Monday, May 13, 2013

Death in the Baltic: The World War II Sinking of the Wilhelm Gustloff by Cathryn Prince


It's hard to know what to make of this book.  The subject is well enough known for those familiar with WWII.  For those who are not, reading about the event changes nothing in the grand scheme of things.  Furthermore, there's no new information provided for greater analysis or contextualization.  The only thing that's new or original are the few recollections from the survivors of the ship.  But their fates don't much differ from the millions of others who survived the Second World in general while living in Germany.  Instead of surviving fire bombings these men and women survived a sinking ship.  Worse is the fact that the author is continually looking for something hidden to unearth but ends up unable to find any such evidence.

The writing leaves a lot to be desired.  There is no chronological coherence throughout much of the text and random tangents that add little to nothing to the overall story are constantly present.  The author randomly jumps from one event and time period to another, introduces random characters, gives minor histories to pad the page count, and moves on.  Journalistic tendencies are evident as the author begins putting thoughts, ideas, and words into the mouths and minds of men and women long dead.  "Would have", "might have thought" belong in fiction, not historical monographs.  This combined with regularly grasping at straws to gain as much sympathy as she can get from the reader, as if the words and recollections of survivors aren't filled with enough emotion, make for an awkward reading experience for those interested in history rather than a forced tearjerker.  Worse are the random generalizations and even a mixing up of the actions of the Wehrmacht for those of the Red Army (page 67).  The latter is evidence of the limited amount of research that went into this book, at times relying on dubious journal and online articles, when it comes to the background and history of the Second World War and, more specifically, the Eastern Front.  Unfortunately, the weaknesses often outnumber the strengths in "Death in the Baltic."





Friday, May 10, 2013

The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe by Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu

The overall thread running through all the chapters in this book is that the memory of the Second World War is continually contested territory that up to the present is still being interpreted and reinterpreted depending on the politician, historian, or institute in question. One issue that is continually brought up is the lag that studies on the Second World War, and simultaneously Holocaust studies, experienced in the immediate postwar period. While studies of WWII and the Holocaust are part of the mainstream today, and in some ways have over-saturated the market, the immediate postwar period saw a dearth of any discussion or analysis about what Europe had just gone through. The reasons differed from country to country, but in many ways all European states are still feeling this omission. West Germans treated themselves as victims of the allies, Nazis, and Hitler. Poland saw itself as the first victim and most heroic for being the first to stand up to Hitler (and Stalin) and for resisting Germany the longest. France continually had to walk a fine line between her collaborationist past and her history of resistance. The Soviet Union omitted any real research or studies on the war as long as Stalin was alive and only began to recall her role in the war with Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

The authors regularly take the reader through the postwar histories of their respectively studied nations and address not only what historians might have been producing but also the field of literature and television/theater. At times it took the initiative of an artist (writer, poet, etc.) to prod his peers and politicians into asking the right questions and begin to offer meaningful analysis for issues few wanted to deal with or address. The more interesting chapters deal with Austria, The Federal Republic of Germany, and to a lesser extent France and Poland. The chapter on the Soviet Union was, unfortunately, a waste of paper and time. It was one of the weakest and added nothing original or worthwhile to the discussion(s) offered by the other chapters or the introduction. Overall, recommended for those who are interested in how the memory of the war has transformed in various European states from the immediate postwar period through the past few decades.




Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Our Harsh Logic: Israeli Soldiers' Testimonies from the Occupied Territories, 2000-2010

