As a student of Soviet history, and being from the former Soviet Union myself, I have a varied interest in modern Russian history. I am one of those who views history (that is events that occurred at least half a century ago) as easier to understand and fit into a context than the study of current events. The Yukos affair and Khodorkovsky are something one hears a great deal about in both the western and Russian media. While western media seems to garner the majority of sympathy for Khodorkovsky, the Russian media seems to be more antagonistic against a man once called an 'oligarch.'
While Sakwa tackles Khdorkovsky, Putin, the Yukos affair, the varied meanings of 'freedom', and a variety of other topics in this text, I cannot help but think that while this is a very good, and academic, treatment of the subject(s) it is not a definitive account. This is not to say that Sakwa's narrative or analysis is weak but simply that he is writing from a hindsight that has yet to fully set in. A large portion of his sources are also media related, both western and Russian, and while journalism once meant something, today's mass media is simply a running joke. Granted, this might apply more to the US than Russia, but there it seems that the journalists are polarized either for or against the government. While this does provide the reader with a broad spectrum of opinions and contextual analysis, in the end, in my opinion, it is still too biased for a scholarly analysis.
With that said, the author utilizes a wide variety of sources so that his foundation and basis for much of what he writes is ingrained in academic literature, be it from Russia or the west. While many will undoubtedly view Khodorkovsky as getting what he deserves, simply because he was an oligarch, in reading this work the reader will be given a more fully developed understanding of the atmosphere Khodorkovsky and others (Berezovsky, Gusinky, Smolensky, etc) were operating in. Much of what they did was illegal and the country was plundered to a great degree under the administration of the 1990s. But it was Yukos and Khodorkovsky that were arrested, imprisoned, and bankrupted by Putin and his administration, not all of the other oligarchs who acted similarly. Then again, Khodorkovsky had more than one chance to leave the country, as many others did, but he chose to stay, more so, to ingrain himself in the politics of the country.
That, in a nutshell, is what Putin rebelled against. It is one thing to become an oligarch and reign supreme in the world of business, it is a totally different matter to indulge in political intrigue and attempt to maneuver against the powers that be, no matter how much money you have on your side. Khodorkovsky learned his lesson and continues to learn it in prison. He speaks out, writers letters and lambastes the current administration for what it has done to him and Yukos. Perhaps he's right, Yukos should not have been taken apart, but Putin and the factions inside the Kremlin that helped him 'tame' Khodorkovsky and the others who helped run Yukos (many were put on trial aside from Khodorkovsky, and even tried in absentia) decided that an example needed to be made. Khodorkovsky proved to be the perfect target and he paid with his freedom while Yukos paid by hemorrhaging billions in 'unpaid taxes' which forced it to sell off its assets and go bankrupt. The winners of this 'affair' were undoubtedly the factions within the Kremlin, but what that 'win' entails is too early to tell. For those interested in an academic, highly detailed and analytical look at modern Russia, you'll do well to invest in this text.
Sunday, July 5, 2009
Sunday, June 21, 2009
"Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The New Cold War" Stephen F. Cohen
Stephen F. Cohen's latest publication, "Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The New Cold War," deals with a variety of events within Soviet and post-Soviet Russian history while outlining missed opportunities/roads not taken within each specific event. He does not so much deal in 'what-if' or 'counterfactual' scenarios as set up and explain existing alternatives that could have been pursued. Simply showing that alternatives within Soviet society existed inevitably puts into question much of the reasoning behind the idea that the Soviet Union was unreformable, especially when put into context with the sustainability of the Soviet Union through, for example, Khrushchev's reforms.
The text is made up of seven chapters; the first is devoted to Nikolai Bukharin, someone Cohen has written about in the past. While I do not think Bukharin could have been a rival to Stalin, in the full sense of the word (perhaps as Trotsky was), I think Cohen's real point within the chapter is encompassed in his discussion of NEP (New Economic Policy) which lasted some eight years, until the five year plans began. This phase of the Soviet Union is viewed by many as a 'golden' time, a time of at least some opportunity when state owned enterprises existed along side privately run companies/trades. But Cohen stops short of guessing what the Soviet Union could have become had NEP policies been pursued rather his point here is solely to show that an alternative to Stalin's five year plans existed, had been implemented and accepted by both the government and its citizens, and could have continued and evolved for years to come.
The next chapter discusses the GULag returnees during Khrushchev's administration. It was only after Khurshchev's condemnation of the 'cult of personality' in 1956 that millions of those convicted and imprisoned under Stalin were exonerated. Cohen then covers how these former zeks were treated by Soviet society as well as their impact on Khrushchev's administration and the reforms of his era. Some died in tragic or lonely circumstances while others rose through the ranks of their respective professions. Cohen does point out that while no former prisoners acquired positions in the highest rungs of power, many became local leaders and were able to play a role in the future policies Khrushchev would become responsible for. This was also a time period which saw accusations by Khrushchev and his allies against the likes of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, who were soon expelled from the party. Many often wonder why there was no Soviet equivalent to the Nuremberg trials, this was probably as close as the Soviets came. Other initiatives were begun against former Communist party higher ups, but the problem is that Khrushchev himself had blood on his hands and if he began to seek out those responsible for the previous crimes of the Soviet state against its own population, most likely more people would have been imprisoned than were being rehabilitated and released.
The third chapter deals with "Soviet conservatism" and the figure of Yegor Ligachev. Undoubtedly conservatives in the US differ markedly from those in the Soviet Union but, as Cohen explains through the lens of Ligachev, they are not simply neo-Stalinists bent on terrorizing the Soviet population and hording power at the top. On the contrary, after examining Ligachev's history Cohen attempts to show that "Soviet conservatism" in this case signified a yearning to reform the Soviet Union and keep it in tact. This type of conservatism has to be understood vis-a-vis the policies Gorbachev implemented during the late 1980s. Men like Ligachev aimed to have Soviet policies improved upon not reinvented.
