The Battle of Kursk has seen more than its fair share of myths but more than half a century later there is still room for a study that takes into account sources, both primary and secondary, from both sides. Sadly, this is not the case with this book. The bibliography is very limited and there are NO footnotes/endnotes. I cannot tell if this was decided on by the publisher or the author, but this is simply unacceptable and truthfully makes this book almost worthless as a source (not to mention that it takes the work done by others and omits the credit they are due). The two 'original' takes offered up in the book are not very original to begin with, both can be traced, and are, to the works by Steven Newton and Niklas Zetterling (Kursk: The German View and Kursk: A Statistical Analysis, respectively). Specifically, the author questions the Soviet interpretation of why Hoth moved his forces toward Prokhorovka rather than Oboyan and how many tanks were actually lost at Prokhorovka. The answers can be found in the aforementioned volumes (the author names and quotes Newton to give specifics for the former assertion). Also, the idea that Hoth, before the Kursk battle began, wanted to move toward Prokhorovka is also discussed in Russian literature today.
Overall the volume is interesting but lacking in numerous ways. The author's style is repetitive, as if each chapter (and there are close to 50 of them) was written on its own, thus overlapping with information from other chapters or when the author really wants to make a point. For instance, the move toward Prokhorovka rather than Oboyan is discussed in the beginning chapters and then has an entire chapter devoted to it later on in the book. I read and understood it the first time, I do not need it repeated ad nauseum. Aside from the repeating there is the ever present imagery the author is trying to draw. I do not care how the sun looked in the sky on the morning of July 5th, 6th, or 7th. I do not need to know how the clouds bunched together to produce precipitation or how rockets from both sides criss-crossed in the sky with their respective smoke trails. Get to the point.
There are countless grammatical errors throughout the book, sloppy editing to say the least. A single name is spelled two different ways within the same paragraph, we have "Rukosuyev" and then not 3 sentences later "Rokuseyev." And yes, he is talking about the same commander of the 3rd Anti-Tank Artillery brigade (p. 285). Bad spelling also rears its head when the reader is presented with an artistic rendering of a T-34 which supposedly has "Lenin" written on the side of the turret in Cyrillic. Sadly, the author of the rendering has spelled out "Lenim." A claim is made that two Red Army Mechanized Brigades were made up of 250 tanks (p. 234), that seems like overkill since some Red Army Tank/Mechanized corps in their whole (that is 3 brigades of tanks/mechanized forces) usually contained less than 250 tanks. At least one assertion I found untenable: "The surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May had resulted in greater losses than at Stalingrad" (p. 368). Yes, more POWs were captured, but this of course overlooks how many Germans, and other axis forces, died getting to Stalingrad, trying to take Stalingrad, and trying to keep it. It also makes the case that the author considers Italian soldiers on par with German troops, as the majority of those surrendering in Tunisia were Italian, not German. Not a credible statement in the least. The author is also keen on repeating Cold War era propaganda as evidenced by the following: "Punishment battalions, the use of charging infantry to 'clear' minefields, the continuing policy of identifying retreat with treason, and the coercive presence of NKVD security units stationed in the rear to 'encourage' the front line troops to fight well..."(p. 104) Aside from these statements being wholly generalized and lacking context some of them are simply wrong. Thus, in general, the Red Army is underrepresented nor are the plethora of sources that have come out from Russia in the past few years (at least 5 volumes on Kursk) analyzed. Undoubtedly the author lacks Russian which is why this entire text is simply a repeat of what has already been written on the subject for an English speaking audience.
Lastly, while the Kursk 'eipic' is told well enough, the above (and what follows) is enough to reduce the work to 3 stars, perhaps 3 and a half at best. I found it quite helpful to have, every now and then, the numbers of tanks on hand and those in need of long/short term repair. It helps to explain why at times Soviet claims are so exaggerated. While some Soviet claims are simply propaganda meant for the population, at other times it becomes understandable why Tiger tanks are constantly being encountered, along with Panthers and Ferdinands. While at times Pz. IVs and StuGs could be confused for the former (Tiger and Ferdinand respectively), the regular appearance of repaired Tigers, Panthers and Ferdinands when they were knocked out just a day or two ago can easily lead to over-counting. At times there were only 3 Tigers, out of some two or so dozen, left within a unit. The next day the number would jump to 20. Sadly, no one took the time to explain this to Red Army soldiers who counted a knocked-out or disabled tank as such. Simultaneously, I found it quite annoying to be told that the Germans lost only 17 tanks at Prokhorovka but yet the Red Army, losing some 600, still retained their positions. Really? If the Germans continued with the supposed 200+ tanks at their disposal just on the Prokhorovka sector then what kept them from advancing? The problem here, it would seem, is that many of the German tank counts day in and day out are dependent on tanks coming out of long/short term repair, meaning that the real losses, be they total write offs or those lost for the moment, cannot be accurately gauged as tank stocks are regularly replenished each new day by those coming out of repair. Hence, the author asserts that on July 13, the day after the Prokhorovka battle, divisional returns totaled 251 tanks and assault guns for the SS Panzer Corps, a difference of 43 machines from the total of 294 which were available on July 12 (the numbers given for the 3 SS divisions are 70, 103, and 121 tanks and assault guns). First off, a tank out of action is one that's not going to be taking part in combat thus there is a real difference between 17 and 43. Secondly, from those 251 tanks and assault guns we are not told if any came from repair; if they did, then the number 43 would go up. Considering newly repaired tanks were regularly being delivered this is something I'd like to see taken into consideration. Somehow the Germans seem to be the only ones for whom we count 'write offs' as the only losses they endured. More so, we have the claim that Totenkopf could deploy 121 machines on July 12, but the next day the division was fielding 54 serviceable tanks and 20 or so Assault guns, what happened to 43 less tanks for all 3 SS divisions? The Liebstandarte on the next day was said to have "fallen" to a strength of "just 50 panzers and 20 Assault Guns" how can it fall to that strength if that's what it started out with on July 12?! Supposedly, it is on July 13 that Rotmistrov, commander of the remnants of 5th Tank Army, halts both the Liebstandarte and Totenkopf in their tracks with the remainder of what was his 800+ tank armada. Interesting, he couldn't do it with 850 tanks, but with some 150-200, it's not a problem. Right, thanks but no thanks. I'll be waiting for the next volume that demolishes some more 'Kursk Myths.'
