Monday, April 18, 2016

With Paulus at Stalingrad by Wilhelm Adam and Otto Ruhle

This text by Wilhelm Adam is a bit of a mixed bag.  There is no doubt it was written with a bias that precluded any real "honest" commentary on what the author thought of the Red Army, Soviet leadership, or the Soviet Union in general.  Criticisms that are to be found are rather tame and platitudes toward both the Soviet state and people come in waves toward the end.  Similarly it becomes readily evident that Adam's thoughts on Paulus are that of an admirer, which means criticisms (where they are evident) are also somewhat mild.  But simultaneously, we in the West have few histories of Stalingrad from inside of the Sixth Army's command staff, which makes this text in some ways still a useful look at the Sixth Army's march toward Stalingrad, the ensuing fighting for the city and their eventual surrender.

The actual fighting for the city receives less attention than I thought it would, but since Adam is constantly at Paulus's side and he's at Sixth Army headquarters, or the headquarters of corps/divisions, that's partly understandable.  The real interesting commentary here is more so about the Sixth Army's initial attempts to deal with the Soviet Kharkov offensive in the spring of 1942 and the actions of Paulus after the Sixth Army is surrounded in Stalingrad.  Here we see that initially the German lunge toward Stalingrad was not a sure thing, nor was the Soviet defeat around Kharkov a foregone conclusion.  There were numerous issues that the Wehrmacht in general had to deal with in order to achieve a victory against Timoshenko's forces and there is reason to believe a victory might have been achievable by the Red Army if proper reconnaissance, better command and control, and more forces were allocated to the offensive.  Although, after the numerous offensives undertaken by the Red Army in the wake of the Moscow Counter-offensive, the lunge against the Sixth Army was still a risky move that did not pay off.

The actual fighting for the city showcased the consistent casualties that German forces suffered as units slowly melted away in urban fighting and Red Army forces continued to desperately cling to every building and meter of ground they could get their hands on.  Adam regularly mentions the growing front-line and the reliance on allied formations (Romanian, Italian, Hungarian) in helping to hold the front.  With the eventual Soviet offensive to encircle the Sixth Army, the reader is offered an intimate look at the decision making process within the Sixth Army as Adam, initially caught outside the encirclement, flies into the city and continues to serve at Paulus's side.  Here the usual lament by many is that Paulus should have immediately broken out, such an argument is easily made with the aid of hindsight.  It took days for the encirclement to close around the Sixth Army, at which point units needed to be reorganized to meet the new threat to every front of the Sixth Army.  With Paulus trying to orient himself and figure out what the Army High Command's plans were for the Sixth Army and Army Group B, time began to be wasted.  Everyone vacillated as Army Group Don was created and Manstein was given the job of breaking through to the Sixth Army.  With this hope and the continued belief that the Luftwaffe would supply the troops with enough supplies, Paulus continued to believe that the Sixth Army would not be forsaken (and on more occasion Adam is critical of Paulus's inability to make decisions and assume responsibility).  One division that attempted to ignore orders and withdrew to eventually attempt a breakout was destroyed by Red Army forces, it was simply too late to make a concentrated effort, at least for forces caught outside the city of Stalingrad itself.  Thus, Paulus had a hard time orienting himself between Manstein, Hitler, and others and could not himself make up his mind, deciding to simply follow orders as otherwise it would set a poor example for other commanders (or so Adam tells us this was part of his reasoning).  Considering Manstein could have also taken the initiative to give Paulus the order to breakout, solely blaming the commander of the Sixth Army seems too simple.  The real problem is that Paulus had no idea what Manstein was planning or capable of and neither did Manstein know the exact situation the Sixth Army was experiencing.  Everyone had their own ideas and unfortunately a lack of initiative meant everyone stayed the course as best they could.

Eventually, with the destruction of the Sixth Army Adam is taken prisoner and slowly converts to a "Soviet" or "socialist" point of view with respect to the war.  The latter parts of the book discuss his time in prison camps and the various generals and officers he encounters, who joins the "Soviet cause" and who opposes it, etc., rather less interesting than the rest of the book.  Thus, overall this text offers an interesting and intimate, although somewhat biased, look at the Sixth Army's attempt to capture Stalingrad and the eventual defeat suffered by German forces.

