Continuing revelations about Russian interference in
American and European elections have become routine, almost banal. Timothy Snyder, a historian who achieved some
popularity after his previous publications (Bloodlands and Black Earth), leaves
history (although not altogether) with this latest volume and enters our
current political discourse. Historians
are usually wary of entering into debates about current events. However, when our present administration
regularly attempts to rewrite and adjust history to fit its needs, historians should
and ought to help penetrate the fog of baseless opinions that has begun to
consume and displace civil discourse and the foundations of civil society.
“The Road to Unfreedom” serves as an important starting
point for readers who want a more comprehensive understanding of the political
intersection between Russia, Europe, and the United States since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. As this text
focuses on recent events, the diligence historians usually bring to subjects
they are investigating is not always present.
News and media publications – making up a large portion of the source
material – make mistakes. Archival
access is limited or nonexistent for recent government actions and operations,
and Snyder himself admits that he is still processing the underlining ideas and
theories he posits for readers. Although
Snyder received mixed reviews, from historians, for his last two major
publications, he is nonetheless an excellent researcher and writer. Thus, while not the final word on the
numerous topics he covers, this is a volume that readers who want a better
understanding of what has been happening for the past few years in the US and
the past few decades in Russia need to read carefully.
The volume’s theoretical foundations rely on Snyder’s
discussion and concentration on the writings of Ivan Ilyin, a little known
personality until Putin’s rise to power.
Ilyin, a philosopher and Slavophile who lived through the First and
Second World War, struggled to determine Russia’s place in the world and to
explain the Russian Revolution. He
sought a middle ground, or a third option, between totalitarian dictatorships
and democracy. Nikita Mikhalkov helped
introduce Ilyin to Putin, who in turn incorporated Ilyin’s thoughts into his
own ideas about Russia’s place in the world while shaping his administration. This leads to Snyder’s ideas about the two
types of politics that we now live under: the politics of inevitability and
eternity. For Snyder, the politics of inevitability
apply primarily to the United States in the shadow of the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
The idea is that democratic and capitalist progress is inevitable, no
matter what you do, the course is still there and will invariably be followed
because others will pick up the slack or help steer the ship of state in the predetermined
direction of democratic progress. The
politics of inevitability relies on the peaceful process of succession and
transition of power. If a president or
prime minister performs poorly, citizens know that eventually they can vote out
an existing administration and a new one can take its place to right previous
wrongs. The politics of eternity,
however, are what Snyder classifies Russia’s current administration as, a state
kept in eternal crisis with the outside world. Most recent examples include the frozen
conflicts in Transnistria, Georgia, and now Ukraine (regularly characterized as
“fascist” to tie into Russian memories of the Second World War), and the
“cultural conflict” against homosexuality that Putin’s administration
consistently emphasizes when it comes to Europe and the United States.
Although these two categories offer a Manichean view of the
current state of politics, they are still useful for understanding what is at
stake and they help explain, at least in part, Russian actions both at home and
abroad. Putin and Russia have evolved
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, this is one of Snyder’s weaknesses in that he hardly discusses
the numerous decisions made by the United States in the 1990s that negatively affected
Russians and their views of America, NATO, and the European Union. Snyder offers little to no analysis of
Russia’s attitude toward NATO, how Putin perceived the decision to include the
Baltics and other East European states into NATO, or how Russians propagandized
the decision to become a regular talking point against the US. Nor is there any mention of the numerous
economic crises suffered by Russians throughout the 1990s and 2000s, including
how they altered Russian perceptions of capitalism and democracy, including
their representative institutions. This
also raises a more inherent weakness of the entire volume in that Snyder
constantly emphasizes Russian agency to the detriment of Europe and the US, who
are portrayed more often than not reacting to Russian actions – in effect
giving too much credit to Russia and exaggerating her strengths and
weaknesses. This is a strategy Putin himself
utilizes on a regular basis as he simultaneously portrays Russia as a power
that still matters – both in the near abroad and in world affairs – but one
that hardly has the power to influence an election in the US.
As Snyder explains, living in a country that relies on the
politics of eternity means consistently manufacturing crises, including what
happened a decade ago with the Russian invasion of Georgia. Although Russia was not the direct instigator
of the conflict, it created another opportunity to portray Russia as under
attack from both forces on the border and those “sponsoring” Georgia,
inevitably the West. Ukraine became
another victim of opportunity after the Sochi Olympics. Putin did not necessarily plan to annex
Crimea or begin a frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine. However, he used the opportunity to employ
WWII era rhetoric, initially insisting on the need to protect Russian citizens
in the “near abroad” (those located in Ukrainian territory) while portraying
the post-Yanukovych government as fascist – thus an enemy of Russia and Russian
citizens in general. Russian actions in
Ukraine laid bare the extremes of Russian propaganda at home and abroad, and
this is the topic that Snyder does so much to bring to the forefront and
analyze for the benefit of his readers. Moreover,
here is where we can begin to trace Russian interference in our 2016 election.
