p. 126 and 127). Lev Mekhlis is transformed into Levrentti Mekhlis. Aside from listing the various tanks operating in the Red Army the author also makes mention of 'assault guns' and 'self-propelled artillery' (p. 7), within the Red Army they were one and the same, specifically, self-propelled artillery. The author also manages to misspell both Pokryshkin and Kozhedub (Pokryshin and Kojedub respectively, although the j in Kozhedub might be forgiven if the original source was German (p. 29)). Novorossysk becomes Novorissyk (p.30). Page 68 Fedyuninsky's name is misspelled as Fedyunsky. On p. 81 the author claims Malinovsky commanded a 'border guard corps.' I've personally never seen such a reference. Border guards were NKVD commanded units, Army formations close to the border were not known as 'border guard' units.

General statements abound in this book, for instance, the statement 'Despite the awful German occupation policies, it remains that internal repression resulted in more deaths among the Soviet population' is presented and linked to a few works in the bibliography, but no numbers are provided nor are specific pages where one can see or even compare the information the author is working with. A huge exaggeration is located on p. 45 when the author claims the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 killed a 'quarter' of the population. The author gives too much credit to the German campaign against Tukhachevsky, especially since to date there is no evidence that German planted documents were even used against Tukhachevsky (how can one take seriously an espionage charge against Tukhachevsky, specifically that he is working for the Germans, when they themselves are giving him up to Stalin?). When listing 'anti-Russian minorities' the author deems fit to include Belorussians and Armenians, not exactly anti-Russian from what I can remember. As mentioned above, Cold War era propaganda enters the picture as well, the description of 'punishment battalions' encompasses the following '...unarmed first wave assault units who would be loaded with vodka before death-charging the enemy lines' (p. 5). I'd recommend the author read "Penalty Strike" by Alexander Pyl'cyn to learn what penal formations were like (there are also a number of works in Russian, half a dozen, by those in Penal formations and outlining the history of penal formations). Page 21 mentions that 'reserve security troops' had 'instructions to shoot down their own men if running', a bit of an ambiguous statement. Blocking detachments were created in order to gather those who initiated in an unauthorized retreat and, depending on the situation, to send them back to their respective units or, in severe cases, send them to penal formations or execute them (the majority were returned to their units). The author also harks back to battles in 1941 as being composed of Red Army riflemen 'link arms and charge across fields of death, shouting and cheering as they were cut down, row by row" (p. 381).

Quite a bit of literary license is taken throughout the text, for example, on p. 81 we're detailed the fate of Major-General Khomenko, commander of the 44th Army, who after accidentally driving into German positions and being killed by German fire was then used by the Germans in a propaganda ploy which claimed he defected to their side. The author claims "Stalin, in a flash of uncalculating rage' disbanded the 44th army when he heard of the 'desertion.' In fact, at least one source points out that Khomenko was traveling with the details of the 44th Army's positions, so while his desertion might have played a role in some of the other commanders from the 44th army being reassigned, the disbanding of the army (which rarely happened by 1944) might have been the result of of the 44th army's positions falling into the hands of the Germans (see "Fallen Soviet Generals" by Maslov).

Initial coverage of Warsaw uprising is lacking, the author skips over too many details to make the point that Stalin 'wanted' the Home Army to perish in the streets of Warsaw. Later coverage of the Warsaw uprising is also lacking, the author would like to make clear that the efforts on the part of the 1st Polish army to cross the Vistula were conducted "contrary to STAVKA's wishes...without their knowledge, approval, or support" p. 242. The author would do well to familiarize himself with orders coming down to the 1st Belorussian front which forecast a beginning of operations on August 25th against Warsaw with the 1st Polish Army moving along the western bank of the Vistula with their right wing and center assigned the object of Warsaw itself (see "Myfi Velikoi Otechestvennoi 2", p. 196, the article by M. Meltukhov "V Avgusti 1944"). Sadly, nothing came of these plans due to the German counterattacks against the 1st Belorussian front that followed. The atrocities that took lace in Germany when the Red Army crossed the frontier are blown out of proportion, in my opinion. The author, once again, takes too many liberties with how he stylizes what happened without adequate research to serve as a foundation. There is also little, if any, mention of the executions and arrests that followed Red Army soldiers when they wantonly raped or pillaged, of which there are more than enough recorded instances.

Lastly, what I found oddly annoying is the author's constant aversion to so-called 'frontal assaults' by the Red Army. Even when they are trying to 'outflank' the Germans they are still attacking 'frontally', the two are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Also annoying is the author dictating what and how the Wehrmacht should have waged war while on the defense in the Balkans, reminiscent of German memoirs and their 'what if/if only' scenarios. In the end, I can't say I was impressed with the text. While there are a few interesting anecdotes and episodes that I'll be sure to remember (although many do not have a source behind them), the obvious lack of knowledge about current literature on the subject is a huge minus. There is nothing ground-breaking presented here, just a lot of secondary and primary (mainly memoirs, worse is that the author does not use the newly released memoirs of such figures as Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Rokossovsky, which have had much of what was then censored put back into their reminiscences) literature coming together. But a problem remains, said literature has been used in a variety of other monographs and narratives on the war as well.

The Quality of Freedom: Khodorkovsky, Putin and the Yukos Affair by Richard Sakwa

2009-07-05T20:28:00.001-07:00

As a student of Soviet history, and being from the former Soviet Union myself, I have a varied interest in modern Russian history. I am one of those who views history (that is events that occurred at least half a century ago) as easier to understand and fit into a context than the study of current events. The Yukos affair and Khodorkovsky are something one hears a great deal about in both the western and Russian media. While western media seems to garner the majority of sympathy for Khodorkovsky, the Russian media seems to be more antagonistic against a man once called an 'oligarch.'

While Sakwa tackles Khdorkovsky, Putin, the Yukos affair, the varied meanings of 'freedom', and a variety of other topics in this text, I cannot help but think that while this is a very good, and academic, treatment of the subject(s) it is not a definitive account. This is not to say that Sakwa's narrative or analysis is weak but simply that he is writing from a hindsight that has yet to fully set in. A large portion of his sources are also media related, both western and Russian, and while journalism once meant something, today's mass media is simply a running joke. Granted, this might apply more to the US than Russia, but there it seems that the journalists are polarized either for or against the government. While this does provide the reader with a broad spectrum of opinions and contextual analysis, in the end, in my opinion, it is still too biased for a scholarly analysis.

With that said, the author utilizes a wide variety of sources so that his foundation and basis for much of what he writes is ingrained in academic literature, be it from Russia or the west. While many will undoubtedly view Khodorkovsky as getting what he deserves, simply because he was an oligarch, in reading this work the reader will be given a more fully developed understanding of the atmosphere Khodorkovsky and others (Berezovsky, Gusinky, Smolensky, etc) were operating in. Much of what they did was illegal and the country was plundered to a great degree under the administration of the 1990s. But it was Yukos and Khodorkovsky that were arrested, imprisoned, and bankrupted by Putin and his administration, not all of the other oligarchs who acted similarly. Then again, Khodorkovsky had more than one chance to leave the country, as many others did, but he chose to stay, more so, to ingrain himself in the politics of the country.

That, in a nutshell, is what Putin rebelled against. It is one thing to become an oligarch and reign supreme in the world of business, it is a totally different matter to indulge in political intrigue and attempt to maneuver against the powers that be, no matter how much money you have on your side. Khodorkovsky learned his lesson and continues to learn it in prison. He speaks out, writers letters and lambastes the current administration for what it has done to him and Yukos. Perhaps he's right, Yukos should not have been taken apart, but Putin and the factions inside the Kremlin that helped him 'tame' Khodorkovsky and the others who helped run Yukos (many were put on trial aside from Khodorkovsky, and even tried in absentia) decided that an example needed to be made. Khodorkovsky proved to be the perfect target and he paid with his freedom while Yukos paid by hemorrhaging billions in 'unpaid taxes' which forced it to sell off its assets and go bankrupt. The winners of this 'affair' were undoubtedly the factions within the Kremlin, but what that 'win' entails is too early to tell. For those interested in an academic, highly detailed and analytical look at modern Russia, you'll do well to invest in this text.

"Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The New Cold War" Stephen F. Cohen

2009-06-21T13:20:00.001-07:00

Stephen F. Cohen's latest publication, "Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The New Cold War," deals with a variety of events within Soviet and post-Soviet Russian history while outlining missed opportunities/roads not taken within each specific event. He does not so much deal in 'what-if' or 'counterfactual' scenarios as set up and explain existing alternatives that could have been pursued. Simply showing that alternatives within Soviet society existed inevitably puts into question much of the reasoning behind the idea that the Soviet Union was unreformable, especially when put into context with the sustainability of the Soviet Union through, for example, Khrushchev's reforms.

The text is made up of seven chapters; the first is devoted to Nikolai Bukharin, someone Cohen has written about in the past. While I do not think Bukharin could have been a rival to Stalin, in the full sense of the word (perhaps as Trotsky was), I think Cohen's real point within the chapter is encompassed in his discussion of NEP (New Economic Policy) which lasted some eight years, until the five year plans began. This phase of the Soviet Union is viewed by many as a 'golden' time, a time of at least some opportunity when state owned enterprises existed along side privately run companies/trades. But Cohen stops short of guessing what the Soviet Union could have become had NEP policies been pursued rather his point here is solely to show that an alternative to Stalin's five year plans existed, had been implemented and accepted by both the government and its citizens, and could have continued and evolved for years to come.

The next chapter discusses the GULag returnees during Khrushchev's administration. It was only after Khurshchev's condemnation of the 'cult of personality' in 1956 that millions of those convicted and imprisoned under Stalin were exonerated. Cohen then covers how these former zeks were treated by Soviet society as well as their impact on Khrushchev's administration and the reforms of his era. Some died in tragic or lonely circumstances while others rose through the ranks of their respective professions. Cohen does point out that while no former prisoners acquired positions in the highest rungs of power, many became local leaders and were able to play a role in the future policies Khrushchev would become responsible for. This was also a time period which saw accusations by Khrushchev and his allies against the likes of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, who were soon expelled from the party. Many often wonder why there was no Soviet equivalent to the Nuremberg trials, this was probably as close as the Soviets came. Other initiatives were begun against former Communist party higher ups, but the problem is that Khrushchev himself had blood on his hands and if he began to seek out those responsible for the previous crimes of the Soviet state against its own population, most likely more people would have been imprisoned than were being rehabilitated and released.

The third chapter deals with "Soviet conservatism" and the figure of Yegor Ligachev. Undoubtedly conservatives in the US differ markedly from those in the Soviet Union but, as Cohen explains through the lens of Ligachev, they are not simply neo-Stalinists bent on terrorizing the Soviet population and hording power at the top. On the contrary, after examining Ligachev's history Cohen attempts to show that "Soviet conservatism" in this case signified a yearning to reform the Soviet Union and keep it in tact. This type of conservatism has to be understood vis-a-vis the policies Gorbachev implemented during the late 1980s. Men like Ligachev aimed to have Soviet policies improved upon not reinvented.

Building on the previous chapter the fourth chapter goes into detail about whether the Soviet system was reformable. Of course, following how Cohen views NEP, the answer is that he believes it was. Today many in the west, with exaggerated egos, believe that the Soviet system was doomed to failure, even though none predicted its end. If a nation like America can exploit the system of slavery for centuries and then turn around and champion their emancipation followed a century later by the civil rights movement, why is it that the USSR, and Russia in general, is forced to carry the stigma of an empire beyond redemption? On the contrary, from the early years of the revolution the Soviet state modified itself to suit the needs of its government, ideology, and population. From creating war communism, to NEP, to five year plans, the destruction of Stalin's 'cult of personality' together with Khrushchev's reforms, a movement of what some label 'neo-Stalinism' under Brezhnev, to a reform minded Gorbachev who instituted Glasnost and Peterstroika, considered by some to have been the most 'democratic' period of recent history. Are these the actions of an unreformable empire?

Chapter five works off the previous chapter and takes on the fate of the Soviet Union, specifically, 'Why did it end?' While there are many figures one can point to, I believe Cohen is quite candid in placing his blame on the shoulders of Yeltsin and perhaps to a lesser degree on Gorbachev. While Gorbachev seems to come out as partly realistic and idealistic in his outlook, Yelstin was simply a man bent on acquiring power, no matter who he had to go through, lie to, or manipulate. An interesting argument is made regarding Gorbachev's reforms and their 'destabilizing' of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, his reforms were not meant to stabilize a system that was not working, rather they were supposed to destabilize it and propel it forward via new initiatives and policies. Evens so, it was Gorbachev's "promarket policies" that initiated the rapid grab for assets, in both legal and illegal means, through which today's Russian oligarchs were created. Yeltsin eventually used these same oligarchs, and they him, in helping curb democratic principles throughout the 1990s. Personally, I viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as inevitable, there just seemed to have been so much going wrong all at once. Specifically, I saw nationalism as playing a large, if not the largest, role. Cohen, however, argues to the contrary. The demonstrations and protests by various ethnicities, which many quickly attribute to ideas of self-determination or "nationalist revolution-from-below" were in fact organized to redress grievances "within the framework of the Union" or directed against other ethnicities, but not that of the USSR. The rest of the chapter deals with all the other usual suspects in the collapse of the USSR (economy, reforms, etc) and Cohen puts them into a coherent and understandable context which has made me rethink what happened and what an alternative might consist of.

The next chapter goes into the legacies of Gorbachev. While he failed in his reforms, obviously he was not aiming at the dissolution of the USSR but rather an improvement on the model before him, what came after under Boris Yeltsin was another step in the wrong direction. Cohen adheres to the idea that it was Gorbachev rather than Yeltsin who ushered in democracy, contrary to what many specialists believe today. Cohen believes this "historical amnesia" was inspired by US ideology which after the breakup of the Soviet Union rewrote the history of the Cold War's end to include a "US Victory" rather than the agreed upon "end" between the two sides with no victors or losers. Throughout the 1990s Yeltsin began to use the oligarchs that Gorbachev's policies first created in cracking down on democratic liberties. The mass media began to be used for manipulation purposes which has continued to this day. Journalists reminisce about Gorbachev's reforms, a time when they were able to pry into Soviet history and spark debates about taboo topics, while during Yeltsin the public was kept in the dark about corruption, human rights abuses, and crime. For Cohen there is a real similarity between 1917 and 1991. In both instances small groups were ushered into power based on promises of "evolutionary progress" but in the end struggles over property and territory tore the nation apart and standing economic institutions were done away.

The last chapter, and by far the most interesting of this book, deals with who was/is responsible for the cooling of relations between the Russian Federation and America. In this case Cohen is not afraid to utilize the expression 'Cold War' to define the attitudes of the US and Russia toward each other, and, perhaps, in a way he is right. But Cohen is also not afraid to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of whom he thinks is in the wrong, Washington. From announcing to the US that the Cold War was won by the US in 1992 (by George H. W. Bush) to the failed policies under Clinton, which seem solely to have plunged Russia into an ever expanding economic hole and let NATO expand its influence to Russia's proverbial doorstep, to the presidency of the second Bush who moved away from arms treaties and provided new impetus for Russia to feel threatened and again seek to find friends among the likes of Iran, Venezuela, etc. Even with the current Obama administration many of those responsible for the initial policies and activities vis-a-vis Russia are still in place, including Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. The double standards and hypocrisy of the US government, mass media, and even academics is clearly laid out. Another opportunity lost for the US, especially at a time when Russia could have contributed greatly to many American initiatives, including the "war on terror." The largest problem, for Cohen, in how the US deals with Russia is that some parties seem to encourage a destabilization of the current regime. How helpful is that if Russia still possesses stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Not very. But apparently showing off a US with the ego and arrogance of a sole superpower means more to Washington's power elite than trying to help Russia and encourage a friendly, open, and reciprocal relationship that will undoubtedly pay off in the long run more so than antagonizing Putin and his country to the point of creating an atmosphere akin to a "cold war."

War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars by Richard N. Haass

2009-05-30T13:11:00.000-07:00

Much, in fact too much, has already been written about the latest war against Iraq (in this book, it is the "War of Choice"). Thus, there is little to be revealed in this book that has not been said or written about before. What is interesting, on the other hand, is the various contradictions that come through between what the author terms the "War of Necessity", that is the First Gulf War, and that of the invasion and "occupation/liberation" of Iraq which occurred most recently. The fact is the administration under the first Bush was hesitant to go to war and had to be convinced in numerous ways. And this after Saddam Hussein annexed a sovereign nation, something few thought he would actually do. This was followed up with a UN backing and half a million troops in the Gulf before any military activity even began. What happened most recently? Threats of Saddam Hussein having "WMDs", which proved to have been false, a badly planned and managed after-action campaign on behalf of our government and troops (whom, in retrospect, can hardly be blamed since they are trained for war, not peacekeeping). All of this is related in various details with some interesting commentary about various personalities the author dealt with throughout both Bush administrations. I was interested in his explanation for why during the first Bush presidency Cheney could say that the US was not interested in 'regime change' but during the recent war changed his mind. According to the author it was the atmosphere of the administration which dictated what Cheney could say and follow through with, both publicly and privately. Makes sense in retrospect, we all act differently depending on the situation and company we find ourselves among. Obviously this does not change the fact that he was wrong, horribly wrong, and much of what occurred in the aftermath of 9/11 (both in domestic policy and foreign) is the fault of the second Bush administration which did an immense amount of damage to this country's reputation as well as its economic and political state. Much of what the author conveys has a ring of truth, but I'm sure there is some self service here and there as well, so I'd take it with a grain of salt. Otherwise an interesting text and comparison between the first Iraq War, that of necessity, and the second, that of choice, which cost this country thousands of lives, hundreds of billions of dollars, time and attention we'll never get back, and whose affects we'll feel for years, if not decades, to come (and this does not include all the turmoil the Middle East has experienced as a result).

http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1416549021/ref=cm_cr_thx_view

The Brusilov Offensive by Timothy Dowling

2009-05-27T17:47:00.001-07:00

To begin, I am in complete agreement with the author that the Eastern Front of WWI, for the most part, is simply missing from English literature. While we have an abundance of studies about the Western Front, from all sides, the Russian experience in WWI is relatively unknown. And this is a nation that went to war with the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires. It's true enough that the Russian officer Corps was a hindrance to the army, but due to the casualties the officer corps sustained throughout the first year of war many of the new officers rose from the ranks or were composed of non-nobles. This in and of itself spelled a change for Russia in the grand scheme of things and goes a long way to explain why so many units eventually allied with the Bolsheviks, or other revolutionary parties, during the Revolution.

The most interesting section of the book was the titled Brusilov Offensive and the eventual role Romania's entry into the war plays. I had heard of this successful offensive before but what it could have accomplished did not register with me until I read through this book. Although in all honesty Brusilov's plan was simply to attack and give the Habsburg empire as many casualties as he could, what his offensive could have accomplished in more idealistic terms, which the author outlines later in the text, had never crossed my mind. I won't lie, a large part of the book is units attacking, retreating, defending, etc. So many units that you'll undoubtedly lose track of many of them. I also couldn't understand why the author regularly referred to the area of Bukovina as "the Bukovina" rather than simply Bukovina, which is how I have always seen it in written. But, aside from these two caveats, one of which you'll deal with in any military history of WWI, the research was impressive as was the atmosphere (usually frustration at the ignorance and ineptitude of one general or another) the author was able to create. There is some context describing how this offensive affected the mood of the Army (casualties were not small and the gains were limited compared to what they could have been) but I hoped for more context when dealing with how the Army treated the Bolshevik-agitators it eventually had to deal with, etc. In the end this work represents a fine addition to WWI literature and the Eastern Front of the First World War.

http://www.amazon.com/Brusilov-Offensive-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253351308/ref=cm_cr-mr-title

To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House

2009-05-24T22:28:00.000-07:00

Glantz, a veritable book producing factory, has definitely set a new standard in literature on Stalingrad. This book, the first of three, follows the Wehrmacht after the Moscow-Counter offensive of 1941/1942 through the Soviet Kharkov offensive and into Operation Blau. In doing so Glantz aims to establish three facts that have been glossed over in general histories of both the Eastern Front and the battle for Stalingrad specifically: Soviet forces did not simply retreat when confronted with Army Groups South, and after Army Groups A and B, to take the fight to Stalingrad, as if pre-planned; STAVKA did not abandon the Donbas region to preserve its forces; and the Red Army soldiers that the Sixth army finally met inside Stalingrad were not the same troops who retreated throughout the summer and finally decided, or were forced, to stand and fight. In reality the Red Army put up resistance to German advances from day one. Glantz takes the time to go through many of these operations and point out exactly how much damage Soviet troops were able to inflict on the Wehrmacht and why the Germans were still able to overcome forces that more often than not outnumbered them in either men, artillery, or armor, and sometimes in all three categories. Of personal interest to myself was the chapter on Army Group A's incursion into the Caucasus region. This is an entire campaign long ignored due to the limelight Stalingrad encompasses.