The problem with books like "Our Harsh Logic" is that they're fuel for the fire.  The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been going on for generations and the presentation of these testimonies without adequate context only enrages those who know little about what's going on in the Middle East or have a stake in playing the 'victimhood' card.  There is little doubt that Israel sits in a position few, if any, find enviable.  Their policies often make more enemies than friends, but to rashly judge all their positions and put them in the camp of 'imperialists' or 'zionists' is too easy and accommodating for those with ulterior motives.  This is a book that is solely based on testimony from soldiers who more often than not participated in the activities they are describing and only after felt remorse.  This says more about the culture of the military than it does about Israel.  Imagine a book based on the US intervention/occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Soviet invasion/occupation of Afghanistan, or the US war in Vietnam told solely from those who witnessed abuse and atrocities.  Would that be a fair depiction of the actions of any of these nations in their respective war zones?  Hardly.  And while the previously mentioned conflicts lasted for around a decade, Israeli soldiers have lived with terror and violence for generations, as have their Palestinian neighbors.  There's no question that abuse takes place on a daily basis when you give teenagers and young adults weapons that can readily be used to kill and maim, especially as they're growing up in an environment where each side demonizes the other.  Highlighting that abuse is pointless without adequate context and analysis.  Thus there is nothing new or original among the pages of this book for those familiar with the institution of the military (which seems to cover things up on a regular basis, only to be discovered for their lies sooner or later) or the situation in the Middle East as it stands today.  It's a tragic situation that few have the patience to attempt to understand, where generational animosities plays themselves out on a regular basis and perpetuate violence and hatred.




Wednesday, May 1, 2013

The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-examination (Helion Studies in Military History) by Boris Sokolov


Many have written on the history of the Second World War in Russia in the past twenty to thirty years.  Gorbachev’s ‘glasnost’ opened the way for new questions, ideas, theories, and accounts from the Stalinist period, including the Eastern Front.  Unfortunately, with all the new information that became available many took it upon themselves to begin writing sensationalist books that flooded the market and continue to do so today.   Thus, the current Second World War book market in Russia is a mixture of historical monographs, journalistic and amateur accounts, and sensationalist conspiracy theories.  ‘The Role of the Soviet Union in the Second World War: A Re-Examination’ falls somewhere in between all three.  The author, Boris Sokolov, was forced to resign from his position as professor of Social Anthropology, which automatically raises questions about his historical background. 

What Sokolov and many authors like him do well is raise questions that have yet to be answered in a satisfactory manner.  Unfortunately, often the questions they raise are pushed beyond their boundaries and become the basis of ill-defined generalizations and fallacious comparisons.  Thus, throughout this slim volume of articles that were previously published in Russian newspapers or western academic journals, there is some interesting information offered but it is missing valuable context and is warped by numerous theories that already exist in Russia, which Sokolov latches onto with his own version of events and evidence.

The initial chapter discusses the oft-repeated idea by conspiracy theorists that Stalin was preparing to attack Hitler in the summer of 1941.  This is usually most associated with the likes of Viktor Suvorov (Vladimir Rezun), even though the initial creator of this myth was Hitler himself who declared the invasion of the Soviet Union a pre-emptive strike against gathering Red Army forces who were poised to strike against Germany.  While Suvorov grasps at every straw that’s available to him, be it real or imaginary, Sokolov utilizes the simplistic idea that because an order was issued to create a Polish division by 1 July 1941, an invasion was imminent.  He points to the corresponding creation of a Finnish Corps on the eve of the Soviet invasion of Finland, but curiously enough fails to point out the entire lead-up to the invasion of Finland and juxtapose it with the diplomatic situation on the ground in the spring and summer of 1941.  The rest of the chapter offers little of substance or new information to those already familiar with the eve of the war on the Eastern Front.