Thursday, July 30, 2009
Monday, July 13, 2009
500 Days: The War in Eastern Europe, 1944-1945 by Sean M. McAteer
As described, this book covers the last year and a half, give or take, of the war on the Eastern Front. It is true that this period of activities is greatly lacking literary coverage when compared to the the battles throughout 1941: the Moscow Counter-Offensive, the battle for Stalingrad, 1942, and Kursk, summer of 1943. I can only commend the author for trying to put together a text that deals with 1944 and 1945, and more so, from both sides. But in the end, too many Cold War myths are propagated and his narrative, in general, is lacking. Perhaps a step in the right direction for those new to the topic and who have an interest in some of the details that the author highlights, but the reader would do well to remember that this is a dated analysis with dated commentary. While the author would probably like to think of himself as an 'objective historian,' in this case that is certainly not true.
This is not an academic work and thus the bibliography and the endnotes are not up to academic standards. This then greatly takes away from trying to figure out where certain information is coming from, aside from this, much of the information offered does not even come with endnotes. For example, the small section of Slavic and Germanic history is interesting, but contains no endnotes. The sources themselves are lacking. There is a large dearth of materials, from both English and Russian sources, that have been released in the past two decades and rely on formerly closed Soviet archival data (the battle of Berlin, for instance, has been documented in great detail by Alexei Isaev in his "Berlin 45-vo"). Many, at times too many, sources are from the cold war era and are outdated today. It seems this book was begun in the mid to late 1980s and, for the most part, stayed glued to the sources of that time period (aside from a few ventures into later publications like Glantz's recent book dealing with the failed first Red Army offensive into the Balkans and Beevor's ever-controversial book on the Battle for Berlin). There are also no maps in this text, which massively takes away from trying to keep up with the narrative.
Aside from the errors and typos the author himself has commented on (not very sporting to give yourself a five star review), the reader will find quite a few more throughout the text. For instance, on p. 121 the author writes, in regards to the 4th Ukrainian front, at the moment it opposed German forces in the Crimea, as having "11 rifle divisions and a reinforced tank corps, 328,000 men" in reality the 4th Ukrainian Front contained 18 rifle divisions on the first of April 1944. Sapun hill is called 'Samun hill' (p. 126 and 127). Lev Mekhlis is transformed into Levrentti Mekhlis. Aside from listing the various tanks operating in the Red Army the author also makes mention of 'assault guns' and 'self-propelled artillery' (p. 7), within the Red Army they were one and the same, specifically, self-propelled artillery. The author also manages to misspell both Pokryshkin and Kozhedub (Pokryshin and Kojedub respectively, although the j in Kozhedub might be forgiven if the original source was German (p. 29)). Novorossysk becomes Novorissyk (p.30). Page 68 Fedyuninsky's name is misspelled as Fedyunsky. On p. 81 the author claims Malinovsky commanded a 'border guard corps.' I've personally never seen such a reference. Border guards were NKVD commanded units, Army formations close to the border were not known as 'border guard' units.
General statements abound in this book, for instance, the statement 'Despite the awful German occupation policies, it remains that internal repression resulted in more deaths among the Soviet population' is presented and linked to a few works in the bibliography, but no numbers are provided nor are specific pages where one can see or even compare the information the author is working with. A huge exaggeration is located on p. 45 when the author claims the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 killed a 'quarter' of the population. The author gives too much credit to the German campaign against Tukhachevsky, especially since to date there is no evidence that German planted documents were even used against Tukhachevsky (how can one take seriously an espionage charge against Tukhachevsky, specifically that he is working for the Germans, when they themselves are giving him up to Stalin?). When listing 'anti-Russian minorities' the author deems fit to include Belorussians and Armenians, not exactly anti-Russian from what I can remember. As mentioned above, Cold War era propaganda enters the picture as well, the description of 'punishment battalions' encompasses the following '...unarmed first wave assault units who would be loaded with vodka before death-charging the enemy lines' (p. 5). I'd recommend the author read "Penalty Strike" by Alexander Pyl'cyn to learn what penal formations were like (there are also a number of works in Russian, half a dozen, by those in Penal formations and outlining the history of penal formations). Page 21 mentions that 'reserve security troops' had 'instructions to shoot down their own men if running', a bit of an ambiguous statement. Blocking detachments were created in order to gather those who initiated in an unauthorized retreat and, depending on the situation, to send them back to their respective units or, in severe cases, send them to penal formations or execute them (the majority were returned to their units). The author also harks back to battles in 1941 as being composed of Red Army riflemen 'link arms and charge across fields of death, shouting and cheering as they were cut down, row by row" (p. 381).
Quite a bit of literary license is taken throughout the text, for example, on p. 81 we're detailed the fate of Major-General Khomenko, commander of the 44th Army, who after accidentally driving into German positions and being killed by German fire was then used by the Germans in a propaganda ploy which claimed he defected to their side. The author claims "Stalin, in a flash of uncalculating rage' disbanded the 44th army when he heard of the 'desertion.' In fact, at least one source points out that Khomenko was traveling with the details of the 44th Army's positions, so while his desertion might have played a role in some of the other commanders from the 44th army being reassigned, the disbanding of the army (which rarely happened by 1944) might have been the result of of the 44th army's positions falling into the hands of the Germans (see "Fallen Soviet Generals" by Maslov).
Initial coverage of Warsaw uprising is lacking, the author skips over too many details to make the point that Stalin 'wanted' the Home Army to perish in the streets of Warsaw. Later coverage of the Warsaw uprising is also lacking, the author would like to make clear that the efforts on the part of the 1st Polish army to cross the Vistula were conducted "contrary to STAVKA's wishes...without their knowledge, approval, or support" p. 242. The author would do well to familiarize himself with orders coming down to the 1st Belorussian front which forecast a beginning of operations on August 25th against Warsaw with the 1st Polish Army moving along the western bank of the Vistula with their right wing and center assigned the object of Warsaw itself (see "Myfi Velikoi Otechestvennoi 2", p. 196, the article by M. Meltukhov "V Avgusti 1944"). Sadly, nothing came of these plans due to the German counterattacks against the 1st Belorussian front that followed. The atrocities that took lace in Germany when the Red Army crossed the frontier are blown out of proportion, in my opinion. The author, once again, takes too many liberties with how he stylizes what happened without adequate research to serve as a foundation. There is also little, if any, mention of the executions and arrests that followed Red Army soldiers when they wantonly raped or pillaged, of which there are more than enough recorded instances.