In the end it seems the Red Army was still committing mistakes they should have learned from in 1941; piecemeal attacks by mechanized and tank forces, lack of command and control in the field, failure to institute combined arms operations utilizing artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and the air force, etc. The Germans, however, are also guilty in that they once more overestimated their abilities and underestimated that of the Red Army. The final result is a detailed and highly needed study that not only provides context to the eventual clash that occurred in Stalingrad, but also highlights the actions that led up to the battle and the many battles, and even campaigns, that have gone long ignored due to Stalingrad's ever growing shadow.

http://www.amazon.com/Gates-Stalingrad-Soviet-German-Operations-April-August/dp/0700616306/ref=cm_cr-mr-title

The Chief Culprit by Viktor Suvorov

2009-05-21T00:55:00.000-07:00

It doesn't surprise me to see all the five star reviews on amazon; ignorance and conspiracy theories usually deliver what readers are inclined to agree with when a factual foundation is missing. Viktor Suvorov, AKA Rezun, is a spy and traitor. Those who want to conceive of him as anything else are free to do so, but both those titles are a part of his history and who he is. The author is a self-proclaimed 'intelligence operative' and not an historian, which should already mean something to those who think this account comes anywhere close to historical discourse. This is also not someone who ever had access to Soviet/Russian archives. He claims to have seen German documents in Podolsk, but claiming so and proving it are two different things. This book is a combination of "ideas" taken out of a dozen or so of Suvorov's other works. There is a reason the majority of his books were never translated, they are worthless. The man is smart, but his grasp of history is fickle, whether he does this on purpose or actually believes in his own lies is a question I cannot answer. And I have to say, overall, this book was painful to read. Not solely because I know of his lies, but mainly because of how he tries to bring things that have nothing in common together. In reading this book I find it interesting that no one noticed how many sides Suvorov caters to. For Germany he provides an acquittal to Barbarossa, Stalin was readying for war, they had a right to defend themselves. He appeases Russians by blaming everything on Stalin, the Soviet Union was strong, the Red Army the greatest, but Stalin forgot who to trust and not to trust. And he appeases Stalinists by describing how smart and ruthless Stalin was, hence his bashing of figures like Mikhail Tukhachevsky and his cheerleading for Stalinist purges.

This is a book built on fallacies, straw men, twisted facts, omitted context, and baseless theories delivered in the form of a kindergarten lecture. Starting with his introduction, a standard is set that Suvorov adheres to in the rest of his text. On pg. xix the author mentions how the Soviet Union contained two field armies in June of 1939 neither of which were deployed in the "European part of the Soviet Union", for a moment we will give him the benefit of the doubt (since no sources or citations are listed). He also claims that by June 1941 there were twenty-six field armies deployed in the European 'part of the country' (in reality there were about 21, two of which were only on paper and without any troops, source is Боевой Состав Советской Армии). The end result is the question of if Stalin trusted Hitler why did he deploy so many troops against him. Well, to begin, in June of 1939 Stalin did not share a border with Hitler. By June of 1941 the Soviet Union had also been involved in a few wars/invasions, that is the Winter War, war with Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol, the invasion of Eastern Poland, and the occupation of the Baltics and Bessarabia and Bukovina. All of this context is forgotten about. Lastly, while Stalin might have trusted in the non-aggression pact, that is not Hitler per se, but a beneficial pact to both countries, he was not stupid and understood that war was on the horizon.

Now, on pg. xxii we're presented with the idea that since Zhukov and Vasilevsky wrote up a pre-emptive strike against Germany, they were awarded the rank of Marshal two years later. There is no correlation between one and the other aside from in the author's mind, fallacy doesn't even begin to cover the kind of ignorance being pandered here. Yet these kinds of out-of-context conclusions are the type of evidence you should be prepared to believe in, since that's all he'll give you. Leaving out context once more he describes the leaders of the Communist Party as all having aliases, which they did, hinting that they took those aliases because of their criminal pasts. He of course leaves out the fact that Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev most likely undertook aliases to hide their Jewish identities which they no longer identified with.

What Suvorov is also keen to do is make up situations, create straw men, and then knock them down all the while casting blame on various figures. He blames Trotsky and Lenin for 'demolishing the Russian army' and claims that Germany's position was 'completely hopeless' leaving out the fact that Germany proper had yet to be invaded and it was the French army that was collapsing, as well as the Russian army which simply could do nothing more of substance after the casualties from Brusilov's offensive. What evidence does he give you? None, aside from "Russia was allied with the mighty French and British colonial empires", empires that would have been defeated on mainland Europe if not for Russia's advances against Germany in 1914 and the destruction of two Russian armies at Tannenberg. But, once more, are the conclusions you, the reader, have to accept without question. Simulatenously he blames Lenin and Trotsky once again on the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, forgetting that German forces were forging into Russian territory practically unopposed and it was a sacrifice Lenin was willing to make since he believed in a future world revolution which would return the territory to Russia. This is actually evident in the book itself, pg. 28, when he quotes Zinoviev saying that peace will be temporary and that peace with Germany will only be 'episodic'. Unfortunately this is solely a quote that starts the chapter, not something Suvorov would go into detail about, since it would prove counterproductive to his underlying lies. Suvorov also forgets that one of the reasons the Bolsheviks were able to seize power was thanks to their platform of being against the war, one of the main reasons Alexander Kerensky's government did not last. Will you read about any of this here? No, because this man is not an historian, nor does he know much about the subject matter he dictates to you, the reader.

When discussing the treaty of Rapallo, which he never names (go figure), he describes how Stalin apparently "prepared Germany for a second world war." He forgets that Stalin was not in a position to dictate such actions in the early 1920s, he also omits how much the Soviets received from the Germans through their officer exchange programs, etc. (see " The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922-33, and Paved the Way for Fascism" although most of the militarization really took part after Hitler came to power).

On pg. 20 Suvorov claims Stalin 'presented Hitler with Poland, and the rest of Europe.' Really? What happened to the fact that Stalin wanted to ally with England and France against Hitler? What happened to Stalin wanting to send the Red Army to help protect Czechoslovakia before England and France gave it away at Munich? You won't find that information here, rather, Stalin 'presented' Hitler with Poland, sure thing.

The chapter on "Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation" is greatly lacking. The Soviet Union, after the purges of the Red Army, convinced itself through propaganda that any attack would be easily repulsed and the war would be taken to the enemy. Hence there was no need for a strategic air force, rather one that supported the Red Army operationally and tactically. Hence the IL-2 and the PE-2 rather than ineffective mass strategic bomber strikes which from a large altitude did less damage than they were worth. The reason Soviet pilots were no match for their German counterparts? They weren't taught to dogfight. Proof? None. Once more context is forgotten when speaking of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. Yes, they were excellent designs and proved their worth in battle. But, the Germans still succeeded in destroying or capturing the majority of them throughout 1941 for a variety of reasons, not exactly proof of a country preparing to go to war with battle-tested weapons and crews. It isn't only the tank design that needs to be studied but in what atmosphere they operated in. The chaotic days of June/July 1941 were not representative of an armed force readying for war, rather a surprised Red Army scrambling for its life.

Suvorov also claims that BT tanks were to be used as an 'offensive' tank along the enemy's road system, aka autobahn. Problem is, BT tanks were built in the early 1930s, before the creation of the autobahn. In general, little is said of the design history of any tank and the problems they encountered, only that they were 'the best in the world.' Suvorov's biggest problem is that he thinks defensive actions on the part of an armed force consist solely of defensive actions. Counter-attacks and offensives are a moot point for him, this master strategist, who apparently has no idea of what defensive warfare consists of. Thus, when speaking of paratroopers, he states that they can only be used on the offensive, OK, but that offensive action can be part of a defensive campaign.

Some of the nonsensical 'facts' Suvorov draws to the readers attention are an order issued by Tukhachevsky on June 23, 1921, then follows up with 'twenty years later, Russia would be invaded...' Really? Did this order of Tukhachevsky about how to handle 'bandits' predict the German invasion of the Soviet Union? If not, why is it mentioned? Stretching reality to fit his own twisted version of history, nothing more nothing less.

One of the worst chapters of this book is entitled 'The Cleansing' rather the the purge that actually took place. This chapter tries to claim that the Red Army purges were not as detrimental to the Red Army as many had assumed. True enough, the problem is the atmosphere that they left in their wake. Over 600 generals were arrested, those who took their place were new to their positions. One example, Kirponos, the commander of the Kiev Military District on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union commanded a division during the Winter War against Finland. He was a competent commander but totally out of his league as a military district, and soon front, commander. Independent thinking and actions were curbed, generals sought out orders and assurances of those orders before they could even begin to think or act. Once again, context is ignored, numbers are thrown around as if they are the answer to all your questions.

All of the above is found within the first 100 pages of this book. At times I have to say I have to force myself to continue to read such drivel. There is also plenty I've left out and which would require pages upon pages to document and put into a historical context. Hard to feel anything but pity and disgust at such a horrid work of fiction being passed off as history, even worse, accepted as the latter by a gullible public.

Soviet Veterans of World War II: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991 by Mark Edele

2009-05-13T13:29:00.000-07:00

We easily forget that after the war is over the soldiers who fought it do not simply disappear into the night nor are they flawlessly incorporated into society. Mark Edele, in this new work on Soviet veterans of the Second World, goes through what these men and women endured from demobilization, trying to configure to the norms of society, on into the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and through perestroika with Gorbachev and beyond. Since I have had an interest in the plight of these men and women of whom we hear so little after the war, especially those who were invalids and who returned as former POWs, I found this text a great benefit to the history of the Red Army and the Soviet Union in general. Additionally, since many myths today prevail about what happened to former POWs, I am happy to say the author gives the relevant numbers for what happened to them and what many went through trying to incorporate themselves into everyday life that did not include a POW camp or a field of battle. Lastly, I found embedded throughout the text a fascinating discussion of veterans as a distinct group, as well as the reasons for why the Soviet government did not give them that right until decades after the war.

The book is separated into three sections, the first section, made up of the introduction and three chapters, is entitled "Reintegration." It introduces the topic for the reader, goes into the process of how soldiers traveled back into the Soviet Union from parts of central and eastern Europe, followed by how they were welcomed home, and lastly their transition into civilian life. From these first few chapters I saw that the author had at the heart of this text an objective view of the events in question. Soviet veterans went through a lot of different situations: heading home in trains cars with limit comforts or amenities, at times ridding on the roofs of trains, hitching rides home wherever and from whomever they could find. Considering how many veterans were being discharged and how many civilians were being repatriated some of this should not come as a shock. But then again, veterans hoped that a country for whom they bleed and gave their years of youth would respond in kind. Their welcome by the population and integration into society took on many forms. Some found jobs quickly enough with the government help or, more readily, from help of friends and family, while others suffered as they might have been invalids without a skill set while government bureaucracy dragged its feet in trying to help them.

The second section, for me the most interesting of the book, is entitled "Victors and Victims" and highlights war invalids, returning POWs, and how veterans as a whole were treated by the population as they entered schools, the party apparatus, or various jobs. What happened to Soviet war invalids is one of the most depressing stories I've come across; although in this text that story is limited to mainly the facts, which are interesting in and of themselves. Some went on to led criminal gangs while others adjusted to civilian life. Some became professional beggars and when orders came down to rid big cities of "anti-social parasitic elements" war invalids might have been included in this category and were swept away from city streets to other destinations. Some POWs, after going through filtration camps and interrogations by various NKVD/MVD agencies, carried a stigma with them for decades to come which precluded them from attaining work, and when they could, from keeping it. Even into the 1980s there were those who wanted to treat POWs who gave up without being severely wounded or knocked unconscious as a separate category from those who fell into captivity in a state beyond their control. What I thought the author ignored in regard to repatriated POWs was the fact that there were many who did join the Germans of their own volition, in a capacity that was detrimental to the Soviet war effort. Not much stress was put on this point, perhaps it was because the author wanted to remain above the politics of it all and continue in an objective light, but I feel this limits the context the author is operating in.

The last section deals with veteran organizations and veterans as an entitlement community. It was interesting to see how they congregated and petitioned for rights and benefits, who joined them (Zhukov, among others) and who opposed them and why (mainly economic reasons). In the end what the Soviet Union planned for its war heroes did not come to fruition, for many reasons. While those demobilized during the first two years after war ended received some benefits, many who followed did not and there was little they could do aside from trying to integrate themselves into civilian life.

Available on Amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199237565/ref=cm_cr_rev_prod_title

War in Human Civilization by Azar Gat

2009-03-30T11:12:00.001-07:00

Overall this was a fascinating book to read. It will take you some time to get through it. As more than one reviewer has pointed out, this is not a small text. Then again, when covering such a large and diverse field as 'war in human civilization' this book seems like just the beginning. The positive aspects of this book are that reading it will give you a good sense of where warfare fits into history. The debate between Hobbes and Rousseau regarding where warfare fits in human history was well developed and the author makes it known where his stance lies. Starting from Neanderthals up to the present day the reader is taken through each time period and war is put into an understandable context with other variables like politics, economics, ideology, nationalism, etc. taking their place as contributing or detracting forces. Seeing how warfare has evolved throughout the ages and how the reasoning behind it has either changed or fluidly adapted to the new environment human beings found themselves in will give readers a new perspective and understanding of how history has been shaped. The one problem I encountered a few times when dealing with a part of history that I try to keep up-to-date on and specialize in, early twentieth-century history, is that when it comes to some of the details the author can be wrong or reductionist at times. You cannot hold it against him as he is not only covering the history of the world, to some extent, within his book but also a variety of subjects outside of history (ethnography, anthropology, etc). It is highly commendable to undertake such a diverse topic with multiple scholarly inputs, but you will undoubtedly encounter problems when it comes to details as you can only spend so much time on each subject/fact and, even worse, you have limited time to do the research. Nonetheless, this is an excellent text which I'll come back to time and time again.

On amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199236631

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-45 by Alexander Hill

2009-02-03T22:25:00.000-08:00

Having paid a high price, and eagerly anticipating this volume, I had high hopes for what it would offer. I'm very torn as to how I want to rate and present this review. Whilst this book offers much to those who are not familiar with the Eastern Front, there are many other books that also do that and cost a fraction of the price that this tome is being sold for. Obviously it could not present the war in as much detail as I'd have liked in its close to 300 pages of text. What is exciting about this book is that it offers primary documents on the war from a wide variety of sources that have come out within the past few decades. While there is one other volume that offers such documentary information, a tome from David Glantz, this book goes through the entire war and presents information from different years/military operations which make for fascinating reading. The first two chapters concentrate on the political, economic, and at times military aspects of the Eastern Front, as the war begins we get into more detailed information about armies, divisions, brigades, etc and military matters take up the bulk of the documents being presented.. The problem one becomes aware of is that at times examples are made out of specific situations, for instance, sending out orders over open lines which could be intercepted by the Wehrmacht, and then extrapolated to other units/formations/commanders. In reality we cannot know how representative such a report really was without comparative evidence. Thus, a lot of the information offered here needs to be taken on a case by case basis, it's interesting in its own right but I would not generalize it.

Already with the chapter on the Icebreaker controversy, the second in the book, I thought the author could have done much more. The documents sprinkled throughout are at times interesting, and in other instances seem less important. This will remain the norm throughout the book. Granted, the problem here is subjective, what the author thought might be important or revealing is at times, in my view, a waste of space. Nothing is perfect, so in this case you'll be forced to take the proverbial good with the bad. To give you a sense of what documents are presented, through the icebreaker chapter we have tables of Soviet military equipment production for 1937-1940, practically the entire pre-emptive planned strike by Timoshenko and Zhukov of May 1941, an excerpt from Stalin's speech to graduating officers, the TASS communique from June of 1941, reports from border troops about German air incursions into Soviet air space, etc. A lot of it interesting, no doubt, but in the end it is just a preview of what the icebreaker controversy is all about. But the point of the book seems to be to offer students of the Soviet Union, WWII, and more specifically the Eastern Front a starting point to do their own research rather than presenting all the author knows about a specific topic. In that respect he has done his job, but you might already be asking yourselves, does that justify the cost of this book? We'll leave that question for the end of this review.

The third chapter on Barbarossa repeats most of what is already known by those familiar with the Eastern front. It was interesting to see order 270 in print, but some of the documents are not at all hard to find. The first three orders that went out on June 22nd, for example, are readily available, as is the list of meetings Stalin undertook during the first week of the war. On the other hand, the establishment of a 'council of evacuation' and the document for its creation isn't that imperative for students of WWII, in my opinion. Some of the documents detailing units of the 48th army were interesting, showing how depleted the divisions were. Also, the few maps that you'll find throughout the book are less than a quarter size of the page, making them pretty much useless.

Chapter four, on the battle for Moscow, gives more coverage to the army and the reader gets a chance to see some interesting reports going back and forth between the high command, the armies at their disposal, and Stalin. Again, the information/documents are limited to a few directions and lack in detail and depth, but are worth being aware of. There is where we come to a few problems. I was skeptical when I read a document detailing some lines of defense and the forces that were designed on them. "31 independent artillery division" and "2 divisions of 'RS' Katiushas." I was positive this was a mistake and apparently, as more than a few authors have done in the past, the confusion comes about with the words diviziya and divizion. The latter is used to designate artillery battalions, the former divisions. The author mixes the two up and instead of battalions of artillery and Katiushas we now have entire divisions. Secondly, the author chooses to quote verbatim from his previous articles on the effect of British Lend Lease tanks during the Moscow counter offensive. The problem is his math is off and he skews the percentages (see pg. 84 if you can get the book). He then seems to contradict himself when he quotes a British mission claiming that by December 9, 1941 some 90 British tanks had seem action with the Red Army and not a page later claims that by the beginning of December "it is reasonable to suggest" that British Lend Lease tanks made up "30-40 per cent of the heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941..."

The chapter on Stalingrad covers the lead up to the German operations and through to the surrender of the 6th Army. Quite a bit of time is spent on Operation Mars, due to the controversy since David Glantz's book came out, with the author leaning on much of what Glantz has to say regarding the importance of Mars when compared to the encirclement of the 6th Army. Some very interesting documents are offered; the infamous order 227 "Not a step back" as well as reports by NKVD blocking detachments from the Stalingrad and Don fronts about how many men they stopped, arrested, shot, and sent back to the front. This chapter also features the creation of the first dedicated tank armies, how they were incorporated into the Red Army, the success and failures they underwent, and what the Red Army learned from the entire campaign in the south.

The next two chapters deal with Kursk and Leningrad. The Kursk section includes documents dealing with the Central, Voronezh, and Steppe fronts. Their strengths, tank forces, artillery, and eventually their casualties after the operations around Kursk were over (this includes operations Kutuzov and Rumiantsev). The author also includes the forcing of the Dnepr and includes a few documents detailing how certain Red Army units were able to cross the river and establish some of the first bridgeheads on the other side. The chapter on Leningrad discusses the siege from 1941 to the beginning of 1943. Some of the more interesting documents include those who were evacuated including where they came from (Leningrad or refugees from the Baltics). The amount of food being brought into Leningrad through air transports and of course the Road of Life. As well a diary from a teacher is included from the archives of the FSB, sadly the writer was arrested during the war and charged with 'counterrevolutionary anti-Soviet agitation.' Another document discusses the arrests made by the NKVD throughout the war in Leningrad and for what crimes.

Lend Lease comes next and begins with a discussion of which position England the US took vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Some in the US wanted nothing to do with the Soviet Union and would not extend Lend Lease to the USSR while Churchill was willing to extend help to Stalin and support the Red Army's struggle. The chapter is divided into three phases, the first of which has England playing the larger role as US deliveries were not yet up to the levels they would eventually reach. Some of the documents prove very interesting, for instance: a report from the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade which discusses the amount of aircraft that the US was supposed to delivery from October through December, 600. In fact, these numbers were decreased to 395 by the Americans and in total only 204 were shipped out of which only 95 arrived in the Soviet Union as of January 9, 1942, with another 106 en route. The same information is supplied for tanks along with an interesting list of supplies received via PQ 12 in March of 1942 and where those supplies went. Overall this is one of the more interesting chapters, at least for me.

The ninth chapter discusses the partisan movement, something the author is quite familiar with having earlier released a book about partisans in North-West Russia. As with the chapter on Lend Lease it seems that these two chapters have a lot more depth to them than some of those previously mentioned. No doubt a reflection on the fact that the author did quite a bit of research for them, but at times some of the military narrative that is employed could use more depth and analysis. One of the documents attached to this chapter is a list of claims for each year from the Leningrad are partisans which details what they destroyed/killed, I immediately noticed one error in the first line, that is rails destroyed, listed for 1943 is 65,363 and for 1944 85,541, the total is then given as 58,563. Nothing major but something that could easily have been caught. When putting down this much money for a book it should be perfect.

The "Ten Stalin blows" are discussed next, specifically this refers to the 10 major offensives taking place throughout 1944 which forced Romania and Finland out of the war against the Soviet Union, took the Red Army to the gates of Warsaw, liberated the Crimea, freed some of the Baltic territory, forced German troop evacuations through the Black Sea and the Baltic, etc. Some operations are described in more detail than others, but that may simply be due to the fact that some were more complex than others. Losses for each operation are provided as well as a few documents about practically each offensive operation. A few more interesting than the rest.

The next chapter captures the actions of the Red Army from the Vistula to Berlin. I found particularly interesting the documents which came out of the fighting for Konigsberg on how combined arms operations are to take place within city walls and in the reduction of fortresses. What problems were encountered and which solutions proposed as a result. Although a mistake is made in one of the translation, specifically: "If one tank advances along the left side of the street, firing upon houses on the right side of the street, then the other advances along the left side." The original document has "right" instead of the first mentioned "left", although in all honesty a mistake might have been made in the original as well. One would figure that tanks operating on the right side of the street should fire to the houses on the left, better to see the threat, and those on the left should fire on houses to their right. In either case, a mistake is still made.

The last chapter deals with the Soviet offensive in Manchuria against the Japanese Kwantung Army. A nice breakdown is given of forces from both sides as well as the advantages enjoyed by the Soviets over that of the Japanese. The victory of the Red Army here was practically the least costly of any Soviet offensive undertaken throughout the Second World War, it was also one of the quickest operations.

Overall this is an interesting book. I hope to see future works come out focusing on the Eastern Front and making use of many of the primary source material that the author was able to incorporate into this narrative. There are a lot of interesting starting points for students to begin thinking subjects they themselves might be interested in exploring. Now that this volume has come out in paperback, I can fully endorse its merits for those interested in a primary documentary reader on the Eastern Front.

The Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941 by Victor Kamenir

2009-01-19T20:01:00.001-08:00

There are already a few narratives that deal with the beginning phases of the war on the Eastern Front. Some in more detail than others, but they are available if you know where to look. Yet with the flow of new literature coming out of Russia regarding WWII, I would be remiss if I said even a tenth of what has come out has been covered in the west. Thus, if you have an interest in the border battles between the Red Army and Wehrmacht in the South during late June and early July of 1941, then this book will prove invaluable in many respects, for others, a very good start to understanding the Eastern Front in general. The majority of the narrative deals with the Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Special Military District: specifically the 8th, 9th, 15th, 19th, and 22nd Mechanized Corps. Their strengths and weaknesses are analyzed by the author so that a better context is given for what would happen when the Germans invaded on June 22, 1941. In the background there is also mention and discussion of the 5th and 6th armies, amongst others, as well as the command staff of the Kiev Special Military District.

A lot of the information presented here is interesting, at times little known, and when looked at in an objective light helps explain what happened to the Red Army in 1941. Were German forces opposed on the border or did they simply walk over Soviet border guards and the forward-most Red Army military formations in their way? For those that like to gloss over this question and move on to the eventual German encirclements that took place throughout the rest of 1941, you will be surprised. Red Army resistance was quite heavy and the Germans paid a large price in the south with both dead and wounded. Their forces were also held up in various locations with in depth defenses by the likes of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade and "Task Force Lukin." Commissar Popel's dash through German lines toward Dubno is described in great detail, as well as the German perspective of how this affected their advance(s).

I was glad to see the author mention the lack of communication between various units including divisions, corps, armies, and even what would become a front. This is one of the biggest reasons for the misuse of the Mechanized Corps; for example, the 8th Mechanized Corps traversed hundreds of kilometers before it had a chance to engage the enemy. The Corps moved from one location to another as orders were constantly changing. Army commanders issued one type of order while their higher ups, not privy to real-time information, issued orders that directly contradicted those of the army command. The chaos that ensued comes through full force within the pages of this text, and for that the author deserves a big thanks.

1941 is especially interesting for me because as a student of the Eastern Front I strive to understand what exactly happened. Sadly, this book was at times a disappointment. Because the Mechanized Corps are the main focus of this narrative not a lot of attention was given to the information presented in regards to the intelligence Stalin was receiving on the eve of the invasion. I thought, overall, the author's analysis of what agents were sending to Stalin and his actions in response were at times weak and lacked substance. The sources used were also very limited. Within the text there are a few incorrect details that few will be able to spot, but still, basic research into what you're going to put into a book should be a must in all cases.

The editing this text went through is horrific. Practically on every page there is a missing word, misspelled word, etc. Amazingly you'll get used to it. The sources used, in my opinion, were lacking. Some were excellent, but a lot of information and books have come out that I did not see cited here, from both Russia and the West. The author needs to cite better, there is an immense amount of interesting information throughout the pages of this book without any citations! How are we supposed to guess where all of this data is coming from? Russian sources are also translated instead of being transliterated in the bibliography, I thought that was a minus. And in at least one instance there is an endnote citation of a book that is not listed in the bibliography.

Because of the above this book is at rare times useless as a source. A lot of the information here I'm familiar with but when I came to interesting discussions and events I had never heard of, I was at a loss as to where they came from. How can I cite this book if it only leads to a dead end? Still, I know the author isn't simply making it all up and because of that I can still recommend this narrative to those who have an interest in the Eastern Front, 1941, and what happened to the Mechanized Corps of the Red Army during the initial border battles. These were the battles which eventually set the stage for the rest of the operations undertaken by the Red Army in 1941, if not the entire war.

Poland Alone: Britain, SOE and the Collapse of Polish Resistance, 1944 by Jonathan Walker

2009-01-17T21:41:00.000-08:00

An interesting book about a subject few know much about. While I am quite interested in the Warsaw uprising of 1944, especially the role the Red Army played, or did not play as the case might be, in it, this book goes somewhat beyond that. The author analyzes the relationship that existed between the Polish Home Army (AK), the Polish government in exile, the British SOE, and the British government. Overall it is an interesting account but, in my opinion, lacking in a few instances.

First, there is not enough coverage of the Red Army and its actions as well as few sources on the subject from the Soviet/Russian side. True, this isn't what the book is ultimately about, but I still think more could have been done. For example, the author would have greatly benefited from David Glantz's article on what the Red Army was doing on the eve of the uprising and throughout the uprising itself. But I will give credit to the author in that he does explain the situation the Red Army found itself in (although not in the detail I'd have liked to see); the dedicated and heavy German resistance and reinforcements that were brought in to hold the Red Army from entering Warsaw, the various attempts and minor offensives that were undertaken by the Red Army, etc.

While some of the accusations the author goes through have merit, others seem to be taken out of context and, forgetting realism, are seen in a simply idealistic light. For example, how much could Britain negotiate on the part of the Poles with Stalin? Not much since Stalin controlled Poland. Yes, it's not fair that Poland's borders were moved, but Stalin had his reasons and Churchill, as well as others within England, understood this reality. On the other hand the author quite poignantly points out that not only was the Soviet Union out of the loop in regards to the beginning of the uprising, but the British themselves were never forewarned. Then when requests were made to begin dropping supplies, immediate action could simply not be taken as there was no planning done for such operations.

In the end I think this narrative has much to offer in explaining the relationship that developed between Poland and the British throughout WWII. Yet, ultimately I believe there is still much that remains to be written about these events, especially the uprising.

A Century of Ambivalence: The Jews of Russia and the Soviet Union, 1881 to the Present by Zvi Y. Gitelman

2009-01-08T13:04:00.000-08:00

I didn't have high hopes for this book, in fact as soon as I received it I put it away in the back of a bookshelf and up until a few days ago forgot I even had it. Deciding I haven't read anything on Jewish history in a while I gave this title a try after rummaging through various bookshelves and coming upon this title. I was not disappointed, well, to be honest, I was only disappointed in two aspect. Overall this book is very well written. The text is interspersed with pictures of Jewish life within Russia throughout the time period(s) being discussed. This is not a boring read, the author does an excellent job of moving the reader through Jewish religious, cultural, social and political history within the Russian Empire and what would become the Soviet Union. Additionally, there is some discussion about Jewish presence within the Russian army in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but this is where I was somewhat disappointed. There is little to no discussion of individual Jews within the Russian army throughout WWI. For example, we are told in general terms that half a million Jews served but little detail is given about what these Jews actually did on the front lines. Secondly, this book is sorely lacking in endnotes. There is a lot of fascinating information which I was pleasantly surprised to learn about but I have no idea where to trace this information to! Thus the four star rating. In the end this is an interesting read and will undoubtedly teach both the novice and the expert something new. Yet still, this becomes a narrative that could have presented a more meaningful account if the time was taken out to source all the information being presented.

A copy can be found here:
http://www.amazon.com/Century-Ambivalence-Russia-Soviet-Present/dp/0253214181/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1231448690&sr=1-1

Afghan Tales: Stories from Russia's Vietnam by Oleg Ermakov

2009-01-07T11:39:00.001-08:00

A few of the stories within the pages of this book might be of interest if you're looking for examples of combat in the hills and villages of Afghanistan, but keep in mind that they will be very few. This is a small book and most of the stories have to do with the soldiers themselves; thus, if you have an interest in a soldier's imagination, thoughts, dreams, and what he thinks about during the war, their conversations with each other, rather than the raids/battles they might become engaged in, you'll find something of interest here. Otherwise, I'd say give this one a pass. This won't be a book I keep around nor is it something one can readily cite as a source.

Copies of the book can be found here:
http://www.amazon.com/Afghan-Tales-Stories-Russias-Vietnam/dp/0688123945/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1231357188&sr=1-1

Terror by Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin by Paul R. Gregory

2009-01-06T13:33:00.000-08:00

This is undoubtedly one of the best books I've had a chance to read on the Soviet Union in the past decade. As an avid reader of Soviet times, especially the Stalinist period, I try to keep up to date on the newest releases. I fought over how many "stars" to give this book because the author presents a 'model' which we follow throughout the book about Stalin, the Cheka/OGPU/NKVD/MVD, and the repressions/purges. This 'model' tries to show in a rational sense what Stalin did, how he did it, and the success or failure that was achieved in the process. The backbone for this 'model' is rationality. I honestly think that the author has a good point in this regard, much of Stalin's behavior as well as the NKVD is rational when put into correct context. This obviously doesn't make it right, but following Stalin's thought process, it makes sense. Sadly, in the end I can't say I'm a fan of such 'models,' I'd rather have the information presented to me and then decide if it might fit into a certain 'model.'

What I was most interested in when reading through the book was the information and the structure/contextualization that information was put into. The author undoubtedly has a good, in fact a very good, grasp of the Soviet period and the purges that took place from the time of Lenin to even after Stalin. He's done the archival research and leans on current Russian primary/secondary literature to give a good narrative of the time and events in question. Again and again I found myself looking up end notes trying to figure out where various bits of information were coming from.

While Stalin indeed deserves a large portion of the blame for what occurred throughout his reign, in the end he was not the only one responsible for what befell the Soviet Union. He can be blamed for the atmosphere that was created, but he was not the only one approving and issuing death sentences or prison terms. Indeed, few if any of those who achieved high status/rank within the USSR can say they did so with "clean hands." Aside from the 'model' that the author presents I'd say the fact that much of the 'bottom-up' relationship - not that of the NKVD personnel to Stalin but the citizens and their complaints against one another - is never really mentioned or contextualized. Obviously Stalin and the NKVD as well as other party functionaries deserve much of the blame for what occurred, if not the majority, but all those people who complained about their neighbors for one reason or another (greed, revenge, etc) also took part in the development of the Soviet state. In the end an interesting read and a worthwhile investment, very much recommended.

Find it on amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/Terror-Quota-Security-Yale-Hoover-Stalinism/dp/0300134258/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1231277707&sr=1-2

The Bitter Road to Freedom: A New History of the Liberation of Europe by William I. Hitchcock

2008-12-25T11:05:00.000-08:00

The idea behind the book is an original one; tell the story from the point of view of those being liberated. In the west, France, Holland, and the Netherlands had suffered German occupation, from one degree to another, and now they were finally being "liberated" by the western allies. What did this liberation entail? Obviously, many were happy, ecstatic even, while others suffered rape, death, or were simply robbed. While it is important to note that all armies experience such behavior, from one degree to another, it is crucial to keep in mind that in war much is permissible. One cannot judge a period of war as they would peace. What is normally looked down upon becomes allowed as long as the final results are achieved. As hard as this might be to accept, war in general is not a pleasant experience. Being a realist one should understand that the army is not filled with prince charmings and chivalrous knights. These are men who were drafted, or at times signed up of their own volition, to put their lives on the line. They were not chosen based on their high regard for innocent life, no; they were given a gun and taught to kill.

The Red Army, an army that carries a stigma of being the one which "raped" and "pillaged" Germany, by 1945 suffered so many losses that prisoners were being given an opportunity to defend their motherland. Let me repeat that, prisoners, not political prisoners, but criminals, were let out and enlisted within Red Army ranks. When Germany drove the Soviet Union to employ such men within its armed forces, the end result is in effect quite predictable. Mind you, this is not a justification for what happened on Germany territory, but an explanation for some of it.

As mentioned above, no army has clean hands, war is a bloody affair and civilian deaths are to be expected and need to be accepted. These deaths are not fair, then again life is hardly ever fair, most certainly war and premature death are not fair, but I can only assume that given the choice to be liberated by the western allies or kept under German occupation, many within France, Holland and the Netherlands, would choose the western allies with their bombing raids and all.

For those familiar with WWII the information the book presents is interesting and allows context to be given to those who were liberated. The problem is much of that information is not put into context by the author himself, the reader has to do it on their own. That earns this book 3 stars and not 4. It's useful, interesting, enlightening, but lacking in quite a few respects. Specifically, the amateurish coverage of the Red Army (claims, for example, that many in the Red Army had no weapons in 1941).

You can find the book on amazon at:
http://www.amazon.com/Bitter-Road-Freedom-History-Liberation/dp/0743273818/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1230308502&sr=8-1

Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front, 1942-1945 by Boris Gorbachevsky and edited by Stuart Britton

2008-12-22T21:58:00.000-08:00

Doubtfully will we find memoirs and recollections of the Second World War which won't have something of interest to share with a reader. There is no real list of "best sellers," but if there was, Boris Gorbachevsky's memoirs would surely hold a high place on it. The Second World War can and is told from a plethora of perspectives, including frontline soldiers and officers, civilians, politicians, etc. Each has their own story to share but, more often than not, the narrative is clouded by omitted facts and figures, candor is often missing, and self-serving intentions are readily evident. Gorbachevsky seems to have gone out of his way to avoid the aforementioned and, relying on memory, published works (primary and secondary), has seen fit to weave a narrative of events which will leave many speechless in its unadulterated sincerity, heartfelt openness, and uninhibited candor. A perfect example is the author's recollection of the problems Red Army officers had with desertion in 1942. Something one hardly hears about in Red Army memoirs but it is quite well known today that 1 million Red Army men served the Wehrmacht in one capacity or another. We regularly read about Soviets leaving the Germans and coming back to the Red Army, in the latter period of the war, but almost never do we get a chance to hear about who the deserters were.

This account is not full of battles and frontline action on the part of the Red Army, although in the end what Boris experienced is enough for ten lifetimes. Reading how his friends died in his hands during the first encounter and battle with the Germans in the Rzhev area will be hard to forget. From time to time this is anything but an easy read, it can be a quick read if you have the time to devote to all that the author has to share (and at over 400 pages, this is one of the larger Red Army memoirs you'll find for sale today). At least two recollections forced me to put this book down and step away from it for a few hours as I tried to put into perspective what I just read. The first battle, described in great detail and imagery, pitted a brand new division against dug-in German troops and the gruesome results that followed. According to the author, half the division was killed or wounded in the battles they would participate in outside Rzhev. The second occurred closer to the end of the war, when the division the author belonged to had been encircled and their rear area service and supply location was destroyed and the personnel massacred by German troops, in a variety of ways.

This book will give the reader a realistic view of the Red Army through a soldier who rose through the ranks and served on both the frontlines and within the political department of the Red Army. What did political officers do? What were soldiers in the Red Army like? What did they talk about? What did they do in their time between battles? Gorbachevsky shares all of this with us and more. In the end, Gorbachevsky is regularly critical of many of the officers he served under and with and offers enough reasoning as to why. Similarly, he gives due credit to those officers and NCOs who deserved it and took the time to talk to their soldiers, ensure their comfort and attend to their needs and treat them as men and not simply cannon fodder. At times their actions were downright reckless and pointless, but orders were orders, and war is war. At least one of his friends, a battalion commander, after refusing an order to attack which would undoubtedly have left the majority of his men dead, committed suicide. Also, within this book was the first time I read of how officers were afraid of their men! I had never encountered the regular punishments that were meted out to officers who had lost men to desertion.

This book is a learning experience from the first page to the last. The language used throughout the book is not the simple soldier's language many have grown accustomed to when reading memoirs of the Second World War. What we have here is a literary personality who writes with passion, experience, imagery, and most importantly, honesty. The forward by David M. Glantz is an excellent introduction to this memoir and what it means to have such a recollection available for today's generations and, more importantly, a western audience. Thus, I would be remiss if i did not point out that this is Stuart Britton's third translation/editing of a Red Army soldier's memoir. He should be commended as with each memoir he has done a fantastic job in regards to both the flow of the narrative and in helping to explain various Red Army and Soviet jargon for the western reader. Hardly any grammatical or spelling mistakes will be found. For the few that he did miss, they hardly take away from the overall reading and will surely be fixed in future editions/printings, of which I'm more than sure there will be.

One Soldier's War by Arkady Babchenko

2008-12-10T22:29:00.001-08:00

Arkady Babchenko's book about his participation in the wars in Chechnya was a rare find for me. I've been greatly interested in these modern and current wars but the literature on them is quit limited and usually comes with a bias/agenda. Accounts from the soldiers themselves are rare, as rare as those of the Soviet-Afghan war. Such an account will more than likely come with a bias of its own, but there is a distinct difference between a primary source (an eyewitness account in this case) and a secondary source with an agenda. Since the author is regularly critical of both the government and military high command, the majority of this book simply deals with what it takes for a soldier to survive such a war.

For those interested in this account, you should be warned it is not an easy read. War is never glamorous, and the type of war Russian soldiers found themselves in during the Chechen conflict regularly involved atrocities, torture, wanton destruction and murder. The book is separated into three parts. The first part consists of mini-chapters, 1-3 pages each, with no real linear narrative to connect them to each other. Just quick "sound bytes" of what war was like. These quick glimpses into the war are probably what stayed with the author long after he had returned from the war. Arkady was drafted and participated in the first Chechen war, then volunteers for the second. He claims that while his body may have left the war his soul had stayed. The overall translation is good, but not great, as there are a few mistakes and omissions which tend to take away from the narrative. But this can be overlooked at some of the events recalled here are simply too powerful to forget, more than once I had to reread entire paragraphs just to make sure I understood what the author was saying.

The period of time spent in Mozdok is eye opening. Hard as it might be to believe, soldiers do go through a hazing process when they first arrive in the army. It was the same during the Soviet Union and it seems to have lasted after the fall of the USSR. Most of the men in my family served in the Soviet Army and quite a few had something to say about the hazing process. Granted, I have never heard of the extremely barbaric experiences described here, but that might be because when my family members served the Soviet Union was not at war. But it isn't hard to believe that such beatings, torture, and humiliation took place on a regular basis if you have been keeping up with news coming out of Russia. Suicides by soldiers have been quite high and many take place because boys of 18, 19, or 20 simply cannot take being beaten on a regular basis for months on end. The authors explains how he learned to deal with it or try to avoid it, some of his friends went AWOL, while another spent time in a hospital after suffering a broken finger during his latest beating. The chaotic situation the regiment he belonged to is also telling of the time. The mid 1990s were hard on Russia and her citizens, corruption was widespread and few cared about anyone but themselves. Soldiers sold weapons and ammunition to the same Chechens that used said weapons and ammunition to then kill Russian soldiers in Chechnya, everyone was looking out for himself.

I won't go into details about the many other stories you'll find within the pages of this book but suffice it to say, it's worth your time if you have an interest in what someone serving in the current Russian Army might go through. While each story is relative to the author and should not be generalized, the fact that such events can occur only speak to the severity of the situation young Russian boys might have found themselves in during the first and second Chechen Wars.

Stalin's Children: Three Generations of Love, War, and Survival by Owen Matthews

2008-11-26T22:41:00.001-08:00

Somehow I expected something more. This book is more 'literature' than 'history.' The metaphors and similes are nauseating more often than not and the ideas put into people's minds, including the authors thoughts of what they must have been 'feeling,' 'thinking,' in the midst of 'understanding,' etc seem like a waste of time and space since we'll never know what they truly were thinking and/or feeling. The author is obviously new to Soviet history, his rapid and general descriptions of what was going on there in the late 1920s and early 1930s speak volumes, including his thoughts on the famine of the early 30s, which occurred throughout the Soviet Union. For example, the author explains that in December of 1932 internal passports were introduced "in an effort to stem the exodus of the starving into the cities" (pg. 40) What isn't discuss is the fact that starving peasants streaming into the cities would only make the food shortages in cities THAT much worse. While it is true that collectivization policies were brutal, as was the dekulakization campaign, the author forgets all the resistance that the Soviets encountered from the peasants in the countryside. This was not a smooth process or transition on the part of the Soviets, but a bloody affair for all sides. I wasn't surprised to find a bibliography in the book, but I was surprised that no footnotes were used. Quite a bit of the information offered is interesting in and of itself in regards to the history of the Soviet Union, but where did it come from?

The author getting to see his grandfather's (Bibikov's) NKVD file was an enlightening story. It was interested to see who implicated whom, and as I expected, his grandfather, after days of what we can only presume were filled with torture, finally implicates his co-workers and they in turn, when interrogated, implicate him. This becomes a common theme throughout the purges as those being interrogated, if they cannot endure it, implicate everyone they can think of, and they in turn do the same. This is one of the reasons for why the purges become so widespread. Even more interesting was that within the same file was contained information about the men who had tortured and interrogated Bibikov, they were all dead within a year. Something few like to remember, or know, about the Soviet Union is that it routinely eliminated those doing the interrogations and torture. This mainly occurs when the heads of the NKVD are changed and they 'cleanse' those put in charge by those they are replacing. There are quite a few touching, at times heart rendering, scenes throughout the Second World War period which the authors describes; the chaos of the times, the wounded Red Army men, retreat, Stalingrad, women digging anti-tank ditches, orphanages, etc. After the war is over the author's grandmother, who was imprisoned for 11 years in a GULag camp in Kazakhstan, comes to live with one of her daughters, the author's aunt, in Moscow. What follows can only be described as a tragedy. Her treatment of her children is simply inhumane at times, she lashes out at them, throws household objects at them, and her daughter and husband endure it all. Few held onto their sanity and human decency while enduring GULag life. It is hard to blame a woman who has lived through more than ten years of such an existence for her actions, some can only endure and wait for it to end, in one way or another.

The above covers a little less than half the book. The rest deals with the author's parents, largely, through their letters to each other. The reader is also told how his father arrived in Moscow (and why) as well as his travels throughout the Soviet Union, how a KGB agent tried to recruit him, how his parents met, who their friends were, etc. And, again, more stories of visits and living in Russia by the author himself. All interesting in their own way, especially in regards to how foreigners viewed Russia and vice versa. Overall an good book which moves along quickly enough but at times offers too much 'literary flare' (and takes artistic license) for my liking.

Peasant Russia: Family and Community in the Post-Emancipation Period by Christine D. Worobec

2008-10-28T01:02:00.000-07:00

For those interested in the everyday life of Russian peasants in a general sense throughout Russia, this book is a great start. Worobec presents a good amount of information in regards to the changes undertaken post-emancipation. These included, of course the emancipation of the serfs (who accounted for about 90% of the Russian population at the time), a small trickling of peasants to urban centers, and marriages moving away from being solely arranged and letting in some aspects of choice on behalf of the future bride and groom. But the reader will mainly notice the continuity of tradition throughout almost all aspects of peasant life. While peasants might no longer have been considered 'serfs' they still had to pay for the land they tilled, they still answered to the head of the household and the commune assembly controlled the majority of the activities throughout the estate.