Building on the previous chapter the fourth chapter goes into detail about whether the Soviet system was reformable. Of course, following how Cohen views NEP, the answer is that he believes it was. Today many in the west, with exaggerated egos, believe that the Soviet system was doomed to failure, even though none predicted its end. If a nation like America can exploit the system of slavery for centuries and then turn around and champion their emancipation followed a century later by the civil rights movement, why is it that the USSR, and Russia in general, is forced to carry the stigma of an empire beyond redemption? On the contrary, from the early years of the revolution the Soviet state modified itself to suit the needs of its government, ideology, and population. From creating war communism, to NEP, to five year plans, the destruction of Stalin's 'cult of personality' together with Khrushchev's reforms, a movement of what some label 'neo-Stalinism' under Brezhnev, to a reform minded Gorbachev who instituted Glasnost and Peterstroika, considered by some to have been the most 'democratic' period of recent history. Are these the actions of an unreformable empire?
Chapter five works off the previous chapter and takes on the fate of the Soviet Union, specifically, 'Why did it end?' While there are many figures one can point to, I believe Cohen is quite candid in placing his blame on the shoulders of Yeltsin and perhaps to a lesser degree on Gorbachev. While Gorbachev seems to come out as partly realistic and idealistic in his outlook, Yelstin was simply a man bent on acquiring power, no matter who he had to go through, lie to, or manipulate. An interesting argument is made regarding Gorbachev's reforms and their 'destabilizing' of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, his reforms were not meant to stabilize a system that was not working, rather they were supposed to destabilize it and propel it forward via new initiatives and policies. Evens so, it was Gorbachev's "promarket policies" that initiated the rapid grab for assets, in both legal and illegal means, through which today's Russian oligarchs were created. Yeltsin eventually used these same oligarchs, and they him, in helping curb democratic principles throughout the 1990s. Personally, I viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as inevitable, there just seemed to have been so much going wrong all at once. Specifically, I saw nationalism as playing a large, if not the largest, role. Cohen, however, argues to the contrary. The demonstrations and protests by various ethnicities, which many quickly attribute to ideas of self-determination or "nationalist revolution-from-below" were in fact organized to redress grievances "within the framework of the Union" or directed against other ethnicities, but not that of the USSR. The rest of the chapter deals with all the other usual suspects in the collapse of the USSR (economy, reforms, etc) and Cohen puts them into a coherent and understandable context which has made me rethink what happened and what an alternative might consist of.
The next chapter goes into the legacies of Gorbachev. While he failed in his reforms, obviously he was not aiming at the dissolution of the USSR but rather an improvement on the model before him, what came after under Boris Yeltsin was another step in the wrong direction. Cohen adheres to the idea that it was Gorbachev rather than Yeltsin who ushered in democracy, contrary to what many specialists believe today. Cohen believes this "historical amnesia" was inspired by US ideology which after the breakup of the Soviet Union rewrote the history of the Cold War's end to include a "US Victory" rather than the agreed upon "end" between the two sides with no victors or losers. Throughout the 1990s Yeltsin began to use the oligarchs that Gorbachev's policies first created in cracking down on democratic liberties. The mass media began to be used for manipulation purposes which has continued to this day. Journalists reminisce about Gorbachev's reforms, a time when they were able to pry into Soviet history and spark debates about taboo topics, while during Yeltsin the public was kept in the dark about corruption, human rights abuses, and crime. For Cohen there is a real similarity between 1917 and 1991. In both instances small groups were ushered into power based on promises of "evolutionary progress" but in the end struggles over property and territory tore the nation apart and standing economic institutions were done away.
The last chapter, and by far the most interesting of this book, deals with who was/is responsible for the cooling of relations between the Russian Federation and America. In this case Cohen is not afraid to utilize the expression 'Cold War' to define the attitudes of the US and Russia toward each other, and, perhaps, in a way he is right. But Cohen is also not afraid to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of whom he thinks is in the wrong, Washington. From announcing to the US that the Cold War was won by the US in 1992 (by George H. W. Bush) to the failed policies under Clinton, which seem solely to have plunged Russia into an ever expanding economic hole and let NATO expand its influence to Russia's proverbial doorstep, to the presidency of the second Bush who moved away from arms treaties and provided new impetus for Russia to feel threatened and again seek to find friends among the likes of Iran, Venezuela, etc. Even with the current Obama administration many of those responsible for the initial policies and activities vis-a-vis Russia are still in place, including Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. The double standards and hypocrisy of the US government, mass media, and even academics is clearly laid out. Another opportunity lost for the US, especially at a time when Russia could have contributed greatly to many American initiatives, including the "war on terror." The largest problem, for Cohen, in how the US deals with Russia is that some parties seem to encourage a destabilization of the current regime. How helpful is that if Russia still possesses stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Not very. But apparently showing off a US with the ego and arrogance of a sole superpower means more to Washington's power elite than trying to help Russia and encourage a friendly, open, and reciprocal relationship that will undoubtedly pay off in the long run more so than antagonizing Putin and his country to the point of creating an atmosphere akin to a "cold war."
The text is made up of seven chapters; the first is devoted to Nikolai Bukharin, someone Cohen has written about in the past. While I do not think Bukharin could have been a rival to Stalin, in the full sense of the word (perhaps as Trotsky was), I think Cohen's real point within the chapter is encompassed in his discussion of NEP (New Economic Policy) which lasted some eight years, until the five year plans began. This phase of the Soviet Union is viewed by many as a 'golden' time, a time of at least some opportunity when state owned enterprises existed along side privately run companies/trades. But Cohen stops short of guessing what the Soviet Union could have become had NEP policies been pursued rather his point here is solely to show that an alternative to Stalin's five year plans existed, had been implemented and accepted by both the government and its citizens, and could have continued and evolved for years to come.