Wednesday, February 17, 2016

Inferno in Chechnya: The Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings by Brian Glyn Williams

Brian Glyn Williams offers an in-depth and engaging account of Chechen history via their regular need to fight those attempting to subdue them and control their land. The accounts begin with Russian incursions into Chechen territories, the opposition raised and its inevitable defeat by a force that can readily engage in prolonged attacks and sieges and can rely on a large pool of manpower against the infinitely smaller number of Chechens and their allies who can, at best, take to the mountains and continue a form of guerrilla warfare that leans on ambushes. This resistance continues in the face of the Russian Revolution and eventually during the Second World War, for numerous reasons, the Chechen people are accused of collaboration and, along with other minorities in and around the Caucasus, are deported wholesale to Central Asia, where tens of thousands die and suffer for the next decade until in the 1950s Khrushchev's administration allows their return (although in truth Khrushchev had little say in the matter as many simply took their belongings and returned home). Then, the eventual break up of the Soviet Union leads to this minor internal Russian region to demand independence and take up the fight against Russian forces when they resist any such move (fearing a domino effect could ensue). After losing too many troops the Russians begin to negotiate with a variety of Chechen personalities and eventually a very precarious calm settles on the region only to be interrupted by a series of bombings within Russia and a renewal of hostilities against Chechnya.

All of the above is what the majority of this text covers, the Boston bombings are given a chapter, the last, and to be honest that chapter is somewhat the least interesting (not the author's fault). The strengths of this book are that you have an academic with a wide knowledge of both the Chechen people and territory and their place within the history of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation today. Furthermore, he makes a good case for why Chechens and their struggle against Russia should not be conflated with Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. At the same time there are some weaknesses readily evident within the pages of this text. First off, there is a distinct bias toward the Chechen side. In part it's understandable but it also translates to at times an omission of the Russian side and at other times a distinct impression that Russians can do no right. The Russian/Soviet side is not represented to the same degree as the Chechens and it also appears that not enough condemnation is being offered for some of the more drastic actions taken by Chechen fighters. Just because they might treat hostages well doesn't mean they're not guilty of perpetrating terrorist acts against civilians. Overall, this is an excellent but at times biased introduction to the history of Chechen resistance and its evolution, especially in the post-Cold War period. It really shows how complex the situation is in and around the Middle East/Central Asia and how we need to have a grasp on the situation there to figure out how best to fight terrorism (international and regional) and avoid creating a worse situation than already exists.

Friday, December 18, 2015

Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler's Invasion of Stalin's Soviet Empire by Frank Ellis

Frank Ellis is something of a conundrum.  His first book, “The Damned and the Dead: The Eastern Front through the Eyes of the Soviet and Russian Novelists,” was an interesting and insightful look at how Soviet literati treated the war years in their works while simultaneously keeping in mind the censorship of the Soviet state.  When it came to Ellis’s analysis of the war itself, there was simply too much lacking in his examination, including his interest in Viktor Suvorov’s thesis, which once more makes an appearance in this volume (Ellis refers to Suvorov as a “talented maverick” (xxvii)).  While I have in my possession the author’s book on Stalingrad I have yet to go through all of it and so cannot comment on its contents, but hope to do so soon. 

This newest work, “Barbarossa 1941: Reframing Hitler’s Invasion of Stalin’s Soviet Empire” makes me question the author’s intentions and knowledge.  This is without a doubt the worst volume of the three that he has put out on the Eastern Front.  What it seems Ellis enjoys doing is utilizing his knowledge of Russian and German and then nitpicking from archival/primary source material that has been around for decades but is not readily available to the average Western reader.  Examining and scrutinizing primary source material is welcome when it comes to the Eastern Front.  Unfortunately, authors who do so need to have a firm grounding and grasp of both the primary and secondary literature that is available on the topic, something Ellis is drastically lacking in and it shows again and again.  What he does is simply pick out material that interests him, throw in woefully inadequate commentary to make greater generalizations out of, and then move on to the next topic without a real transition or thread to tie them all together unless it’s simply the umbrella of “Barbarossa,” “Stalingrad” or “The Eastern Front.”