Bailiff's (those looking after estates for the land owners) mainly let the serfs take care of themselves and their problems, they might interfere in case of a catastrophe when the peasants needed monetary loans, but for the most part the serfs settled their own problems. For example, to get rid of those considered troublesome within the commune, the assembly might choose to send them for conscription into the army (although this became less of a threat after the 25 year conscription was reduced to 6). In the end a good description of peasant life before the revolution in Russia.

The Jews of Poland by Bernard, D Weinryb

2008-10-28T01:01:00.002-07:00

Overall, I'd say this is an excellent start if you're interested in the history of Jews in Poland. Personally, I wasn't very interested in the few chapters that deal almost solely with religious matters, (the last three chapters, mainly) but otherwise, this book was an excellent introduction for me on the subject. To begin, the exact date of the first Jewish settlement or when the first Jews came to Polish territory cannot be ascertained for sure. But the 13th and 14th centuries are rife with sources that point to Jews already established in Polish territory and the first ritual murder accusation occurs at this point as well, specifically 1347. The real growth of the Jews occurred later on in the 16th through the 18th centuries, even though there were constant wars, famines, and other disasters/illnesses.

Jews, as well as other minorities, were regularly invited by Polish kings and nobles to settle their territories and become merchants, craftsman, and renters/leasers of their properties. It is hard to know how to classify Jewish existence in Poland because they flourished there like nowhere else, but at the same time there were plenty of pogroms being committed against Jews as well as blood libel accusations, etc. Laws being passed by the "royal power" could not be fully enforced to protect the Jews but on the other hand this also meant that enforcing anti-Jewish regulations was also a problem. Overall, Polish attitudes toward Jews were usually relative. Merchants had something to gain by denouncing Jews and trying to pass laws that would enable them to get ahead of their Jewish counterparts. In the end this was done by all merchants against foreigners coming into their territory, be they Jewish, Armenians, or Ruthenians. Jews had it worse at times because of their religious practice, thus they were `double' the foreign elements, unlike that of others.

Many laws that were enacted toward Jews were always `special' in some sense of the word, that is, they differed from the same laws which existed for the Christian population. For example, in 1392 "the city council of Cracow demanded that a Jew who purchased a house from a Christian sign a promise to resell it only to a Christian" (62). Many times these types of rules applied to certain Jews, mainly those who had money and something to contribute in an economic sense. As is evident from a tax roll from the middle of the 14th century from Breslau, only some 7 percent were `very rich' and only 15 percent "of the Jewish population were earners of wages, salaries, and fees" (70).

Within the Polish nobility it is evident that every good King who gave Jews special privileges and rights would simultaneously take other rights away from them. Jews were defended in some parts of the empire, mainly by those with an economic interest in what Jews could do for them. But due to the chaotic nature of the times and the difficulty in instituting any laws/regulations wholesale throughout the country it was really up to the masses and individual nobility to decide what they wanted out of and to do with their Jews.

Lastly, the Cossack uprising in the mid 17th century was a deadly episode in Jewish history when around a quarter of the Jews, that is 40-50,000, were killed in various episodes of mass murders and pillaging on the part of Cossack, Swedish, Russian, and Polish troops. The Jews were at times attacked because they were viewed as representative of the absentee Polish landlords for whom they worked and collected money/taxes (this was mainly the reasoning behind the Cossack uprising). This uprising would lead to further wars and the eventual 3 partitions of Poland between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. That's pretty much where the story ends for Polish Jews in this book. If you're interested in details about any of the above, this book is a good start.

Russia Gathers Her Jews: The Origins of the "Jewish Question" in Russia, 1772-1825 by John Doyle Klier

2008-10-28T01:01:00.001-07:00

This book proves to be an excellent source for understanding what happened after the partition of Poland when a large Jewish population was taken into Russia. Before the partition practically all Jews were thrown out of Russia for a variety of reasons and the Russian government had to start anew vis-a-vis its policies toward such a large population of Jews. The result was when Russia first inherited the Jews of Poland they did not exactly know what to do with them and kept the institutions that the Poles/Jews had created previously. With an influx of Poles into Russia Polish anti-Semitism seemed to influence Russian and what would eventually become Ukrainian anti-Semitism. Ukrainian anti-Semitism stemmed from the fact that Polish landlords went through Jews, as middle men, to lease/rent property to Ukrainians before the partition. But this wasn't so much anti-Semitism as we have come to know it today as simply antagonistic feelings toward Jews since they were such a visible enemy in regards to economic conditions Ukrainians were being forced into.

As Jewish merchants spread through the Russian empire complaints by merchants against Jewish merchants began. Many of the accusations made against Jews had to do with the innovative - and today we'd call them capitalistic - ideas that the Jews were using, such as underselling their competition, selling with whole sale prices, fixing prices, cornering the market, driving up prices, etc. For the most part Jews were not allowed to work in agriculture or own land, when a time came when they were given the legal right to work in agriculture they were still not allowed to own land. In regards to taxes, Jews in Russia had to pay a double tax, or if they wanted to emigrate out of Russia they would have to pay a 3 year equivalent of it. Anti-Judaism began to pick up economic connotations which would eventually be evident in future anti-Semitic ideas about the Jews. Jewish distillers and tavern-keepers were accused of keeping the peasantry in perpetual debt, etc.

It is interesting to note that the future `Pales of Settlement' was based - out of context - on an idea and submission of a Jew who thought that the Black Sea area would offer large economic opportunities for Jews. In reality Jews were uprooted and moved to the Black Sea to become farmers and factory workers and help populate this area. Some saw a reasoning behind the complaints against Jews. That they might cheat at trade was due to the double tax burden placed on them. That they were mainly money-lenders was the result of the fact that professions considered `honest' were closed off to them, etc. Throughout the entire reform process the interests of the Christian population were always taken ahead of that of the Jews. In the end some Jews choose to follow the reformist ideas, picking up their lives in Belorussia and moving to the future `Pale of Settlement.' Yet when they arrived, much of what they were promised was not given to them. That is tax exemption, loans, and other government help. To those interested in any of these ideas I would highly recommend purchasing this book, it is very informative and well written as well.

The Jewish Revolution; Jewish Statehood by Israel Eldad

2008-08-20T15:18:00.003-07:00

Anyway familiar with historical books/studies will automatically notice that this book is missing a bibliography and does not cite any sources. If you are familiar with European and Middle Eastern history, especially the role that Jews have played in both, then much of what is written here will not be a surprise for you. The context given to all of the above is, on the other hand, interesting, from time to time. It would be even more interesting if the author could cite sources!

I can't say I agree for 100% with all the arguments but much here makes sense. The sad fact, in the end, is that the world cannot and will not function as this book/author would like. A lot of what is advocated comes from hindsight, but humanity does not work that way. At other times the author wishes that double standards would not exist against Israel, so do I, but that is, again, not the world we live in. In the end this book is filled with a good amount of truth and honesty as well as emotion. At the same time, there is also too much idealism and not enough realistic thinking and acceptance. If the majority of the world was familiar with its own history then many of the mistakes made today would never have occurred, but that type of idealistic dream is just that. We should not concentrated on what could have been but rather try to understand our present reality, including how and why it came about, and what we can do to change it in the future, for the better.

By Blood & Fire July 22, 1946: The Attack on the King David Hotel by Thurston Clarke

2008-08-01T12:41:00.000-07:00

I have heard of the King David 'terrorist attack' but I had little knowledge of what actually occurred and how it was pulled off. This book is an excellent description of those events and interweaves stories of those involved in the attack, including the attackers, those who would be wounded/killed, and those who would be witnesses. The planning that went off into pulling this operation off, why the King David was chosen, who was picked for the mission and why, etc, all of this is covered in more than enough detail and the story moves along at quite a quick pace.

One will have to rethink the idea of 'Jewish terrorism' when they read this book. I have never thought of 'Jewish terrorists' to be the equivalent of the terrorists the world has encountered in the past few decades. As the author points out, though, there are differences and quite a few similarities between the two.

But, it should be remembered that the men and women involved in the King David operation telephoned, three times, to warn those in the King David of what would happen. They were ignored and some consider the end result no longer their fault. The bottom line will remain that they targeted the building and what it stood for, rather than the innocent human beings inside it, and tried to minimize lives lost, unlike the terrorism of today. This will forever separate them, in my mind, from the Islamic terrorists the world over who choose to target innocent civilians, and the more the better.

Moscow Rules by Daniel Silva

2008-07-29T20:12:00.000-07:00

Being from the former Soviet Union I had high hopes for this book as I am used to the large amount of research Daniel Silva usually goes through for his novels. Having read most, if not all, of the Gabriel Allon series, and, at the same time, having read about some of the operations described in Silva's books (operation Wrath of God, etc) I was looking for an accurate assessment of today's Russia. Sadly, while the story was good enough and moved at the usual pace that Allon novels do, I was very much let down by the author/editors of this book in a variety of ways.

First, the Russian newspaper represented in the book is entitled "Moskovsky Gazeta", it should be "Moskovskaya Gazeta." The character Olga Sukhova has a grandfather with the same last name, Sukhova. Sukhova is the feminine form, if it is a man, it should have been Sukhov. I also noticed that the AK-47 is purported to have been one of the reasons the Soviets won against the Germans. I could only interpret this as a reference to WWII, yet, the AK-47 was not developed until after WWII. These are just a few of the errors I found, there weren't many more, but they did take away from the usual interest I have when delving into the world the author is trying to create.

The major "mistakes" that I noticed, and to a degree, one might not be a mistake per se but rather something I do not agree with the author on. Russian journalists feature highly in this book and to a large degree there have been a large number of journalists killed, from a variety of causes. Yet, I cannot agree that all the journalists killed, Silva claims 14 have died during Putin's time as President, died because of the work they have been doing (be it against the government or a government agency). In truth, few have been killed in such a way as to raise suspicion that they might have died under "professional" hands. Others have been made to seem that way for a variety of propaganda purposes. What I vehemently disagree with the author on is the idea that a character like Ivan Kharkov, a gun runner and former KGB operative, could be one and the same and an oligarch to boot. The oligarch's in today's Russia (and of the 90's) are not former KGB (Berezhovsky, Gusinsky, Abramovich, Khodorkovsky, Smolensky, Luzhkov, Chubais, etc) but they do have former KGB and spetsnaz forces as their security. These men made their money through banks, speculation, natural resources (gas, oil, etc), TV channels, real estate, etc. I'm more than sure that all of them took illegal steps in one way or another, but that is the natural order of things in capitalism.

Lastly, I resent the fact that just because Russia is using her resources as a bargaining chip means she wants to become a super power once more. Russia has a sphere of influence just like the US does, their actions in foreign policy are dictated by self interest just like every other country in this world. While it is true that they helped arm the Middle East during the cold war when the Soviet Union was in existence it was the US that helped arm Islamic extremists the world over (especially those who flooded Afghanisan during the 80's to take up the war against the USSR, this of course doesn't take into account all the other covert operations undertaken by the US). I am not here to preach if what either country did/does is right or wrong, I just hate seeing a double standard at work.

My apologies if this review didn't cover the book as others have, I figure they did a good enough job and there was little I could add as to what the book was about/encompasses. But I do feel that what I mentioned above will take away from the usual accuracy Silva tries to delivery in his books. Russians can and want to live normal lives, otherwise how do you explain the millions living around the world? But it won't happen so soon in a nation which has been around for less than two decades and has been living off of perverted capitalistic ideals that the west helped usher in.

Middle Andzia by Anda Meisels Rosen

2008-07-15T07:32:00.000-07:00

When I first began to be interested in history I was mainly oriented toward the 20th Century and that of the Second World War. I could not wait to begin a new book about the war and learn as much as I could, being so young, I could not fathom that the names, places, and events that I was reading about carried so much context behind them because, ultimately, it was about real people and their very real lives. Thus, I ask you, have you ever dreaded taking up a book? Perhaps most would think this way when presented with a large tome like War and Peace or maybe Lord of the Rings. Just thinking of how long it would take one to read, tackle in some cases, such a huge text turns many off before they even crack open the first page. As for me, these days I get this feeling when I'm faced with a memoir from the Second World War. Be it about a soldier, civilian, or Holocaust survivor. I know I'm in for a struggle.

Therefore, today I view reading some aspects of history more as a chore rather than an enlightening experience. I know as soon as I pick up a book that this will not be a well written fictional tale which has a clear winner and loser. It won't be a story with a happy ending or a story of human triumph, although, at times it might present us with the victory of the human spirit, as survivors of the Holocaust beat all the odds against them to make it out alive. In the end a story such as this, and others like it, will make me think, it will make me reread sentences, paragraphs, and, at times, whole pages as my brain desperately tries to grapple with what it's just ingested. By the time I come to its conclusion, I know that the dread I felt in the beginning was an exaggeration. Nothing in the world can compare to what the author, Andzia, went through from age 7, until she was liberated at age 12, and I owe it to her and myself to learn from her experiences. Can humanity really be responsible for something as coarse and degrading as the Holocaust? Can human beings really treat each other in such a way? The bottom line is that this is our history, humanity's history, and today, it is our responsibility to those who endured such a tragedy to never forget and to learn from our past so that future generations will not make the same mistakes.

Starting this book the reader is presented with the above questions, and a multitude of others, and I am reminded of what I'm about to delve into As hard as it is for us to come to terms with such ideas it is that much harder for her, someone who faced anti-Semitism on regular basis and lived with death on her doorstep. As I read about her childhood in Sambor, her family and neighbors, I could almost imagine myself living in those same streets. Readers who are familiar with Holocaust and WWII literature should not be surprised at the amount of information the author is able to retain of her years before the war. It seems that survivors have set up a specific reference called 'pre-war' where they can only remember the good times. Yet one can almost feel the tension building as WWII comes closer and closer and is finally thrust upon this peaceful community and its residents. Even before the war, there are instances when Andzia speaks of certain characters from her past; describing their looks, jobs, families, and qualities. Inevitably, the last sentence about them discloses where and how they were killed or simply never heard from again. A select few times the end result is a bit different, Andzia encounters this person or people again, be in Israel or the US, but they are not as they used to be. Broken and depressed by the losses they suffered and what they had to live through.

The first encounter with German officers came in the beginning of September 1939, when a group of German officers asked politely if they could stay overnight. Andzia's mother spoke to them in German and made every effort to see to their needs. They left the next morning thanking her for her hospitality; soon they would disappear with the rest of the German army as the Russians took over the occupation of Sambor. Deportations to various parts of the Soviet Union would follow for some. A young couple decided to poison themselves and their baby rather than be deported. Few could know that those who were deported would have a better chance of survival than those who remained and would endure the future German occupation one year later.

At one point, after the Soviets took over Sambor, to escape deportation to Siberia, Andzia and her family left Sambor for another town where they were not known but, eventually, chose to return to Sambor after the Soviets withdrew and the Germans re-entered Galicia. On the way back they were stopped by a group of German officers and soldiers who wanted to know if her father was a Communist. Her father proceeded to lift up his shirt to show the ritual Tzitzit he always wore underneath, saying that he was a religious Jew and thus could not be an Atheist Communist. The officer, miraculously, motioned for him to move on.

More than once there is reference to the local Ukrainian population who greeted the Germans with great enthusiasm as they re-entered Sambor after declaring war on the Soviet Union. They would remind Jews that their time would soon come to an end by actively helping the Germans to persecute them.

The first German aktion, before the establishment of the ghetto in Sambor, saw Andzia and her family barely manage to hide. When it was over, and they returned to their apartment, they found it almost empty. The locals had helped themselves and striped it practically bare, taking the linens, clothes, and even towels. The next day she "saw a neighbor's child wearing one of my dresses" (pg. 115). Such crude behavior and utter regardlessness for their actions came to symbolize a large portion of locals and their lack of remorse toward their Jewish neighbors and former friends. While during the third aktion, there is a description of how a neighbor was inadvertently shot by a German, while hiding in an attic. The neighbor never made a sound nor did anyone else hiding next to him, they were even able to prevent the blood from seeping through the boards so as not to give away themselves to the Germans standing just below them.

At one point Andzia recounts how she was taken in by an anti-Semitic couple who agreed to keep her 'safe' in exchange for money. They kept her in a very small kitchen cupboard and every once in a while let her out to use a bucket, as a toilet. Otherwise, a dog would stand guard outside the small cupboard whenever the couple would leave the apartment and she was told to stay there no matter what as she could easily be seen through the windows. Eventually, the money ran out and she was returned to the ghetto.

Heart breaking is the memory of orphans as young as 3 years old who had to fend for themselves within the confines of the ghetto in Sambor; one tends to forget that living is at times harder than giving up and dying. As a side note, I found it fascinating to learn that Sambor was a central point for the trains leaving for and from the Eastern Front. The author explains that the town was always filled with soldiers and officers and on a regular basis they would be loaned out to the local SS in helping with surrounding the ghetto during rounds up, at times even helping with the round ups themselves.

After the liquidation of the Sambor ghetto, Andzia spent a full 16 months hidden in a cellar with 25 others, hundreds of rats, and one white cat. They had no light, had to dig a well for water and lived with the constant smell of feces from their toilet pit a few feet away from where they slept. Somehow, the smell turned to the least of their concerns as they progressed on a day to day basis, living their lives as best as circumstances could dictate. A Ukrainian knew about their hiding place and demanded money/goods, on a regular basis, as well as a young pretty Jewish girl to be at his beck and call whenever he came around. A girl had to be "sacrificed" for the good of the group, she endured it until the end. Andzia would regularly see her returning to the cellar crying after spending time with him. The Ukrainian even forced all of them to write letters attesting to how much he had done on their behalf as the Red Army was coming closer and the Germans were retreating toward Sambor. He wound up in Canada, as did many Ukrainian collaborators, and regularly showed off the letters as a testament to how much he had done to save Jews.

Andzia's uncle tried to join the local Polish partisans in their fight against the Germans. But they instead shot and killed him, saying "that they did not want a Jew in their midst" (pg. 186). A man who escaped with the author's uncle related the story to her as he survived based on his non-Semitic looks and fought with the partisans until liberation, when he found the author and her family and told her them about her uncle. This was a regular occurrence with the Polish Home Army and Ukrainian nationalist partisans as well, at times they kept Jews within their ranks but usually they were doctors or useful in other ways (perhaps radio operators, etc).
After the author was liberated, she and her family, as well as a Polish gentile, were robbed at gun point by two Polish Home Army members who "considered themselves at war with the Soviets" (pg. 256). Again, after the war, in liberated Poland, there were numerous pogroms against Jews who had survived the Holocaust, forcing the majority to flee.

We tend to think that after liberation these Holocaust survivors had little to worry about. They were finally free and could live their lives in peace. This, in so many ways, was exactly the opposite of what happened. As shown above, quite a few became victims of those not yet done with their war against the Jews, in one way or another. While others escaped to fight and die defending Israel in its war of independence, the author; she spent years trying to figure out who she was and where she would fit in. As a refugee and a displaced person she was forced to spend time in Germany, around those same people who had aligned themselves with Hitler's Nazi regime as the Holocaust was taking place throughout the European continent. Yet, spending time around them she could not help but think how normal they now appeared, and not like the German monsters she remembered.
For much of the time after the war she was very introverted for the, having few friends and limited contact with those around her. Keeping to herself gave her time to study and pursue a variety of work, first with radios and then to physics.
Eventually, after coming to New York, she would settle in California, her sister in Canada, as her parents remained in New York.

There are quite a few scenes which I had to reread again and again as I could not quite grasp what was being expressed. I could not help reading the lines again and again hoping that I had misread something. I wish I could go into every story and every encounter Andzia experienced but some are better left here unsaid. My words simply could not convey such raw emotion, tenderness, and innocence.

Leningrad: State of Siege by Michael Jones

2008-06-13T20:35:00.000-07:00

This book is not an easy read, but one that needed to be written, especially considering all the new literature out there in both English and Russian about the siege. This work then brings together accounts from dozens of sources and interviews to tell an altogether harrowing tale of how millions trapped within Leningrad had to struggle to survive. One of the main points this book will try to address, as Jones did in his previous book on Stalingrad, is how the citizens and soldiers of this city managed to survive and eventually defeat their German opponents. The psychological angle is one that is not often presented as being important. Usually, weapons, commanders, and numbers are glorified or blamed by one side or the other. Here, we have that idea of 'morale' being given center stage, as well as seeing what it is capable of achieving.

Very interesting descriptions are given in regards to when Zhukov took over control of the North Western Front from Voroshilov. On September 11th, 1941, Zhukov assumed command and soon after the 4th Panzer Group was taken out of the area and switched over in preparation for Operation Typhoon, which would throw it against the defenders of Moscow. Zhukov, apparently, couldn't be convinced by those around him that the Germans were digging in around Leningrad and further offensive actions were being discontinued. The end result was a series of needless offensives by Red Army troops in the Oranienbaum bridgehead and around Leningrad which needlessly wasted lives. When a commander refused to obey, in one instance, he was 'sacked' and his replacement was given the same orders. At another part of the front a marine landing unit of 200 men was sent against their target in broad daylight, they were picked off in the water by the Germans and only 14 managed to reach the shoreline (pg. 117). The actions on the Nevsky bridgehead are quite telling of the time and desperation the Red Army found itself in. Units of the 54th Army, under Kulik, were a mere 9 miles away from the Nevsky bridgehead, which if broken through to would have created a corridor to besieged Leningrad. As Kulik's forces could not break through, it appears that Zhukov tried his hardest from the other side. He threw unit after unit into action, trying to break through to the 'main land'. Divisions were ground down to mere hundreds of men and, at least one marine brigade, simply ceased to exist. This seems to ring quite true with what I am familiar with in regards to Zhukov. He seems to be more than willing to sacrifice ten thousand or twenty thousand men if it means saving millions. On the 21st of November, Zhdanov, after taking over when Zhukov left to help defend Moscow, ordered Colonel Ivan Frolov and his 80th Rifle Division into battle with exhausted soldiers who were short on ammunition. Frolov refused to issue the orders and was replaced by another commander who would send his men into a frontal assault over an open expanse of a frozen lake, "the men were mown down in their thousands" (pg. 140). In the end Zhdanov needed a scapegoat and Frolov, along with the divisional commissar, who was also dismissed, were brought in front of a military tribunal. Both were found guilty of "cowardice and criminal negligence that resulted in the failure of the operation" and were shot on December 3rd.