Lastly, what I found oddly annoying is the author's constant aversion to so-called 'frontal assaults' by the Red Army. Even when they are trying to 'outflank' the Germans they are still attacking 'frontally', the two are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Also annoying is the author dictating what and how the Wehrmacht should have waged war while on the defense in the Balkans, reminiscent of German memoirs and their 'what if/if only' scenarios. In the end, I can't say I was impressed with the text. While there are a few interesting anecdotes and episodes that I'll be sure to remember (although many do not have a source behind them), the obvious lack of knowledge about current literature on the subject is a huge minus. There is nothing ground-breaking presented here, just a lot of secondary and primary (mainly memoirs, worse is that the author does not use the newly released memoirs of such figures as Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Rokossovsky, which have had much of what was then censored put back into their reminiscences) literature coming together. But a problem remains, said literature has been used in a variety of other monographs and narratives on the war as well.
This is not an academic work and thus the bibliography and the endnotes are not up to academic standards. This then greatly takes away from trying to figure out where certain information is coming from, aside from this, much of the information offered does not even come with endnotes. For example, the small section of Slavic and Germanic history is interesting, but contains no endnotes. The sources themselves are lacking. There is a large dearth of materials, from both English and Russian sources, that have been released in the past two decades and rely on formerly closed Soviet archival data (the battle of Berlin, for instance, has been documented in great detail by Alexei Isaev in his "Berlin 45-vo"). Many, at times too many, sources are from the cold war era and are outdated today. It seems this book was begun in the mid to late 1980s and, for the most part, stayed glued to the sources of that time period (aside from a few ventures into later publications like Glantz's recent book dealing with the failed first Red Army offensive into the Balkans and Beevor's ever-controversial book on the Battle for Berlin). There are also no maps in this text, which massively takes away from trying to keep up with the narrative.
Aside from the errors and typos the author himself has commented on (not very sporting to give yourself a five star review), the reader will find quite a few more throughout the text. For instance, on p. 121 the author writes, in regards to the 4th Ukrainian front, at the moment it opposed German forces in the Crimea, as having "11 rifle divisions and a reinforced tank corps, 328,000 men" in reality the 4th Ukrainian Front contained 18 rifle divisions on the first of April 1944. Sapun hill is called 'Samun hill' (p. 126 and 127). Lev Mekhlis is transformed into Levrentti Mekhlis. Aside from listing the various tanks operating in the Red Army the author also makes mention of 'assault guns' and 'self-propelled artillery' (p. 7), within the Red Army they were one and the same, specifically, self-propelled artillery. The author also manages to misspell both Pokryshkin and Kozhedub (Pokryshin and Kojedub respectively, although the j in Kozhedub might be forgiven if the original source was German (p. 29)). Novorossysk becomes Novorissyk (p.30). Page 68 Fedyuninsky's name is misspelled as Fedyunsky. On p. 81 the author claims Malinovsky commanded a 'border guard corps.' I've personally never seen such a reference. Border guards were NKVD commanded units, Army formations close to the border were not known as 'border guard' units.
General statements abound in this book, for instance, the statement 'Despite the awful German occupation policies, it remains that internal repression resulted in more deaths among the Soviet population' is presented and linked to a few works in the bibliography, but no numbers are provided nor are specific pages where one can see or even compare the information the author is working with. A huge exaggeration is located on p. 45 when the author claims the famine in Ukraine in 1932-33 killed a 'quarter' of the population. The author gives too much credit to the German campaign against Tukhachevsky, especially since to date there is no evidence that German planted documents were even used against Tukhachevsky (how can one take seriously an espionage charge against Tukhachevsky, specifically that he is working for the Germans, when they themselves are giving him up to Stalin?). When listing 'anti-Russian minorities' the author deems fit to include Belorussians and Armenians, not exactly anti-Russian from what I can remember. As mentioned above, Cold War era propaganda enters the picture as well, the description of 'punishment battalions' encompasses the following '...unarmed first wave assault units who would be loaded with vodka before death-charging the enemy lines' (p. 5). I'd recommend the author read "Penalty Strike" by Alexander Pyl'cyn to learn what penal formations were like (there are also a number of works in Russian, half a dozen, by those in Penal formations and outlining the history of penal formations). Page 21 mentions that 'reserve security troops' had 'instructions to shoot down their own men if running', a bit of an ambiguous statement. Blocking detachments were created in order to gather those who initiated in an unauthorized retreat and, depending on the situation, to send them back to their respective units or, in severe cases, send them to penal formations or execute them (the majority were returned to their units). The author also harks back to battles in 1941 as being composed of Red Army riflemen 'link arms and charge across fields of death, shouting and cheering as they were cut down, row by row" (p. 381).
Quite a bit of literary license is taken throughout the text, for example, on p. 81 we're detailed the fate of Major-General Khomenko, commander of the 44th Army, who after accidentally driving into German positions and being killed by German fire was then used by the Germans in a propaganda ploy which claimed he defected to their side. The author claims "Stalin, in a flash of uncalculating rage' disbanded the 44th army when he heard of the 'desertion.' In fact, at least one source points out that Khomenko was traveling with the details of the 44th Army's positions, so while his desertion might have played a role in some of the other commanders from the 44th army being reassigned, the disbanding of the army (which rarely happened by 1944) might have been the result of of the 44th army's positions falling into the hands of the Germans (see "Fallen Soviet Generals" by Maslov).