The more interesting chapters are those on the Battle of Kursk and Lend Lease.  In the case of the former, Sokolov makes an interesting point in his discussion of whether it was ideal to wait for the Germans to attack or whether an earlier offensive by the Red Army against a Wehrmacht lacking Tigers, Panthers, and Ferdinands would have garnered greater success and fewer losses.  Unfortunately, he doesn’t offer enough information about the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in April or May of 1943, nor does he analyze the weather conditions or logistical constraints that either side might have been under.  It’s easy to pass judgment by simply mentioning a few figures, harder still to analyze the entire contextual situation that existed on a month-by-month basis.  The more interesting aspect of this chapter is his discussion of the losses the Red Army sustained.  Unfortunately, his example is limited to the Central Front and a figure of some 50-60,000.  There is no adequate explanation for why the Central Front is listed as containing 738,000 men on July 5, yet numbered 645,300 on July 12 when it supposedly only suffered 33,897 casualties.  The only Order of Battle change was the departure of two rifle brigades and the arrival of a tank brigade, at best a change of strength of some 5-7,000 men, according to Sokolov.  Yet no explanation is offered of why such a drastic change in figures exists.  The author believes this represents an undercounting of losses, which is the simplest explanation and there’s no doubt that undercounting existed in every army (who doesn’t want extra rations?).  While this is the only real evidence Sokolov presents about the undercounting of casualties, he readily begins to apply this formula (undercounting by around 1/3) to other operations, creating a generalization out of one example.  When discussing Red Army losses in general compared to the Wehrmacht, Sokolov comments that the ‘unfavorable ratio of losses may be explained by the superiority of the new German tanks and also the superiority of German command and control in armor combat.’  While this analysis is undoubtedly accurate in some scenarios, Valery Zamulin has shown quite well that the losses the Red Army sustained were a result of a combination of factors, few of which can be analyzed without understanding the greater context of specific engagements, forces utilized, etc.

The chapter on Lend Lease seems to be a limited analysis of random equipment and materials and again lacks context.  Yes, it is important to stress that value of Lend Lease supplies and the fact that the Soviet Union played down the aid it received while some in the west believed it represented a lifeline in the fullest sense of the term.  Unfortunately, Sokolov doesn’t do a great job in getting his point(s) across.  He discusses aviation fuel but fails to offer a breakdown of deliveries by year.  There is also no breakdown of motor vehicle deliveries by year nor does Sokolov discuss the fact that Soviet domestic production of motor vehicles could have been increased if the need arose at the expense of light tank production, which was being curbed as is by the latter years of the war due to the dominance of the T-34.  The reason Soviet domestic truck production was so low was because they knew that Lend Lease trucks were supposed to be delivered, but this is left out of Sokolov’s discussion(s).   Thus, similar to previous chapters, the author discusses important subjects and brings up relevant examples only to then exaggerate their value and importance without adequate context and analysis. 

The last two chapters deal with losses and to some extent overlap each other.  The more interesting look at the Soviet Union’s losses once more shows that serious research is still needed to give a more credible account and understanding of the devastation the Soviet Union experienced and how well or poorly the Red Army performed throughout the war.  Sokolov again points to interesting information but fails to accurately analyze it.  For instance, he lists the number of prisoners of war the Soviet Union sustained from 1943-1945 as 604,000 by Soviet estimates while German data gives a figure of 746,000.  Yet there is no mention made of the fact that the Germans counted anyone of military draft age as a prisoner of war, no matter if they were part of the Red Army or were civilians (and there are accounts of civilians in German POW camps).  This is also why the figures of the prisoners taken from the Kiev encirclement in 1941 differ when Soviet numbers are compared to German ones.  Sokolov is also quick to dismiss Germany’s allies when calculating losses, his reasoning being the Red Army suffered fewer losses and Germany’s allies didn’t actively participate during the entire war.  Not what I’d call an objective analysis.

There’s much more one can say but the above is a good representation of what this thin volume offers.  For those interested in understanding how much of Russia’s literature on the war is written this is a good starting point that features a middle ground between historical analysis and journalistic tendencies that create the ability to exaggerate and sensationalize without adequate understanding.  Due to the limited archival access that was available to historians interested in writing on the Eastern Front within the Soviet Union, the end result was a plethora of literature that said little but never failed to exaggerate socialist heroism and economic abilities.  Today’s Russian historians, journalists, and amateurs have access to much more information but lack a foundation or grounding in how to properly analyze and present the raw data at their disposal.  The end result is that all too often the right questions are asked but adequate answers are not always forthcoming.


Friday, April 26, 2013

The Taste of Ashes: The Afterlife of Totalitarianism in Eastern Europe by Marci Shore


'The Taste of Ashes' is an odd book to categorize.  I can't say it is a memoir as its concentration is rather limited.  It's definitely not a historical monograph in the traditional sense of the word, especially since it has no bibliography or index (which I found quite odd).  The focus is on the career of the author and her interactions with Eastern Europeans from the 1980s through the next three decades, which inevitably leads to discussions and tangents about Eastern European history in general from the turn of the century up to the present.  For those unfamiliar with Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, and Russian history, you will become quickly lost in a quagmire of names, places, and events that are invoked, described, and mentioned as the author attempts to weave dozens of stories into a coherent narrative, an attempt that I found lacking.