The chapters the author devotes to the people living and suffering in Leningrad will gnaw at your heart. The elderly, women and children slowly lost their sanity as hunger began to take its toll on them. In the midst of all that suffering, they still endured constant German artillery bombardments. Yet, there was still hope. In one instance, during a bombing of the city, violinists are trapped in a shelter with civilians. In the middle of explosions one begins to play his violin and, miraculously, no longer are the deafening noises the only thing those trapped in the shelter can think about, the terror that had gripped them all was somehow transported outside their bodies, and the powerful music, was all they could concentrate on. Another account portrays a woman pulling her double bass through the snow on a sled, trying to make it to a hospital for a concert recital. Behind the sled, pushing, was her young child.

Disturbing are the scenes of cannibalism and dead bodies in the streets missing limbs or simply the meat from their bones. While the civilian administration and those with high status seemed to be well fed, the rest of Leningrad, suffered and died by the thousands during that first winter of 1941/1942. While cannibalism might have been heard about via rumors during the siege, I believe this book shows more than enough evidence that it was at times an all too common phenomenon. The suppression by the government and local administrators of what the siege did to the people and the city was enlightening, I had never really encountered such information before. One would think the government would use this cruelty, on the part of the Germans, to their advantage and their people's suffering to its greatest effect on the population, but apparently talk of it was forbidden. I can only guess that such full disclosure would cause the citizens of the Soviet Union to question their government in ways which were not wanted. One story which I ran across, and have read before (in Bellamy's "Absolute War") was in regards to "The Rebel" which was leaving leaflets, trying to incite the population against the Soviet leadership, and sending letters to Zhdanov, etc. The resources poured into investigating this one man were enormous, tens of thousands of people were interviewed and their hand writing was compared to try to find the culprit. The author feels this was a waste of resources considering what the city was going through, I'd have to agree on one hand. On the other, it seems the perpetrator had to be found and, as the NKVD had been known to do, any person could have been hauled off the street and put in prison or killed for the offense (a confession could have been beaten out of them, etc) but instead the authorities tried their best to actually find the guilty party.

The majority of the stories told here, be they from the military or civilian population, will make you think twice about what it might take to survive an event like this. Words can’t begin to describe what these people endured and overcome. What kind of will power and stamina it takes to stand in line for hours trying to get food, to lead a normal life and go to work everyday as people slowly die in front of your eyes. How much can one endure as death becomes a constant companion on each trip to visit a loved one, a friend, or a co-worker and check up on how they are doing? Many times civilians would walk along the street only to see someone in front of them slowly fall to the ground and lay there without the strength to even ask for help. I found myself having to reread passages dozens of times, the meaning of these words and what they represented just couldn’t sink in. How humanity is capable of such cruelty and indifference and yet such love and devotion baffles the mind.

Rommel: The End of a Legend by Ralf Georg Reuth

2008-06-10T18:30:00.000-07:00

Just like the majority of those new to WWII, years ago, I thought that Rommel was an excellent commander, tactician, strategist, etc. It was only when I began to delve into details and talking with authors that I realized the myths built up around Rommel, and many other Generals, were finally coming down. This book actually does an excellent job in showing Rommel's tactical knowledge and expertise and puts it into context with what actually was the reason for his achievements in France and North Africa.

I have to point out that what I wanted to read the most about was the British addition to propaganda in regards to Rommel. The author shows that since the British were pushed off the continent, after the fall of France, Norway, the Balkans, etc, their only field of battle against Nazi Germany (aside from the Battle of Britain) was the North African theatre. This meant that their only 'claim to fame', so to speak, in showing that they had taken a part in taking down the German land Army was showing what odds they were able to overcome. Thus, Rommel became a 'superman' and the 'Desert Fox' and Montgomery, the commander who eventually defeated him, became THAT much better than Rommel himself.

A lot of detail is given to Rommel's involvement with the assassination attempt on Hitler (or non-involvement). I wasn't surprised to see that Rommel was ignorant of what was going on around him in terms of German policies and strategy. He was a talented tactician, to a point, but the fact is he was sent to North Africa to help the Italians hold back the British, not wage war toward the Suez Canal and beyond, which is something he hoped to do. He never had the man-power for such an offensive and even so decided to go through with it, letting logistics sort themselves out. The end result was a sea-saw of battles that eventually led to the demise of the Afrika Armee.

A recommended read for those interested in seeing Rommel's achievements in an objective light, his victories and losses, as well as how BOTH the Germans and British used Rommel for their own needs (the most photographed German general, it should be noted). Also, how even after the war he served as a token tool for, once more, both the Germans and British in propagating their respective causes.

The Shoah in Ukraine: History, Testimony, Memorialization by Ray Brandon (Editor), Wendy Lower (Editor)

2008-05-30T14:15:00.001-07:00

This anthology is made up of chapters written by a variety of authors/specialists on either the Holocaust or Ukraine. Some of these chapters are most likely taken straight from books that these authors have previously published (i.e. Bartov's chapter is pretty much from his lastest book entitled "Erased"), which detail various aspects of the Holocaust in Ukraine before, during, and after the Second World War. Today, most of the attention has been focused on either the Holocaust in Poland or the Soviet Union in general, not so much on specifically Ukraine. This book aims to correct that missing page in western historiography on the Holocaust.

Being from Ukraine I found much of the information within the pages of this book engrossing to read about. Specifically, the history of Jews and Ukrainians in Galicia was very intriguing. I found it interesting that the Ukrainians in this area were affected by German/Austrian anti-Semitism which differed from that of other areas within Ukraine which was more affected by Polish and Russian anti-Semitism. There is an entire chapter which chronicles the destruction of Ukrainian Jewry village/town/city by village/town/city and year by year, an excellent reference. One of the chapters also notes how much more research is needed in regards to the role of Police Battalions, which in Ukraine actually killed more Jews than Einsatzgruppen C and D combined! Something that undoubtedly few know about. As with any book worth its salt this one raises as many questions as it answers, questions which hopefully will be answered in the near future as our knowledge and understanding of this event within the borders of Ukraine grows. Highly recommended for those with an interest in either the Holocaust or Ukrainian history during this time period.

Honor Denied by Paul Harker

2008-05-28T14:59:00.000-07:00

This book was produced by the same author as "Directive 19". It is my opinion, and that of others, that these books are NOT real but fiction. In fact, if the author had advertised them as such they would probably have been well received, overlooking the enormous amount of factual mistakes the author makes, he does show some talent for fictional writing. Sad to say that the writing in both books is similar enough that one would know they were written by the same person rather than simply 'transcribed' from two totally separate veterans. While "Directive 19" shows the "ugly" side of the SS, that of an officer personally responsible for mass murder and genocide, "Honor Denied" is more a book about the "innocent" soldiers who simply fought for reasons other than what has been prescribed to the majority of those who served in the SS. Some would say this is a "white washing" of the SS, I would agree with them. Still, if some would like to treat this book as fact, then you'll have to account for the following mistakes/errors:

From the forward of the book:
"The average soldier in the Waffen SS did not care if a person was Jewish or a Communist."
Hard to believe especially in light of the indoctrination these men received, and the 5th SS Wiking division that the author belonged to most definitely was indoctrinated at one point or another, see "Valhalla's Warriors" by terry Goldsworthy.
"We saw 13 million Ukrainians starved to death under the orders of Josef Stalin and we believed it was a just act to liberate those people and destroy the Communist system that oppressed them."
The German invasion of the USSR was not a war based on liberation but rather on genocide. 13 million Ukrainians did not starve to death, the highest estimates at the height of the cold war didn't even reach that preposterous figure. There is also no evidence that Stalin ordered any such thing, but this is of course easily overlooked since the Mr. Harker can claim this is the author's opinion which doesn't need to be based in reality. Then again, this is the first time I've ever heard a so called SS soldier speak of such things when it comes to Ukraine, the Ukrainian people, or Soviet history.

The rest of the book:
As with "Directive 19" the main character in "Honor Denied" serves under Rommel, what are the chances?
"North of Verviers, Herr General leaned over the guiding bar of his hatch and said, "Put my 102's at the 2300 position, put my Panzer IIIs at 1400, my Grenadiers at the 1700 position and line up the 88's at 2000!" pg. 14. This just does not sound at all authentic, aside from the fact that "102s" did not exist and tanks were not ordered around by type but rather by the formation they were in.
Then on pg. 11 "Herr General [in this case Rommel] believed it suicide to directly assault this line of defense [Maginot Line] so instead of crossing directly into France and taking this line head on, he chose to invade France through Belgium, swing south through the Ardennes Forest and low country, drive past the Maginot Line and then turn parallel to it and attack it from behind." Rommel chose how to attack France? That's a new one for me.
Also, why would Rommel be asking Keitel "if he would be willing to hold firm at Sivry-Rance for six hours" during the invasion of France/Belgium? pg. 36 Keitel did not serve in the field.
During the campaign against France the author contends, on pg. 45, "I was able to contact the Grenadiers by using the Pertrix and asked if it was probable to put grenades or a panzerfaust round into the bell tower." Panzerfausts were not in circulation until 1943, the earliest, this is 1940. The same mistake was made in "Directive 19".
I found it odd that this soldier is constantly receiving orders directly from OKH and OKW, I can't imagine that the high command of the armed forces and high command of the army would both be sending orders directly to a divisional commander, specifically Rommel. What happened to his immediate superior(s)/commanding officer(s)?
On pg. 124 the author discusses training with his Wiking Regiment in the snow as they are getting ready to invade the Soviet Union. This would make more sense if Hitler and his high command actually anticipated fighting in the winter months, they didn't.
The chapter on Barbarossa has the author come into the Soviet Union, on June 21, 1941, by plane, land, come out and be met by so called "Ukrainian partisans" and then the plane that dropped him off leaves. I can't even begin to understand this. The soldiers are never told what their mission is, they aren't told who they're meeting, and the Ukrainians have their orders for them! While German aircraft went on spy missions over the Soviet Union, these missions were not a secret and they were almost always trailed by Soviet aircraft until they left Soviet airspace.
On pg. 129 the author claims "The Russian Army suspects the German attack will come." Not so, the Red Army was caught by surprise for a reason, they were not expecting or ready for an attack.
Pg. 137, as in the author's other book, the usual Ukrainian greeting is wrong, he states the Germans were greeted with flowers and wine, the usual greeting is bread and salt.
Pg. 139, the author uses the same "Communism and Bolshevism" as he did in "Directive 19", there is no reason to use both as they mean the same thing in this context. It seems that both sides blow whistles when they want something done, either retreat or attack. First time I've encountered so much whistle blowing.
Pg. 155 claims the author was assigned to an Einsatzgruppen for communication training, this is simply preposterous.
And on pg. 158 the author says that they "were told the Einsatz Units followed the main combat troops and remained behind in captured cities to access damages, repair factories and plants, fix the rail lines and govern the local population." That's unbelievably inaccurate, they were there to 'pacify the rear' and eliminate those who were deemed a threat to the Third Reich. And the Wehrmacht, and most definitely the SS, knew exactly what they were doing as they were often coordinating with them and were quite often asked for help in a variety of ways, cordoning off areas, helping with logistics, etc.
On pg. 163 the author reports about Russian 'half tracks' same mistake as in "Directive 19" the Red Army had no half-tracks so early in the war, and when they did have them they were sent through Lend Lease later in the war.
Pg. 181 the Red Army apparently has PaK39 anti-tank artillery, in reality they did not, the Red Army also has 108mm 'cannon', I've never seen mention of such a caliber.
The author claims, on pg. 182, that the Wehrmacht was given credit for "the capture of an entire Russian Army Group' when they took Kharkov in 1941, that's simply not true. This would be closer to the truth for Kiev, but not Kharkov.
Pg. 200 replacements arrive from a "replacement battalion" located at Rostov-on-Don, while the city was in Red Army hands. Operation "Blau", the German advance into the Caucasus and against Stalingrad, was, in reality, planned for late May 142, in this book the author is already talking about it, and it seems in February, it is already beginning.
Pg. 211 the author claims that Tiger tanks arrived at Rostov-on-Don in the middle of February 1942. The first use of Tiger tanks on the Eastern Front was in the north outside Leningrad in August of 1942, this of course overlooks the fact that, once more, Rostov was in Soviet hands in February.
On pg. 214 a Russian 'Nun' is watching over a German wounded soldier, I can't particularly remember too many Russian Nuns since the Soviet Union was an atheist state and persecuted religious institutions.
The author's Russian certainly hasn't improved since "Directive 19." On pg. 275 we have "Vam anee myortvee?" being translated as "Are they dead?" Not very accurate, 'vam' doesn't belong there as it means 'for you.'
It only gets worse as on pg. 276 the author hears "Tye saldaten! Pree kha deets!" "tye" is the only Russian word I recognize here, the rest are just letters put together.
More on pg. 278, "Da, min vee kyaat!" only 'da' can be identified.
On pg. 283 the author claims a regiment, specifically the one he's in, has over 12,000 men, I'm pretty sure he's confused a division with a regiment here. Regiments usually number 3,000 men.
On pg. 292 the author claims Novorossiysk was abandoned by the germans in October 1942, not true, Novorossiysk was fought over until late 1943.
On pg. 343 the author speaks of operation Bagration, which occurred in June of 1944, yet in this book it takes place in March as "...the Soviets launched a powerful offensive on the Belorussian Front..."

I cannot imagine how much more proof is needed to show that this book is the furthest thing from "authentic".

Directive 19: The Memoirs of SS Sturmbannfhrer Rolf Otto Shiller by Rolf Schiller (Author), Paul K. Harker (Compiler)

2008-05-17T15:39:00.000-07:00

Who could ask for something more interesting than an intimately knowledgeable member of the SS writing about his experiences throughout the Second World War? More, someone who experienced the invasion of Poland, France, the Soviet Union, the Holocaust, the battle of Stalingrad, liquidation of ghetto's, etc. Reading histories of such events is one thing, getting a rare glimpse into the mind and thinking of a person who not only experienced it but took an active role in these events is something wholly different. For this reason I decided to give this book a read. I had read arguments for why this book is more fiction than reality from at least two authors but was told to read it myself and decide. Well, for those who are familiar with my reviews you'll notice I have something of an expertise when it comes to the Eastern Front. From what I read in this book I can say that the author did not serve on the Eastern Front and in fact has limited knowledge of what went on there, more so, there are many details that are simply off when it comes to the time period and the Holocaust, which the author describes in great detail. The bottom line seems to me that while the author has a rather intimate knowledge of the Holocaust, SS, and Nazi administration, he is lacking in his knowledge of the Eastern Front which pretty much makes it seem that either the book is in fact fiction or simply riddled with an enormous number of mistakes, thus precluding it from being used as a source.

Some of the major mistakes, inconsistencies, and errors that I found begin on pg. 156-157 when the reader is presented with the following: "A group of four or five Ukrainian Nationalists approached an SS Scharfuhrer and began to chatter in the native language. The Scharfuhrer summoned a Corporal who intently listened to the men before looking around and seeing me. He brought the small delegation over and explained that the men told him the Soviet NKVD had come through Lokachi on the night of the German invasion. He related how the Soviets rounded up the village school teachers, politicians, doctor, census taker, tax collector, and priest. According to the account the Soviet soldiers marched the members of the local intelligentsia into the nearby woods and shot them. When I asked why they would do this, the Corporal translated and one of the men explained. It was said that the NKVD had orders to liquidate all members of the Ukrainian Nationalist intelligentsia because of Stalin's fear they would collaborate with invading German forces to retaliate agianst Soviet political and social oppression." A few things I find odd with this story, the idea that the NKVD came through the town on the NIGHT of the German invasion, how were they able to react so quickly? Most of the communications were down throughout the night as Red Army units had no clue what was going on and what they should do, how did the NKVD mere moments after a German invasion already have orders for the above? Secondly, if in fact those arrested were suspected of being Nationalists they would have already been arrested, why would the NKVD wait to arrest them when the Germans invaded? Lastly, the way these 'nationalists' were killed does not equal what is known of NKVD executions, the author claims they were shot in the back. The NKVD did not shoot at backs, they shot at the base of the neck.

On pg. 234 the author claims Rostov-on-Don is "...by all accounts a fully operational Reich headquarters and city inside the Ukrainian state." Rostov-on-Don is not located in Ukraine. More interestingly it appears that the author spent a lot of time in Rostov-on-Don in 1942, prior to April 5, 1942, yet this is when the city was still in Soviet hands as it was only captured in July of 1942 after being taken from Rundstedt in late 1941 by Marshal Timoshenko's offensive which was able to capture it.

In regards to the Holocaust aspect of the book, it struck me as odd that on pg. 213, when the 'author' is trying to get the Judenrat to give up names of black marketeers he threatens the Judenrat by saying "You will have a roster of names for me within 24 hours or I promise you each resident in this ghetto will be sent to Auschwitz." As far as I can remember, and this being 1942, the death camps and what went on in them were not supposed to be well known. Since when would Jews in ghettos be threatened with deportation to death camps? True enough, some undoubtedly feared deportation and thought they knew what happened to those who were deported, but for an SS officer in 1942 to threaten a Judenrat by simply saying they 'will be sent to Auschwitz'? I thought the whole process was supposed to be a surprise until the very end so that they would not revolt/rebel, etc.

Something that surprised me: "The Russians were untermenschen by political definition. They were equal to Jews and other undesirables by the classification laws of the Reich." pg. 236. While Russians, or rather Slavs, were close to Jews on the Nazi scale they certainly were not 'equal.' Also, on pg. 239 there is a scene when soldiers within an Einsatzgruppen refuse to shoot Jews and are made to do it by the author, I can not recall ever reading that someone who refused was not allowed, more so, the author claims that the men did this all the time by making themselves sick through vomiting, etc. And once again the author uses "babushka" to refer to something a woman is wearing, a head scarf from what I can tell.

In regards to fighting at Stalingrad the author states on pg. 263: "Two of my men primed panzerfausts and launched shells into the structure." And again pg. 267 a T-34 is destroyed with panzerfausts. I've read quite a few books on Stalingrad and there has never been a mention of a Panzerfaust being used in Stalingrad, more so the weapon wasn't used anywhere on the Eastern Front in 1942. A few Red Army assaults are described in Stalingrad as 'tidal wave' attacks by workers militias, whistles blow and an attack commences, this is very reminiscent of "Enemy at the Gates" the movie rather than Stalingrad the actual battle. It seems women were also very much a part of these 'suicidal charges.' Also, I find it surprising the amount of details that are being offered. I don't think I've ever read a non-fictional account with so much description, a step by step retelling of who did what, who went where, who died where, when, and how, etc. Pg. 275, the Red Army is described as having half-tracks, at least two other mentions of Red Army half-track in the next few pages. The Red Army never had halftracks unless they were sent through Lend Lease, and by the time Stalingrad was going on Lend Lease had yet to be felt in great numbers and once again in all my readings on Stalingrad I have never heard of Lend Lease equipment like half-tracks being used. The author also claims the 'rear command area' of 6th Army was on the bank of the Volga River, pg. 279, I can't say how accurate that is but for some reason it sounds off to me. According to the author, Gumrak airfield was in Red Army hands in November of 1942, pg. 282, after doing some research Gumrak was in German hands since the beginning/middle of September. Same pg, another mention of Panzerfausts, there seem to have been a lot of them in Stalingrad. On pg. 289 we have a soldier in Stalingrad speaking to the wounded author and claiming in November a "Full Russian counterattack, Sir. The 62nd Soviet Army reclaimed parts of Gumrak Airfield and several tank and artillery divisions have flanked us from the east." Gumrak airfield wasn't taken until January 1943 and there weren't any tank divisions, only tank corps and brigades at that point in time, within the Red Army.

Pg. 293 "The Soviets had retaken Leningrad just two weeks before Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus surrendered the entire VI Army and all German forces at Stalingrad on 2 February." Leningrad was never taken by the Germans nor ever 'retaken' by the Soviets, they always had it. On pg. 307 the author claims that by July 13th, during the battle of Kursk in 1943, the German lost 2,900 tanks. A pretty big exaggeration. Pg. 318 carries a mention of an encircled Russian 89th Army, as far as I recall the armies only numbered into the 70's, not 80's. Pg. 363, The author claims Hitler's ideas regarding war strategy "had not seemed sound since ordering the total withdrawal of our forces when he had Moscow surrounded and was weeks from taking the Soviet capital." Moscow was never surrounded, Hitler issued orders against a 'total withdrawal' and he was not 'weeks from taking the Soviet capital.'

It appears that the author makes quite a few mistakes when speaking of the Ardennes offensive. First he claims, on pg. 382, that German plans had the 5th, 6th, and 7th Panzer Armies ready to launch an offensive in the Ardennes forest, then, not two pages later he is talking about the 1st and 12th Panzer Armies. In a few sources that I looked into it was the 6th SS Panzer Army (sometimes referred to as just the 6th Panzer Army) and the 5th Panzer Army. I can't seem to find the 7th or 12th Panzer Armies in German Orders of Battle. German artillery, throughout the book, is downed down to only two types of guns, the 88mm and 102mm. Although I have read the 88mm gun can be used as regular artillery it seems to be doing that more often than not in this book, instead of its intended use as AA artillery or an anti-tank gun.