Initial coverage of Warsaw uprising is lacking, the author skips over too many details to make the point that Stalin 'wanted' the Home Army to perish in the streets of Warsaw. Later coverage of the Warsaw uprising is also lacking, the author would like to make clear that the efforts on the part of the 1st Polish army to cross the Vistula were conducted "contrary to STAVKA's wishes...without their knowledge, approval, or support" p. 242. The author would do well to familiarize himself with orders coming down to the 1st Belorussian front which forecast a beginning of operations on August 25th against Warsaw with the 1st Polish Army moving along the western bank of the Vistula with their right wing and center assigned the object of Warsaw itself (see "Myfi Velikoi Otechestvennoi 2", p. 196, the article by M. Meltukhov "V Avgusti 1944"). Sadly, nothing came of these plans due to the German counterattacks against the 1st Belorussian front that followed. The atrocities that took lace in Germany when the Red Army crossed the frontier are blown out of proportion, in my opinion. The author, once again, takes too many liberties with how he stylizes what happened without adequate research to serve as a foundation. There is also little, if any, mention of the executions and arrests that followed Red Army soldiers when they wantonly raped or pillaged, of which there are more than enough recorded instances.
Lastly, what I found oddly annoying is the author's constant aversion to so-called 'frontal assaults' by the Red Army. Even when they are trying to 'outflank' the Germans they are still attacking 'frontally', the two are, in fact, mutually exclusive. Also annoying is the author dictating what and how the Wehrmacht should have waged war while on the defense in the Balkans, reminiscent of German memoirs and their 'what if/if only' scenarios. In the end, I can't say I was impressed with the text. While there are a few interesting anecdotes and episodes that I'll be sure to remember (although many do not have a source behind them), the obvious lack of knowledge about current literature on the subject is a huge minus. There is nothing ground-breaking presented here, just a lot of secondary and primary (mainly memoirs, worse is that the author does not use the newly released memoirs of such figures as Zhukov, Vasilevsky, and Rokossovsky, which have had much of what was then censored put back into their reminiscences) literature coming together. But a problem remains, said literature has been used in a variety of other monographs and narratives on the war as well.
Sunday, July 5, 2009
The Quality of Freedom: Khodorkovsky, Putin and the Yukos Affair by Richard Sakwa
As a student of Soviet history, and being from the former Soviet Union myself, I have a varied interest in modern Russian history. I am one of those who views history (that is events that occurred at least half a century ago) as easier to understand and fit into a context than the study of current events. The Yukos affair and Khodorkovsky are something one hears a great deal about in both the western and Russian media. While western media seems to garner the majority of sympathy for Khodorkovsky, the Russian media seems to be more antagonistic against a man once called an 'oligarch.'
While Sakwa tackles Khdorkovsky, Putin, the Yukos affair, the varied meanings of 'freedom', and a variety of other topics in this text, I cannot help but think that while this is a very good, and academic, treatment of the subject(s) it is not a definitive account. This is not to say that Sakwa's narrative or analysis is weak but simply that he is writing from a hindsight that has yet to fully set in. A large portion of his sources are also media related, both western and Russian, and while journalism once meant something, today's mass media is simply a running joke. Granted, this might apply more to the US than Russia, but there it seems that the journalists are polarized either for or against the government. While this does provide the reader with a broad spectrum of opinions and contextual analysis, in the end, in my opinion, it is still too biased for a scholarly analysis.
With that said, the author utilizes a wide variety of sources so that his foundation and basis for much of what he writes is ingrained in academic literature, be it from Russia or the west. While many will undoubtedly view Khodorkovsky as getting what he deserves, simply because he was an oligarch, in reading this work the reader will be given a more fully developed understanding of the atmosphere Khodorkovsky and others (Berezovsky, Gusinky, Smolensky, etc) were operating in. Much of what they did was illegal and the country was plundered to a great degree under the administration of the 1990s. But it was Yukos and Khodorkovsky that were arrested, imprisoned, and bankrupted by Putin and his administration, not all of the other oligarchs who acted similarly. Then again, Khodorkovsky had more than one chance to leave the country, as many others did, but he chose to stay, more so, to ingrain himself in the politics of the country.
That, in a nutshell, is what Putin rebelled against. It is one thing to become an oligarch and reign supreme in the world of business, it is a totally different matter to indulge in political intrigue and attempt to maneuver against the powers that be, no matter how much money you have on your side. Khodorkovsky learned his lesson and continues to learn it in prison. He speaks out, writers letters and lambastes the current administration for what it has done to him and Yukos. Perhaps he's right, Yukos should not have been taken apart, but Putin and the factions inside the Kremlin that helped him 'tame' Khodorkovsky and the others who helped run Yukos (many were put on trial aside from Khodorkovsky, and even tried in absentia) decided that an example needed to be made. Khodorkovsky proved to be the perfect target and he paid with his freedom while Yukos paid by hemorrhaging billions in 'unpaid taxes' which forced it to sell off its assets and go bankrupt. The winners of this 'affair' were undoubtedly the factions within the Kremlin, but what that 'win' entails is too early to tell. For those interested in an academic, highly detailed and analytical look at modern Russia, you'll do well to invest in this text.
While Sakwa tackles Khdorkovsky, Putin, the Yukos affair, the varied meanings of 'freedom', and a variety of other topics in this text, I cannot help but think that while this is a very good, and academic, treatment of the subject(s) it is not a definitive account. This is not to say that Sakwa's narrative or analysis is weak but simply that he is writing from a hindsight that has yet to fully set in. A large portion of his sources are also media related, both western and Russian, and while journalism once meant something, today's mass media is simply a running joke. Granted, this might apply more to the US than Russia, but there it seems that the journalists are polarized either for or against the government. While this does provide the reader with a broad spectrum of opinions and contextual analysis, in the end, in my opinion, it is still too biased for a scholarly analysis.
With that said, the author utilizes a wide variety of sources so that his foundation and basis for much of what he writes is ingrained in academic literature, be it from Russia or the west. While many will undoubtedly view Khodorkovsky as getting what he deserves, simply because he was an oligarch, in reading this work the reader will be given a more fully developed understanding of the atmosphere Khodorkovsky and others (Berezovsky, Gusinky, Smolensky, etc) were operating in. Much of what they did was illegal and the country was plundered to a great degree under the administration of the 1990s. But it was Yukos and Khodorkovsky that were arrested, imprisoned, and bankrupted by Putin and his administration, not all of the other oligarchs who acted similarly. Then again, Khodorkovsky had more than one chance to leave the country, as many others did, but he chose to stay, more so, to ingrain himself in the politics of the country.