While I am immensely interested in intellectual history, and the previous monograph published by the author is something I'd be interested in reading in the future, attempting to discuss the history of some half a dozen nations through the lived experiences of the men and women she's encountered in her travels throughout Eastern Europe leaves a lot to be desired.  There is plenty of fascinating information offered but an immense amount of context is missing.  One example would be the discussion of the Warsaw Uprising by the Polish Home Army, which is wholly inadequate.  It's missing relevant information and offers a rather biased view of events.  Additionally, jumping from one storyline to another will undoubtedly leave even those familiar with the people, places, and events mentioned flipping back and forth trying to find the relevant thread they should be following or keeping in mind.  While I found parts of the book interesting, I can't help but feel that more could have been done if a greater history/narrative was attempted, which included, or intermixed, the lived experiences of the author and her acquaintances/friends.  Their lives and struggles are worth knowing and acknowledging, but they're hardly different than dozens, hundreds, and most likely thousands of others who lived, suffered, or even prospered in Eastern Europe during the twentieth century.





Monday, April 8, 2013

The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers by Rolf-Dieter Muller


"The Unknown Eastern Front: The Wehrmacht and Hitler's Foreign Soldiers" by Rolf-Dieter Muller gives a brief account of the various formations that joined the Wehrmacht or became units (ranging from battalions to divisions) within the German Wehrmacht and Waffen SS.  The book is divided into three sections dealing initially with Germany's allies (Finland, Hungary, Romania, Italy, Slovakia, and Croatia), volunteers from neutral and occupied territories (Spain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway), and Eastern European states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucasus).  The territory covered here would take two dozen volumes to truly understand.  While there are a multitude of works that deal with local collaboration and foreign units in the German Armed Forces throughout the Second World War, the majority rely on presenting just one nation or ethnicity and thus leave out the impact that all of these foreign soldiers had on the German war effort.

Muller deals with numerous complex issues and, more often than not, provides a good foundation for understanding just how complicated and convoluted German policy was when dealing with allies, collaborators, and the local population of whatever territory is being considered and discussed.  Unfortunately, because this a slim volume, it barely skims the surface of many issues that need to come to the forefront when studying both the war the Wehrmacht waged on the Eastern Front as well as the Wehrmacht itself.  This is a great introduction for those interested in the Second World War and the Eastern Front.  You should have some basic knowledge about battles, events, and main characters (both nations and individuals) as while there is some context presented much more is left out.  Additionally, there are also numerous weaknesses and errors sprinkled throughout the text, including the idea that Richard Sorge predicted the date the Germans were going to invade the Soviet Union, an ambiguous statement about Stalin's reaction to the invasion, a lack of endnotes for every chapter (often some interesting information is present but no source is listed), and at least in one instance (chapter on Hungary) there are some 30 endnotes in the text but only 17 in the endnote section at the end of the book(!).

For those familiar with the Eastern Front and Germany's efforts, little presented here is original information or groundbreaking analysis.  Rather, Muller does something that often escapes many of us who study this subject in-depth.  To begin, lets take a step back and look at what made possible Germany's ability to wage war.  If we leave the Eastern Front for a moment and take a look at Germany's previous 'miracles' during the initial stages of the Second World War, what do we see?  An initial invasion of Poland that received help some two weeks later from a Red Army invasion from the East.  A miraculous victory over France that saw Italy join in the war and, unfortunately, much of France's army and air force remain uncommitted for various reasons.  Finally, the struggles in North Africa relied heavily on Italian forces and the Italian navy.  Yet who gets the credit?  Germany.  Now, moving on to the Eastern Front.  The initial invasion featured some one million foreign volunteers from allied Finland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, in addition to tens of thousands of foreigners within the German Army.  While German forces advanced on a 2,000-kilometer front, their allies held some 1,200 kilometers of frontline for them, allowing them to concentrate on encirclements at Kiev, Briansk, and Viazma.  In 1942, as German forces continued to deteriorate through attrition, further allied forces were mobilized and fielded together with additional foreign volunteers, allowing for the German advance on Stalingrad and the Caucasus.  Finally, after the destruction of the German Sixth Army around Stalingrad, it was with the aid of foreign helpers that the Wehrmacht continued to put up a fight for as long as it did.  And, of course, not to forget the help that local populations and foreign volunteers offered in the rear-areas that were routinely contested by partisan forces throughout Eastern Europe.  Over 3 million allies and volunteers went through the ranks of the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS throughout the Second World War, helping Germany wage a war of genocide (which many foreigners also participated in).  For all those who keep wondering how it was possible that Germany could fight for so long against the combined might of the USSR, Britain, and America, this book in part details a very important factor that contributed to German success and is often overlooked.