The current volume on “Barbarossa” consists of the following chapters - here I will discuss the positive and negative aspects of each and give some analysis of their worth.  The introduction already prepared me for disappointment.  In many ways this chapter (and a few other sections of this text in general) read like a bad version of Timothy Snyder’s “Bloodlands,” which has numerous issues of its own.  The author presents varied flawed arguments and draws wholly flawed conclusions from them.  For instance, the best Ellis can do is portray Hitler as somehow following in Lenin’s footsteps when it came to his genocidal ambitions while fully omitting any and all German precedents (see Fritz Stern’s “The Politics of Cultural Despair”).  This is most readily evident when Ellis traces how Germans forced Jews to wear armbands or badges to identify themselves in public to “the same psychological terror tactic advocated by Lenin as early as 1918” somehow forgetting that Jews having to distinguish themselves from others predates Lenin by a few centuries (xix).  This type of lazy research is evident in the first chapter as well when the best that Ellis can do is trace everything to WWI/Soviet/Russian precedents (59).

The first chapter discusses the “conception, planning, and execution” of Operation Barbarossa.  Ellis has an outdated view of Blitzkrieg, arguing that Germany’s success before the invasion of the Soviet Union can all be attributed to this innovative form of warfare (see “The Blitzkrieg Legend” by Karl-Heinz Frieser for a recent analysis of Blitzkrieg and why German propaganda, along with the allies, has misrepresented German victories in the lead up to the invasion of the Soviet Union).  This first chapter is supported by a limited source base, in many ways a useless introduction to the topic that relies on outdated concepts and sources like Manstein to answer questions that recent research has been done on and can analyze with greater authority than an outdated self-serving memoir.  Another weakness is the analysis offered of Soviet theorists (Frunze, Triandafillov, and Isserson) which is missing any mention of Svechin (See Harrison’s “The Russian Way of War” for a detailed discussion of this highly important and influential figure). 

Close to the end of the first chapter Ellis already sets up his premise for the next chapter, which deals with Germany’s Commissar Order.  He portrays all commissars as being guilty of “Terror” within the Soviet state.  And here we come to probably the most disappointing and inept chapter of this entire volume.  It’s hard to understand exactly what Ellis is trying to accomplish.  He claims he is not taking anything away from the nature of the National Socialist system yet he continually tries to diminish their responsibility when it comes to the Commissar Order and justify its inclusion within the greater parameters of the nature of the conflict on the Eastern Front.  He compares this order with Soviet actions at Katyn (84) but in general the arguments he utilizes are at best fallacious.  German thoughts on the internal actions and developments within the Soviet Union should have no bearing on the rules of warfare.  Furthermore, there is no real attempt to analyze who was a commissar or how they came to occupy this position within the Red Army.  All agency is taken away from party functionaries, they are only characterized as robots fulfilling genocidal orders and representatives of the Soviet regime.  Worse is the comparison Ellis then makes between the NKVD and commissars, claiming one is the same as the other.  Here this entire chapter and argument unravel since if the German state feared the actions of representatives of the Soviet state then the Commissar Order should have also included the NKVD or simply all representatives of the Soviet state within the Red Army and Soviet society in general.  But it did not.  The entire chapter is marred by lack of research, generalizations and assumptions that are the mark of an amateur rather than historian.

The third chapter traces the diplomatic relationship between Germany and the Soviet Union from the non-aggression pact of 1939 to the outbreak of war in June 1941.  Not surprisingly, Ellis once again is lacking in the source material he utilizes.  Worse is that he takes the word of figures such as von Ribbentrop at face value without any analysis or contextualization.  Ellis presents an untenable argument for the start of the war claiming, similar to Suvorov, that Germany “cannot be held solely responsible for starting World War II.”  He misinterprets the language of the secret protocols, lacks any type of documentation or primary research when it comes to what was happening in those 17 days when the Soviets did not invade Poland and in the end presents nothing new or original about the topic.