Following Ilyin’s philosophy, Snyder describes how Putin’s
administration portrays Russia as an innocent victim vulnerable to the fascist
tendencies of those surrounding her, who themselves were regularly victims of
western conspiracies. Thus perceived
notions of western interference in the color revolutions and in Russian
protests against Putin at home provided ready fodder for Russian propaganda
outlets. Moreover, this resulted in
Putin’s hatred of Hillary Clinton (who was Secretary of State in 2012, when
some of the largest demonstrations took place in Russia). Originally, propaganda meant emphasizing the
perceived good of an idea or event and an omission of anything that might look
bad (in the US we call this PR). Today’s
propaganda coming out of Russia is quite post-modern in its disregard for a
single “truth” and use of “whataboutism” to divert attention from indefensible
positions. The truth or facts do not
matter for Russian propaganda. Be it
with respect to Russian forces showing up in Crimea, or the shooting down of
MH17, Russian sources began producing numerous narratives for why “little green
men” were suddenly showing up in Crimea or, in the case of MH17, who or what was
responsible for bringing down the plane.
No matter the evidence, media outlets presented new versions, new
sources, and new theories in order to muddle the conversation and steer it away
from the truth. The result was an
inevitable degradation of informed discourse and the idea that one conspiracy
theory is just as good as another or is just as good as the truth and only your
emotional needs at any given point in time will decide what you choose to
believe. Snyder fears that feelings will
displace logical explanations, theories that reinforce pre-existing beliefs
will replace factual evidence with the result that intellectual discourse will
breakdown and help usher in an “unfree” state that relies on the politics of
eternity rather than inevitability. Truth
ceases to matter in a fractured society that moves from one manufactured crisis
to another, kept in eternal fear of the other.
This, in essence, is what we have recently witnessed occur throughout America. For Putin, turning the US into another
version of Russia is part of the endgame.
Showing that US “democracy” at its core is no more factual, truthful, or
representative of its citizens than Russia’s current government, means America
carries no greater credibility on the world stage than its Russian counterpart
does. Today, there is no doubt that our
current administration had regular contact with Russians – before, during, and
after the election – and that Trump’s business has been sustained on money
funneled through shell corporations and off-shore accounts as Russian oligarchs
and mobsters laundered untold millions through questionable real estate ventures. Trump’s business acumen relies on his either
being too dumb to realize what was happening, or simply not caring because he
was in debt for billions, and all his “genius” business ventures failed.
Recently, Russian cyberattacks have surpassed interference
in the US election process. Russian bots
and trolls on the internet will inevitably exploit any events that occur in
America (NFL players kneeling during the anthem, Black Lives Matter, 2nd
amendment, etc.) to fan the flames of anger, resentment, bitterness, and hostility
in order to continue the degradation of our most valued institutions. Russian meddling does not have to be
sophisticated nor does it need to create conspiracy theories; they use and
exploit those that already exist to steer us away from conversations we need to
engage in and they rely on obfuscation to continue showing the US in the worst
possible light. In truth, America’s
political climate cannot be solely blamed on Russian cyberattacks; the US has a
host of problems and issues that it needs to address aside from Russian
interference. Snyder discusses some of them,
including the rising level of inequality, the death of local news,
gerrymandering, and the Citizens United ruling that allowed corporations and
those with enough money to buy political influence. These problems are creating fertile territory
for racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and xenophobia to become
battlegrounds for Russian internet trolls or serve as talking points for
political pundits paid for being nothing more than a mouthpiece on behalf of
special interest groups.
We have no way of knowing to what extent Ilyin’s philosophy
has influenced Putin (although Putin has referenced him in speeches) or what
effect Snyder’s ideas around the “politics of inevitability” and “eternity”
will have on our society. Nor do we know
the full impact or extent of Russia’s interference in our electoral process,
aside from the fact that it worked in tandem with the Trump campaign’s general
rhetoric against Democrats and aimed at specific segments of the American
population. What we do know is that Putin’s
administration has attempted to export its ideology throughout the world by
employing a type of cyber warfare.
Trolls regularly attempt to reduce the value of facts and the truth so
that societal development is stalled because a conversation without an agreed
upon factual foundation will never lead to solutions, only an endless cycle of arguments
that rely on entrenched positions and talking points both sides have previously
perfected and will continually employ. Without
an ability to make progress on issues that continue to divide our society, we
will transition to a politics of eternity, reduced to a never-ending
existential crisis, as we reinforce our fears instead of confronting them.
2 comments:
It's a little odd that critiques of Russia always read like descriptions of the US.
PS my name is Keith Crosby.
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