That, in a nutshell, is what Putin rebelled against. It is one thing to become an oligarch and reign supreme in the world of business, it is a totally different matter to indulge in political intrigue and attempt to maneuver against the powers that be, no matter how much money you have on your side. Khodorkovsky learned his lesson and continues to learn it in prison. He speaks out, writers letters and lambastes the current administration for what it has done to him and Yukos. Perhaps he's right, Yukos should not have been taken apart, but Putin and the factions inside the Kremlin that helped him 'tame' Khodorkovsky and the others who helped run Yukos (many were put on trial aside from Khodorkovsky, and even tried in absentia) decided that an example needed to be made. Khodorkovsky proved to be the perfect target and he paid with his freedom while Yukos paid by hemorrhaging billions in 'unpaid taxes' which forced it to sell off its assets and go bankrupt. The winners of this 'affair' were undoubtedly the factions within the Kremlin, but what that 'win' entails is too early to tell. For those interested in an academic, highly detailed and analytical look at modern Russia, you'll do well to invest in this text.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
"Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The New Cold War" Stephen F. Cohen
Stephen F. Cohen's latest publication, "Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism To The New Cold War," deals with a variety of events within Soviet and post-Soviet Russian history while outlining missed opportunities/roads not taken within each specific event. He does not so much deal in 'what-if' or 'counterfactual' scenarios as set up and explain existing alternatives that could have been pursued. Simply showing that alternatives within Soviet society existed inevitably puts into question much of the reasoning behind the idea that the Soviet Union was unreformable, especially when put into context with the sustainability of the Soviet Union through, for example, Khrushchev's reforms.
The text is made up of seven chapters; the first is devoted to Nikolai Bukharin, someone Cohen has written about in the past. While I do not think Bukharin could have been a rival to Stalin, in the full sense of the word (perhaps as Trotsky was), I think Cohen's real point within the chapter is encompassed in his discussion of NEP (New Economic Policy) which lasted some eight years, until the five year plans began. This phase of the Soviet Union is viewed by many as a 'golden' time, a time of at least some opportunity when state owned enterprises existed along side privately run companies/trades. But Cohen stops short of guessing what the Soviet Union could have become had NEP policies been pursued rather his point here is solely to show that an alternative to Stalin's five year plans existed, had been implemented and accepted by both the government and its citizens, and could have continued and evolved for years to come.
The next chapter discusses the GULag returnees during Khrushchev's administration. It was only after Khurshchev's condemnation of the 'cult of personality' in 1956 that millions of those convicted and imprisoned under Stalin were exonerated. Cohen then covers how these former zeks were treated by Soviet society as well as their impact on Khrushchev's administration and the reforms of his era. Some died in tragic or lonely circumstances while others rose through the ranks of their respective professions. Cohen does point out that while no former prisoners acquired positions in the highest rungs of power, many became local leaders and were able to play a role in the future policies Khrushchev would become responsible for. This was also a time period which saw accusations by Khrushchev and his allies against the likes of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, who were soon expelled from the party. Many often wonder why there was no Soviet equivalent to the Nuremberg trials, this was probably as close as the Soviets came. Other initiatives were begun against former Communist party higher ups, but the problem is that Khrushchev himself had blood on his hands and if he began to seek out those responsible for the previous crimes of the Soviet state against its own population, most likely more people would have been imprisoned than were being rehabilitated and released.
The third chapter deals with "Soviet conservatism" and the figure of Yegor Ligachev. Undoubtedly conservatives in the US differ markedly from those in the Soviet Union but, as Cohen explains through the lens of Ligachev, they are not simply neo-Stalinists bent on terrorizing the Soviet population and hording power at the top. On the contrary, after examining Ligachev's history Cohen attempts to show that "Soviet conservatism" in this case signified a yearning to reform the Soviet Union and keep it in tact. This type of conservatism has to be understood vis-a-vis the policies Gorbachev implemented during the late 1980s. Men like Ligachev aimed to have Soviet policies improved upon not reinvented.
Building on the previous chapter the fourth chapter goes into detail about whether the Soviet system was reformable. Of course, following how Cohen views NEP, the answer is that he believes it was. Today many in the west, with exaggerated egos, believe that the Soviet system was doomed to failure, even though none predicted its end. If a nation like America can exploit the system of slavery for centuries and then turn around and champion their emancipation followed a century later by the civil rights movement, why is it that the USSR, and Russia in general, is forced to carry the stigma of an empire beyond redemption? On the contrary, from the early years of the revolution the Soviet state modified itself to suit the needs of its government, ideology, and population. From creating war communism, to NEP, to five year plans, the destruction of Stalin's 'cult of personality' together with Khrushchev's reforms, a movement of what some label 'neo-Stalinism' under Brezhnev, to a reform minded Gorbachev who instituted Glasnost and Peterstroika, considered by some to have been the most 'democratic' period of recent history. Are these the actions of an unreformable empire?
Chapter five works off the previous chapter and takes on the fate of the Soviet Union, specifically, 'Why did it end?' While there are many figures one can point to, I believe Cohen is quite candid in placing his blame on the shoulders of Yeltsin and perhaps to a lesser degree on Gorbachev. While Gorbachev seems to come out as partly realistic and idealistic in his outlook, Yelstin was simply a man bent on acquiring power, no matter who he had to go through, lie to, or manipulate. An interesting argument is made regarding Gorbachev's reforms and their 'destabilizing' of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, his reforms were not meant to stabilize a system that was not working, rather they were supposed to destabilize it and propel it forward via new initiatives and policies. Evens so, it was Gorbachev's "promarket policies" that initiated the rapid grab for assets, in both legal and illegal means, through which today's Russian oligarchs were created. Yeltsin eventually used these same oligarchs, and they him, in helping curb democratic principles throughout the 1990s. Personally, I viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as inevitable, there just seemed to have been so much going wrong all at once. Specifically, I saw nationalism as playing a large, if not the largest, role. Cohen, however, argues to the contrary. The demonstrations and protests by various ethnicities, which many quickly attribute to ideas of self-determination or "nationalist revolution-from-below" were in fact organized to redress grievances "within the framework of the Union" or directed against other ethnicities, but not that of the USSR. The rest of the chapter deals with all the other usual suspects in the collapse of the USSR (economy, reforms, etc) and Cohen puts them into a coherent and understandable context which has made me rethink what happened and what an alternative might consist of.