The next chapter discusses the GULag returnees during Khrushchev's administration. It was only after Khurshchev's condemnation of the 'cult of personality' in 1956 that millions of those convicted and imprisoned under Stalin were exonerated. Cohen then covers how these former zeks were treated by Soviet society as well as their impact on Khrushchev's administration and the reforms of his era. Some died in tragic or lonely circumstances while others rose through the ranks of their respective professions. Cohen does point out that while no former prisoners acquired positions in the highest rungs of power, many became local leaders and were able to play a role in the future policies Khrushchev would become responsible for. This was also a time period which saw accusations by Khrushchev and his allies against the likes of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, who were soon expelled from the party. Many often wonder why there was no Soviet equivalent to the Nuremberg trials, this was probably as close as the Soviets came. Other initiatives were begun against former Communist party higher ups, but the problem is that Khrushchev himself had blood on his hands and if he began to seek out those responsible for the previous crimes of the Soviet state against its own population, most likely more people would have been imprisoned than were being rehabilitated and released.
The third chapter deals with "Soviet conservatism" and the figure of Yegor Ligachev. Undoubtedly conservatives in the US differ markedly from those in the Soviet Union but, as Cohen explains through the lens of Ligachev, they are not simply neo-Stalinists bent on terrorizing the Soviet population and hording power at the top. On the contrary, after examining Ligachev's history Cohen attempts to show that "Soviet conservatism" in this case signified a yearning to reform the Soviet Union and keep it in tact. This type of conservatism has to be understood vis-a-vis the policies Gorbachev implemented during the late 1980s. Men like Ligachev aimed to have Soviet policies improved upon not reinvented.
Building on the previous chapter the fourth chapter goes into detail about whether the Soviet system was reformable. Of course, following how Cohen views NEP, the answer is that he believes it was. Today many in the west, with exaggerated egos, believe that the Soviet system was doomed to failure, even though none predicted its end. If a nation like America can exploit the system of slavery for centuries and then turn around and champion their emancipation followed a century later by the civil rights movement, why is it that the USSR, and Russia in general, is forced to carry the stigma of an empire beyond redemption? On the contrary, from the early years of the revolution the Soviet state modified itself to suit the needs of its government, ideology, and population. From creating war communism, to NEP, to five year plans, the destruction of Stalin's 'cult of personality' together with Khrushchev's reforms, a movement of what some label 'neo-Stalinism' under Brezhnev, to a reform minded Gorbachev who instituted Glasnost and Peterstroika, considered by some to have been the most 'democratic' period of recent history. Are these the actions of an unreformable empire?
Chapter five works off the previous chapter and takes on the fate of the Soviet Union, specifically, 'Why did it end?' While there are many figures one can point to, I believe Cohen is quite candid in placing his blame on the shoulders of Yeltsin and perhaps to a lesser degree on Gorbachev. While Gorbachev seems to come out as partly realistic and idealistic in his outlook, Yelstin was simply a man bent on acquiring power, no matter who he had to go through, lie to, or manipulate. An interesting argument is made regarding Gorbachev's reforms and their 'destabilizing' of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, his reforms were not meant to stabilize a system that was not working, rather they were supposed to destabilize it and propel it forward via new initiatives and policies. Evens so, it was Gorbachev's "promarket policies" that initiated the rapid grab for assets, in both legal and illegal means, through which today's Russian oligarchs were created. Yeltsin eventually used these same oligarchs, and they him, in helping curb democratic principles throughout the 1990s. Personally, I viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as inevitable, there just seemed to have been so much going wrong all at once. Specifically, I saw nationalism as playing a large, if not the largest, role. Cohen, however, argues to the contrary. The demonstrations and protests by various ethnicities, which many quickly attribute to ideas of self-determination or "nationalist revolution-from-below" were in fact organized to redress grievances "within the framework of the Union" or directed against other ethnicities, but not that of the USSR. The rest of the chapter deals with all the other usual suspects in the collapse of the USSR (economy, reforms, etc) and Cohen puts them into a coherent and understandable context which has made me rethink what happened and what an alternative might consist of.
The next chapter goes into the legacies of Gorbachev. While he failed in his reforms, obviously he was not aiming at the dissolution of the USSR but rather an improvement on the model before him, what came after under Boris Yeltsin was another step in the wrong direction. Cohen adheres to the idea that it was Gorbachev rather than Yeltsin who ushered in democracy, contrary to what many specialists believe today. Cohen believes this "historical amnesia" was inspired by US ideology which after the breakup of the Soviet Union rewrote the history of the Cold War's end to include a "US Victory" rather than the agreed upon "end" between the two sides with no victors or losers. Throughout the 1990s Yeltsin began to use the oligarchs that Gorbachev's policies first created in cracking down on democratic liberties. The mass media began to be used for manipulation purposes which has continued to this day. Journalists reminisce about Gorbachev's reforms, a time when they were able to pry into Soviet history and spark debates about taboo topics, while during Yeltsin the public was kept in the dark about corruption, human rights abuses, and crime. For Cohen there is a real similarity between 1917 and 1991. In both instances small groups were ushered into power based on promises of "evolutionary progress" but in the end struggles over property and territory tore the nation apart and standing economic institutions were done away.
The last chapter, and by far the most interesting of this book, deals with who was/is responsible for the cooling of relations between the Russian Federation and America. In this case Cohen is not afraid to utilize the expression 'Cold War' to define the attitudes of the US and Russia toward each other, and, perhaps, in a way he is right. But Cohen is also not afraid to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of whom he thinks is in the wrong, Washington. From announcing to the US that the Cold War was won by the US in 1992 (by George H. W. Bush) to the failed policies under Clinton, which seem solely to have plunged Russia into an ever expanding economic hole and let NATO expand its influence to Russia's proverbial doorstep, to the presidency of the second Bush who moved away from arms treaties and provided new impetus for Russia to feel threatened and again seek to find friends among the likes of Iran, Venezuela, etc. Even with the current Obama administration many of those responsible for the initial policies and activities vis-a-vis Russia are still in place, including Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. The double standards and hypocrisy of the US government, mass media, and even academics is clearly laid out. Another opportunity lost for the US, especially at a time when Russia could have contributed greatly to many American initiatives, including the "war on terror." The largest problem, for Cohen, in how the US deals with Russia is that some parties seem to encourage a destabilization of the current regime. How helpful is that if Russia still possesses stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Not very. But apparently showing off a US with the ego and arrogance of a sole superpower means more to Washington's power elite than trying to help Russia and encourage a friendly, open, and reciprocal relationship that will undoubtedly pay off in the long run more so than antagonizing Putin and his country to the point of creating an atmosphere akin to a "cold war."
