When writing on the German advance toward Moscow, too often it appears authors/historians take it for granted that the Germans achieved as much as they did. The campaign of 1941 was far from a walk in the park, even counting all the success the Wehrmacht enjoyed. What has yet to be shown and emphasized is the state of the Wehrmacht in those critical weeks and months leading up to and through operation Typhoon. Further, the ensuing Soviet counter-offensive is known in a general sense to have been a defeat for the Wehrmacht, but the reality of what the Soviets accomplished and, more so, had the ability to accomplish, has long been omitted from the historical record. While this book does not present an operational, or strategic, picture as well as it presents the tactical view of the soldiers and lower level officers, it nonetheless serves as an exceptionally well documented narrative of the lead up to the Moscow counter-offensive and the counter-offensive itself. Reading what soldiers and civilians were thinking, seeing, and doing does much to create a rich contextual portrait, for both sides, of what these men and women were able to overcome, or at times succumbed to, in those winter months of 1941/1942.
Jones makes interesting observations as to how both German soldiers and officers began to believe in their own propaganda. Having been driven into their heads that "Blitzkrieg" was a winnable strategy, and seeing for themselves the achievements of their armed forces during the past two years, the evidence of a false sense of superiority is readily evident in the diaries and documents the author quotes from. Within a matter of months the reader can see the change in the Werhmacht's attitude. No longer are they seeing themselves in Moscow within a few days time, or picturing a Soviet defeat within a matter of weeks; now they are simply struggling to survive and continuously question the now ridiculous notion that the war is soon coming to an end, and in Germany, according to the newspapers, has already come to an end. Poignant are Jones's observations of how the Soviet and German high command viewed the situation on the ground. As Stalin gave way to his commander's and their decisions, putting Zhukov in charge of Moscow's defense, Hitler, to the contrary, roused and exhorted his commanders to push toward Moscow. While many field commanders were aware of the condition their forces were in, to those in Berlin/Moscow, unrealistic orders were regularly issued and all too often obeyed. By the end of the counter-offensive we see a switch again, with Model being given room to operate by Hitler and Stalin now exhorting his generals to continue offensive operations when Red Army troops were spent and well past their supply lines.
Thus one of the main strength's of this narrative is the ease with which the reader can track the changing mentalities on both sides. The taste of defeat on the lips of Soviet soldiers and commanders as the are forced to an agonizing duty of retreat after retreat (for all intents and purposes, if the title of this text was simply "The Retreat" it would serve the dual purpose of applying to both the Red Army and the Wehrmacht) to the dramatic shift as Soviet forces begin to make their stand on the outskirts of Moscow in November and early December, slowly grinding down the German Blitzkrieg machine. On the other side, we see the enthusiastic German soldier marching toward another assured, it seems, victory in the East. Soon this mood of triumphalism turns to depression and exhaustion as the Soviet countryside continues to swallow German units into its expanses and spit out new Red Army formations to oppose a tiring Wehrmacht. This is followed by the initial shock of a Soviet counter-offensive and surprise on side of the Soviets at their initial success. The eventual German deterioration is epitomized by General Heinrici, "Now the Grim Reaper mercilessly raises his sickle over our battle lines. Each day he cuts down more and more of our men. Soon it will all be over." (246) And, as fate would have it, on the same day Stalin gave orders to take the 1st Shock Army off the line and transferred it to the army reserve. Simultaneously, with Model being put in charge of the 9th Army, two Soviet armies found themselves encircled. While initial German achievements gave them a false sense of superiority, the Soviets were experiencing something quite similar. As they witnessed German forces retreating along the entire front, they were urged on by Stalin and their generals to an ever increasing speed, all the while forgetting to give them adequate preparation, support, and supplies. Thus a perfect storm for the Germans was avoided, instead, the Red Army began to suffer a series of defeats anew. Defeats which eventually set the stage for the catastrophe at Kharkov before German operation Blau took the Sixth Army to the gates of Stalingrad.
Understandably, there are a few weaknesses within this book. A lack of maps makes tracking unit movements very hard, unless you have an atlas handy. Jones discusses the German campaigns against France and Poland as utilizing Blitzkrieg. Personally, I am in agreement with authors like Karl-heinz Frieser, who believe that the only real Blitzkrieg used by the Wehrmacht was against the Soviet Union during Operation Barbarossa. Quite a bit of emphasis is placed on "Siberian divisions" saving the day outside Moscow, in reality those divisions were ordered to the west in September and October, long before Moscow was in danger. Lastly, I noticed one specific editing mistake, Stepan Mikoyan is spelled as "Stephan" throughout the text. Aside from the aforementioned, this book was hard to put down, another excellent addition to Eastern Front literature by Michael Jones.
Friday, January 1, 2010
To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War by Rebecca Manley
Professor Manley has created a well researched and written narrative of the evacuations which took place in the Soviet Union during 1941 and, to a lesser extent, 1942. Building on Peter Gatrell's "A Whole Empire Walking", the author discusses the space created within the Soviet Union for evacuees/refugees with the German invasion of the USSR. Early plans for evacuation of factories, workers, party personnel, and others were discussed and debated during the 1920s and early to mid 1930s. They seem to have reached a climax in 1937, when a new draft was proposed and remained in limbo without being outright rejected or passed as guidelines by which the state would interact with future evacuees. Unfortunately, to some degree this is a reflection of the purges the Red Army underwent. Ideas about "War of Attrition" became taboo and a Blitzkrieg style form of warfare, known as "war of destruction", came to dominate strategic and operational thought. "War of destruction" influenced Soviet thinking and was reflected in the idea that any war launched against the Soviet state would be met with a quick counterattack and taken to the "enemy's soil" with little loss of Red Army blood. With such ideas, there was little need for evacuation of either factories, workers, or party personnel. Nevertheless, some discussion still existed and was renewed weeks before June 22, 1941.