Thursday, April 4, 2013

The Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin's Russia by Orlando Figes


Orlando Figes is a well known name in the historical community.  He's also a popular historian whose books sell.  To write a book as dense and factually rich as 'The Whisperers' requires decades, and as Figes himself explains, the original idea came about some three decades ago. Figes also gained support and help from numerous colleagues, friends, and volunteers who helped him interview victims of the purges and the GULag as well as obtained archival information to supplement those interviews and help understand the context of what happened to these victims from beginning to end.  Twice this book was supposed to have been published in Russian but was rejected both times.  The second rejection, the more pertinent to any review of this book, was a result of accusations against Figes due to the numerous issues that were brought up by the Memorial society (which helped Figes with research as well).  A few western scholars have also accused Figes of sloppy research and translation errors but he has consistently defended himself (feel free to google the issue(s)).  In some ways this is inevitable since trying to write a book for some three decades can result in sloppy research and, unfortunately for Figes, his previous actions (writing negative reviews of books by other historians on amazon under a pseudonym) combined with accusations of plagiarism (which he was found innocent of) should make all readers approach his texts with some caution.

When it comes to the subject matter of 'The Whisperers', even without mentioning all of the above, at best this book would earn only some four stars out of five.  This book is for those who want to understand what life was like for that percentage of the population that suffered at the hands of Stalin and his regime, and continued to suffer (whether purely in their mind after all that they had been through, or in reality as a result of their 'sordid' past in eyes of employers, friends, and family) in the post-Stalin period.  The immediate problem here is that this is not a full representation of 'Private Life in Stalin's Russia' because it only represents those who were arrested, tortured, and suffered in prisons or camps (including their close relatives and sometimes friends).  For all of those who suffered under such conditions there were many more who did not, and they are almost wholly left out of this monograph.  Imagine for a moment a history of the United States based purely around men and women who were falsely accused of crimes, beaten by police officers and jailers, and suffered years of abuse and humiliation in the prison system.  Upon realization that they were innocent, apparently someone in the system had lied or made a mistake, they are released to the outside world but instead of enjoying life they are immediately relegated to the dregs of society.  Throughout this entire process, not only did these innocent men and women suffer the humiliation of a trial and time in prison, after their release they consistently fail to find employment due to the stigma of their time in prison or receive fair compensation for the years they were forced to waste and suffer through.  Can this be a fair representation of everyday life in the United States?  For some, maybe even many, most definitely, but it certainly would not apply to the majority.  Keeping in mind that the Soviet Union operated on totally different parameters than the US, the above comparison is purely cosmetic and made to showcase the limited use of 'The Whisperers' in fully understanding what life was like in the Soviet Union.

From the point of view of history, 'The Whisperers' contains no new conclusions or analysis about the Soviet system.  While dense and filled with interesting factoids, this text does little in terms of contributing to a better understanding of Stalin's reign or the period immediately following when the GULag prison population slowly began to filter back into cities and towns.  These topics have been previously covered and in greater detail and depth.  At best 'The Whisperers' is a good, although flawed, introduction to aspects of what life was like in the Soviet Union and during Stalin's reign for those caught up in the infamous purge trials of the 1930s.





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