Saturday, May 30, 2009
War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars by Richard N. Haass
Much, in fact too much, has already been written about the latest war against Iraq (in this book, it is the "War of Choice"). Thus, there is little to be revealed in this book that has not been said or written about before. What is interesting, on the other hand, is the various contradictions that come through between what the author terms the "War of Necessity", that is the First Gulf War, and that of the invasion and "occupation/liberation" of Iraq which occurred most recently. The fact is the administration under the first Bush was hesitant to go to war and had to be convinced in numerous ways. And this after Saddam Hussein annexed a sovereign nation, something few thought he would actually do. This was followed up with a UN backing and half a million troops in the Gulf before any military activity even began. What happened most recently? Threats of Saddam Hussein having "WMDs", which proved to have been false, a badly planned and managed after-action campaign on behalf of our government and troops (whom, in retrospect, can hardly be blamed since they are trained for war, not peacekeeping). All of this is related in various details with some interesting commentary about various personalities the author dealt with throughout both Bush administrations. I was interested in his explanation for why during the first Bush presidency Cheney could say that the US was not interested in 'regime change' but during the recent war changed his mind. According to the author it was the atmosphere of the administration which dictated what Cheney could say and follow through with, both publicly and privately. Makes sense in retrospect, we all act differently depending on the situation and company we find ourselves among. Obviously this does not change the fact that he was wrong, horribly wrong, and much of what occurred in the aftermath of 9/11 (both in domestic policy and foreign) is the fault of the second Bush administration which did an immense amount of damage to this country's reputation as well as its economic and political state. Much of what the author conveys has a ring of truth, but I'm sure there is some self service here and there as well, so I'd take it with a grain of salt. Otherwise an interesting text and comparison between the first Iraq War, that of necessity, and the second, that of choice, which cost this country thousands of lives, hundreds of billions of dollars, time and attention we'll never get back, and whose affects we'll feel for years, if not decades, to come (and this does not include all the turmoil the Middle East has experienced as a result).
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1416549021/ref=cm_cr_thx_view
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1416549021/ref=cm_cr_thx_view
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
The Brusilov Offensive by Timothy Dowling
To begin, I am in complete agreement with the author that the Eastern Front of WWI, for the most part, is simply missing from English literature. While we have an abundance of studies about the Western Front, from all sides, the Russian experience in WWI is relatively unknown. And this is a nation that went to war with the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires. It's true enough that the Russian officer Corps was a hindrance to the army, but due to the casualties the officer corps sustained throughout the first year of war many of the new officers rose from the ranks or were composed of non-nobles. This in and of itself spelled a change for Russia in the grand scheme of things and goes a long way to explain why so many units eventually allied with the Bolsheviks, or other revolutionary parties, during the Revolution.
The most interesting section of the book was the titled Brusilov Offensive and the eventual role Romania's entry into the war plays. I had heard of this successful offensive before but what it could have accomplished did not register with me until I read through this book. Although in all honesty Brusilov's plan was simply to attack and give the Habsburg empire as many casualties as he could, what his offensive could have accomplished in more idealistic terms, which the author outlines later in the text, had never crossed my mind. I won't lie, a large part of the book is units attacking, retreating, defending, etc. So many units that you'll undoubtedly lose track of many of them. I also couldn't understand why the author regularly referred to the area of Bukovina as "the Bukovina" rather than simply Bukovina, which is how I have always seen it in written. But, aside from these two caveats, one of which you'll deal with in any military history of WWI, the research was impressive as was the atmosphere (usually frustration at the ignorance and ineptitude of one general or another) the author was able to create. There is some context describing how this offensive affected the mood of the Army (casualties were not small and the gains were limited compared to what they could have been) but I hoped for more context when dealing with how the Army treated the Bolshevik-agitators it eventually had to deal with, etc. In the end this work represents a fine addition to WWI literature and the Eastern Front of the First World War.
http://www.amazon.com/Brusilov-Offensive-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253351308/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
The most interesting section of the book was the titled Brusilov Offensive and the eventual role Romania's entry into the war plays. I had heard of this successful offensive before but what it could have accomplished did not register with me until I read through this book. Although in all honesty Brusilov's plan was simply to attack and give the Habsburg empire as many casualties as he could, what his offensive could have accomplished in more idealistic terms, which the author outlines later in the text, had never crossed my mind. I won't lie, a large part of the book is units attacking, retreating, defending, etc. So many units that you'll undoubtedly lose track of many of them. I also couldn't understand why the author regularly referred to the area of Bukovina as "the Bukovina" rather than simply Bukovina, which is how I have always seen it in written. But, aside from these two caveats, one of which you'll deal with in any military history of WWI, the research was impressive as was the atmosphere (usually frustration at the ignorance and ineptitude of one general or another) the author was able to create. There is some context describing how this offensive affected the mood of the Army (casualties were not small and the gains were limited compared to what they could have been) but I hoped for more context when dealing with how the Army treated the Bolshevik-agitators it eventually had to deal with, etc. In the end this work represents a fine addition to WWI literature and the Eastern Front of the First World War.