The next chapter deals with Soviet intelligence assessments of German military intentions from 1939-1941.  For this chapter Ellis mainly utilizes the two volumes “Year 1941” that were released decades ago and have been utilized by numerous authors and historians since.  What amazed me first and foremost is that Ellis did not even bother to use “What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa” by David Murphy.  Although Murphy has some issues with his work, it is simply a must read for those trying to understand the intelligence situation within the Soviet Union on the eve of the war.  Once more there is nothing new or original here, in fact Ellis now takes Soviet intelligence reports about German troops, aircraft, etc., at face value without any type of analysis.  He presents a few intelligence summaries without putting them into context, including military intelligence in terms of German units being moved to the East but he never addresses the German disinformation campaign, the numerous contradictory reports that were coming in, or how often dates came and went of Germany’s supposed invasion and what that could do to an agent’s credibility.  While readers will themselves see the various dates offered for when Germany will invade you will not see Ellis contextualizing this information.  Murphy’s text is a better alternative in every way.  (Later in the text Ellis claims Sorge reported the correct date of the German invasion, he did not.)

The fifth chapter deals with “NKVD Operations During Barbarossa, 1941-1942” and is mainly composed of reports from another multi-volume Russian publication on Security Organs that was published over a decade ago.  There are some interesting reports here and as primary source material it can be a very useful source base but, as previously mentioned, Ellis takes the reports at face value without looking at the other side so that what you’re getting here is, at best, Soviet impressions, rumors, etc., which do not add much to our overall understanding of the period or events in question.
Chapter six might look interesting, but it is not.  A diary from a 20th Panzer Division veteran could be useful in understanding the German invasion and advance into the Soviet Union up until the winter counteroffensive, but overall it’s a rather dry read.  I enjoy memoir/diary literature for the most part, but this was one of the most boring I’ve come across.  Here I probably know why no one has published it previously, it wouldn’t sell.

Chapter seven looks at Soviet literature on the German invasion and 1941 in general.  Here Ellis is probably in familiar territory with literary analysis, some of it interesting some less so.  Once more, however, it doesn’t alter our understanding of either Barbarossa, the Red Army or the Soviet Union.
Finally, the eight chapter looks at Suvorov’s thesis on who started the Second World War from his infamous text “Icebreaker.”  First, a few issues I have with this chapter.  Ellis once more goes along with the idea that the non-aggression pact meant war was a guarantee, it did not.  Secondly, Ellis does not provide any of his own evidence and readily falls for Suvorov’s ideas which were made from hindsight rather than research and analysis.  Thirdly, Ellis claims Suvorov used “primary source material,” if he means memoirs then he is right, although somehow he readily forgets the amount of censorship that always accompanied any literature on the war.  If he means primary source material from archives, then he is wrong.  I will give credit where it is due – Ellis addresses numerous claims made by Suvorov and shows how they never support Suvorov’s foundational assertion that Stalin was preempted.  That’s all fine and good.  Unfortunately, he once again takes a source at its word without doing any research beyond the superficial.  I will offer only one example of the duplicity Suvorov’s text is full of and the laziness Ellis exhibits within this entire volume.  On pg. 436 Ellis quotes Suvorov who is quoting S. Ivanov’s book on the “Beginning Period of the War.”  Ellis quotes Suvorov as saying Ivanov claimed “that Germany acted before Stalin could do so.”  Why couldn’t Ellis simply go to the original source and cite Ivanov’s book?  Here is what Suvorov quotes Ivanov as saying: “As General Ivanov put it, 'The Nazi command simply succeeded in forestalling our troops in the two weeks preceding the outbreak of war.' (General of the Army S. P. Ivanov, Nachal'nyi Period Voiny, Moscow 1974, p. 212).”  On the surface it seems that Ivanov is saying Soviet troops were preparing an outbreak of their own war, i.e. preparing to start a war against Germany.  Since I have Ivanov’s book in my collection, I looked up the quote and found that Ivanov was actually commenting on how German troops on the border were able to complete their deployment and pre-empt Soviet troops coming from the interior, who were recently called up to bolster the Western Military Districts in case of war breaking out, in their deployment.  As such German troops “thereby creat[ed] favorable conditions for the seizure of the strategic initiative in the beginning of the war.”  The only reason ‘two weeks’ are mentioned by Ivanov is because that was when Soviet forces in the interior were told to begin moving to the border regions.  Suvorov quotes out of context and makes it seem as if Ivanov is claiming that Hitler pre-empted a Red Army attack when in fact he is saying no such thing – something Ellis could have readily understood if he did the necessary research.