The next chapter goes into the legacies of Gorbachev. While he failed in his reforms, obviously he was not aiming at the dissolution of the USSR but rather an improvement on the model before him, what came after under Boris Yeltsin was another step in the wrong direction. Cohen adheres to the idea that it was Gorbachev rather than Yeltsin who ushered in democracy, contrary to what many specialists believe today. Cohen believes this "historical amnesia" was inspired by US ideology which after the breakup of the Soviet Union rewrote the history of the Cold War's end to include a "US Victory" rather than the agreed upon "end" between the two sides with no victors or losers. Throughout the 1990s Yeltsin began to use the oligarchs that Gorbachev's policies first created in cracking down on democratic liberties. The mass media began to be used for manipulation purposes which has continued to this day. Journalists reminisce about Gorbachev's reforms, a time when they were able to pry into Soviet history and spark debates about taboo topics, while during Yeltsin the public was kept in the dark about corruption, human rights abuses, and crime. For Cohen there is a real similarity between 1917 and 1991. In both instances small groups were ushered into power based on promises of "evolutionary progress" but in the end struggles over property and territory tore the nation apart and standing economic institutions were done away.
The last chapter, and by far the most interesting of this book, deals with who was/is responsible for the cooling of relations between the Russian Federation and America. In this case Cohen is not afraid to utilize the expression 'Cold War' to define the attitudes of the US and Russia toward each other, and, perhaps, in a way he is right. But Cohen is also not afraid to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of whom he thinks is in the wrong, Washington. From announcing to the US that the Cold War was won by the US in 1992 (by George H. W. Bush) to the failed policies under Clinton, which seem solely to have plunged Russia into an ever expanding economic hole and let NATO expand its influence to Russia's proverbial doorstep, to the presidency of the second Bush who moved away from arms treaties and provided new impetus for Russia to feel threatened and again seek to find friends among the likes of Iran, Venezuela, etc. Even with the current Obama administration many of those responsible for the initial policies and activities vis-a-vis Russia are still in place, including Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. The double standards and hypocrisy of the US government, mass media, and even academics is clearly laid out. Another opportunity lost for the US, especially at a time when Russia could have contributed greatly to many American initiatives, including the "war on terror." The largest problem, for Cohen, in how the US deals with Russia is that some parties seem to encourage a destabilization of the current regime. How helpful is that if Russia still possesses stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Not very. But apparently showing off a US with the ego and arrogance of a sole superpower means more to Washington's power elite than trying to help Russia and encourage a friendly, open, and reciprocal relationship that will undoubtedly pay off in the long run more so than antagonizing Putin and his country to the point of creating an atmosphere akin to a "cold war."
The text is made up of seven chapters; the first is devoted to Nikolai Bukharin, someone Cohen has written about in the past. While I do not think Bukharin could have been a rival to Stalin, in the full sense of the word (perhaps as Trotsky was), I think Cohen's real point within the chapter is encompassed in his discussion of NEP (New Economic Policy) which lasted some eight years, until the five year plans began. This phase of the Soviet Union is viewed by many as a 'golden' time, a time of at least some opportunity when state owned enterprises existed along side privately run companies/trades. But Cohen stops short of guessing what the Soviet Union could have become had NEP policies been pursued rather his point here is solely to show that an alternative to Stalin's five year plans existed, had been implemented and accepted by both the government and its citizens, and could have continued and evolved for years to come.
The next chapter discusses the GULag returnees during Khrushchev's administration. It was only after Khurshchev's condemnation of the 'cult of personality' in 1956 that millions of those convicted and imprisoned under Stalin were exonerated. Cohen then covers how these former zeks were treated by Soviet society as well as their impact on Khrushchev's administration and the reforms of his era. Some died in tragic or lonely circumstances while others rose through the ranks of their respective professions. Cohen does point out that while no former prisoners acquired positions in the highest rungs of power, many became local leaders and were able to play a role in the future policies Khrushchev would become responsible for. This was also a time period which saw accusations by Khrushchev and his allies against the likes of Molotov, Kaganovich and Malenkov, who were soon expelled from the party. Many often wonder why there was no Soviet equivalent to the Nuremberg trials, this was probably as close as the Soviets came. Other initiatives were begun against former Communist party higher ups, but the problem is that Khrushchev himself had blood on his hands and if he began to seek out those responsible for the previous crimes of the Soviet state against its own population, most likely more people would have been imprisoned than were being rehabilitated and released.
The third chapter deals with "Soviet conservatism" and the figure of Yegor Ligachev. Undoubtedly conservatives in the US differ markedly from those in the Soviet Union but, as Cohen explains through the lens of Ligachev, they are not simply neo-Stalinists bent on terrorizing the Soviet population and hording power at the top. On the contrary, after examining Ligachev's history Cohen attempts to show that "Soviet conservatism" in this case signified a yearning to reform the Soviet Union and keep it in tact. This type of conservatism has to be understood vis-a-vis the policies Gorbachev implemented during the late 1980s. Men like Ligachev aimed to have Soviet policies improved upon not reinvented.
Building on the previous chapter the fourth chapter goes into detail about whether the Soviet system was reformable. Of course, following how Cohen views NEP, the answer is that he believes it was. Today many in the west, with exaggerated egos, believe that the Soviet system was doomed to failure, even though none predicted its end. If a nation like America can exploit the system of slavery for centuries and then turn around and champion their emancipation followed a century later by the civil rights movement, why is it that the USSR, and Russia in general, is forced to carry the stigma of an empire beyond redemption? On the contrary, from the early years of the revolution the Soviet state modified itself to suit the needs of its government, ideology, and population. From creating war communism, to NEP, to five year plans, the destruction of Stalin's 'cult of personality' together with Khrushchev's reforms, a movement of what some label 'neo-Stalinism' under Brezhnev, to a reform minded Gorbachev who instituted Glasnost and Peterstroika, considered by some to have been the most 'democratic' period of recent history. Are these the actions of an unreformable empire?