http://www.amazon.com/Brusilov-Offensive-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253351308/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
Sunday, May 24, 2009
To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House
Glantz, a veritable book producing factory, has definitely set a new standard in literature on Stalingrad. This book, the first of three, follows the Wehrmacht after the Moscow-Counter offensive of 1941/1942 through the Soviet Kharkov offensive and into Operation Blau. In doing so Glantz aims to establish three facts that have been glossed over in general histories of both the Eastern Front and the battle for Stalingrad specifically: Soviet forces did not simply retreat when confronted with Army Groups South, and after Army Groups A and B, to take the fight to Stalingrad, as if pre-planned; STAVKA did not abandon the Donbas region to preserve its forces; and the Red Army soldiers that the Sixth army finally met inside Stalingrad were not the same troops who retreated throughout the summer and finally decided, or were forced, to stand and fight. In reality the Red Army put up resistance to German advances from day one. Glantz takes the time to go through many of these operations and point out exactly how much damage Soviet troops were able to inflict on the Wehrmacht and why the Germans were still able to overcome forces that more often than not outnumbered them in either men, artillery, or armor, and sometimes in all three categories. Of personal interest to myself was the chapter on Army Group A's incursion into the Caucasus region. This is an entire campaign long ignored due to the limelight Stalingrad encompasses.
In the end it seems the Red Army was still committing mistakes they should have learned from in 1941; piecemeal attacks by mechanized and tank forces, lack of command and control in the field, failure to institute combined arms operations utilizing artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and the air force, etc. The Germans, however, are also guilty in that they once more overestimated their abilities and underestimated that of the Red Army. The final result is a detailed and highly needed study that not only provides context to the eventual clash that occurred in Stalingrad, but also highlights the actions that led up to the battle and the many battles, and even campaigns, that have gone long ignored due to Stalingrad's ever growing shadow.
http://www.amazon.com/Gates-Stalingrad-Soviet-German-Operations-April-August/dp/0700616306/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
In the end it seems the Red Army was still committing mistakes they should have learned from in 1941; piecemeal attacks by mechanized and tank forces, lack of command and control in the field, failure to institute combined arms operations utilizing artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and the air force, etc. The Germans, however, are also guilty in that they once more overestimated their abilities and underestimated that of the Red Army. The final result is a detailed and highly needed study that not only provides context to the eventual clash that occurred in Stalingrad, but also highlights the actions that led up to the battle and the many battles, and even campaigns, that have gone long ignored due to Stalingrad's ever growing shadow.
http://www.amazon.com/Gates-Stalingrad-Soviet-German-Operations-April-August/dp/0700616306/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
Thursday, May 21, 2009
The Chief Culprit by Viktor Suvorov
It doesn't surprise me to see all the five star reviews on amazon; ignorance and conspiracy theories usually deliver what readers are inclined to agree with when a factual foundation is missing. Viktor Suvorov, AKA Rezun, is a spy and traitor. Those who want to conceive of him as anything else are free to do so, but both those titles are a part of his history and who he is. The author is a self-proclaimed 'intelligence operative' and not an historian, which should already mean something to those who think this account comes anywhere close to historical discourse. This is also not someone who ever had access to Soviet/Russian archives. He claims to have seen German documents in Podolsk, but claiming so and proving it are two different things. This book is a combination of "ideas" taken out of a dozen or so of Suvorov's other works. There is a reason the majority of his books were never translated, they are worthless. The man is smart, but his grasp of history is fickle, whether he does this on purpose or actually believes in his own lies is a question I cannot answer. And I have to say, overall, this book was painful to read. Not solely because I know of his lies, but mainly because of how he tries to bring things that have nothing in common together. In reading this book I find it interesting that no one noticed how many sides Suvorov caters to. For Germany he provides an acquittal to Barbarossa, Stalin was readying for war, they had a right to defend themselves. He appeases Russians by blaming everything on Stalin, the Soviet Union was strong, the Red Army the greatest, but Stalin forgot who to trust and not to trust. And he appeases Stalinists by describing how smart and ruthless Stalin was, hence his bashing of figures like Mikhail Tukhachevsky and his cheerleading for Stalinist purges.
This is a book built on fallacies, straw men, twisted facts, omitted context, and baseless theories delivered in the form of a kindergarten lecture. Starting with his introduction, a standard is set that Suvorov adheres to in the rest of his text. On pg. xix the author mentions how the Soviet Union contained two field armies in June of 1939 neither of which were deployed in the "European part of the Soviet Union", for a moment we will give him the benefit of the doubt (since no sources or citations are listed). He also claims that by June 1941 there were twenty-six field armies deployed in the European 'part of the country' (in reality there were about 21, two of which were only on paper and without any troops, source is Боевой Состав Советской Армии). The end result is the question of if Stalin trusted Hitler why did he deploy so many troops against him. Well, to begin, in June of 1939 Stalin did not share a border with Hitler. By June of 1941 the Soviet Union had also been involved in a few wars/invasions, that is the Winter War, war with Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol, the invasion of Eastern Poland, and the occupation of the Baltics and Bessarabia and Bukovina. All of this context is forgotten about. Lastly, while Stalin might have trusted in the non-aggression pact, that is not Hitler per se, but a beneficial pact to both countries, he was not stupid and understood that war was on the horizon.
Now, on pg. xxii we're presented with the idea that since Zhukov and Vasilevsky wrote up a pre-emptive strike against Germany, they were awarded the rank of Marshal two years later. There is no correlation between one and the other aside from in the author's mind, fallacy doesn't even begin to cover the kind of ignorance being pandered here. Yet these kinds of out-of-context conclusions are the type of evidence you should be prepared to believe in, since that's all he'll give you. Leaving out context once more he describes the leaders of the Communist Party as all having aliases, which they did, hinting that they took those aliases because of their criminal pasts. He of course leaves out the fact that Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev most likely undertook aliases to hide their Jewish identities which they no longer identified with.