Detail mistakes would include the following:
Labelling a Motorcycle battalion a corps, twice.
While listing Germany's 'enemies' writing both 'Communists' and 'Bolshevists' (or at least once Bolsheviks). As far as I can recall both pretty much meant the same general thing, there would be no reason to use both and it is done far too often.
For spending so much time in the East during the war the author certainly is lacking in his Russian.
Instead of calling an elderly woman a 'babushka' he claims a 'babushka' is something she is wearing.
The author does not know the transliteration for 'we surrender' in Russian, what he does write to signify those words is "I" and then something that isn't a Russian word.
The traditional Ukrainian greeting is bread and salt, the book claims German troops were greeted with bread and wine.
On pg. 377 the author claims that Riga is located in Ukraine, Riga is the capital of Latvia.
There is a mention of 'Hungarian oil fields" on pg. 377, most likely it is in reference to Romanian oil fields.
The author labels a 30mm gun a 'howitzer.'
The German Army has Leopard tanks, in fact they were not created until long after WWII.

I'm sure that this is only the tip of the iceberg. If relevant experts in the Holocaust, Nazi Germany, the SS, the Western Front, etc, were to read through this book I'm more than positive they would discover a plethora of other mistakes, ranging from the minor to the major. The above speaks volumes about the quality of 'facts' being presented in this book.

Valhalla's Warriors: A History of the Waffen-SS on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 by Terry Goldsworthy

2008-05-05T14:38:00.000-07:00

Within history there are basically primary and secondary sources. This book is based around a majority of secondary sources with little new information to offer. Having said that, I must emphasis that in today's world new original primary research is a great thing to find and read through but I believe that so much has been written about the Waffen SS, and the Eastern Front in general, that it is time to take a step back and take some of that secondary research to see where it takes us. New research is always nice but gaining a new understanding and comprehension by analyzing and comparing/contrasting existing accounts is also something that needs to be done from time to time. This is what I believe the author did here and I commend him for a job well done. I can easily admit to have read quite a few books from the bibliography but there were still many books I had never heard of or wasn't familiar with and just for that this book was worth getting.

The author is quite fair to the Waffen SS; he presents both extremes to the reader and chooses to walk in the middle showing that those who believe the Waffen SS to be a criminal organization are not basing it on fiction but rather on fact. The book is short, a little over 200 pages, goes over the history of the SS, the composition of the SS, and the ideology behind it before diving into the activities of a variety of SS formations on the Eastern Front. While not all SS soldiers were ideologues hunting Jews and Commissars enough of the SS officer corps was, which in turn influenced a large number of those under them. These men were not the ‘fourth’ part of the Armed Forces but more so the political tool with which Hitler and Himmler could unleash their genocidal plans with throughout the Eastern Front.

A plethora of divisions are gone over as well as the atrocities and criminal actions they were involved in throughout the Second World War, mainly on the Eastern Front. Personally, I had always heard that the "Wiking" SS division had 'clean hands' when it came to atrocities, apparently that's not true and I have this book to thank for gaining that knowledge. A worthwhile investment of your time and money, definitely recommended.

Inside the Blue Berets: A Combat History of Soviet and Russian Airborne Forces, 1930-1995 by Steven Zaloga

2008-05-01T09:17:00.001-07:00

The author does an excellent job detailing the history of the Soviet and, to a degree, Russia's airborne forces. From their talented beginning during the 1930's the reader gets a feeling for how far ahead the Soviet Union really was in regards to their military endeavors. The purges, in the late 1930's, put a stop to a lot of the research and exercises setting back Soviet paratroops years. Ultimately, this was seen in the various, but few, airborne operations throughout WWII. Most would lack reconnaissance, planes were often lacking in their quality and most notably in their quantity, to speak little of the inexperience of the pilots and navigators who were often incorporated from the civilian air fleet and, at times, hardly had the talent to fly at night and more so behind enemy lines. Although these units had some success it was far outweighed by the casualties they took, the detailed reasoning behind their failures is well described within the pages of this book.

For the most part these troops would be used as light infantry throughout WWII, be it around Kiev during the encirclement, at Stalingrad or Kursk. Although the first year of the war saw them take heavy defeats and it wasn't until Stalingrad and Kursk that they, in my opinion, earned their 'guards' titles. Airborne divisions and corps would be built and rebuilt throughout the war as units were sacrificed and lost in various operations. By the end of the war the Soviets were as weary to use them as the Germans were after Crete.

I found it quite interesting to see the different way the Soviets thought of their airborne forces when compared to the US. While in the US they were seen as light infantry in the Soviet Union they were more and more moved toward the role of a regular mechanized division. Their armament was increased, their fire power expanded, and their manpower declined. The details, in regards to the use of these troops during the invasion of Hungary, were very interesting as well as their role during Prague Spring, not to mention the fighting they took part in during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. So, for those interested in airborne units/forces I highly recommend this book for an interesting and at times eye opening look at the Soviet/Russian Blue Berets.

Napoleon: The Path to Power by Philip Dwyer

2008-04-06T10:16:00.001-07:00

This book is an interesting look into the early life and various sides of Napoleon; including the soldier, the politician, the lover, etc. Specifically, I'm appreciative of the fact that the author doesn't look at Napoleon in a vacuum but rather the reader is presented with some of the history of Corsica, of the revolution, Napoleon's other family members, etc. All the things that in the end affected Napoleon and made him what he was to become. Undoubtedly this is one of the more entertaining and enlightening biographies that I've read. On the whole the book is a much easier read than I expected for such a complex character and time period. The author should be commended for presenting both sides of a variety of stories and 'tales' and showing myths for what they are. I've always thought it a must for an author to give the reader all sides of the story and either let the reader decide or have the author state his/her reasons for why one side should be believed over the other. Also important to note that context is provided for a variety of events in the book, such as presenting the "band of marauders" that Napoleon entered Italy with yet commenting that they were "no worse than any other army of the day."

The book goes over Napoleon's childhood on Corsica and then in France, his coming back to Corsica and his failed political movements within that Island's history. How he came back to France and through his connections was able to secure spots within the armed forces which went on to get wide attention thanks to the plethora of myths that were built up around his actions and, to a degree, his own descriptions of what went on. The two campaigns of Napoleon covered in this book are of him in Italy and Egypt. For me, being relatively new to this field, there wasn't much in terms of strategy or tactics but the author did get his points across in why Napoleon was successful. While he definitely had plenty of talent, intelligence, and other qualities that went a long way, there were, as always, mitigating factors that helped in his success and the defeat of his enemies. For example, during his retreat from Syria his army could have easily been assailed and beaten by the forces arrayed against him, which highly outnumbered him at that point, but for one reason or another they did not press their advantage and Napoleon was able to make it back to Egypt with at least the majority of his troops in tact (although plenty were suffering from disease, were wounded, etc). Napoleon's actions throughout this period resemble the majority of infamous 'tyrants' or 'rulers' of the past few centuries. His actions were not dictated by a growing awareness of what he was meant to do, although some would like to think so, but rather he took the opportunities that were presented to him on a day to day basis. I'd say the chapter on his attempt to usurp authority over France speaks volumes of how much 'planning' and 'fate' have little to do with the reality of the moment. Overall, this book is an excellent look into the early life and career of Napoleon. You will easily find the author being highly critical of some of Napoleon's actions but at the same time an explanation will be given for why he might have chosen one path over another, including a list of the options open to him, etc. Highly readable, filled with interesting facts, anecdotes, eye witness accounts, and the author's insights are, for the most part, objective.

Bomber Pilot on the Eastern Front: 307 Missions Behind Enemy Lines by Vasily Reshetnikov

2008-03-28T10:14:00.000-07:00

Today there are many memoirs out by Soviet soldiers; infantrymen, tankers, artillery men, cavalry troops, partisans, even quite a few fighter pilots. But this is the first time I've come across a bomber pilot's memoirs. More so a bomber pilot who operated in the ADD (Long Range Bomber Air Force). These are the pilots, navigators, machine gunners/radio operators who flew, at times as early as the summer of 1941, against such cities as Berlin, Danzig, Warsaw, Tilsit, Insterburg, Koenigsberg, etc.

For those interested in a variety of intricacies and details when it comes to planes and operations in the air, you won't be disappointed. Some of it is way above my head but interesting nonetheless. What I found telling were the, as expected, variety of stories that the author shared, some his own, and as well those of his crew and other crews in his unit and their sister regiments. Losses were to be expected, at times crews never made it back, other times days even weeks would go by and they'd again appear in the regiment, in a few cases their fates would not be found out until the end of the war, and in some instances their final moments of life would remain, to this day, a mystery. Yet these are the stories that make this book what it is. These are stories of men who put their lives on the line day and night as they went on mission after mission to support their ground troops.

Shot down behind enemy lines these bomber pilots, navigators, and machine gunners/radio operations had to make their way back through swamps, enemy territory, bypassing enemy troops and polizei. A few would spend the rest of the war in prisoner of war camps barely surviving, at least one would come out of Buchenwald at the end of the war when a group of POWs burst out of the camp, destroyed an SS depot, and went on to meet the 3rd US Armored Division.

I also found interesting the fact that the author shares quite a few instances of when the NKVD, SMERSH, and OO troops would get involved when a pilot or crew member found his way back to the unit. The majority, if not all, of the men mentioned in this memoir were released after a period of time when they were questioned. I was surprised to read that apparently Stalin was asked by the commander of the ADD that troops who were not taken captive and returned to their lines should be handled by the air force itself, his headquarters specifically, and not the NKVD, Stalin relented and acquiesced but those who did wind up in POW camps would have to go through the NKVD screening process. This occured because of the following; two crew members who were being held by the NKVD were 'rescued' by another crew and flown back to their regiment. The NKVD came looking for them but eventually left after being threatened by other pilots and crews. This story was recounted to the commander of the ADD and he then made the above mentioned request to Stalin, considering that his crews were few, badly needed at the front, and going on such long distance missions, those found after being shot down should be brought straight to his headquarters instead of enduring NKVD questioning and losing valuable time. Then again, I was also intrigued by the fact that after the war was over the majority, if not all, of those men who had been in German captivity were slowly removed from their units, some even arrested and jailed.

As with most memoirs everyone should find something to interest them and you'll definitely learn something new, I know I did. I have to comment that some of the translations looked awkward and could have been done better, and "Komsomol" is spelled as "Comsomol." Otherwise this book is a great addition to WWII Eastern Front Memoirs and any WWII library!

From Stalingrad to Pillau by Isaak Kobylyanskiy

2008-03-10T15:55:00.001-07:00

I'm always thrilled when a new Soviet memoir from the Second World War is released. In practically every instance I always get to learn something new and read about a plethora of experiences the author went through which enrich my understanding of this time period and WWII as a whole. This book highlights Isaak Kobylyanskiy's experiences as a 76mm gunner (gun commander and battery commander) during the Second World War on the Eastern Front while he served in the 87th Guards Division, 2nd Guards Army. To those interested in gritty details of offensive operations that undoubtedly contain hand to hand combat and the savagery of war, you will not find much of that here. In this book you will experience war from an artillery officer's point of view, although this artilleryman was not in the rear, he was right up there with the soldiers in the front lines providing direct fire in support for their actions, etc.

What I greatly appreciated about this book is that it is divided in half. The first half of the book is devoted to the author's experiences during the war and the other half to his thoughts on the war and the people he served with, the Red Army, writing letters, marches, leisure at the front, being a Jewish Red Army soldier, political workers within the Red Army, his views of the Germans (both soldiers and civilians), rear services troops, drinking alcohol, etc. Usually, one hardly ever comes across such a division within a book, most of the time all these ideas are dealt within the pages of the author's experience throughout the war, but there might be some added benefit to having chapters devoted solely to the war and then chapters devoted solely to stories which might not necessarily deal with the war. While in at least one chapter the author highlights the dubious side of some soldiers within the Red Army, he explains that the Red Army was not made up solely of such characters but these were simply people and events which he encountered throughout the war for the first time, these became lessons he learned for life. I should also like to mention that the editor, Stuart Britton, does an excellent job, a lot of contextual information is given to make the books progress and flow smoothly.

To begin, the author discusses his life in Vinnitsa and Kiev before the war began. It was interesting to learn about the author's reading habits, going from children's books to a plethora of foreign works including Twain, Hemingway, Dumas, etc. The famine of 1933 that took place in Ukraine, and other Soviet areas, was witnessed by the author, although he himself, his family, and his school mates did not suffer much. Also of interest was Kobylyanskiy's description of the "Great Purge" years when his father's boss was arrested and the next day the author's father "obliterated" his boss's face in all the pictures he could find in his photo album with black ink, for fear of being arrested himself. The author himself went to such lengths with some of the certificates of merit that he had received. The author's insight into the political situation as the USSR grabbed land from Poland, the Baltics, and Romania was interesting to hear as well as his thoughts on the winter war, which he was not in agreement with.

When the war began the author encountered Jewish refugees from Western territories, including Poland, streaming through Kiev. Eventually, his mother and brother, amongst many others, would be evacuated but he does recount how some Jews refused as they remembered the German occupation from WWI during which they were treated well enough by the Germans, something that is often repeated when looking for reasons why so many Jews 'stayed' behind. The majority, if not all, of those Jews who remained in Kiev would wind up being shot to death at Babi Yar.

The author's story about a Red Army soldier who wandered too far from his own lines, while wanting to do some ice fishing, and then was caught by the Germans was quite interesting. After 10 days the soldier escaped from the Germans and within a half hour OO (osobyi otdel) troops had tracked him down and taken him away. Although the author says they never heard anything more about the soldier, I personally, don't think this should denote automatically that the soldier was executed. While it is a distinct possibility, it is also possible that he was sent to a Penal formation or assigned to convoy duty, etc. In another episode the author discusses a soldier who shows up after being a POW for months, SMERSH (death to spies) officers had no interest in him. As well, when going through liberated territory the Red Army often received reinforcements from the local population, in one such case it was eventually brought to the attention of SMERSH that one soldier collaborated with the Germans in locating Jews and even executing them. He was sentenced to death and hanged.

A moving account is offered of how Kobylyanskiy had to make a choice of putting a gun crew in danger, by attacking a dozen or so tanks and self propelled guns, or letting them take on Red Army infantry who had yet to fully dig in. Without thinking twice Kobylyanskiy gave the order to fire, the end result was a dead gun commander, but the enemy's tanks did not advance. The author's experiences in what he dubbed "The Ravine of Death" were quite telling of the time period. While the 2nd Guards Army failed in their offensive endeavor, and the commanding officer was dismissed, it took a few days to understand that the failed offensive was in fact a huge help for other sectors of the front, namely in the Kursk area, thus the army in the end received some recognition for its actions. One of the most interesting parts of the book is when the author took it upon himself to try and stop a retreating group of soldiers by firing his pistol into the air, cursing, and threatening to shoot them. Eventually, with help from a few other officers, the retreat was stopped and the soldiers went back to their positions. I also enjoyed the rendition of a speech his divisional commander gave, where in he stressed how quickly houses, buildings, and factories could be rebuilt but how precious soldiers lives were; noting that officers should be careful with their men's lives.

Descriptions of Political workers are offered in the second part of the book and prove interesting, in regards to both the good and bad. The same is true for the examples offered of what it was like being a Jewish Red Army soldier and how Kobylyanskiy dealt with the stereotypes of Jewish soldiers, at times risking his life to prove that a Jewish soldier was just as good, if not better, than any other. The author's frankness in regards to his thoughts about Germans was revealing as well as his honesty in detailing sexual crimes and the Red Army. While he himself did not witness any prosecution within his unit for violation of orders from above (which forbid such activities) he did hear from Germans themselves and through rumors about what some Red Army soldiers did and how some Germans suffered. Especially touching was the story of a German girl, Annie, who on her way back home from Pillau was stopped by numerous Red Army soldiers and made to "lie down." The author is correct that this is a part of war, he stresses, and as would I, that this is not an excuse but should be an accepted fact. War is not pretty, innocent people suffer, but their suffering should not constitute cause for hypocrisy. While Red Army soldiers raped, so did western allied soldiers and so did German soldiers, etc.

While I have more than given away a good deal of what this book is about and what it contains within its pages I can guarantee that you'll find all of this and much more.

Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze

2008-03-03T20:37:00.000-08:00

I first noticed this book when it was discussed on a WWII military history forum. I bought it and put it on my book shelf to read at some future point in time. Recently, a comment in regards to one of my reviews (on amazon.com) said they'd like to see a review of this book. I was apprehensive to tackle such a scholarly done project, ESPECIALLY since I know next to nothing about economics. I was told to simply begin when the author starts talking about WWII, somewhere past page 400, more than half way through the book. I thought I'd try to read it cover to cover...well, I was fooling myself. A lot of this stuff I will not remember the next day, hell, probably not the next hour. I skimmed through perhaps 10-20% of the book, but as I was skimming the book I kept coming up on small gems and nuggets of information which put things into a better perspective and context.

I cannot do a review of this book in any type of 'traditional' manner, I can only manage a small list of facts, ideas, theories, etc that I found interesting and enlightening. To begin with; the author made an excellent point in the fact that Jewish longing for leaving Germany was being affected by Germany not letting them take much currency with them, this turns out to have been due, to a large degree, to the fact that such a loss for the German currency market would prove a horror for the German economy. This is an aspect of this event I had never thought of, undoubtedly, because I am not an economist but also because no one ever thought of mentioning it. Of course this will not take away from the rampant anti-semitism and perhaps did in fact see an easy way to make money by making Jewish refugees leave practically all of their belongings behind. In either case, this is simply another fact which is worth knowing about.

In regards to WWII; you will regularly hear people mention how the Third Reich was in control of the majority of Europe yet still could not match the production numbers of a Soviet Union, for example, which was down in population, land, and factories after the German invasion of the USSR. Well, it appears that France, for example, depended highly on resources that they were receiving from England and other overseas countries, without it their economy couldn't function to its fullest. Germany, apparently, was hardly being able to keep up to their own needs of raw materials for their highly expanding industry, having another country, or half dozen countries, in need of the same raw materials became more of a hindrance to the German war effort. France and Poland helped by supplying workers when more and more Germans were needed for the armed forces, but many times these foreign workers would not be up to German worker 'quality.'

I greatly appreciate the author going into details regarding Germany's invasion of France. Manstein's plan was nothing out of the ordinary, as the author points out, in concentrating an enormous amount of man and machine power into a section of the front the enemy doesn't consider worth its time is not something that has never been done in the history of warfare. In fact it would not have been done if not for some of the earlier plans falling into enemy hands! The same is true for the attack against the Soviet Union, concentrating the largest invasion force the world has ever seen, and operationally achieving enormous advantages in the breakthrough sectors is what pushed Germany through to her victories in 1941. The Soviets did the same in the latter part of the war, but today they're known as "Red Army hordes" while the Germans are lauded for the military prowess and finesse. As for the war in North Africa it was a sideshow, Rommel's running back and forth with a force he could hardly coordinate or provide logistics for was a thorn in the allies' side and both sides, during the invasion of France and North Africa, used propaganda to highlight Germany's military abilities. The Germans Wehrmacht's military capabilities were played up while the allies could cling to a reason for some of the most spectacular defeats they'd suffer during WWII.

It should also be mentioned that, contrary to popular belief, Germany employed a tremendous amount of females throughout their industries, heavily in agriculture. Thus the idea that if they would have only used more women they would have had an easier time is a myth. Added to this should be the fact that due to Nazi Racial policies MILLIONS of workers, mainly Jews and Russian POWs, were lost to murder, genocide, mass starvation, disease, etc throughout the first few years of the war. It was only when there was a tremendous enough need for more workers did these two groups, as two examples, begin to be used more in the German wartime economy.

General PlanOst is well known, but here it is presented, as well as its history, with excellent detail. It was quite interesting to see how during the war the Wehrmacht was cut off from its food supplies coming in from the Reich and made to live off the land, as if what they were doing there for the past 1-2 years wasn't enough, now they would be taking away whatever food they found from an already poverty ridden and starving population. The General Government was then made to send Germany food supplies, up till then they had relied on food FROM Germany to keep the population on rations. Suffice to say, all of these measures led to massive starvation, not something that concerned the German administration as long as their troops and Germany proper were/was fed.

The 'myth' of Speer was interesting to skim through, I'm not that familiar with this particular 'myth' so I didn't want to go into SO much detail, but according to the author the 'miracle' he was responsible for was a long time coming, he simply arrived at the right time and at the right place. Milch was also a man one should pay attention to as, apparently, he was the one responsible for the Luftwaffe's tremendous numbers, rather than Speer.

These are only a few examples of the information you'll find within the pages of this tremendous work. Definitely a new look at the war, a new context for what you might think you knew is presented, very much worth your time (even if you skim through the first few chapters like I did!).

Warsaw 1920 by Adam Zamoyski

2008-02-25T11:20:00.001-08:00

This is a short book and one that is not, at this point, available in the US. I got my copy from amazon.co.uk and have to say I am disappointed in the author. I read Zamoyski's book on Napoleon's invasion of Russia and thought it was quite good, but here, I'd say he's very much lacking. This is a 'niche' subject that few have covered and to date, as this book shows, it is a subject filled with bias and hypocrisy. The reader is confronted by the old idea that the not yet created Soviet Union wanted to and WOULD HAVE exported their revolution to Germany through Poland. That is an idea that is not based in fact, there were many who wanted to export the Revolution but at the same time, and this is in fact what really happened, there were those who understood that in time a revolution would begin anyway. That is the reason for signing the Brest-Litovsk treaty, they gave away land that they expected to take back at one point or another. When that point would come was anyone's guess since these people were not fortune tellers but revolutionaries who jumped at opportunities and, undoubtedly, at times tried to make those opportunities come about.