In the end I found this book almost completely useless.  

I am amazed, shocked, and utterly horrified that a university press would produce such a complete embarrassment to historical literature.  

Saturday, September 19, 2015

Britain's Two World Wars against Germany: Myth, Memory and the Distortions of Hindsight by Brian Bond

Brian Bond's 'Britain's Two World Wars against Germany' is a slim volume that offers a somewhat in-depth look at the continued myths that cloud our history and memory of both World Wars when it comes to British efforts.  The Second World War is regularly viewed as the 'good' war with acceptable casualties and brilliant commanders while the First World War is too often seen as the 'donkeys' leading the 'lions' to slaughter.  Bond convincingly points out that the Battle of the Somme, more specifically the first day of the Somme, has continued to influence our views and perceptions of the First World War when in fact so many other encounters with the enemy occurred that resulted in victories and, more importantly in some ways, taking the war in its entirety shows the progression of military art among the British that eventually led to the defeat of the Germans on the Western Front.  While casualties were certainly much greater in WWI than WWII that's partly because of the limited time the British spent on the ground fighting the axis powers in large numbers, compared to the regular encounters on the Western Front of the First World War. While many mistakes were made by generals in the First World War they certainly learned from their errors and continued to improve, in part by incorporating new technology and more of it.  All the military arms in the First World War grew by tremendous numbers (tank, air force, artillery, etc.) and combined arms operations helped pave the way to victory, while the Second World War featured a Britain that defied the Germans but had to continually rely on more powerful allies (the USSR and America) to undertake the brunt of the struggle in defeating Nazi Germany.  Some of the campaigns undertaken by the British and the allies in the Second World War actually proved more costly when viewed by casualties per day statistics than battles in the First World War.  Even though this is a volume that relies on secondary sources its quite a good fit in today's 'memory wars' that are continually going on in regards to the Second World War and the First World War considering the centenary celebrations.  But it also becomes quickly apparent that much research remains to be done to do justice to both World Wars in order to separate myths from reality and fact from fiction.

Tuesday, September 15, 2015

The Battle of Moscow 1941-1942: The Red Army's Defensive Operations and Counter-offensive Along the Moscow Strategic Direction Translated and Edited by Richard W. Harrison

The Soviet General Staff's study "The Battle of Moscow, 1941-1942" is in some ways essential reading.  For those familiar with David Glantz's operational histories, much of this study reads similarly.  There is no real narrative for the German side and the Stalinist narrative of the war that was crafted during the war itself is very much evident throughout the pages of this text.  That is really, for this reader, the most important aspect of this volume.  This is a glimpse into a historical document that shows what was allowed to be said and written about during Stalin's time in power, even in a confidential General Staff Study, and what had to go unmentioned.

There are some frank admissions made throughout in regards to Red Army weaknesses, both for the rank-and-file and in terms of commanding officers, which would undoubtedly be absent from any literature that was released on the war during Stalin's lifetime for the general public.  But, for the most part, what you have here are pages of descriptions of defensive operations in the lead up to the Red Army's Moscow Counteroffensive, usually described under the umbrella term "active defense," and the ensuing counterattacks along the Moscow direction by a few fronts and the armies under their command.  Attention is also paid to logistics, party work among soldiers, and some of the heroic acts performed by Red Army soldiers.  Stalin's name is featured here more than any other, as would be expected in some respects, with the likes of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, Dovator, Belov, and a few others making a rare appearance.

There are numerous tables offered for the sake of reference and some of them are quite eye opening, especially when it comes to the number of troops in divisions.  There are a few mentions of the losses sustained by Red Army forces but numerous instances of German losses, which are undoubtedly inflated.  Whether they were inflated by the authors of the study or the primary reports they were based off of is a separate question.  Finally, I have often believed that Red Army forces operating on the Moscow direction were capable of inflicting a greater defeat on the Wehrmacht that what actually occurred in the winter of 1941/1942.  In part I am still of that mindset but, in reading this volume and following the numerous maps and information included, I am also more aware of the difficulties Red Army forces encountered and the limits they were up against.  In some ways this is a very important work but one that speaks more to its limits as a document created under Stalin than an analysis of the Battle of Moscow.