What Suvorov is also keen to do is make up situations, create straw men, and then knock them down all the while casting blame on various figures. He blames Trotsky and Lenin for 'demolishing the Russian army' and claims that Germany's position was 'completely hopeless' leaving out the fact that Germany proper had yet to be invaded and it was the French army that was collapsing, as well as the Russian army which simply could do nothing more of substance after the casualties from Brusilov's offensive. What evidence does he give you? None, aside from "Russia was allied with the mighty French and British colonial empires", empires that would have been defeated on mainland Europe if not for Russia's advances against Germany in 1914 and the destruction of two Russian armies at Tannenberg. But, once more, are the conclusions you, the reader, have to accept without question. Simulatenously he blames Lenin and Trotsky once again on the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, forgetting that German forces were forging into Russian territory practically unopposed and it was a sacrifice Lenin was willing to make since he believed in a future world revolution which would return the territory to Russia. This is actually evident in the book itself, pg. 28, when he quotes Zinoviev saying that peace will be temporary and that peace with Germany will only be 'episodic'. Unfortunately this is solely a quote that starts the chapter, not something Suvorov would go into detail about, since it would prove counterproductive to his underlying lies. Suvorov also forgets that one of the reasons the Bolsheviks were able to seize power was thanks to their platform of being against the war, one of the main reasons Alexander Kerensky's government did not last. Will you read about any of this here? No, because this man is not an historian, nor does he know much about the subject matter he dictates to you, the reader.
When discussing the treaty of Rapallo, which he never names (go figure), he describes how Stalin apparently "prepared Germany for a second world war." He forgets that Stalin was not in a position to dictate such actions in the early 1920s, he also omits how much the Soviets received from the Germans through their officer exchange programs, etc. (see " The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922-33, and Paved the Way for Fascism" although most of the militarization really took part after Hitler came to power).
On pg. 20 Suvorov claims Stalin 'presented Hitler with Poland, and the rest of Europe.' Really? What happened to the fact that Stalin wanted to ally with England and France against Hitler? What happened to Stalin wanting to send the Red Army to help protect Czechoslovakia before England and France gave it away at Munich? You won't find that information here, rather, Stalin 'presented' Hitler with Poland, sure thing.
The chapter on "Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation" is greatly lacking. The Soviet Union, after the purges of the Red Army, convinced itself through propaganda that any attack would be easily repulsed and the war would be taken to the enemy. Hence there was no need for a strategic air force, rather one that supported the Red Army operationally and tactically. Hence the IL-2 and the PE-2 rather than ineffective mass strategic bomber strikes which from a large altitude did less damage than they were worth. The reason Soviet pilots were no match for their German counterparts? They weren't taught to dogfight. Proof? None. Once more context is forgotten when speaking of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. Yes, they were excellent designs and proved their worth in battle. But, the Germans still succeeded in destroying or capturing the majority of them throughout 1941 for a variety of reasons, not exactly proof of a country preparing to go to war with battle-tested weapons and crews. It isn't only the tank design that needs to be studied but in what atmosphere they operated in. The chaotic days of June/July 1941 were not representative of an armed force readying for war, rather a surprised Red Army scrambling for its life.
Suvorov also claims that BT tanks were to be used as an 'offensive' tank along the enemy's road system, aka autobahn. Problem is, BT tanks were built in the early 1930s, before the creation of the autobahn. In general, little is said of the design history of any tank and the problems they encountered, only that they were 'the best in the world.' Suvorov's biggest problem is that he thinks defensive actions on the part of an armed force consist solely of defensive actions. Counter-attacks and offensives are a moot point for him, this master strategist, who apparently has no idea of what defensive warfare consists of. Thus, when speaking of paratroopers, he states that they can only be used on the offensive, OK, but that offensive action can be part of a defensive campaign.
Some of the nonsensical 'facts' Suvorov draws to the readers attention are an order issued by Tukhachevsky on June 23, 1921, then follows up with 'twenty years later, Russia would be invaded...' Really? Did this order of Tukhachevsky about how to handle 'bandits' predict the German invasion of the Soviet Union? If not, why is it mentioned? Stretching reality to fit his own twisted version of history, nothing more nothing less.
One of the worst chapters of this book is entitled 'The Cleansing' rather the the purge that actually took place. This chapter tries to claim that the Red Army purges were not as detrimental to the Red Army as many had assumed. True enough, the problem is the atmosphere that they left in their wake. Over 600 generals were arrested, those who took their place were new to their positions. One example, Kirponos, the commander of the Kiev Military District on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union commanded a division during the Winter War against Finland. He was a competent commander but totally out of his league as a military district, and soon front, commander. Independent thinking and actions were curbed, generals sought out orders and assurances of those orders before they could even begin to think or act. Once again, context is ignored, numbers are thrown around as if they are the answer to all your questions.
All of the above is found within the first 100 pages of this book. At times I have to say I have to force myself to continue to read such drivel. There is also plenty I've left out and which would require pages upon pages to document and put into a historical context. Hard to feel anything but pity and disgust at such a horrid work of fiction being passed off as history, even worse, accepted as the latter by a gullible public.
This is a book built on fallacies, straw men, twisted facts, omitted context, and baseless theories delivered in the form of a kindergarten lecture. Starting with his introduction, a standard is set that Suvorov adheres to in the rest of his text. On pg. xix the author mentions how the Soviet Union contained two field armies in June of 1939 neither of which were deployed in the "European part of the Soviet Union", for a moment we will give him the benefit of the doubt (since no sources or citations are listed). He also claims that by June 1941 there were twenty-six field armies deployed in the European 'part of the country' (in reality there were about 21, two of which were only on paper and without any troops, source is Боевой Состав Советской Армии). The end result is the question of if Stalin trusted Hitler why did he deploy so many troops against him. Well, to begin, in June of 1939 Stalin did not share a border with Hitler. By June of 1941 the Soviet Union had also been involved in a few wars/invasions, that is the Winter War, war with Japanese troops at Khalkhin Gol, the invasion of Eastern Poland, and the occupation of the Baltics and Bessarabia and Bukovina. All of this context is forgotten about. Lastly, while Stalin might have trusted in the non-aggression pact, that is not Hitler per se, but a beneficial pact to both countries, he was not stupid and understood that war was on the horizon.