While evacuations of peoples was nothing new to Russia/Soviet Union, the many complexities that came out of the events in 1941 created a new paradigm through which "evacuees" were judged; those who left too early could be accused of spreading panic, those too late, collaborators and traitors. A limited space came into existence during which evacuations were viewed as permissible by both the state and civilian population. The author has done a great deal of research and weaves personnel accounts with archival documentation to present a mosaic of what higher officials were considering and dealing with, and what evacuees went through on their journey to Tashkent. The description of the evacuation itself begins with civilians who did not want to leave and those who could not find a way of attaining the needed permission to evacuate with their families, followed by discussions of how long these refugees waited at stations for their trains, the journeys themselves, which could take up to a month, how they were received them at their destinations, how they lived and tried to survive in Tashkent, and finally, how they tried to return home. Although the narrative is limited to evacuees from major cities such as Odessa, Moscow, and Leningrad and to the destination of Tashkent, there is little reason to believe other experiences differed drastically from those presented here. My grandfather was evacuated from the city of Kherson in Ukraine to Central Asia and underwent much of the same experiences described here, including being separated from his family and eventually being united with them again.
The experiences recounted here make for depressing reading. Families separated by enemy bombardments of their stations or individual trains, thievery was a common occurrence as was lost luggage and valuables throughout the journey and even at final destinations. Arriving in Tashkent meant an immediate search for shelter, food, and work; otherwise, there was little chance of remaining in the city or surviving. Networks and connections counted for much of how people were able to get by. Through relatives, friends, and friends of friends evacuees in Tashkent were able to attain a place to live, vouchers for food, and jobs so as to remain with their loved ones and/or friends. And through all of this a war was still going on. Too often while reading this text one can easily forget the heightened threat this nation faced. Even so, authorities in Moscow and throughout Uzbekistan tried to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees from the west.
In the end, there is clearly a dearth of literature on the evacuations that took place throughout the first year(s) of war. The suffering, deprivation, and tragedy of the time can hardly be captured for a 100%, but this book is an auspicious beginning and deserving of a five star rating. I can only hope that others will take to this topic and try to present an even more encompassing narrative of the evacuation efforts the government of the Soviet Union undertook and the obstacles evacuees/refugees faced as they struggled with the idea of leaving everything they knew to head for an unknown destination in the East. There are still countless stories to be related about the obstacles these men, women, children, and the elderly faced on their journeys and their perseverance in the face of danger, both from the enemy and their own bureaucracy. An excellent addition to both Soviet and Eastern Front literature.
While evacuations of peoples was nothing new to Russia/Soviet Union, the many complexities that came out of the events in 1941 created a new paradigm through which "evacuees" were judged; those who left too early could be accused of spreading panic, those too late, collaborators and traitors. A limited space came into existence during which evacuations were viewed as permissible by both the state and civilian population. The author has done a great deal of research and weaves personnel accounts with archival documentation to present a mosaic of what higher officials were considering and dealing with, and what evacuees went through on their journey to Tashkent. The description of the evacuation itself begins with civilians who did not want to leave and those who could not find a way of attaining the needed permission to evacuate with their families, followed by discussions of how long these refugees waited at stations for their trains, the journeys themselves, which could take up to a month, how they were received them at their destinations, how they lived and tried to survive in Tashkent, and finally, how they tried to return home. Although the narrative is limited to evacuees from major cities such as Odessa, Moscow, and Leningrad and to the destination of Tashkent, there is little reason to believe other experiences differed drastically from those presented here. My grandfather was evacuated from the city of Kherson in Ukraine to Central Asia and underwent much of the same experiences described here, including being separated from his family and eventually being united with them again.
The experiences recounted here make for depressing reading. Families separated by enemy bombardments of their stations or individual trains, thievery was a common occurrence as was lost luggage and valuables throughout the journey and even at final destinations. Arriving in Tashkent meant an immediate search for shelter, food, and work; otherwise, there was little chance of remaining in the city or surviving. Networks and connections counted for much of how people were able to get by. Through relatives, friends, and friends of friends evacuees in Tashkent were able to attain a place to live, vouchers for food, and jobs so as to remain with their loved ones and/or friends. And through all of this a war was still going on. Too often while reading this text one can easily forget the heightened threat this nation faced. Even so, authorities in Moscow and throughout Uzbekistan tried to accommodate hundreds of thousands of refugees from the west.
In the end, there is clearly a dearth of literature on the evacuations that took place throughout the first year(s) of war. The suffering, deprivation, and tragedy of the time can hardly be captured for a 100%, but this book is an auspicious beginning and deserving of a five star rating. I can only hope that others will take to this topic and try to present an even more encompassing narrative of the evacuation efforts the government of the Soviet Union undertook and the obstacles evacuees/refugees faced as they struggled with the idea of leaving everything they knew to head for an unknown destination in the East. There are still countless stories to be related about the obstacles these men, women, children, and the elderly faced on their journeys and their perseverance in the face of danger, both from the enemy and their own bureaucracy. An excellent addition to both Soviet and Eastern Front literature.
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