Zamoyski himself states on pg. 9 that it was the Poles who first attacked Soviet troops by taking Wilno (Vilnius) and then Minsk. The idea here, apparently, is that it is OK for the Poles to take lands that belonged to them over a century ago before Poland was partitioned, but the Russians cannot do the same thing (for which they also can bring up a claim as they DID control the land for the past century, etc, one should also note that Ukrainians, Lithuanians, etc also have claims. But who has a claim matters little if they do not have an army to back that claim up with). Apparently, if you are only interested in nationalistic ideals that is OK with Zamoyski, but if you want to eventually spread the Communist ideal, that is going overboard. One has to keep in mind that when the Poles attacked the Red Army was facing Denikin in the south and on pg. 10 the author explains that the Army created in the West by the Russians was not strong enough to fight its way across Poland but rather only to fill a power-vacuum when available. The problem here is that the author, as far as I can tell, confuses what the Russians wanted to do with what they eventually would do. Just because some wanted to spread the revolution doesn't mean that's what would have happened. This can be seen by the fact that at least two of the leading Bolsheviks were against the war, Trotsky and Chicherin. Would Lenin still have attacked if the Poles didn't attack first? And then while peace negotiations were going on attack again and take the city of Dunaberg from the Russians and give it over to the anti-Bolshevik government of Lativa? A historian would not be able to give a concrete answer, but the author, apparently, can. Taking an extreme and making it seem as the only viable route is not the job of a historian. My real problem with this book is not the idea that if successful the Bolsheviks might have taken their revolution abroad, or that some wanted this from the start, but that the author is asserting this as a fact and that nothing could change it from happening, aside from, apparently, what did happen, makes sense?

If someone followed everything the Bolsheviks said and took it to heart, how can they then explain how Russian officers, known as 'enemies of the people', were then taken into the Red Army and named 'specialists' and in fact, put in charge of the Red Army (according to the author, by 1920 over 80% of the Red Army officer cadre would be made up of them)? Bolshevik rhetoric is just that, one has to be cautious in assuming that everything Lenin or anyone else said is what would have happened, especially during such a chaotic and turbulent time.

Bottom line is that the Red Army responded to a Polish threat. If there was no Polish threat there is no evidence one can point to which would undoubtedly show that the Red Army would have been used to spread the Revolution, especially considering the position Russia/Soviet Union found itself in after a bloody civil war. What happened in 1920 can be compared to what happened at the end of WWII, the Soviets did not export the revolution but they did enter Eastern Europe and Germany because they were on the COUNTERoffensive rather than an offensive. Hitler also claimed he was preempting a Soviet invasion, the Polish claim is taken seriously today while the German is known, by most, to be a complete fabrication. One can only wonder why that is.

A statement I vehemently disagree with is on pg. 13 when Zamoyski claims that for Russia and Lenin "...the best way of mobilizing support was war..." how can that be when not getting out of WWI is what ended Kerensky's run in the government and the Bolsheviks understood that they would be supported if they ended the war, thus the Brest Litovsk treaty! This can only be valid if seen in the context of the Polish invasion of Russia rather than any undertaking the Russians did before hand. With the Polish invasion many officers who had left the armed forces or never joined the Red Army in the first place came to it in droves and offered their support, such as the famous Brusilov. So, it might be argued that the Polish invasion helped increase support for the Bolshevik cause, but this is when the country is on the defensive, not the offensive, which is the author's original claim here. This can also be seen as the Poles rushed to support their troops when Warsaw was threatened, in both cases it was 'defensive' and 'counteroffensive' actions that rallied support, not outright offensive intentions.

If this book would have presented both sides in the same light, and I will readily admit that in some instances it does - for instance Polish and Russian atrocities against each other are listed, as well as some of the motley formations that were being led by both sides, their 'armies' at times were the furthest thing from what we picture in our minds as 'armies' - but overall this is in the end a biased looked at the events in question, and for that reason, I would not recommend it.

No Foreign Sky by John Farquhar

2008-01-23T11:35:00.000-08:00

All in all this is the worst historical novel I've ever read. Perhaps that might not mean much to those who read this review, but I've read hundreds of historical novels and hundreds of non-fictional accounts of the Eastern Front. This book is a travesty. This review is written specifically because a reviewer on amazon mentioned that this book should be 'required reading' for every high school student.

Where to begin? First, a few warnings, in the next paragraph I do give away some aspects of the plot and I want to state that for those who finish reading my review and want to think that I won't be happy with a book that isn't 100% accurate, think again. Read "The Triumph and The Glory" by Rustad, he makes a few mistakes but they are forgivable since his book is simply amazing, sadly, out of print. Then again I wouldn't recommend that book to be read by every high school student either.

This book is lauded on the back cover to have been written after years of research in Russia, Ukraine, and Germany. It tackles the Eastern Front of the Second World War, some aspects of the Holocaust and the Ukrainian nationalist partisan movement. There are few historical fiction works today which concentrate on the Eastern Front. So this book, for a lot of reasons, stands on its own. The book is divided into small chapters, over thirty of them, and mainly revolves around a German tank Captain and his crew with the latter part of the book dealing with his love interest, a Ukrainian girl who winds up being forced to join the partisans. Throughout the story we travel with Army Group South into the Soviet Union and wind up in Stalingrad, from Stalingrad it's into Soviet captivity, then escape to the Ukrainian partisans, and then back to the Germans.

Within the first 35 pages of reading this book I knew this was going to be a waste of time, even so, I finished it just to document the more glaring errors, and believe me when I say that I've left PLENTY out.

The biggest issue I have with this book is the countless times the Wehrmacht and the main character, a German tanker, are lionized while the Red Army is dumbed down to illiterate peasants who can only rape girls and boys. While the SS and Einsatzgruppen carry the burden for most of the 'evil' deeds occurring in the East the Wehrmacht is practically never touched. This reeks of being a cheap attempt to whitewash the Wehrmacht when the reality of the matter is that they were just as guilty of war crimes as the SS. There is of course the possibility that this officer did not know what was going on, an entire Holocaust unfolding in his backyard, but some of the scenes depicted in this book just do not seem realistic enough to believe that they could have happened.

In a literary sense the characters had little depth, they didn't feel as if they are coming out of Nazi Germany in the early 40's but rather the US in the 21st Century, if one is to believe the conversations they have throughout the book. It also seemed as if they were little school girls as they 'giggle' their way through the book. Their line of thinking does not measure up to what we know today about the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the invasion of the Soviet Union. For example, how often does one think Germans made jokes about being homosexuals in the 1930's and 1940's when Hitler and the German administration were sending all homosexuals to concentration camps? This book has plenty of them though. The following statement speaks for itself: "Kurt's hand dropped to Ernst's nipple and twisted it hard" (pg. 94).

It seems as if the reader is supposed to sympathize with a man that likes to go off to war and kill others, he might not be aware of the genocide going on around him, but that's OK, he embodies everything 'good' and 'valiant' in a German soldier. Apparently, the author wants his ignorance to be excused just because he wants to do the right thing. What does doing the right thing entail here? Following orders without question? Can such ignorance be excused just because deep down he's supposedly a good person? If he was, he wouldn't be fighting for such a regime, blocking out everything that doesn't fit into his Utopian vision of war, nor would he be thrilled by war.

Then, there is of course, the stereotypical mass infantry wave assaults against German machine gunners. This is recounted more than once with the German machine gunner whispering 'please stop' to the 'Russians' as he keeps killing them. At this point we have German soldiers playing with Ukrainian children and getting along as well as they can with the local population, yet just a dozen pages back these same soldiers referred to Ukrainians as 'inbred', now they're going out with the girls and playing with the children? I did enjoy the author letting me know that there were 'orders' against looting and to "treat civilians with respect and courtesy," but where is the reference to the Commissar order? The 14th Panzer division is portrayed as being beyond valiant, the officers stand up to an SS officer who requests support for actions against Jews and other Partisans. Where is that mention of the 33,771 Jews who were shot outside Kiev at Babi Yar with 6th Army's support? Although Babi Yar is mentioned later on in the book as well as that 30,000 Jews were shot in 2 days time, not much is said of the support offered by the Wehrmacht at the time or any of the other actions that army personnel participated in, only the idea is kept up that the main character is somehow 'above' this.

Eventually, it turns out that it was the cold winter that turned the main character's division against the local population and thus they began to either help the SS or simply turn their heads away from what was happening. The same character believes that a few degrees of frost drives all the Ukrainians in Kiev indoors...this line of thinking seems misplaced when its coming from a man representing the armed forces who blame the winter for their failures in the Soviet Union (pg. 101). "We do not shoot prisoners" the main character exclaims on pg. 90, how true is that statement in light of the Commissar order? Another incident, this time of a Soviet swimmer who is being shot at while swimming to the opposite bank of a river from the Germans, if he's lucky to survive and reach land unscathed, the Germans apparently stop their shooting and applaud because "they were great sportsmen, after all' (pg. 134).

The author has a limited knowledge in regards to his history with the Red Army throughout the 1930's and 1940's yet chooses to talk about the purges and the commanders as if dropping names (Kork, Primakov, and Uborevitch [sic]) to show off his knowledge. Rokossovsky is mentioned, as is the fact that he was purged and sent to "Siberia" but then a comment is added about him being a great tanker before he was sent off to the Far East. How could this be if he only commanded Cavalry formations before being purged? The German success in the beginning of the Barbarossa is attributed mainly to the purges of the Red Army, while this did play a role, in more ways than one, it was not the sole reason for the Red Army's defeats.

A Russian Captain is captured in 1941 who supposedly fought in a T-34 and Sherman tank, yet in 1941 there were no Sherman tanks on the battlefields of the USSR. In all some 35 tanks managed to arrive in all of 1941 via Lend Lease from the US, but that doesn't mean that they were incorporated into the Red Army the same year (sorry, I could go into more details, but suffice it to say, it's another mistake). On pg. 70 the aforementioned Russian captain says "If we retreat, Commissars shoot us. If we advance, you will kill us." I'm not sure how the Commissars would go about shooting tank captains while they are in their tanks. All I can see here is one stereotype being broadcast after another. Apparently Stalin "stripped" the far east of its "armies," there were actually at least half a million men there at all times. Usually, to replace divisions sent to face the Germans, new ones would be created from the local population. On page 131 the following statements are made "...prisoner battalions that clear minefields by walking through them", of which there are no recorded incidents, and of course "political officers stand behind men and shoot anyone who hesitates", actually it was the NKVD or regular army soldiers who were assigned to stop unauthorized retreats. Then there is the accusation that Red Army soldiers make children carry supplies as they are too light to set off mines, I've personally never come across such an incident. While it is a fact that the Germans used the local population in Stalingrad to get water for them from the Volga so that the Red Army wouldn't shoot them. Just because these statements are made by a German character doesn't mean that it doesn't reinforce cold war stereotypes. Penal formations are claimed to have had 1 rifle for 3 men, reading the memoirs of an officer in a penal formation, "Penalty Strike" by Alexander Pyl'cyn, gives a totally different version of events. The Red Army is claimed to rape not just women, but boys as well.

Then an incident with a KV 2 tank is described, the event in question is quite well known to readers of the Eastern Front. A lone KV 2 tank in the Northern sector of the front detains elements of a German tank division. In this book, the tank is magically transformed to the Southern sector of the Eastern Front, against a totally different German tank division, and is described as simply a "KV" instead of a KV 2, a KV is obviously a totally different tank, is first given a 122mm gun, then a 155mm gun (in reality it had a 152mm gun). Then the KV 2 is supposed to have participated in the Winter War, no, the KV did, the KV 2 did not. Some of those reading this review might consider this too much nitpicking. Sorry, if I read a historical novel about the Eastern Front I'd like to see some sense of history instead of convoluted ideas which take away from the reality of what went on during the largest invasion and the most gruesome fighting the world has seen. Similarly, if these details are added to the book then they should be correct, if you don't know much about them then simply omit them.

The author seems ignorant of the reasoning behind the designation of Stalingrad as a target for the summer offensive in 1942, supposedly Hitler wants it because it has Stalin's name. The reality of the matter is that Hitler never designated that the city should be taken in the first orders for the operation, rather it could be surrounded and the crossing brought under artillery and air bombardment to stop river traffic. A "strategic" discussion ends with the apparent idea that the summer campaign isn't about oil at all, but rather a personal battle of "Stalin's city against Hitler's finest army." No, Stalingrad was attacked by 2 armies, 4th Panzer and 6th Army, and the 6th Army was not the "finest" army, rather it was the largest army Hitler possessed at the time with something over 300,000 men.

The latter half of the book will deal with the partisan movement. Still, the reader is exposed to cold war propaganda about Ukrainian partisans fighting against both the Germans and Soviets to protect their land, etc. Somehow I don't believe that killing innocent Red Army men who are fighting for their own lives and that of their family members can be considered an honorable thing when discussing the activities of the Ukrainian Nationalist partisan organizations. Quite a few chapters mention the famine in Ukraine but it is again a layman's knowledge that is presented. Eye witness accounts can only tell a person so much about what happened, the author has pretty much propagated what the cold war developed. Farmers were innocent; it was all the higher quotas, etc. The real story is much more complex than presented here. Also, a claim is made that reporters were invited to Kiev during the famine. No, Ukraine was shut off from all reporters and no one was allowed in or out so that the famine would not spread (even though Ukraine wasn't the only place the suffered from the famine at the time). It seems that if you're Russian you cannot be a 'hero' in this book, no matter what. A scene has Red Army tankers run down their own countrymen who are actually trying to get away from the Germans to greet them. These same tankers, at times, even go out of their way to pursue fleeing civilians and run them over.

The men of the Red Army who would eventually finish the war in Berlin are labeled "stupid" and illiterate...makes you wonder how does that kind of army win against that wonderful German Armed forces that conquered all of Europe? Stereotypes, propaganda, myths, I simply cannot count them all and list them all. This book is beyond a waste of time it will drown you in ignorance, forget that it costs money; you are simply throwing away reality for disturbed fantasy, truth for lies, myths, and omissions.

Incorrect spelling and detail errors (although it's been brought to my attention that the transliteration might have simply been taken from German, when it came to Russian words and their spelling, in which case, what did those years researching in Russia really mean?):
Tukhachevsky is spelled as Tuchachevsky.
Shturmovik is spelled as Sturmovik.
Uborevich spelled as Uborevitch.
There is a mention of Vyansk...most likely Vyazma is what was meant and it seems as if Bryansk and Vyazma were joined into one word.
The author's Russian, in general, is also lacking.
Army Group Center became Army Group Central (pg. 36).
Kleist apparently commands the "Second Armored" army, in fact he commanded the 1st Panzer group which became an army after Kiev was captured.
The chronology of events, like encirclements, if very much off.
The PPSh is labeled a 'machine gun', no, it was a submachine gun.
The Jewish character is first named Ivan Kulikov then Ivan Kalugin.
Operation Uranus, the encirclement of the 6th Army at Stalingrad, occurs on November 13th, as best one can tell from the narrative, instead of the historical November 19th.
According to the author German POWs served in the same camps as GULag prisoners, another mistake.
Wilhelm Kube is mentioned to have been killed by a 'maiden' he was in fact killed by a 'maid.'

The Mascot by Mark Kurzem

2008-01-12T15:04:00.000-08:00

Many times I'm asked why I study history, specifically that of the Second World War. This book is what they should read if they want to understand my answer. Even today, over half a century later, the Second World War affects lives and more so helps make up national character for a multitude of countries throughout the world. This story first attracted me when I read an article about it online, a Jewish child used as a Mascot by those fighting on the side of Nazi Germany? Was I surprised? No, reading "Europa Europa" was more than enough to convince me that history is more powerful than any human imagination. Thus, while I wasn't surprised I was intrigued, how did the child survive?

This book, while starting out slowly (I kept yelling at it to pick up the pace and get to the point within the first hundred or so pages) picks up pretty quickly after that, 2-3 days reading is more than enough to tackle all of its 400 pages. The beginning of the book is mainly a rendition of memories, by bits and pieces, of a man who is trying to recall who he was in an almost past life. By the time one gets to the end, much of what seemed like it couldn't possibly mean anything takes on a whole new meaning. I would hate to ruin any of it for future readers so I'll only say a few words.

A boy escapes into the forest and witnesses the death of his mother, brother, and sister. He survives to be found by Latvian soldiers in the service of the Germans and is raised partly by them and partly by a rich Latvian and his family who owns a chocolate factory. It took him over half a century to finally tell his story to his family and with the help of a few people the mysteries that he could never understand, words he could never put into context, were all solved for him. Easily one of the better books I've read in a long time about the Holocaust, even though the concentration is less the Holocaust as a whole and more a struggle of one 6 year old boy to survive and over 60 years later to find out his true past and identity. Highly recommended.

Police Battalions of the Third Reich by Stephen Campbell

2008-01-03T09:55:00.000-08:00

Thus far the only book I've read on Police Battalions has been that of Browning's "Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution." This is an organization that not much has been written about when compared to the Army, SS, SD, and probably a wide variety of other organizations within Nazi Germany. Yet these were the troops that were involved in some of the more horrific crimes that took place on the Eastern Front. For this the author deserves praise, he's taken a topic that few know much about and given those, like myself, a solid base from where to start further research if at some point it comes to that. There are quite a few pictures throughout the book and many times it will become apparent that when one is viewing pictures from the Holocaust these men, more than occasionally, were most likely amongst those in the pictures. Their uniforms resembled the army's except they were green instead of gray, not something easy to spot in black and white photos.

The first chapter explains the organization of Police Units, who they answered to, what they were equipped with, how they were numbered, and what their responsibilities were.

The second chapters deals with the German invasion of Poland. With the estimated 1.8 million German troops that crossed the border came 21 police battalions. With the invasion the Nazis also began their Operation Tannenburg which was to target a variety of members of the Polish population with the intent of erasing the memory of Poland as a state for good. The Einsatzgruppen were created for the job, of the 4,250 personnel assigned to the Einsatzgruppen 2,250 were men from police battalions. The army was told that these men were there to ensure rear area security, a viable excuse and one used to gain 'freedom of action' for Himmler and Heydrich. According to the author this invasion was the first time that buildings were burned with human beings inside of them. While Germans were more or less 'experts' at burning down Synagogues by this time it had never been done with Jews inside. Einsatzgruppen actions in Poland would change that, although their activities were day and night compared to what they would reap when the Soviet Union would be invaded. The discipline of the Einsatzgruppen at times outraged the army officers. The commander of the Special Operations Group of the Einsatzgruppen was even asked by the Army to be put in front of a court martial. Keeping in mind that this was not in regards to the activities he and his men were performing but rather the way in which they were going about performing them (which included looting, raping, and the burning down of synagogues). Himmler made the commander in question a "special commander of the Police" in response. Within a span of some three weeks the Einsatzgruppen were able to burn 500 towns and villages and 16,376 people were executed. Police battalions were then sent to a variety of villages and towns with Jewish populations of under 500 to transfer them to urban ghettos. At times it would be decided that it was easier to march Jews off to a hastily dug ditch outside of town than proceed with their resettlement in a ghetto. At the end of the chapter the author gives a list of the Polish Battalions and their 'group compositions' which participated in Poland, quite useful and interesting! Many would later go on to participate in the war against the Soviet Union.

Third chapter deals with the invasion of the Soviet Union where the 'total war' based on Hitler's genocidal ideas and intrigues finally came to fruition. The Einsatzgruppen here consisted of 3,000 men of whom 500 belonged to the police. Yet, throughout the entire campaign, if one takes into account rotations and transfers at least 10,000 German police served in one capacity or another with the Einsatzgruppen. Thus far one mistake on the author's part is to state that when the German army entered Soviet regions which encompassed Ukraine and the Baltics they were greeted as "friends and liberators" while many in the Baltics and Ukraine did greet the Wehrmacht MANY more did not and would fight against them as Partisans and with the Red Army. For Ukraine specifically this welcoming would be most present in the Western regions which were only incorporated in 1939 when Poland was divided between the Soviets and the Germans. Throughout the first year of occupational duties police battalions would perform 'special tasks' this would mainly include rounding up and shooting Jews, Communists, etc. When the Moscow Counter-Offensive started many of these battalions would be used in the front lines to shore up collapsing lines, especially in Army Group North. After they were released from front line duties and participated in the final year, 1942, of large-scale executions by squads with rifles and/or machine guns. This period also saw the rise of indigenous police units which began to carry out the job of mass murder under German supervision. Throughout the rest of the war police battalions would participate in anti-Partisan sweeps and operations and in the last year of the war help make up Kampfgruppen which were desperately trying to stop the Soviet advance on Germany. Luckily for those police battalion members who were able to survive is the fact that the Nuremberg "trials did not consider the police a criminal organization."

The fourth chapter recounts the partisans and their activities as well as how the Germans tried to stop/annihilate them. Security divisions were responsible for the rear areas but with the Soviet Union being so large and there only being 9 security divisions for all three army group's rear areas, it was not a small task to silence all the opposition in the rear. Police battalions which entered the Soviet Union were assigned to security divisions; for example, Army Group North in 1941 and for the beginning of 1942 had three police battalions each assigned to one of three security divisions. The same could be seen for Army Groups South and Center, three battalions for three divisions. As the war progressed the policing was carried out more by indigenous units which were easily recruited during the beginning period of the war. The three operations usually undertaken by the police battalions was the patrolling of areas, "search and destroy missions", and real military operations which usually took place against armed partisans.

The fifth chapter quickly tackles the issue of auxiliaries. Their creation in the beginning of the war had as much to do with the fact that they could point out who the Jews were and other "undesirables" and were willing to assist in murdering their former neighbors for a price. As early as late July in 1941 indigenous units were being created to help in the mass murdering process throughout the rear areas of the Soviet Union. The Polish population offered 15,000 in terms of auxiliaries while in Ukraine in 1941 eighteen battalions at around 500 each (this of course excludes the men who would later join the SS Galicia division), Estonia produced twelve battalions, etc.

The last chapter, six, is on the Holocaust. The author asks the usual question of how could it be that such an event could occur and how is it that the Jewish people could stand by and do nothing, reacting via the partisan movement or in other ways much later on in the war. A fictional account is given of a city in Ukraine and the way that a usual German aktion would take place against its Jewish population. It will easily ring true to all those who are familiar with the Holocaust and German actions in the east, it is a quick recounting with an inevitable conclusion and one that occurred hundreds if not thousands of times throughout the former Soviet Union.