Now, on pg. xxii we're presented with the idea that since Zhukov and Vasilevsky wrote up a pre-emptive strike against Germany, they were awarded the rank of Marshal two years later. There is no correlation between one and the other aside from in the author's mind, fallacy doesn't even begin to cover the kind of ignorance being pandered here. Yet these kinds of out-of-context conclusions are the type of evidence you should be prepared to believe in, since that's all he'll give you. Leaving out context once more he describes the leaders of the Communist Party as all having aliases, which they did, hinting that they took those aliases because of their criminal pasts. He of course leaves out the fact that Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev most likely undertook aliases to hide their Jewish identities which they no longer identified with.
What Suvorov is also keen to do is make up situations, create straw men, and then knock them down all the while casting blame on various figures. He blames Trotsky and Lenin for 'demolishing the Russian army' and claims that Germany's position was 'completely hopeless' leaving out the fact that Germany proper had yet to be invaded and it was the French army that was collapsing, as well as the Russian army which simply could do nothing more of substance after the casualties from Brusilov's offensive. What evidence does he give you? None, aside from "Russia was allied with the mighty French and British colonial empires", empires that would have been defeated on mainland Europe if not for Russia's advances against Germany in 1914 and the destruction of two Russian armies at Tannenberg. But, once more, are the conclusions you, the reader, have to accept without question. Simulatenously he blames Lenin and Trotsky once again on the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, forgetting that German forces were forging into Russian territory practically unopposed and it was a sacrifice Lenin was willing to make since he believed in a future world revolution which would return the territory to Russia. This is actually evident in the book itself, pg. 28, when he quotes Zinoviev saying that peace will be temporary and that peace with Germany will only be 'episodic'. Unfortunately this is solely a quote that starts the chapter, not something Suvorov would go into detail about, since it would prove counterproductive to his underlying lies. Suvorov also forgets that one of the reasons the Bolsheviks were able to seize power was thanks to their platform of being against the war, one of the main reasons Alexander Kerensky's government did not last. Will you read about any of this here? No, because this man is not an historian, nor does he know much about the subject matter he dictates to you, the reader.
When discussing the treaty of Rapallo, which he never names (go figure), he describes how Stalin apparently "prepared Germany for a second world war." He forgets that Stalin was not in a position to dictate such actions in the early 1920s, he also omits how much the Soviets received from the Germans through their officer exchange programs, etc. (see " The Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets Militarized Germany, 1922-33, and Paved the Way for Fascism" although most of the militarization really took part after Hitler came to power).
On pg. 20 Suvorov claims Stalin 'presented Hitler with Poland, and the rest of Europe.' Really? What happened to the fact that Stalin wanted to ally with England and France against Hitler? What happened to Stalin wanting to send the Red Army to help protect Czechoslovakia before England and France gave it away at Munich? You won't find that information here, rather, Stalin 'presented' Hitler with Poland, sure thing.
The chapter on "Stalin and the Destruction of Soviet Strategic Aviation" is greatly lacking. The Soviet Union, after the purges of the Red Army, convinced itself through propaganda that any attack would be easily repulsed and the war would be taken to the enemy. Hence there was no need for a strategic air force, rather one that supported the Red Army operationally and tactically. Hence the IL-2 and the PE-2 rather than ineffective mass strategic bomber strikes which from a large altitude did less damage than they were worth. The reason Soviet pilots were no match for their German counterparts? They weren't taught to dogfight. Proof? None. Once more context is forgotten when speaking of Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. Yes, they were excellent designs and proved their worth in battle. But, the Germans still succeeded in destroying or capturing the majority of them throughout 1941 for a variety of reasons, not exactly proof of a country preparing to go to war with battle-tested weapons and crews. It isn't only the tank design that needs to be studied but in what atmosphere they operated in. The chaotic days of June/July 1941 were not representative of an armed force readying for war, rather a surprised Red Army scrambling for its life.
Suvorov also claims that BT tanks were to be used as an 'offensive' tank along the enemy's road system, aka autobahn. Problem is, BT tanks were built in the early 1930s, before the creation of the autobahn. In general, little is said of the design history of any tank and the problems they encountered, only that they were 'the best in the world.' Suvorov's biggest problem is that he thinks defensive actions on the part of an armed force consist solely of defensive actions. Counter-attacks and offensives are a moot point for him, this master strategist, who apparently has no idea of what defensive warfare consists of. Thus, when speaking of paratroopers, he states that they can only be used on the offensive, OK, but that offensive action can be part of a defensive campaign.
Some of the nonsensical 'facts' Suvorov draws to the readers attention are an order issued by Tukhachevsky on June 23, 1921, then follows up with 'twenty years later, Russia would be invaded...' Really? Did this order of Tukhachevsky about how to handle 'bandits' predict the German invasion of the Soviet Union? If not, why is it mentioned? Stretching reality to fit his own twisted version of history, nothing more nothing less.
One of the worst chapters of this book is entitled 'The Cleansing' rather the the purge that actually took place. This chapter tries to claim that the Red Army purges were not as detrimental to the Red Army as many had assumed. True enough, the problem is the atmosphere that they left in their wake. Over 600 generals were arrested, those who took their place were new to their positions. One example, Kirponos, the commander of the Kiev Military District on the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union commanded a division during the Winter War against Finland. He was a competent commander but totally out of his league as a military district, and soon front, commander. Independent thinking and actions were curbed, generals sought out orders and assurances of those orders before they could even begin to think or act. Once again, context is ignored, numbers are thrown around as if they are the answer to all your questions.
All of the above is found within the first 100 pages of this book. At times I have to say I have to force myself to continue to read such drivel. There is also plenty I've left out and which would require pages upon pages to document and put into a historical context. Hard to feel anything but pity and disgust at such a horrid work of fiction being passed off as history, even worse, accepted as the latter by a gullible public.