Chapter five works off the previous chapter and takes on the fate of the Soviet Union, specifically, 'Why did it end?' While there are many figures one can point to, I believe Cohen is quite candid in placing his blame on the shoulders of Yeltsin and perhaps to a lesser degree on Gorbachev. While Gorbachev seems to come out as partly realistic and idealistic in his outlook, Yelstin was simply a man bent on acquiring power, no matter who he had to go through, lie to, or manipulate. An interesting argument is made regarding Gorbachev's reforms and their 'destabilizing' of the Soviet Union. In retrospect, his reforms were not meant to stabilize a system that was not working, rather they were supposed to destabilize it and propel it forward via new initiatives and policies. Evens so, it was Gorbachev's "promarket policies" that initiated the rapid grab for assets, in both legal and illegal means, through which today's Russian oligarchs were created. Yeltsin eventually used these same oligarchs, and they him, in helping curb democratic principles throughout the 1990s. Personally, I viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as inevitable, there just seemed to have been so much going wrong all at once. Specifically, I saw nationalism as playing a large, if not the largest, role. Cohen, however, argues to the contrary. The demonstrations and protests by various ethnicities, which many quickly attribute to ideas of self-determination or "nationalist revolution-from-below" were in fact organized to redress grievances "within the framework of the Union" or directed against other ethnicities, but not that of the USSR. The rest of the chapter deals with all the other usual suspects in the collapse of the USSR (economy, reforms, etc) and Cohen puts them into a coherent and understandable context which has made me rethink what happened and what an alternative might consist of.
The next chapter goes into the legacies of Gorbachev. While he failed in his reforms, obviously he was not aiming at the dissolution of the USSR but rather an improvement on the model before him, what came after under Boris Yeltsin was another step in the wrong direction. Cohen adheres to the idea that it was Gorbachev rather than Yeltsin who ushered in democracy, contrary to what many specialists believe today. Cohen believes this "historical amnesia" was inspired by US ideology which after the breakup of the Soviet Union rewrote the history of the Cold War's end to include a "US Victory" rather than the agreed upon "end" between the two sides with no victors or losers. Throughout the 1990s Yeltsin began to use the oligarchs that Gorbachev's policies first created in cracking down on democratic liberties. The mass media began to be used for manipulation purposes which has continued to this day. Journalists reminisce about Gorbachev's reforms, a time when they were able to pry into Soviet history and spark debates about taboo topics, while during Yeltsin the public was kept in the dark about corruption, human rights abuses, and crime. For Cohen there is a real similarity between 1917 and 1991. In both instances small groups were ushered into power based on promises of "evolutionary progress" but in the end struggles over property and territory tore the nation apart and standing economic institutions were done away.
The last chapter, and by far the most interesting of this book, deals with who was/is responsible for the cooling of relations between the Russian Federation and America. In this case Cohen is not afraid to utilize the expression 'Cold War' to define the attitudes of the US and Russia toward each other, and, perhaps, in a way he is right. But Cohen is also not afraid to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of whom he thinks is in the wrong, Washington. From announcing to the US that the Cold War was won by the US in 1992 (by George H. W. Bush) to the failed policies under Clinton, which seem solely to have plunged Russia into an ever expanding economic hole and let NATO expand its influence to Russia's proverbial doorstep, to the presidency of the second Bush who moved away from arms treaties and provided new impetus for Russia to feel threatened and again seek to find friends among the likes of Iran, Venezuela, etc. Even with the current Obama administration many of those responsible for the initial policies and activities vis-a-vis Russia are still in place, including Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden. The double standards and hypocrisy of the US government, mass media, and even academics is clearly laid out. Another opportunity lost for the US, especially at a time when Russia could have contributed greatly to many American initiatives, including the "war on terror." The largest problem, for Cohen, in how the US deals with Russia is that some parties seem to encourage a destabilization of the current regime. How helpful is that if Russia still possesses stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons? Not very. But apparently showing off a US with the ego and arrogance of a sole superpower means more to Washington's power elite than trying to help Russia and encourage a friendly, open, and reciprocal relationship that will undoubtedly pay off in the long run more so than antagonizing Putin and his country to the point of creating an atmosphere akin to a "cold war."
Saturday, May 30, 2009
War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars by Richard N. Haass
Much, in fact too much, has already been written about the latest war against Iraq (in this book, it is the "War of Choice"). Thus, there is little to be revealed in this book that has not been said or written about before. What is interesting, on the other hand, is the various contradictions that come through between what the author terms the "War of Necessity", that is the First Gulf War, and that of the invasion and "occupation/liberation" of Iraq which occurred most recently. The fact is the administration under the first Bush was hesitant to go to war and had to be convinced in numerous ways. And this after Saddam Hussein annexed a sovereign nation, something few thought he would actually do. This was followed up with a UN backing and half a million troops in the Gulf before any military activity even began. What happened most recently? Threats of Saddam Hussein having "WMDs", which proved to have been false, a badly planned and managed after-action campaign on behalf of our government and troops (whom, in retrospect, can hardly be blamed since they are trained for war, not peacekeeping). All of this is related in various details with some interesting commentary about various personalities the author dealt with throughout both Bush administrations. I was interested in his explanation for why during the first Bush presidency Cheney could say that the US was not interested in 'regime change' but during the recent war changed his mind. According to the author it was the atmosphere of the administration which dictated what Cheney could say and follow through with, both publicly and privately. Makes sense in retrospect, we all act differently depending on the situation and company we find ourselves among. Obviously this does not change the fact that he was wrong, horribly wrong, and much of what occurred in the aftermath of 9/11 (both in domestic policy and foreign) is the fault of the second Bush administration which did an immense amount of damage to this country's reputation as well as its economic and political state. Much of what the author conveys has a ring of truth, but I'm sure there is some self service here and there as well, so I'd take it with a grain of salt. Otherwise an interesting text and comparison between the first Iraq War, that of necessity, and the second, that of choice, which cost this country thousands of lives, hundreds of billions of dollars, time and attention we'll never get back, and whose affects we'll feel for years, if not decades, to come (and this does not include all the turmoil the Middle East has experienced as a result).