This marks the beginning of the appendices. The six chapters listed above take up some 40 pages, with many pictures intermixed with text. It is a good background to the actions of these men and the rest of the book goes into specific police battalions and what they were responsible for, where they were raised, stationed, participated, etc. A treasure trove for those who want specifics in regards to various actions on the Eastern Front. A few examples include Police Battalion 3 (Reserve) whose 1st company "was responsible for the death of 48,000 people" while working with Einsatzgruppe B and Einsatzkommando 8. For those interested in the Holocaust this book is a must read, highly recommended. This is an organization that few paid attention to while the limelight was on the SS, yet these men were just as responsible for the genocides going on in the East.

Jihad and Jew-Hatred: Islamism, Nazism and the Roots of 9/11 by Matthias Kuntzel

2007-12-24T08:24:00.000-08:00

Terrorism is not an area that I will claim to know a great deal about. Rather the Second World War is my forte. Which makes it that much more important for me to have read this book. It was nothing less than utter shock which greeted me when I was finally able to put two and two together. Nazism/fascism had not died with the destruction of the Third Reich. On the contrary, those ideals are alive and well in the Middle East today. After the end of the Second World War Hitler's anti-Semitic ideas became entrenched in Egypt and what today are the Palestinians, amongst a plethora of individuals and future groups/terrorist organizations. The author also makes the argument that after the collapse of the Soviet Union a new anti-US sponsor had to be found, that 'sponsor' turned out to be "Islamism" and everything that comes with it.

It is no wonder that behind practically any and every terrorist attack there is that vehemence against Jews, as if they are the real reason for why this terrorist attack had to happen. Even if on the cover it might be anti-globalization, anti-US _______ fill in the blank, behind it all is the "fact" that the Jews are the ones controlling ALL the moves that the rest of the world makes against the Middle East and, always, in support of Israel. The majority of what is presented here one will hardly find in our news media outlets. One would tend to think that a good portion of the US and the Western World are logical and rational, they cannot blindly accept conspiracy theories, like the idea that the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" are the truth behind how the Jews have been manipulating the world. We cannot fathom the anti-Semitism that gripped Nazi Germany in the 1930's and 1940's but today's terrorists can and do, they are the embodiment of the racist ideals of that period. Terrorists and their supporters have no restraints in regards to how much they will believe the Jews are responsible for, it is an explanation to them for all they have suffered and continue to suffer. I can only commend the author on his efforts and what he will open your eyes to. This book has greatly changed my line of thought in regards to the past half century and terrorism in general.

Beslan: The Tragedy of School No. 1 by Timothy Phillips

2007-12-10T16:12:00.000-08:00

This book is an interesting read about what happened at the siege of Beslan's school No. 1 but in the end I found it lacking. The book is broken into chapters, but they are not exactly in chronological order. The first chapter will address a part of the Siege while the next will go into the background of Chechnya or Russia and maybe tell the author's own adventures while over there and what kind of impact they had on him, the next chapter will again relate to Beslan and the one after again to the historical context, and so on and so forth.

I have to say that the author committed a few errors in his historical prose and I can't say he was 'unbiased' in presenting the plight of the Chechens. The author does talk about the various deportations of the Chechen and Ingush people as well as a variety of other ethnicities throughout the Soviet Union, what I noticed was missing was the fact that none of the other ethnicities turned to terrorism against innocent civilians, worse women and children, aside from the Chechens, why leave that out? The accounts from the parents and others who were trapped in the school were all quite interesting.

Some stories that are stuck in my mind are when the first police units arrived they had blanks for bullets, the police "armourer" had gone to the city and had taken the key to their arsenal with him. At one point when a negotiator asked the terrorists if they would allow food and water to be brought in for the children the response was that the children "had announced their own hunger strike in sympathy with the terrorists' aims." More than once the author points out the media's incorrect guesstimates when it came to how many hostages were bieng held in the School. The exact number of 354 was pronounced when the reality was that it only covered perhaps a quarter of those trapped in the school. This under counting, according to the author and some of those trapped inside the school, seemed to enrage the terrorists. When the siege began on the first day children and adults were still allowed to get water from a tap and go to the bathroom, by the second day this was rescinded as the terrorists awaited expected "VIPs" whom they demanded to see so that they could discuss their demands. Chaos and panic were evident throughout, a village less than a mile from Beslan was receiving calls where the callers claimed they had seen the local school attacked by terrorists. When the local police went to investigate it turned out that the attackers were special forces practicing for the storming of School No. 1.

What I wasn't too interested in seeing, yet saw a lot of, were wild claims with little to back them up aside from rumors and hearsay, this could be seen in regards to the Russian president Putin and a variety of other 'characters' in this situation who apparently owe their jobs to him, the terrorists and why they would grow aggravated, and a variety of other incidents which one can only guess at when wondering what the cause or causes might have been. I, personally, would simply have preferred to simply hear the outcome and not the author's ideas about how or why the outcome was come to. Without all the facts being available for scrutiny it is very hard to understand what the truth is and to separate it from the chaos of the events in question which inevitably lead to such rumors. While it might be OK for the author to present what he's heard in terms of rumors and innuendos it would be a benefit if he were to specifically state which can be proven to be true and which are simply allegations. There is also a recounting of the Nord Ost siege, which took place in Moscow a few years before Beslan, which in my opinion leaves a lot out of what happened and easily puts all the blame on Russian officials and special forces. For a more balanced view of that incident and others, including Beslan, I would recommend "Terror at Beslan" by John Giduck. Giduck's book has an abundant number of interviews with Special Forces and others who helped to rescue as many children as they could, some moving into the field of fire to distract the terrorists from the children when they were running out of the school after the two initial explosions. In this book hardly any of that is covered, if it is the author questions the accounts from the special forces side. It would have been preferable if the author actually interviewed not only survivors and locals but also some of the special forces that participated in this operation. When it comes to their side of the events all one has in this book is speculation. When I saw the following words "...the mighty Russian bear had fallen" in regards to uncensored footage being shown of this event I couldn't help myself but to think, is this what the world thought of the US on 9/11? Doubtful. A lot of blame is leveled against government forces and administration but nowhere did I find a recounting of the massive number of civilians who came out to the school armed with their own weapons and shooting indiscriminately at the terrorists throughout the siege. Yes, mistakes were made on all sides, this was a chaotic situation but that doesn't make it alright to pile all the blame on any one body. While it did take time for Alpha and other special forces to finally be able to rescue those trapped throughout the school this was because they were searching the school one classroom at a time and not running through it screaming 'Marco!' All in all I'd have to caution those reading this, if you do read it get Giduck's book as well to see the other side.

SS Polizei: Memoirs of Poland by Stephen Campbell

2007-12-08T19:02:00.000-08:00

Overall this is a very interesting book and definitely an original take on the Holocaust. I simply have to mention that reading this book it is hard to forget that it is fiction. The author did a great job in many aspects, he knows his history and the events he portrays are right on with the history of this time period. In this book the author takes on the persona of a regular German police officer serving in a police battalion. I sympathize with the author; I think it would have been easier if the persona he took on was someone who abhorred his job. We, the reader, could possibly understand that, it would fit with what the majority of us know; that killing is wrong and takes a toll on a person that few can even begin to imagine. But, for probably the first time we get a glimpse of what someone who enjoyed what they did saw and how they might have felt as they followed Hitler’s orders and committed genocide on a scale never before even imagined. It is a work of fiction but much of what is contained within its pages rings true if one were to read Jewish accounts, amongst a plethora of others, of what they witnessed in Eastern Europe throughout the Holocaust.

The first ‘aktion’ in Poland sounds like what one would usually hear about when thinking of how ‘aktions’ were done before the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The massacre of Jewish males in one town is described: German collaborators drink themselves into stupors as they execute line after line of naked male Jews. Men are assigned to give the coup de grace to those who still remained alive after the initial volleys. At least one of the Germans when first seeing the bodies piled on top of one another vomits while others go through various phases of shock. While back in the village they had just come from the locals were already busy looting Jewish goods as volleys of fire could be heard just a short distance away.

Alcohol was in abundance as men’s senses were dulled to what they were doing and/or witnessing. Eventually the reader is informed some of the men in the battalion commit suicide while others become numb to the activity of killing and the rest turn to alcohol. From what I recall when studying the Holocaust and the Einsatzgruppen the usual ratio was 1/3 became accustomed to the killings, 1/3 turned to alcohol, and 1/3 was transferred out or in this fictional account turned to suicide, so quite believable.

I did enjoy the description of how the men of this fictitious battalion got around, not as the usual mechanized German Army that we hear about, but rather on bicycles! Today most know that the German Army was far from the mechanized juggernaut it made itself out to be. The pogrom that descended on Bialystok is explored and a scene is recounted of the main synagogue being stuffed with innocent Jews and set on fire as anyone trying to escape was shot by those waiting outside.

At one point the company is moved up to the front as the Soviet counter-offensive outside Moscow made a mess out of the frontline. Few of these soldiers thought they’d ever see the real front line and the cold weather didn’t make it any better. Eventually the company would be squeezed into a slot which a formation at least twice its size should have been assigned. When an artillery barrage is fired against their positions on one sunny morning the narrator and those around him are reduced to screaming infants as they get a real taste of war, not simply killing unarmed civilians.

The reader gets a chance to join the narrator on “bandit” hunts. At first the Germans would talk to and question village elders. Then they moved on to threatening them and at times outright killing them. Later on reprisal actions took place and by that time the local populations had found out that they had traded one evil for another when they welcomed the German army was ‘liberators’, as some had done. One village is totally decimated after a radio is found within a house; the entire population, which consists of a few dozen people, is machine gunned and their houses torched to the ground.

Jewish “bandits” are described as hated by both the Ukrainian and Polish partisans and local populations, quite correct. What Jewish partisans had to go through no other partisan groups and individual partisans had to face. In the book a Jewish partisan group has its location given to the Germans by a Pole. This is not at all out of the ordinary as Ukrainians and Poles have been documented to betray Jews for either monetary gain or simply because of anti-Semitic tendencies. This of course shouldn’t merit anyone from forgetting that many Poles also risked their lives to save Jews and many are praised as “righteous” by Yad Vashem.

Too often we see accounts, both fiction and nonfiction, from the German side which characterizes the majority of what was going on in the East as heroic soldiers fighting against the “Bolshevik hordes” from the east. Here, albeit a fictional piece, we have something that shows us the other side of the war; the bloody way in which the war on the Eastern Front, and the holocaust that followed in its wake, was truly waged by those who participated in it.

Lastly, the minuses of the book; there are quite a few grammar errors here and there which don’t take much away from the reading but are still a bit annoying. There is some modern ‘slang’ thrown in, but if one believes the ‘introduction’ then this is a recollection not a verbatim record from the 1940’s. One other error that I found was when the main character mentions a Soviet Guards division in 1940; Guards divisions didn’t appear until after the Soviet Union was invaded in 1941. Other than that, overlooking these minor examples, I would recommend the book to those interested in the Eastern Front and historical fiction.

The Myth of the Eastern Front by Ronald Smelser and Edward J. Davies II

2007-12-03T15:02:00.001-08:00

“The Myth of the Eastern Front” is an interesting look at the evolution of the Western view when it came to the German Wehrmacht throughout WWII.

To begin with the book is broken down into eight chapters, discounting the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter aims to reveal how the Soviet Union was viewed throughout the war in the American Media. Many times the Russians, from the soldiers to the women working in industries and within the Red Army, were compared to their US counterparts with the idea that they were very alike and similar as a people and in their individual qualities. From Readers Digest to a variety of other publications like Time and Life readers would be able to catch a glimpse of the Soviet Union through journalists, reporters, and a variety of others. Yet, just as soon as some publications went from vilifying the Soviet Union before they were attacked by Hitler, they would go back to the same standard quite soon after the war was over. Helping to tarnish relations that so many worked had to sustain and cement in the hopes of a peaceful future.

The Second chapter tackles the Nuremberg trials and the numerous ways in which the German General Staff and Army Generals were shown to have been implicit in genocidal acts on the Eastern Front. Trials began to take place soon after the war in various cities throughout the Soviet Union where perpetrators were put on trial for their crimes, from collaborators to SS and regular army officers and soldiers. The Wehrmacht’s guilt was made quite clear by a number of their own generals, and others, including Einsatzgruppen commanders who testified to the regular cooperation of the army with their troops. Some of the generals convicted of various war crimes through trials held after the Nuremberg IMT were Wilhelm List, Walter Kunze, Lothar Rendulic, Wilhelm Spiedel, Helmuth Felmy, Ernst von Leyser, Hubert Lanz, Ernst Dehner, Wilhelm von Leeb, Georg von Kuchler, Hermann Hoth, Hans Reinhardt, Hans von Salmuth, Karl Hollidt, Karl von Roques, Hermann Reinecke, Walter Warlimont, Otto Wohler, and Rudolf Lehmann. Walter H. Rapp, the prosecutor, stated that the one of the reasons for the trials was partly so that legends would be prevented from forming in the future about military generals, as had happened after WWI. It seems that the American occupation paved the way for the future view of the Germans and the Soviets. Those soldiers who had liberated the Concentration camps and had seen what the Third Reich was all about were soon replaced by new recruits who began to view the Germans in a different light. Fewer and fewer came to blame the German people for the war and even less could believe that they were responsible for concentration camps. But US soldiers were quick to apply their homegrown stereotypes to the Slavs and the Jews which the Germans eagerly encouraged and cultivated, especially after US soldiers were allowed to fraternize with the Germans. One must also take into consideration the fact that the Soviets, to a large degree, did not want to be friends with the Germans since they were so different culturally and the Germans did invade and unleash a genocidal war on their land. After this the reader can follow the various political machinations that eventually led to the majority of those convicted of war crimes, from the SS to the German Army, to be released for a variety of reasons cooked up as a result of the political situation in the US, the war in Korea, and the rearmament of West Germany. The last part of the chapter examines the “Halder Group” which was, for the most part, responsible for the Cold War view of the Eastern Front and the Soviets. A surprise to me was to learn that after France was conquered, in the beginning of July, it was Halder’s staff which drafted the first major plan for a war against the USSR, “Operation Otto”, which was created in part out of strategic considerations and as well to counter the demobilization which Hitler was contemplating.

The third chapter, aptly named “The German Generals Talk, Write and Network” begins with a description of how Halder was helped by the Americans in escaping a trial in Bavaria, which was a result of his diaries being found and incriminating Halder in a variety of war crimes. Halder’s thoughts and ideas on how the German military should be perceived were tape recorded as he conferred with others. He continued with the “war against Bolshevism” theme and at the same time tried to “rescue the honor of the German officer corps” by removing the stigmatism that had developed in regards to Hitler, Nazism, and the Holocaust/atrocities of the war. A list of Generals who would help Halder write about the Eastern Front is given and, even more interesting, is a list of the titles that came out from the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical field which helped create the myths that have been sustained to this day in the west in regards to the war on Germany’s Eastern Front. Halder would become a household name after his diaries were published in the 1960’s. He’d be given various honors from the military and politicians; he’d give speeches throughout military schools in the US and receive numerous letters from the layman asking every kind of question about the German Military and WWII, etc. The Bundeswehr as an institution is described, interesting is the fact that 100% of its officers were part of the former Wehrmacht in 1955, when it was created.

The last part of the chapter deals with the similarities between the "lost cause" phenomenon of the US Civil War and the Eastern Front in WWII. A fascinating insight into how the American public has been, to a degree, duped into reveling in the failures of racists.

The fourth chapter deals with "Memoirs, Novels, and Popular Histories." The first tackled is Manstein's memoirs, going through Manstein's history on the Eastern Front I couldn't help but see the authors of this book mention that after the defeat at Kursk Germany went on the defensive and Manstein was advocating a fluid defense, after this the author mentions Manstein's victory when retaking Kharkov in March of 1943, why mention this AFTER Kursk when it happened before? Apparently, as someone pointed out to me, this is how Carell presents this in his book on the Eastern Front which the two authors quote from throughout the book. The majority of the material on Manstein speak to his knowledge of the genocidal activities going on, his orders which suggest he knew and supported these activities, and testimony that shows the aforementioned as well. Manstein's ideas about how Hitler was at fault for most of the blunders in the war and that he was the only one who could contradict and/or stand up to him are prevalent throughout his memoirs, yet are simply self serving as they go to discredit any officer who opposed or hindered Manstein's career during the war. I'd say this has been well established in recent literature, especially by Marcel Stein's recent book, but even so, it's here for those who are interested. The authors also cover books by Guderian, von Mellenthin, Rudel, Carell, and Sven Hassel noting how they’ve helped create a new of the Wehrmacht.

Next chapter goes over some of the previously mentioned authors and recounts how their books became part of the mainstream. Gaining accolades and forwards from scholars and historians as they ignored the genocidal aspect of the war they waged and rather praised their stance against the Soviet Union. Practically all the memoirs mentioned, from the officer to the lowly soldier, state outright that they will solely concentrate on the military aspect of the war and skip over the politics. In the end it appears that these were all valiant soldiers fighting for the good of their nation and people under the auspices of a brutal ignorant dictator. We can easily ask ourselves, how often does “good” fight for “evil”? Well, this is what the above mentioned authors would have you believe when they discuss their time on the Eastern Front. Everything is discussed from the blurbs to the photos inside each book and how it affected the US public.

Chapter 6 discusses the “gurus” of the German Army and Waffen SS, which today have legions of followers all over the internet. A critique of Mark Yerger is offered, the authors claim that although he has done some excellent research, for at least 2 of his books, on the whole the majority of the others rely on pictures and at best are ‘iconographic’ representations of the war and its participants. For me personally it was interesting to learn about Richard Landwehr who mostly caters to the Waffen SS, although many would probably consider him a revisionist of the highest nature for his love of the Waffen SS and the allies of Nazi Germany that joined its ranks. Erich Hartmann’s biography, The Blond Knight of Germany, is mentioned and the title already gives way to how the authors of his biography wanted him to be viewed. A variety of Franz Kurowski books are mentioned and the type of view that they give of the common German soldier, that of fighting for their comrades and uniting them in both life and death, yet where is the mention of the genocidal context for which these units were sent into the East in the first place? In the end it is simply a matter of one side of the war being ignored to present the other. There is no doubt that the actions Kurowski describes or bravery and compassion for the enemy took place, but he never questions why the enemy is in fact an ‘enemy.’ One “guru” who does admit what the Germans practiced in the east, that of brutal behavior and criminal acts, is Anthony J. Munoz who more so concentrates on foreign volunteers in the Waffen SS.

Chapter 7 discusses war gamers, the internet and popular culture. War games apparently saw an opportunity to re-fight the battles of the Eastern Front with wholly different outcomes from what actually happened. Instead of only being able to read about the battles they could now take part in them and let these battles become a part of their world. Various cover art is discussed and shown for war games and the sympathy or righteousness that they are supposed to evoke from those who purchase them. Eventually what started in the 1950’s and 1960’s would evolve with various magazines in the 1970’s and 1980’s which gave context to these games with articles about the various scenarios being offered and the eventual breakthrough in communications, the internet, would create a new outlet for these “romancers” of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS. The authors do an interesting dissection of various sites catering to the Waffen SS and the Wehrmacht as well as sites like Achtung Panzer and what they have to offer. Suffice it to say there is too much to recount in this review. The last chapter is dedicated to ‘what if history’, reliving the past on their own terms, it seems, for those who partake in such activities.

Overall I believe this is a needed book on the subject although it leaves a lot out. The main point here is that German generals and soldiers who have written about their experiences on the whole leave out the politics. This specifically means that the Generals who had knowledge and at times even participated in various ways with the genocide going on in the East blatantly pretended not know and denied any association with organizations like the Einsatzgruppen. While some might accept this and concentrate on the fighting itself this in essence absolves these authors from talking about the fact that they fought for a genocidal regime in a war of total annihilation against the Soviet people and at the same time knew little to nothing about what was going on in their proverbial ‘backyards.’ Their actions NEED to be put into context, that is what is missing today from WWII literature on the Eastern Front, yet slowly this is beginning to change with authors like Omer Bartov, amongst others. The western world has held and believed in racist opinions and outright lies in regards to what happened during the German invasion of the Soviet Union, it is long past due for the truth or at least a viable context to be presented which includes the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ of what went on. Many will look at the errors within this book, some of which I point out below, but I want to make it clear that they should not and do not detract from the main thesis of this book.

Lastly, the negatives of the book. A few mistakes/errors that I found which didn’t take away anything from the reading, but were something I’m familiar with: quite a few Soviet names were spelled, that is transliterated, incorrectly. Tukhachevsky is spelled as Tuchachevsky, Chekhov is Checkhov, and Litvinov is sometimes spelled as Litvinoff. But, as I said, it didn’t take much away from the reading (especially since this book is about the German point of view of the war on the Eastern Front, not the Soviet). Also instead of Marshal of the Soviet Union Konev, we have “Marshall Konev.” Two statements that I found made out of context were “Given the inadequacies of early tank models and the initial inability of the Russians to appreciate combined arms tactics until the Germans used them effectively…” I would say that this is a very difficult statement to make and one that cannot be made in a vacuum. Theoretically there was plenty of appreciation for combined arms within the Red Army. Practically, operations that tried to sustain combined arms were often lacking. Was it the fault of a specific commander or the circumstances he found himserlf in? That has to be examined on a case by case basis. Lastly, when the authors mention that “having troops ride the outside of the tank was a tactic of desperation made necessary by lack of trucks” I had to look twice. It was a lack of APC’s not trucks which forced the creation of ‘tank riders.’ Infantry does not ride trucks into combat. I have also been informed by quite a few people that there are quite a few mistakes from the German side including numerous misspellings of German words.