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Soviet Veterans of World War II: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941-1991 by Mark Edele
We easily forget that after the war is over the soldiers who fought it do not simply disappear into the night nor are they flawlessly incorporated into society. Mark Edele, in this new work on Soviet veterans of the Second World, goes through what these men and women endured from demobilization, trying to configure to the norms of society, on into the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and through perestroika with Gorbachev and beyond. Since I have had an interest in the plight of these men and women of whom we hear so little after the war, especially those who were invalids and who returned as former POWs, I found this text a great benefit to the history of the Red Army and the Soviet Union in general. Additionally, since many myths today prevail about what happened to former POWs, I am happy to say the author gives the relevant numbers for what happened to them and what many went through trying to incorporate themselves into everyday life that did not include a POW camp or a field of battle. Lastly, I found embedded throughout the text a fascinating discussion of veterans as a distinct group, as well as the reasons for why the Soviet government did not give them that right until decades after the war.
The book is separated into three sections, the first section, made up of the introduction and three chapters, is entitled "Reintegration." It introduces the topic for the reader, goes into the process of how soldiers traveled back into the Soviet Union from parts of central and eastern Europe, followed by how they were welcomed home, and lastly their transition into civilian life. From these first few chapters I saw that the author had at the heart of this text an objective view of the events in question. Soviet veterans went through a lot of different situations: heading home in trains cars with limit comforts or amenities, at times ridding on the roofs of trains, hitching rides home wherever and from whomever they could find. Considering how many veterans were being discharged and how many civilians were being repatriated some of this should not come as a shock. But then again, veterans hoped that a country for whom they bleed and gave their years of youth would respond in kind. Their welcome by the population and integration into society took on many forms. Some found jobs quickly enough with the government help or, more readily, from help of friends and family, while others suffered as they might have been invalids without a skill set while government bureaucracy dragged its feet in trying to help them.
The second section, for me the most interesting of the book, is entitled "Victors and Victims" and highlights war invalids, returning POWs, and how veterans as a whole were treated by the population as they entered schools, the party apparatus, or various jobs. What happened to Soviet war invalids is one of the most depressing stories I've come across; although in this text that story is limited to mainly the facts, which are interesting in and of themselves. Some went on to led criminal gangs while others adjusted to civilian life. Some became professional beggars and when orders came down to rid big cities of "anti-social parasitic elements" war invalids might have been included in this category and were swept away from city streets to other destinations. Some POWs, after going through filtration camps and interrogations by various NKVD/MVD agencies, carried a stigma with them for decades to come which precluded them from attaining work, and when they could, from keeping it. Even into the 1980s there were those who wanted to treat POWs who gave up without being severely wounded or knocked unconscious as a separate category from those who fell into captivity in a state beyond their control. What I thought the author ignored in regard to repatriated POWs was the fact that there were many who did join the Germans of their own volition, in a capacity that was detrimental to the Soviet war effort. Not much stress was put on this point, perhaps it was because the author wanted to remain above the politics of it all and continue in an objective light, but I feel this limits the context the author is operating in.
The last section deals with veteran organizations and veterans as an entitlement community. It was interesting to see how they congregated and petitioned for rights and benefits, who joined them (Zhukov, among others) and who opposed them and why (mainly economic reasons). In the end what the Soviet Union planned for its war heroes did not come to fruition, for many reasons. While those demobilized during the first two years after war ended received some benefits, many who followed did not and there was little they could do aside from trying to integrate themselves into civilian life.
Available on Amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199237565/ref=cm_cr_rev_prod_title
The book is separated into three sections, the first section, made up of the introduction and three chapters, is entitled "Reintegration." It introduces the topic for the reader, goes into the process of how soldiers traveled back into the Soviet Union from parts of central and eastern Europe, followed by how they were welcomed home, and lastly their transition into civilian life. From these first few chapters I saw that the author had at the heart of this text an objective view of the events in question. Soviet veterans went through a lot of different situations: heading home in trains cars with limit comforts or amenities, at times ridding on the roofs of trains, hitching rides home wherever and from whomever they could find. Considering how many veterans were being discharged and how many civilians were being repatriated some of this should not come as a shock. But then again, veterans hoped that a country for whom they bleed and gave their years of youth would respond in kind. Their welcome by the population and integration into society took on many forms. Some found jobs quickly enough with the government help or, more readily, from help of friends and family, while others suffered as they might have been invalids without a skill set while government bureaucracy dragged its feet in trying to help them.
The second section, for me the most interesting of the book, is entitled "Victors and Victims" and highlights war invalids, returning POWs, and how veterans as a whole were treated by the population as they entered schools, the party apparatus, or various jobs. What happened to Soviet war invalids is one of the most depressing stories I've come across; although in this text that story is limited to mainly the facts, which are interesting in and of themselves. Some went on to led criminal gangs while others adjusted to civilian life. Some became professional beggars and when orders came down to rid big cities of "anti-social parasitic elements" war invalids might have been included in this category and were swept away from city streets to other destinations. Some POWs, after going through filtration camps and interrogations by various NKVD/MVD agencies, carried a stigma with them for decades to come which precluded them from attaining work, and when they could, from keeping it. Even into the 1980s there were those who wanted to treat POWs who gave up without being severely wounded or knocked unconscious as a separate category from those who fell into captivity in a state beyond their control. What I thought the author ignored in regard to repatriated POWs was the fact that there were many who did join the Germans of their own volition, in a capacity that was detrimental to the Soviet war effort. Not much stress was put on this point, perhaps it was because the author wanted to remain above the politics of it all and continue in an objective light, but I feel this limits the context the author is operating in.
The last section deals with veteran organizations and veterans as an entitlement community. It was interesting to see how they congregated and petitioned for rights and benefits, who joined them (Zhukov, among others) and who opposed them and why (mainly economic reasons). In the end what the Soviet Union planned for its war heroes did not come to fruition, for many reasons. While those demobilized during the first two years after war ended received some benefits, many who followed did not and there was little they could do aside from trying to integrate themselves into civilian life.
Available on Amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0199237565/ref=cm_cr_rev_prod_title
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