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1416549021/ref=cm_cr_thx_view
http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1416549021/ref=cm_cr_thx_view
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
The Brusilov Offensive by Timothy Dowling
To begin, I am in complete agreement with the author that the Eastern Front of WWI, for the most part, is simply missing from English literature. While we have an abundance of studies about the Western Front, from all sides, the Russian experience in WWI is relatively unknown. And this is a nation that went to war with the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires. It's true enough that the Russian officer Corps was a hindrance to the army, but due to the casualties the officer corps sustained throughout the first year of war many of the new officers rose from the ranks or were composed of non-nobles. This in and of itself spelled a change for Russia in the grand scheme of things and goes a long way to explain why so many units eventually allied with the Bolsheviks, or other revolutionary parties, during the Revolution.
The most interesting section of the book was the titled Brusilov Offensive and the eventual role Romania's entry into the war plays. I had heard of this successful offensive before but what it could have accomplished did not register with me until I read through this book. Although in all honesty Brusilov's plan was simply to attack and give the Habsburg empire as many casualties as he could, what his offensive could have accomplished in more idealistic terms, which the author outlines later in the text, had never crossed my mind. I won't lie, a large part of the book is units attacking, retreating, defending, etc. So many units that you'll undoubtedly lose track of many of them. I also couldn't understand why the author regularly referred to the area of Bukovina as "the Bukovina" rather than simply Bukovina, which is how I have always seen it in written. But, aside from these two caveats, one of which you'll deal with in any military history of WWI, the research was impressive as was the atmosphere (usually frustration at the ignorance and ineptitude of one general or another) the author was able to create. There is some context describing how this offensive affected the mood of the Army (casualties were not small and the gains were limited compared to what they could have been) but I hoped for more context when dealing with how the Army treated the Bolshevik-agitators it eventually had to deal with, etc. In the end this work represents a fine addition to WWI literature and the Eastern Front of the First World War.
http://www.amazon.com/Brusilov-Offensive-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253351308/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
The most interesting section of the book was the titled Brusilov Offensive and the eventual role Romania's entry into the war plays. I had heard of this successful offensive before but what it could have accomplished did not register with me until I read through this book. Although in all honesty Brusilov's plan was simply to attack and give the Habsburg empire as many casualties as he could, what his offensive could have accomplished in more idealistic terms, which the author outlines later in the text, had never crossed my mind. I won't lie, a large part of the book is units attacking, retreating, defending, etc. So many units that you'll undoubtedly lose track of many of them. I also couldn't understand why the author regularly referred to the area of Bukovina as "the Bukovina" rather than simply Bukovina, which is how I have always seen it in written. But, aside from these two caveats, one of which you'll deal with in any military history of WWI, the research was impressive as was the atmosphere (usually frustration at the ignorance and ineptitude of one general or another) the author was able to create. There is some context describing how this offensive affected the mood of the Army (casualties were not small and the gains were limited compared to what they could have been) but I hoped for more context when dealing with how the Army treated the Bolshevik-agitators it eventually had to deal with, etc. In the end this work represents a fine addition to WWI literature and the Eastern Front of the First World War.
http://www.amazon.com/Brusilov-Offensive-Twentieth-Century-Battles/dp/0253351308/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
Sunday, May 24, 2009
To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House
Glantz, a veritable book producing factory, has definitely set a new standard in literature on Stalingrad. This book, the first of three, follows the Wehrmacht after the Moscow-Counter offensive of 1941/1942 through the Soviet Kharkov offensive and into Operation Blau. In doing so Glantz aims to establish three facts that have been glossed over in general histories of both the Eastern Front and the battle for Stalingrad specifically: Soviet forces did not simply retreat when confronted with Army Groups South, and after Army Groups A and B, to take the fight to Stalingrad, as if pre-planned; STAVKA did not abandon the Donbas region to preserve its forces; and the Red Army soldiers that the Sixth army finally met inside Stalingrad were not the same troops who retreated throughout the summer and finally decided, or were forced, to stand and fight. In reality the Red Army put up resistance to German advances from day one. Glantz takes the time to go through many of these operations and point out exactly how much damage Soviet troops were able to inflict on the Wehrmacht and why the Germans were still able to overcome forces that more often than not outnumbered them in either men, artillery, or armor, and sometimes in all three categories. Of personal interest to myself was the chapter on Army Group A's incursion into the Caucasus region. This is an entire campaign long ignored due to the limelight Stalingrad encompasses.
In the end it seems the Red Army was still committing mistakes they should have learned from in 1941; piecemeal attacks by mechanized and tank forces, lack of command and control in the field, failure to institute combined arms operations utilizing artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and the air force, etc. The Germans, however, are also guilty in that they once more overestimated their abilities and underestimated that of the Red Army. The final result is a detailed and highly needed study that not only provides context to the eventual clash that occurred in Stalingrad, but also highlights the actions that led up to the battle and the many battles, and even campaigns, that have gone long ignored due to Stalingrad's ever growing shadow.
http://www.amazon.com/Gates-Stalingrad-Soviet-German-Operations-April-August/dp/0700616306/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
In the end it seems the Red Army was still committing mistakes they should have learned from in 1941; piecemeal attacks by mechanized and tank forces, lack of command and control in the field, failure to institute combined arms operations utilizing artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, and the air force, etc. The Germans, however, are also guilty in that they once more overestimated their abilities and underestimated that of the Red Army. The final result is a detailed and highly needed study that not only provides context to the eventual clash that occurred in Stalingrad, but also highlights the actions that led up to the battle and the many battles, and even campaigns, that have gone long ignored due to Stalingrad's ever growing shadow.
http://www.amazon.com/Gates-Stalingrad-Soviet-German-Operations-April-August/dp/0700616306/ref=cm_cr-mr-title
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