Tuesday, September 1, 2015

The New Tsar: The Rise and Reign of Vladimir Putin by Steven Lee Myers

"The New Tsar" is a good account of Putin's "Rise" and "Reign."  Steven Lee Myers is a journalist and in many ways it shows throughout the text that what you're reading are almost extended journalistic pieces of famous events/personalities that made headlines in their time rather than in-depth historical coverage.  Some of the topics covered in one or two chapters (Beslan, Kursk, Chechnia, Yukos affair, etc.) have entire volumes dedicated to them by historians and scholars that often do more justice to them than the space provided for here.  Nonetheless, what Myers does well is congest a lot of information into a readable account, pretty much what journalists are paid to do.  The majority of the text leans from unbiased to somewhat biased (against Russia/Putin), not that one can fault Myers, Putin and his time in office have witnessed numerous disasters, mysterious deaths, wars, the jailing of prominent members of Russian society, etc.

A more subjective approach, however, I think would have been helpful for western readers to gain a sense of where Putin and the many Russians who support him are coming from - even if their arguments are often laced with familiar propaganda.  There is a lot to learn here for those somewhat familiar with the Russia of the post-Soviet period, those totally unfamiliar might get lost among the many names, places, and events that Myers goes over with, at times, the briefest of descriptions.  Personally, I've long suspected that Putin's Russia is less so guided by ideology than by Geo-politics and economics, which often come into direct conflict with European and American organizations that appear to Russia as encroaching on her "spheres of influence."

Russia often appears to be the epitome of crony capitalism, the revolving door that we're so familiar with in the US (between corporations and political positions) is a given in Putin's administration, except it's more brazen than in the west.  Embezzling, fraud, tax evasion, etc., are all prevalent within the Russian economy, but its fallout is usually much easier to spot than in the US where our economy and GDP dwarf Russia to enough of a degree that billions can be siphoned off and usually forgotten about within a matter of months if not weeks.  It's as if Russia has taken the worst aspects of capitalism that exist in the US and around the world and applied them to the 10th degree.  While some of Putin's early reforms helped raise the average Russian's economic situation in terms of buying power and savings, what has happened after that initial term in the early 2000s has been a policy of attempting to strengthen the state to the detriment of any and all "democratic" institutions that might have existed.  This enriching of friends and focusing power within the hands of a "loyal entourage" means Putin becomes that much more frightened of what will happen once he's out of office.  What he undid after Yeltsin stepped down is undoubtedly in the back of his mind and his losing power seems an impossibility in the near future as his popularity continues permeate much of the Russian population.

Thursday, August 20, 2015

Marshal K.K. Rokossovsky: The Red Army's Gentleman Commander by Boris Sokolov (Author), Stuart Britton (Translator)

Boris Sokolov’s biography of Marshal of the Soviet Union K. K. Rokossovsky is a noble effort to document the life and history of one of the most accomplished Soviet commanders to come out of the Second World War.  The subtitle, “The Red Army’s Gentleman Commander,” serves multiple purposes as it immediately highlights that other Red Army commanders were “ungentlemanly” and it allows Sokolov to pontificate somewhat on a subject he covers in numerous publications – the true losses the Red Army suffered were much higher than those presented in published works.  In general Sokolov’s biography walks a less than fine line between academic study and a polemical work.  He takes a few too many literary licenses when he goes off on tangents here and there that have no place in a historical work but in a general sense this biography is still full of valuable information.   

Sokolov discusses Rokossovsky’s history and youth in the first few chapters and covers his exploits in the Revolutionary/Civil War period.  The most interesting parts of the book are those that cover Rokossovsky’s actions during the Second World War, or the Great Patriotic War.  In part this is not the fault of Sokolov as there is little enough information available on Rokossovsky from his youth (Rokossovsky wanted to write about the Civil War but never had a chance).  The majority of Rokossovsky’s major campaigns are covered by the author: his actions in 1941 and clashes with Zhukov, the Moscow Counteroffensive and his thoughts about what was done correctly and incorrectly, the operations around Stalingrad and Rokossovsky’s role in the destruction of the German Sixth Army, operation Kursk, operation Bagration, the Home Army’s Warsaw Uprising, and the final battles for Germany.   Before continuing I will say that one of the weaknesses of this volume is that while there are many quotes (more so than western readers might be used to) and the author utilizes a range of archival documentation and published archival collections there is a distinct lack of endnotes/footnotes (something the original volume undoubtedly suffers from as well).  Sokolov is in no way making this information up, as I have some of the collections he uses and can verify the information he presents in a few cases, but the problem remains in that this volume becomes problematic as a source.   Furthermore, some of the source material is dated, unfortunately alternatives were/are hard to find.

Coming back to the text itself, the more interesting chapters were those on the Warsaw Uprising and the final battles/actions of the Red Army in Germany.  Here is where Sokolov presents a wide variety of interesting and pertinent material but at the same time goes off on tangents and at times simply makes up statistics.  The Warsaw Uprising is presented well enough with a lot of information provided from a number of eye witnesses (both Polish and Soviet) but primary source material is a bit sparse for the conclusions he makes.  We know that Soviet forces suffered losses trying to reach Warsaw, with the 2nd Tank Army losing close to 1,000 tanks and having to be taken off the line.  Similar attempts to by the 1st Polish Army resulted in losses for a variety of reasons but Sokolov insists on pointing toward Stalin as the cause.  Even though orders were given to take Warsaw that’s not good enough, for Sokolov armies needed to be moved over to Rokossovsky’s front, supplies diverted, other operations cancelled and postponed, all to help the Poles in Warsaw.  From an ethical standpoint, yes, everything should have been done to aid the Warsaw Uprising.  Unfortunately reality dictated otherwise, the Poles were in an unenviable position and acted in their own best interests then relied on Stalin’s apparent good graces and that of the Red Army to support them in taking the capital of Poland to use as a bargaining chip against Stalin.   They were asking for quite a bit from a man and armed forces they held in high contempt.

Finally, the chapter on the Red Army’s actions in Germany at the end of the war there are two arguments Sokolov expands on.  First is the issue of losses in the battle of Berlin.  He argues against the provided figure of 81,116 irrecoverable losses because in that figure are included losses for the two Polish armies that participated in the battle for the city.  Irrecoverable losses for both armies were 2,825.  Sokolov cites an “official” report from the Polish Defense Ministry that lists killed and missing in action as 11,000, almost four times as large a figure.  What he does then is argue that since this figure is a quarter of the number presented by the Russians then all other losses during the Berlin operation should be multiplied by four.  He utilizes the same argument in other places and I’m simply unconvinced.  I appreciate coming across new information and presenting it (I appreciate it more if it includes a citation) but an extrapolation based on limited evidence is unacceptable for a historian or an academic publication.  A similar argument is utilized when discussing the Red Army’s progress through Germany and Eastern Europe in terms of atrocities and rapes.  There’s no doubt that Red Army soldiers, as well as soldiers from national contingents serving within the Red Army (Poles among them), committed atrocities against the Germans, including wholesale plunder, murder, and rape.  Similar actions were committed when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union, the allies invaded Western Europe, or the Japanese invaded China.  But to paint an entire armed forces with such a broad brush is unacceptable, at least in my opinion.  In terms of degrees it might very well be that the Red Army’s occupation proved that much more detrimental than that of the allies, unfortunately qualifying some of the actions of Red Army soldiers will prove impossible.  What Sokolov does well enough is present a variety of eye witness accounts to some of the actions that happened on the ground, but he offers little to nothing as explanation for why these criminal actions happened.  Recently Filip Slaveski, in his “The Soviet Occupation of Germany,” offered an enlightening look at the Soviet occupation of Germany including the crimes committed.  Sokolov aimed for emotions, Slaveski offers that and an attempt to explain what happened along with why. 

As much as I appreciate Sokolov’s efforts, there are quite a few weaknesses here that make this far from a definitive study of either Rokossovsky’s life or his actions within the confines of the Second World War.  In part this is a result of many archives still being closed off to research within the Russian Federation but I would also argue that Russian academic standards are still somewhat lacking when compared to their Western equivalents.  Furthermore, while there are some excellent historians within Russia they are still working within a state that continues to view its present as a reflection of past accomplishments and shies away from attempts to take a closer look at its history for fear that a crack in the foundation will unravel a collection of myths better kept under a Potemkin village fa├žade.